JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawral, J. - This is a tenants' writ petition filed against the judgment of 111 Add]. District Judge, Meerut, dated 28.4.1978. 2. Smt. Murtaza Begum (respondent No. 2) filed an application under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947) hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947, against the petitioners. The application was granted by the Commissioner on 17.4.1971. The tenants went in revision before the State Government. The revision was rejected by the State Government on 7.2.1972. The permission, thereafter, became final. 3. In pursuance of the aforesaid permission obtained under Section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 3, 1947, the respondent No. 2 filed a suit no. 464 of 1972 in the court of Judge Small Causes, Meerut, for eviction of the petitioners. The suit was contested by the petitioners. It seems that some-time in 1973 the respondent No. 2 filed an application for withdrawal of the suit on the ground that as U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Control and Eviction). Act of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) had been amended, the petitioners would file an application for enforcement of the permission obtained under Section 3 of U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947. The application was taken up by the Court on 24.9.1973, on which date the court found that as the cause of action on which the suit was filed was rendered infructuous, the suit was liable to be dismissed. After the suit was dismissed the respondent No. 2 filed an application under Section 43(2)(rr) of U P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for eviction of the petitioners from the premises in dispute. The application was resisted by the petitioners on the ground that as the suit filed by the respondent No. 2, on the basis of the said permission, had been dismissed, the application filed under Section 43(2)(rr) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not maintainable. 4. The prescribed authority upheld the objection of the petitioners and rejected the application filed by the respondent No. 2 on the ground that since the permission, obtained by the respondent No. 2 obtained under Section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947, had been exhausted, the application filed by the respondent No. 2 was not maintainable. 4. The prescribed authority upheld the objection of the petitioners and rejected the application filed by the respondent No. 2 on the ground that since the permission, obtained by the respondent No. 2 obtained under Section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947, had been exhausted, the application filed by the respondent No. 2 was not maintainable. Against the aforesaid order of the prescribed authority, an appeal was filed by the respondent No. 2. The appeal was allowed by the impugned order dated 28th April, 1978. Aggrieved, the tenants filed the present writ petition. 5. The main controversy that arises for decision in the present case is whether the application filed by the respondent No. 2 under Section 43(2)(rr) of the said Act was not maintainable. The basis of the claim of the petitioners was that as the permission had been utilised by filing of the suit, another proceeding, the basis of the same permission, could not be initiated. It would be noticed that Section 43(2)(rr) was added by U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972, previous to the addition of Section 43(2)(rr) the relevant provision made in U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was in section 43(2)(rr). By the addition of the new provision, the legislature conferred a right on a landlord who hat obtained a permission under the old Act and had filed an application under this provision to get the tenant evicted. This Section 43(2)(rr) was again amended by the U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976. By this amendment, the words- "whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted"- were inserted. The amending Act laid down that the amendment in the aforesaid provision shall be deemed always to have been substituted. Consequently, the amendment was retrospective. 6. In this back-ground, it will be found that Section 43(2)(rr) as it stated in 1973 permitted land-lord to file an application for the enforcement of the permission obtained by him. After the aforesaid provision was amended, the landlord was not required to file a suit to avail a permission. Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the petitioners, however, urged that as on the basis of the permission obtained, suit had already been filed and the same dismissed, it could not form a subject matter of second proceedings. The submission made has no substance. Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the petitioners, however, urged that as on the basis of the permission obtained, suit had already been filed and the same dismissed, it could not form a subject matter of second proceedings. The submission made has no substance. As observed, the suit was not decided on merits but was dismissed on the preliminary ground that, as the cause of action did not sustain, the suit was liable to be dismissed. Although, it is not clear from the order as is what was the precise reason, which led the court to hold that the cause of action had been rendered infructuous. But it appears that, since the respondent No. 2 could file an application under Section 43(2)(rr) for the enforcement of permission, the suit was not decided on merits. That apart, it is undisputable that merits of the case were not examined by the Court. He did not find that the permission obtained by the respondent No. 3 was invalid or illegal. The judgment given, of the dismissal of the suit was, thus, innocuous and was not on merits. Consequently, the same did not have the effect of depriving the right of the respondent no. 2 to take another proceeding for effectuating the permission. 7. In the case of Rameshwar Dayal v. Smt. Mohania, 1963 A.L.J. 1998. the Division Bench dealt with the same aspect and found that :- "Normally, therefore, if permission is once obtained it should ensure till the purpose for which the permission had been obtained is achieved." In Pahlad Das v. Ganga Saran, AIR 1958 Allahabad 774. a Division Bench of this Court took the same view. It found hat as long as the purpose of the permission was not fulfilled, the permission could not exhaust itself. Accordingly, it is clear that a permission does not exhaust simply because the first suit filed on its basis was dismissal on some technical ground. 8. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenants was not justified in arguing that, as earlier suit filed by respondent no. 2 had been dismissed, the present application was not maintainable. 9. It was next contended that the amendment made by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1978 was not retrospective hence, the same did not apply to the facts of the present case. 2 had been dismissed, the present application was not maintainable. 9. It was next contended that the amendment made by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1978 was not retrospective hence, the same did not apply to the facts of the present case. By this amendment, the words "whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant had been instituted" were inserted in Section 43(2)(rr). In the present case, it was not necessary for the respondent no. 2 to rely on the aforesaid amendment, the respondent could file the application even under the old provision of Section 43(2)(rr), as it stood before amendment. 10. It was next contended that since the suit was dismissed on the ground that the cause of action did not survive to the landlord, this court should held that the land-lords had no rights left to file the application under Section 43(2)(rr). The submission is devoid of substance. The cause of action for a suit for eviction is based on the facts that there is a valid determination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The grounds of eviction mentioned is Section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 or in Section 2 of U P. Act No. 13 of 1972 do not constitute a necessary part of the cause of action. The words 'cause of action' have been defined in Mullah's Civil Procedure Code thus : "Cause of Action' means every effect which if transversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to the judgment of the court." 11. The grounds of eviction do not form a necessary part of the cause of action for evicting a tenant from an accommodation because even if untraversed, the suit of the plaintiff is liable to fail it one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 or Section 20 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not made out. In A.K. Gupta and Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 96. Sarcar, J., speaking for the majority, observed :- "The expression 'cause of action' in the present context does not mean "every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed......" 12. In Jitendra Nath Das v. Dr. Kalayan Dr. In A.K. Gupta and Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 96. Sarcar, J., speaking for the majority, observed :- "The expression 'cause of action' in the present context does not mean "every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed......" 12. In Jitendra Nath Das v. Dr. Kalayan Dr. Banerjee and another, 1977(1) R.C.J. 564. it was observed that :- "The suit is one for ejectment of a tenant and the amendment if allowed, will not change the nature and character of the suit, inasmuch as, it will nevertheless remain, a suit for eviction of a tenant, secondly, the cause of action in the suit is not default, but it is the determination of the tenancy by a notice to quit." In Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Bareilly, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 326. the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 3 of U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 observed thus : "Section 3 is only a procedural restriction and does not create a substantive right. All that Section 3 therein laid down was that :- "No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds..." It is more a procedural disability that is cast, in substantive cause of action that is created. Their Lordships then includes stating :- ".............a disability of the plaintiff to enforce his cause of action under the ordinary law may not necessarily be transmitted into a substantive right in the defendant." In Prem La1 v. Jadav Chand and another, 1977(2) R.C.J. 425. "a Full Bench of Rajasthan High Court held that Section 13(1) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, is only a procedural restriction and it does not create a substantive right. The grounds mentioned in the aforesaid sub-section 13(1) of the Act do not constitute a necessary part of the cause of action for eviction of the tenant from an accommodation. 13. It may be true that land-lords generally set out the grounds in the plaint but that is done not because they constitute his cause of action but to show that the conditions have arisen which remove the bar and take away the protection of the tenant. 13. It may be true that land-lords generally set out the grounds in the plaint but that is done not because they constitute his cause of action but to show that the conditions have arisen which remove the bar and take away the protection of the tenant. That being so, I am unable to subscribe to the view of the learned counsel for the petitioner that on the dismissal of the suit, the permission was exhausted. 14. Another question that was vehementally pressed by the learned counsel was that as the order passed by the prescribed authority under Section 43(2)(rr) was not appealable, the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and to allow the same. There is substance in this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Section 43(2)(rr) clearly provides that the order under the provision at will not be appealable under Section 22 of the Act. It is not correct, as argued by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, that the words-"and such other shall be final and shall not be open to appeal under Section 22" - would apply only to a case where an application under this Section is allowed. The words-"such order"-are wide enough to include the case of rejection of an application as well. Although, therefore, the appeal filed by the respondent No. 2 was not maintainable before the district judge but, as I have found that the order of the prescribed authority was invalid and illegal and was rightly set aside by the district judge, I do not feel inclined to interfere with the same. 15. For these reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs to respondent No. 2. The petitioner is granted two months time to vacate the premises.