JUDGMENT K.S. Verma, J. - The petitioner was recruited as a constable in the U. P. Civil Police and in due course was selected for the post of Sub-Inspector in the Civil Police. After undergoing the required training the petitioner was posted as Sub-Inspector in the year 1964. In the year 1974 the petitioner was posted at Lucknow. As a consequence of allegations of corruption against the petitioner, Departmental proceedings under Section 7 of the Police Act were initiated against him in regard to misuse of official jeep in the year 1971-72. The allegations were enquired into by one Shri A. B. Shukla. He on 3-6-1975 completely exonerated the petitioner from the charges levelled against him. The Inspector General of Police opposite party No. 1 in exercise of his powers under paragraph 511 of the U. P. Police Regulations passed an order dated 24-4-1976 whereby he quashed the findings of acquittal recorded by Shri A. B. Shukla and directed the re-trial of the petitioner from the stage of findings keeping the earlier proceedings intact and requiring the new Inquiry Officer to record his finding against. A copy of the order passed by opposite party No. 1 is Annexure 1 to the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. 2. The grievance of the petitioner is that the order Annexure 1 was passed after the expiry of six month's from the date of the receipt of the record by opposite party No. 1 and that opposite party No. 1 in exercise of his revisional powers could not set aside the order of acquittal unless he had recorded in writing special reasons for exercising the said powers after the expiry of six months. The petitioner further complains that opposite party No. 1 while upsetting the finding of acquittal did not afford any opportunity to him even though the order passed by him adversely affected the petitioner and that the order passed by opposite party No. 1 setting aside the order of acquittal was in violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner further states that he was informed about the order passed by opposite party No. 1 when opposite party No. 2 informed him that in pursuance of order annexure 1 he had been appointed Inquiry Officer to enquire into the charges again. The petitioner further states that he was informed about the order passed by opposite party No. 1 when opposite party No. 2 informed him that in pursuance of order annexure 1 he had been appointed Inquiry Officer to enquire into the charges again. Opposite party No. 2 proceeded with the inquiry and by an order dated 22.6.1976 issued a notice to the petitioner to show cause why he should not be reduced to the lowest stage in the time scale of Sub-Inspector for a period of one year. 3. Aggrieved by the order Annexure 2, the petitioner preferred a claim under Section 4 of the U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act before the Tribunal constituted under the Act. On behalf of the petitioner one of the contentions raised before the Tribunal was that the order passed by opposite party No. 1, Annexure 1. was in violation of principles of natural justice as no opportunity was afforded to him to show cause why the order of acquittal passed in his favour earlier be not set aside. The petitioners contention before the Tribunal was that the order setting aside the acquittal adversely affected the rights of the petitioner. In all fairness he was entitled to reasonable opportunity to show cause why the order of acquittal be not set aside. The Services Tribunal by order dated 14-6-1977 dismissed the petitioners claim and the Inquiry Officer was directed to proceed with the case expeditiously. The order of the Tribunal is Annexure 3. The petitioner has challenged the legality of the orders passed by opposite party No. 1 and opposite party No. 3 in this writ petition. He has prayed that the said orders be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and a writ of mandamus be issued to opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 not to proceed against the petitioner under Section 7 of the U. P. Police Act. 4. We have heard Shri A. Mannan for the petitioner and the Chief Standing Counsel for the opposite parties. A perusal of the order Annexure 1 indicates that opposite party No. 1 in exercise of its powers under Section 511 of the U. P. Police Regulations set aside the order of acquittal passed in favour of the petitioner. 4. We have heard Shri A. Mannan for the petitioner and the Chief Standing Counsel for the opposite parties. A perusal of the order Annexure 1 indicates that opposite party No. 1 in exercise of its powers under Section 511 of the U. P. Police Regulations set aside the order of acquittal passed in favour of the petitioner. Paragraph 511 (a) of the Police Regulations provides that the power of revision may, in the case of all orders against which appeal would lie under para 508 (1), be exercised suo motu by any authority to whom the appeal would lie. In the instant case the appeal would lie to the Inspector General of Police. Paragraph 511 (b) provides that the Inspector General of Police may revise an order of a subordinate authority in non-appealable cases and also in cases of acquittal. Paragraph 511 (d) further provides that no order adversely affecting the Government servant shall be passed in exercise of revisionary powers, ordinarily after six month's from the date of receipt of record except for very special reasons to be recorded in writing. 5. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the order passed by opposite party No. 1, Annexure 1, adversely affects the rights of the petitioner. Opposite party No. 1 had no jurisdiction to set aside the said order without affording him opportunity to show cause against the order proposed. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that if the petitioner had been afforded an opportunity to show cause he would have satisfied the authority concerned that the order of acquittal could not be quashed and that there were no justifiable reasons for setting aside the acquittal after expiry of six month's from the date of the receipt of the record. 