JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C.J. - On March 15, 1977, the State Government issued a notification declaring its intention to regulate the sale and purchase of agricultural produce mentioned in Sch. 'B in the Market Areas mentioned in Sch. A, in partial modification of earlier notifications mentioned in Column 4 of Sch. 'A. It invited objections in respect of the proposed declaration. Having considered the objections and suggestions received by it, the State Government, on April 11, 1978, issued a notification under Section 8 (1) (a) of the U. P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964, declaring that with effect from May 1, 1978, agricultural produce mentioned in Schedule B shall be included in the list of specified agricultural produce of Market Areas mentioned in Sch. A. Sch. A covered 250 Market Areas in various districts of this State. Sch. B referred to nearly 100 different commodities. 2. The petitioners in the large group of writ petitions have challenged the validity of the aforesaid notification. 2-A. The validity of the notification has been questioned on the following grounds: (1) The notification is ultra vires Sections 5, 6 and 8 of the Act. In the alternative, Sections 5, 6 and 8 of the Act are violative of Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. (2) The notification violates the guarantee under Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. (3) The notification violates Art, 301 of the Constitution. (4) The notification was invalid, as there was no application of mind to the relevant and material factors. (5) The licence fee and the market fee leviable under the Act is ultra vires; it is, in substance, a tax. (6) Commodities like wood, bamboo, hides and skins, dairy products, ghee, zeera, tobacco, tendu leaves, Rab, Bhusa, rice, etc. are not covered by the Act, and 60 the notification in relation thereto is ultra vires. 3. Most of these points have been, during the course of the years, urged before this Court in earlier rounds of writ petitions and have been rejected. 4. In relation to the first point, that the notification is ultra vires Sections 5, 6 and 8, learned counsel submitted that the U. P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam was enacted to protect the producer of agricultural produce in relation to commercial crops cultivated and produced by him. 4. In relation to the first point, that the notification is ultra vires Sections 5, 6 and 8, learned counsel submitted that the U. P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam was enacted to protect the producer of agricultural produce in relation to commercial crops cultivated and produced by him. This object and purpose of the Act implies that the State Government is confined to notifying only such commercial crops as are cultivated or produced in the Market Area to be liable to regulation in that particular Market Area. Crops which are either not commercial crops or are not produced in the Market Area cannot be notified for that Market Area. 5. In support, reference was made to the Statement of Objects and Reasons as well as to several provisions of the Act. It was stressed that the Act was intended to apply to the producer who sells. It was inapplicable to middle-men, commission agents, importers of agricultural produce from outside the State or from other Market Areas. 6. The express provisions of the Act are not restricted to either commercial crops or to crops grown in the particular Market Area. They also contemplate regulation of trade between trader and trader. Section 17 (iii) (b) provides for levy of market fee. Cl. (3) thereof says that the market fee shall he payable if the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader, the trader selling the produce may realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee. This is an express provision regulating transactions between trader and trader no matter he be a wholesaler, commission agent, importer or any other kind of trader. 7. In State of West Bengal v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1241 it was held that the Statement of Objects and Reasons can be used for the limited purpose of understanding the background and the antecedents of the state of affairs leading up to the legislation. It cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of the statute, or as an aid to the construction of the enactment. It cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of the statute, or as an aid to the construction of the enactment. A statute as passed by the Parliament is the expression of the collective intention of the legislature as a whole, and any statement made by an individual, albeit a Minister, of the intention and objects of the Act cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used in the statute. 8. In that case the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Act contained the crucial words "because the Central Government does not intend to acquire the proprietary rights vested in the States.................." and "without affecting State Governments rights as owners". But the substantive provisions of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act (XX of 1957) did seek to acquire the ownership rights of the State Government in the coal bearing lands. As already observed, the clear statement in the Statement of Objects and Reasons was ignored, because of the] express provisions of the Act. 9. Similar views were expressed by the Supreme Court in the State of Haryana v. Chanan Mai AIR 1976 SC 1654 (para 31). 