ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition is directed against the judgment of District Judge, Basti, dated 23-12-76, in Misc. Ceiling Appeal No. 844 of 1975 - Sakseria Inter College v. State of U. P. 2. The present writ petition arises out of proceedings under Section 14 (3) of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (prior to amendment of 1976). It is noteworthy that the disputed plots were shown as surplus area of one Jaidev Shukla (opp. party No. 2 in the writ petition). The petitioner had filed an objection on 15-12-63 under Section 14 (3) of the Ceiling Act. The petitioner had alleged that the aforesaid Jaidev Shukla had no concern with the disputed plots and the petitioners were Sirdars of the same. The prescribed authority through its order dated 16-5-64 had observed that the land may be settled with the petitioner. Thereafter some other persons also filed objection against the order dated 16-5-64 which was dismissed on 8-3-65. It has been alleged that thereafter the disputed plots were settled with the petitioners. In a proceeding under Section 10 (2) of the Ceiling Act against the petitioner it was decided that there was no surplus area with the petitioner as is evident from the order dated 17-3-75. In the meantime the aforesaid Jaidev Shukla moved an application on 12-5-72 for vacating the order dated 16-5-64 whereby the disputed plots were to be -settled with the petitioner. To similar effect the State also filed an application on 3-10-73 that the order dated 16-5-64 should be vacated. The prescribed authority through its order dated 30-10-75 set aside the earlier order dated 16-5-64 and thereafter abated the proceedings under Section 14 (3) of the Ceiling Act started at the instance of the petitioner. In appeal, the same order was confirmed through the impugned judgment dated 23-12-76. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 23-12-76 the petitioner has come to this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the ceiling authorities have acted illegally in abating the proceeding under Section 14 (3) of the Ceiling Act in the circumstances of the present case. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 23-12-76 the petitioner has come to this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the ceiling authorities have acted illegally in abating the proceeding under Section 14 (3) of the Ceiling Act in the circumstances of the present case. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the proceeding pending before the relevant authority was only for setting aside the order passed on the application of the 4 petitioner under Section 14 (3) of the Act. In this view of the matter the learned counsel for the petitioner emphasizes that only proceeding for setting' aside the order dated 16-5-64 should have been abated. 4. Secondly, he has contended that at the instance of the State the order dated 17-3-75 was passed whereby it had been held that the petitioner had no surplus area, hence the proceeding at the instance of the State should not have been allowed to vacate the order dated 16-5-64. 5. Thirdly, he has contended that the order dated 16-5-64 was passed as back as the year 1964 and the application for vacating the aforesaid order was moved nearly about 8 years thereafter, the same should have been dismissed. 6. Lastly, he has contended that the application which purported to be under Section 14 of the aforesaid Ceiling Act was really under Section 11 of the aforesaid Ceiling Act, hence it should not have been abated. 7. The learned counsel for the State has tried to refute the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and he has submitted that the orders passed by the ceiling authorities in the circumstances of the present case are eminently just orders and in accordance with law hence the same should not be interfered with. 8. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. I do not agree with the contention of the petitioner that the only proceedings for vacating the order dated 16-5-64 should -have been abated by the ceiling authorities. 8. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. I do not agree with the contention of the petitioner that the only proceedings for vacating the order dated 16-5-64 should -have been abated by the ceiling authorities. In my opinion if the order dated 16-5-64 was passed behind the back of the tenure-holder Jaidev Shukla, the order was rightly vacated by the prescribed authority and in that event the application under ,S. 14 (3) of the Act filed by the petitioner came up for consideration and it was rightly abated by the prescribed authority through its impugned judgment dated 31-10-75. 9. As regards the petitioners contention that the order dated 17-3-75 has become final, it is sufficient to say that the order dated 17-3-75 was not passed in the presence of the alleged tenure-holder Jaidev Shukla. When the disputed plots were held as the property of Jaidev Shukla, any order passed in his absence would not be final between the parties. The dispute in this case is not only between the State and the petitioner, but the real dispute is amongst the petitioner, the original tenure-holder Jaidev Shukla and the State. In this view of the matter I think that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the order dated 17-3-75 ,is final cannot be accepted. 10. As regards the petitioners contention that the order dated 16-5-64 should not have been vacated as the application for vacating the same was moved near about 8 years thereafter, it is noteworthy that the petitioner had not impleaded the original tenure-holder Jaidev Shukla and had obtained the order dated 16-5-64 behind his back and in this view of the matter if the prayer of Jaidev Shukla was accepted, the petitioner cannot make any legitimate grievance on the ground of delay. When the petitioner had not made Jaidev Shukla party in the proceeding nor the prescribed authority had given notice to the tenure-holder concerned in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 (4) of the aforesaid Ceiling Act, the petitioner cannot be permitted to urge that the prescribed authority acted illegally in vacating its earlier order dated 16-5-64. It is well known that if a mistake has been committed by a tribunal it can set it right at any time and there does not. arise any question of delay. 11. It is well known that if a mistake has been committed by a tribunal it can set it right at any time and there does not. arise any question of delay. 11. As regards the petitioners claim that his application giving rise to the present writ petition should be treated as an objection under Section 11 of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, it is sufficient to say that the petitioner had not taken this stand before the ceiling authorities at any point of time. The perusal of the application filed on behalf of the petitioner indicates that it was under Section 14 (3) of the aforesaid Ceiling Act. The application under Section 14 (3) of the Act was rightly abated by the ceiling authorities in the present case as is evident from the ruling reported in 1978 All LJ 717, Dilbagh Singh v. State. Hence, I find that there is no error apparent on the face of the record in the impugned judgments. However, it is made clear that if the petitioner wants to agitate about his right in the disputed plots he can file proper objection under Section 11 (2) of the aforesaid Act with an application for condoning the delay which would be considered by the ceiling authorities in the light of the ruling mentioned supra. 12. For the reasons given above, the writ petition lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed but I make no order as to costs.