6. In order to appreciate the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner it would be necessary to ascertain the scope of inquiry in a claim under the U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act. The section provides that if any public servant has been dealt with by his employer in a manner which is not in conformity with any contract or law having force of law under Article 309 of the Constitution, he may prefer a claim to the Tribunal. The section provides that if any public servant has been dealt with by his employer in a manner which is not in conformity with any contract or law having force of law under Article 309 of the Constitution, he may prefer a claim to the Tribunal. Article 302 of the Constitution provides that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State. Rules in Chapter XXXII of the Police Regulations have been framed under Section 7 of the Police Act (Act V of 1861) and they apply to officers appointed under Section 2 of the said Act. Paragraph 477 of the Police Regulations provides that no officer appointed under section shall be punished by any executive order otherwise than in the manner provided for by Chapter XXXII. Chapter XXXIII of the Police Regulations deals with appeals and revisions and Paragraph 508 I of the Police Regulations provides that every police officer against whom an order, as a result of departmental trial has been passed under Chapter XXXII, may prefer an appeal to the Inspector General of Police. Paragraph 511 of the Regulations finds place in chapter XXXIII which deals with powers of revision conferred on the Inspector General of Police. The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that under section 4 (a) of the U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, the Tribunal can enquire whether the order passed by the Inspector General of Police in exercise of his revisional powers was or was not an order in conformity with law. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the finding recorded by the Tribunal that Para 511 of the Police Regulations did not require any notice to be issued to the Government servant before setting aside the order of acquittal is palpably erroneous as the order is in violation of principles of natural justice. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the principles of natural justice are implicit in paragraph 511 of the Regulations, more so in view of the fact that the order setting aside the acquittal adversely affects the right of the petitioner. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the principles of natural justice are implicit in paragraph 511 of the Regulations, more so in view of the fact that the order setting aside the acquittal adversely affects the right of the petitioner. 7. It is true that Paragraph 511 does not require notice to be issued to the party concerned but having regard to the nature of the order which can be passed by opposite party No. 1, it is reasonable to read in the language of Paragraph 511 of the Police Regulations, an implication that the principles of natural justice should be followed. 8. In Cooper v. The Board of Works for the Wandsworth District ( (1863) 135 R. R. 643) this point was considered at some length. The observations of Byles, J. are relevant in this connection. In the said case the Wandsworth District Board had taken upon themselves to pull down a house, and to saddle the owner with the expenses of demolition, without notice of any sort. No notice of hearing was given to enable to party to say anything against the demolition. On these facts the learned Judge observed that in such a situation the authorities were wrong whether they acted judicially or ministerially. The learned Judge observed as follows:- "...although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the Legislature". The learned Judge in support of this line of reasoning relied upon the observations of Mr. Justice Fortescue made in Dr. Bentley's case (R. v. University of Cambridge, (1723) 2 Ld. Ray, 1334). The observations of Mr. Justice Fortescue as quoted by the learned Judge are as follows :- "The objection for want of notice can never be got over. The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any. I remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man upon such an occasion, that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. 'Adam' (says God), 'Where art thou ? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? And the same question was put to Eve also". 'Adam' (says God), 'Where art thou ? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? And the same question was put to Eve also". In Wiseman v. Borneman (Law Reports, 1971 A C 297): (1969) 3 All E. R. 275: (1969) 3 WLR 706 , the House of Lords accepted the dictum of Byles. J. In Cooper v. Board of Works for the Wandsworth District (supra). The observations of Lord Morries of Borth-y-Gest at page 308 of the above report may be quoted as follows :- "We often speak of the rules of natural justice. But there is nothing rigid or mechanical about them. What they comprehend has been analysed and described in many authorities. But any analysis must bring into relief rather their spirit and their inspiration than any precision of definition or precision as to application. We do not search for prescriptions which will lay down exactly what must, in various divergent situations, be done. The principles and procedures are to be applied which, in any particular situation or set of circumstances, are right and just and fair. Natural justice, it has been said, is only "fair play in action". Nor do we wait for directions from Parliament. The common law has abundant riches: there may we find what Byles J. called "the justice of the common law" (Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 C. B. N. S. 180, 194)." Lord Guest also relied upon the dictum of Byles J. in Cooper v. The Board of Works for the Wandsworth District (supra). His observations at page 310 of the above Report may be quoted as follows :- "............. if the statute is silent upon the question, the Court's will