10. In the Krishi Utpadan Adhiniyam though one of the objects emphasised the pitiable plight of the agricultural producer, and it was stated that the Act was being enacted to remedy the situation of the agricultural producer, yet these ideas cannot be used to ignore the express provisions of the Act, which make it applicable to persons other than producers but who carry on business in the specified agricultural produce in the market area. 11. This argument was raised and repelled in a group of Writ Petitions, in which the leading case was Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 8184 of 1973 (U.P. Oil Millers Association v. State of U. P., decided on 29t.h April, 1977) : (1977 Tax LR NOC 68) (All). 12. In that case a Division Bench repelled this submission relying on the following observations of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Bhai v. State of Gujarat AIR 1962 SC 1517 (Para 20): "Next it is urged that the provisions in the Act also affect transactions between traders, and also affect produce not grown within the market area if it is sold in the market area. That is undoubtedly so. That is undoubtedly so. But if control has to be effective in the interest of the agricultural producer such incidental control of produce grown outside the market area and brought into the market yard for sale is necessary as otherwise the provisions of the Act would be evaded by alleging that the particular produce sold in the market yard was not grown in the market area. For the same reasons transactions between traders and traders have to be controlled, if the control in the interest of agricultural producers and the general public has to be effective. We are, therefore, of opinion that the Act and the Rules and Bye-laws thereunder cannot be struck down on this ground." 13. In the aforesaid group of writ petitions the Bench further rejected the submission that only such commodities which are produced or grown within the limits of the Market Area can be notified for that Market Area. Their Lordships held - "A perusal of Sections 5, 6 and 17 (iii) (b) of the Act makes it clear that the emphasis is only on the specified agricultural produce and the place where the transaction of purchase and sale takes place. The place where a particular commodity is produced has not been given any relevance. In our opinion if the commodity in respect of which sale and purchase takes place constitutes specified agricultural produce and the transaction of sale takes place in the area as contemplated in Section 17 (iii) (b) market fee becomes recoverable from the purchaser at the rates specified". 14. The petitioners counsel have clutched on the passing observation by the Supreme Court in Arunachala Nadar v. State of Madras AIR 1959 SC 300 (para 7) to submit that the Act applies only to commercial crops grown in a Market Area. 15. In that case the preamble recited that it is expedient to provide for the better regulation of the buying and selling of commercial crops in the Presidency of Madras. In the U. P. Act even the preamble does not refer to "commercial" crops. 16. The Act applies to agricultural produce, which, according to the definition in Section 2 (a) means such items of produce of agriculture, horticulture, viticulture, apiculture, sericulture, pisciculture, animal husbandry or forest as are specified in the Schedule. The agricultural produce, regulation whereof was sought by the Act, were those mentioned in the Schedule. 16. The Act applies to agricultural produce, which, according to the definition in Section 2 (a) means such items of produce of agriculture, horticulture, viticulture, apiculture, sericulture, pisciculture, animal husbandry or forest as are specified in the Schedule. The agricultural produce, regulation whereof was sought by the Act, were those mentioned in the Schedule. The Schedule mentions 14 kinds of cereals, 14 kinds of legumes, 10 varieties of oilseeds, 7 of fibres, 1 of narcotics, 8 kinds of spices, all types of grass and fodder and Bhusa, 15 commodities under the head "Miscellaneous", 39 varieties of vegetables, 39 varieties of fruits, 15 products of animal husbandry and 6 forest products, besides grapes, honey, wax, silk and fish. The preamble to the Act states - "An Act to provide for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment, superintendence, and control of markets therefor in Ultar Pradesh". In its terms the Act is not confined to sale and purchase by the producer. The emphasis is on regulation of agricultural produce. 17. The argument that the Act is confined to transactions of sale and purchase in which the producer is involved was also repelled in a group of Writ Petitions led by Writ Petn. No. 1846 of 1968 (Musaddi Lal Madho Lal v. State of U.P., decided on 25th Sept. 1969) (All). It was held in those cases that the ambit of the Act is not confined merely to the sale by the producers, but covers the entire activity of sale and purchase of agricultural produce in the markets. The wide language of Section 10 cannot be cut down by importing the supposed objective of the Act. 18. It was urged that under Section 11 the provisions of the Act, other than Sections 9 (2) and 10, apply to the whole or any part of the market area outside the principal market yard and sub-market yard only with effect from the date of the notification applying Sections 9 (2) and 10 to such market areas. No such notification has been issued