ORDER K.C. Agarwal, J. - This is a landlords writ petition filed against the judgment of the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Kanpur dated December 2, 1975 dismissing an appeal filed by the landlord under Section 22 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 2. The dispute relates to portion of house No. 108/113 situated in Mohalla Rambagh, district Kanpur. There were two portions in this house. One of them had been let out to respondent No. 3 for the purposes of a factory. The remaining portion was in occupation of the petitioners. An application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act was filed by the landlord for release of the portion let out to respondent No. 3 on the ground that the same was required by the petitioners for their occupation. The petitioners alleged that there were a number of family members including a son who had also become an engineer and that a proper and suitable accommodation was needed for the family. The application was resisted by respondent No. 3. The Prescribed Authority held that the need of the petitioners was not genuine and rejected the same. In appeal taken by the petitioners to the appellate court, the judgment of the prescribed authority was upheld. Feeling aggrieved, the landlords have filed the present writ petition. 3. It is true, as emphasised by Sri S. P. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the learned District Judge committed mistakes in giving the details of accommodation in possession of the petitioners, but the mistakes, committed by the appellate court, were of a trivial nature and they did not affect the judgment given by him. After perusal of the evidence the court below found, with which I agree, that the petitioner had sufficient accommodation at his disposal and that he did not require further accommodation for their residence. 4. Another question decided against the petitioners was about the hardship. On a comparison, the learned District Judge found that respondent No. 3 was likely to suffer greater hardship from the grant of the prayer made in the application under Section 21 (1) (a). In the portion of the house which had been let out to respondent No. 3, the said respondent had set up a manufacturing plant and that they were manufacturing biscuit dyes. In the portion of the house which had been let out to respondent No. 3, the said respondent had set up a manufacturing plant and that they were manufacturing biscuit dyes. It has come in evidence that the respondent No. 3 was likely to suffer, if he was asked to shift his business from the premises in dispute to some other place. This again is a question of fact. 5. It is true and was rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appellate court wrongly observed that R. 16 has to be strictly complied with. In fact, the expression 'strictly used in the judgment is incapable of conveying any meaning. A combined reading of the (iv) proviso to sub-sec. (1) of Section 21 and R. 16 of the Rules, framed under the Act, would indicate that the law only requires the authorities to have regard to the various factors mentioned in the Rule. The expression having regard to cannot be given a meaning which the learned District Judge intended to impute to it. The use of the expression shows that an authority is only required to have regard to those factors. It means attention to circumstances in balancing consideration for grant. Whether there has been a proper balancing is more appropriately a subject of appeal. It is not open to review by the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Weighing the circumstances is an appellate function and not supervisory. A grievance that due and proper regard had not been paid, does not give rise to an issue which may be justifiably raised in a writ petition. But since the interpretation made of R. 16 (1) does not affect the merits of the case this matter need not be dilated upon any further. 6. For these reasons the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs to respondent No. 3.