by the State Government. Consequently the remaining provisions of the Act, including Section 17, which authorises the levy and collection of market fee, cannot apply to market areas outside the market yard or sub-market yard. 19. We are unable to accept this submission. No such notification has been issued by the State Government. Consequently the remaining provisions of the Act, including Section 17, which authorises the levy and collection of market fee, cannot apply to market areas outside the market yard or sub-market yard. 19. We are unable to accept this submission. Section 17 (iii) (b), of its own force, entitles the market committee to levy and collect fees in the entire market area. This section is not dependant for its application to the entire market area, on Section 11. When this provision expressly makes itself operate in the entire market area, the general provision in Section 11 that the remaining provisions will apply on the issue of the notification will have to be read so as to exclude Section 17 (iii) (b), 'There is hence no conflict between the (two provisions. 20. At this place we may also deal with the question that several commodities, like Katha, wood, ghee, hides and skins etc. are not agricultural produce within meaning of the Act. 21. The term "agricultural produce" has been defined by Section 2 (a) as follows: "(a) 'agricultural produce means such items of produce of agriculture, horticulture, viticulture, apiculture, sericulture pisciculture, animal husbandry, or forest as are specified in the Schedule, and includes admixture of two or more of such items, and also includes any such item in processed form, and further includes gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery." 22. The definition does not leave the decision as to what is agricultural produce either to the executive Government or to the courts. The legislature itself has indicated the agricultural produce which are meant to be regulated by the Act. This is clear from the phrase "as are specified in the Schedule" occurring after the statement that agricultural produce means such items of produce of agriculture, horticulture etc. By the Schedule the legislature specifies the commodities which, according to it, axe agricultural produce, being either the produce of agriculture or forest etc. The argument that in its true scientific sense, or even in the commercial parlance a particular [commodity, though specified in the Schedule, is not an agricultural produce is not open for judicial scrutiny. 23. A similar submission was repelled in the group of writ petitions led by Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 8184 of 1973 : (1977 Tax LR NOC 68 (All)) (supra). 23. A similar submission was repelled in the group of writ petitions led by Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 8184 of 1973 : (1977 Tax LR NOC 68 (All)) (supra). The Division Bench, which decided that case, relied upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in M/s. Raunaq Ram Tara Chand v. State of Punjab AIR 1975 SC 1587 (at p. 1590) - "The appellants also contend that since gur and shakkar are manufactured products they cannot come under the definition of agricultural produce within the meaning of Section 2 (a) of the Act. Section 2 (a) defines agricultural produce to mean "all produce whether processed or not, of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry or forest as specified in the schedule to this Act which mentions 85 items of commodities". The Supreme Court proceeded - "These are statutorily agricultural produce under Section 2 (a). It is not possible to entertain the argument that the Court will undertake a judicial scrutiny of these items in order to come to a conclusion whether these are agricultural produce or not. In view of the definition in Section 2 (a) such an enquiry is out of place. In this context we may note that under Section 38 the State Government may by notification add to the schedule any other item of agricultural produce or amend or omit any such specified item. It is because of this power to add to the schedule items of agricultural produce that the first part of the definition under Section 2 (a) gives guidance as to what agricultural produce means. The submissions are, therefore, devoid of substance." 24. In the present case section 4-A confers power on the State Government to add to, amend or omit any of the items of agricultural produce specified in the Schedule, and thereupon the Schedule shall stand amended accordingly, The extended definition has been given in order to afford guidance to the State Government while amending the Schedule. Up-till now the State Government has not exercised the power conferred by Section 4-A and has not amended or modified the Schedule to the Act. The previous decisions of this Court as well as the Supreme Court completely demolish the argument based upon over-fine niceties of technology etc. Katha, wood, timber. hides and skins, ghee etc. are commodities which are statutorily agricultural produce. The previous decisions of this Court as well as the Supreme Court completely demolish the argument based upon over-fine niceties of technology etc. Katha, wood, timber. hides and skins, ghee etc. are commodities which are statutorily agricultural produce. The producers and traders in any of the specified commodities are' within the purview of the Act. 25. The submission that rice and ginned cotton were not agricultural produce was repelled in the group of Writ Petitions led by Writ Petn. No. 1846 of, 1968 (All) (supra). 26. In Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 5213 of 1972 (M/s. Girraj Kishore Chandra Pal v. State of U. P., decided on 15th Oct. 1973) (All) it was held that ghee is an agricultural produce for the purposes of this Act. 27. In Sp. Appeal No. 83 of 1974 (Hindu Muslim Trading Co. v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, decided on 6th Nov. 1974) (All) a Division Bench held that un-manufactured tobacco, though excisable commodity, is also liable to be regulated by this Act. In that decision this Court elaborately went into the Excise Rules and held that there was no conflict between the operation of the Excise Rules and the provisions of the present Act. 28. Similarly, in Nisar Ahmad v. State (Writ Petn. No. 11668 of 1975, decided on 9-11-1976) (All), a Division Bench repelled the submission that dealers in tobacco are (not) within the purview of this Act. The traders who carry on the business of manufacture, sale and storage etc. [of tobacco were held to be governed by the provisions of the Act. They were bound to obtain a licence before they could validly carry on their business. 29. We are in respectful agreement with these decisions, and, therefore, we do not consider it necessary to elaborately deal with the various aspects of the same argument which has been reiterated before us. 30. Similarly, Tendu leaves, which are specifically mentioned under the heading "Forest produce" are liable to be governed by the Act. The various submissions besed on the rules and the Excise Act are liable to be rejected on the same grounds as relate to tobacco. 31. In relation to Biri, it was urged that it is manufactured from tobacco and Tendu leaves. Our attention was invited to the definitions of the word "manufacture" occurring in Central Excises and Salt Act and in the Factories Act. 31. In relation to Biri, it was urged that it is manufactured from tobacco and Tendu leaves. Our attention was invited to the definitions of the word "manufacture" occurring in Central Excises and Salt Act and in the Factories Act. Those definitions have been given for the purposes of those Acts. In the present Act the definition of "agricultural produce" includes not only the items specified in the Schedule but also admixture of two or more of such items including any such item in processed form. Biri is made by covering tobacco with Tendu leaves. Both tobacco and Tendu leaves are specified commodities. Biri is nothing else except an admixture of these two commodities. It is clearly within the definition of 'Agricultural produce. 32. A good deal of stress was laid by more than one counsel on wood obtained from cultivated forests. It was argued that the definition refers to produce of forests, which means self-grown forests, otherwise the definition would have included produce of silviculture. 33. The argument has no substance, and is liable to be rejected on the grounds on which it has been rejected in earlier decisions. The commodities mentioned in the Schedule are statutorily agricultural produce. The first part of the definition of agricultural produce has been given only to provide guidance to the State Government if it acts under Section 4-A to amend the Schedule. When the Schedule mentions wood, which is a generic term, its ambit cannot be cut down by technical arguments. Firewood, timber etc. obtained from whatever source whether forests, or groves, or orchards, or plantations or bamboo, are wood and so within the Act. In this view the submission that the word "forest" should be read as coloured by the preceding terms, like agriculture, horticulture, viticulture etc. is of no avail in courts. Such a submission may be beneficial if and when the State Government thinks of amending the Schedule. 34. The term "producer" has been defined by cl. In this view the submission that the word "forest" should be read as coloured by the preceding terms, like agriculture, horticulture, viticulture etc. is of no avail in courts. Such a submission may be beneficial if and when the State Government thinks of amending the Schedule. 34. The term "producer" has been defined by cl. (p) of Section 2 - "(p) 'producer means a person who, whether by himself or through hired labour, produces, rears or catches, any agricultural produce, not being a producer who also works as a trader, broker or Dalai, commission agent or Arhatiya or who is otherwise ordinarily engaged in the business of storage of agricultural produce: Provided that if a question arises as to whether any person is a producer or not for the purposes of this Act, the decision of the Director, made after an enquiry, conducted in such manner as may be prescribed, shall be final;" 35. R. 131 deals with disputes regarding a person being a producer. In some of the petitions a question has been raised that Rab Galawat and Rab Salawat are not Rab: they are molasses. Molasses are not a specified commodity in the Schedule of the Act. Therefore, dealers in them are not producers of agricultural produce and are hence not liable to be regulated under the Act. 36. We do not desire to enter into this controversy at this stage. The question whether a person is producer of agriculture produce is liable to be decided by the Director. The petitioners can approach the Director, who will, no doubt make a proper enquiry and decide the question in relation to these petitioners. 37. Learned counsel appearing for certain cold storage owners argued that they do not conduct any transaction of sale or purchase; they only store potato in their cold storages on payment of storage charges, and they are hence not liable to be regulated by the Act. 38. Section 9 applies to every person, who, within the Market Area, sets up, establishes any place for the sale - purchase, storage, weighment or processing of the specified agricultural produce. It requires every such person to take a licence. Cold storage owners undoubtedly store as well as weigh potato. They cannot hence carry on such business within the Market Area without obtaining a licence. 39. In Writ Petn. No. 3784 of 1976, (M/s. Hayatullah Mohd. It requires every such person to take a licence. Cold storage owners undoubtedly store as well as weigh potato. They cannot hence carry on such business within the Market Area without obtaining a licence. 39. In Writ Petn. No. 3784 of 1976, (M/s. Hayatullah Mohd. v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, decided on 31st Jan. 1977) (All) a Division Bench repelled the claim of potato dealers to be outside the purview of the Act. 40. In some cases the petitioners are furniture makers or saw-millers. They say that they only manufacture furniture and sell them. They do not sell wood as such. The saw-millers case is that they saw logs of wood into smaller pieces and charge for the labour. They are hence outside the Act. 41. The furniture dealers purchase wood. They are hence liable to take a licence for, inter alia, storing wood. They would be liable to pay market fee on the transaction of sale or purchase of wood by them. We did not hear learned counsel to say that they are being asked to pay market fee on the turnover of sale of furniture. 42. In relation to saw-millers, the facts are disputed. The respondents urged that the saw-millers purchase logs of wood and sell the same after sawing them into smaller planks. No relief can be granted on the basis of disputed facts. The respondents do not seek to levy market fee on saw-millers on purely such transactions in which they neither purchase nor sell but only do the labour of sawing the logs into smaller planks. 43. We are hence satisfied that none of the petitioners who trade or deal in the commodities specified in the notification can be said to be outside the regulatory provisions of the Act. 44. The next ground of attack was on the power to levy market fee. It was stressed that no service was being rendered, and, in the alternative, the rendering of service was confined to the market yard. The market fee cannot be charged more than once, namely, if a commodity has borne market fee in one market area, and then it is taken for sale in another market area, no market fee can be charged in the second market area. 45. The market fee cannot be charged more than once, namely, if a commodity has borne market fee in one market area, and then it is taken for sale in another market area, no market fee can be charged in the second market area. 45. Levy of market fee under this Act has been upheld by this Court more than once, in inter alia, previous decisions of this Court mentioned above. The attack on the validity of the licence fee was dealt with and repelled in the group of writ petitions led by Writ Petn. No. 1846 of 1968 (All) (supra). The levy of market fee was upheld in Spl. Appeal No. 280 of 1972 (M/s. Mangali Prasad Kamta Prasad v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, decided on 23rd Nov. 1972): (reported in 1973 Tax LR 2372) (All), which was followed in Writ Petn. No. 5213 of 1972 (M/s. Girraj Kishore Chandra Pal v. State of U. P.) (All) (supra). 46. The matter has been dealt with at length in M/s. Mangli Prasad Kamta Prasad (supra). In that case the learned Judges considered virtually all the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court, and applying the principles deducible from them upheld the levy of market fee. They observed that a fee can be levied and collected for services intended to be rendered. The authority may commence rendering the services after the fee has been recovered and not before. The services are to be rendered to the traders in general and not to individual trades or individual traders. The essential thing is that there should be a nexus between the levy and the purpose for which it is utilised. 47. It was stressed, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Salvation Army, AIR 1975 SC 846 that accumulations of income over expenditure must be spent or utilised before any further levy can validly be made. 48. In that case there was a large surplus even after the levy of fee for nearly seventeen years. In that connection the Supreme Court observed that after some time the budget should be balanced. Such situation has not arisen in the present case. The levy and collection of market fee was considerably disturbed by several rounds of litigation in Courts launched by the traders. It is only for the last few years that market fee has been collected. In that connection the Supreme Court observed that after some time the budget should be balanced. Such situation has not arisen in the present case. The levy and collection of market fee was considerably disturbed by several rounds of litigation in Courts launched by the traders. It is only for the last few years that market fee has been collected. The respondents would no doubt keep the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in mind and balance their budget after every ten or fifteen years. The Act makes provision for the framing of budgets by the market committees - vide Section 16 (2) (x). The budget prepared by the committee is to be sent to the State Agricultural Produce Markets Board constituted under Section 26-A. The fee collected by the market committee goes into the market committee fund mentioned in Section 19 of the Act. This provision lays down the various purposes for which the market fee can be utilised. We are, therefore, not impressed that the levy of market fee is invalid on any of the grounds mentioned by learned counsel. 49. By no stretch of imagination can this levy of fee be termed as a tax. 50. The submission that the notification or the provisions of Sections 5, 6, etc. of the Act are violative of Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution has been repelled more than once. The constitutional validity of the Act has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Vishnu Dayal Mahendra Pal v. State of U. P., AIR 1974 SC 1489 . The provisions of the Act are neither so harsh nor so drastic as to constitute unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade. Learned counsel clarified that this submission was based on the earlier submission that the provisions of the Act are applicable only to commercial crops and to transactions of sale by producers thereof. We have already rejected this submission. Neither the provisions of the Act nor of the notification are violative of Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. 51. The submission that the notification dated 11th April, 1978, imposes restrictions on freedom of trade and commerce in violation of Art. 301 of the Constitution has merely to be stated to be rejected. Neither the provisions of the Act nor of the notification are violative of Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. 51. The submission that the notification dated 11th April, 1978, imposes restrictions on freedom of trade and commerce in violation of Art. 301 of the Constitution has merely to be stated to be rejected. It is well-settled that regulatory laws are outside the purview of Art. 301 of the Constitution, (a) Automobile Transport v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1962 SC 1406 ). (b) State of Madras v. Nataraja ( AIR 1969 SC 147 ). The Act, in its terms and in its operation, is merely regulatory of the transaction of sale and purchase in a market area. It does not impede the free flow of trade or commerce in the country. The fact that an importer of commodities from outside [the State has to pay a fee or take out a [licence has nothing to do with the transport of goods. The levy is on the event of storage or sale etc. in the market area. 52. The argument that the notification is invalid because there was no application of mind to the relevant and material factors is equally without substance. In pursuance of the provisions of the Act the State Government invited objections to its intention to include the commodities mentioned in the notification in the market areas mentioned in it. Whatever objections and suggestions were received were considered by the State Government. This is recited in. the impugned notification. It cannot hence be said that the State Government did not apply its mind to the material considerations. 53. It has not been alleged that the commodities mentioned in the notification are not the subject-matter of transactions of sale, purchase etc. in the market area. Even if any particular commodity is not dealt with in a particular market area, the petitioners cannot gain anything. The petitioners are admittedly traders in one or more of the commodities specified in the Schedule, Since they deal in those commodities in the market area, they are liable to take a licence and pay the market fee. They cannot make a grievance that some other commodity not dealt with by them is such as is not subjected to any transaction of sale or purchase etc. in the concerned market area. They cannot make a grievance that some other commodity not dealt with by them is such as is not subjected to any transaction of sale or purchase etc. in the concerned market area. Obviously the petitioners are not hurt by the inclusion of such a commodity in respect of the market area. They cannot be said to be aggrieved persons in relation to such a commodity so as to entitle them to approach this Court for relief. 54. In some of the cases it was urged that the petitioners were industrialists and not agriculturists. They were manufacturing ghee as industrialists. They had their sale centres outside the market area. 55. The fact that a person is an industrialist is of no consequence so long as he deals in a specified commodity. If the sale centres are outside the market area, obviously the market committee can have no control over them. But ghee being a specified commodity, if they deal in it, like producing, storing or selling it within a market area, they would undoubtedly be liable to take the licence under the Act. 56. On behalf of certain forest contractors and paper manufacturers and cold storage owners, it was stressed that they do not sell within the market area They only store wood or paper etc. in their own godowns situate within the market area. Storing within a market area is also within Section 9 of the Act. Such people are liable to take licence before they can validly carry on the business of storing specified commodities within the territory of a market area. 57. All these writ petitions are dismissed with costs.