imply into the statutory provision a rule that the principles of natural justice should be applied. This implication will be made upon the basis that Parliament is not to be presumed to take away parties rights without giving them an opportunity of being heard in their interest. In other words, Parliament is not to be presumed to act unfairly. The dictum of Byles J. in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, (1863) 14 C. B. N. S., 180, 194 is clear to this effect and has been followed in many subsequent cases". In other words, Parliament is not to be presumed to act unfairly. The dictum of Byles J. in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, (1863) 14 C. B. N. S., 180, 194 is clear to this effect and has been followed in many subsequent cases". Lord Wilberforce while discussing the scope of principles of natural justice remarked at page 317 of the above Report as follows :- "It is necessary to look at the procedure in its setting and ask the question whether it operates unfairly to the taxpayer to a point where the Court's must supply the legislative omission. I echo the well-known language of Byles, J. in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of the Works, (1863) 14 C. B. N. S. 180, 194. I need not restate the numerous authorities in which the general principle has been affirmed. The strength and pervasiveness of them has been asserted and reasserted by decisions, English, Australian, Canadian and South African which were cited at the bar". 9. The case of Cooper v. The Board of Works for the Wandsworth District (Supra) again came up for consideration before the Privy Council in a case reported in Furnell v. Whangarei High Schools Board, (1973) 1 All E R 400). A perusal of the judgment rendered by-Lord Moris of Borth-y-Gest in this case would indicate that he relied upon Cooper v. The Board of Works for the Wandsworth District (supra) and Wiseman v. Borneman (supra) for the proposition that the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the Legislature. Viscount Dilhorne while discussing the scope of regulation 4 of the Secondary and Technical Institutes Teachers Disciplinary Regulations. 1969, at page 421 of the Report remarked as follows :- "In my opinion the sub-committee failed to discharge the duty imposed on them by reg. 4 by not giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard by them and so, in my opinion, this appeal should be allowed. If, however, the reference to investigation in reg. 1969, at page 421 of the Report remarked as follows :- "In my opinion the sub-committee failed to discharge the duty imposed on them by reg. 4 by not giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard by them and so, in my opinion, this appeal should be allowed. If, however, the reference to investigation in reg. 4 does mean only that the case in support of the complaints is to be investigated and does not mean that the teachers answer, if he wishes to put one forward, must also be investigated, and so that he must be given an opportunity of putting forward his answer, then in my opinion the appeal should also be allowed, for natural justice requires this duty to be read into the regulations. To do so would not frustrate their purpose. It would implement it. I see nothing in the regulations to suggest that what natural justice requires was deliberately excluded". In Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the Environment ((1976) 2 All E R 865). Lord Russell of Killowen at p. 872 of the Report observed as follows: "For it is to be implied, unless the contrary appears, that Parliament does not authorise by the Act the exercise of powers in breach of the principles of natural justice, and that Parliament does by the Act require, in the particular procedures, compliance with those principles". In M. Gopalkrishna Naidu v. State of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R. 1968 SC 240): (1968 Lab I C 216), the Supreme Court had an occasion to interpret the provisions of Fundamental Rule 54. In that case in Departmental proceedings launched against a delinquent officer, an inquiry committee recorded a finding that although charges against the appellant were not proved beyond reasonable doubt the suspension and Departmental inquiry were held to be "not wholly justified." The order directed that the appellant should be reinstated in service with effect from the date of the order and retired from that date and that the entire period of absence from duty should be treated as period spent on duty under Fundamental Rule 54 for purposes of pension. It was also ordered that the officer would not be allowed any pay beyond what he had actually received or what was allowed to him by way of subsistence allowance during the period of his suspension. It was also ordered that the officer would not be allowed any pay beyond what he had actually received or what was allowed to him by way of subsistence allowance during the period of his suspension. This order was challenged by the delinquent officer by making a representation to the State Government. The representation was rejected and the petitioner filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Madhya Pradhesh High Court. The petition was dismissed and against that order, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court. The line of reasoning that commended itself to the learned Judges was that although Fundamental Rule 54 did not in express terms lay down that the authority shall give to the employee concerned the opportunity to show cause before he passes the order, even so the question posed by the Supreme Court was whether the rule casts such a duty on the authority by implication. The Supreme Court held that the order passed against the delinquent officer which was under challenge would affect the Government servant adversely if it is made under clauses (3) and (5) of Fundamental Rule 54. According to the Supreme Court the very nature of the function to be discharged by the State in such circumstances implied the duty to act judicially and in such a case if opportunity to show cause against the action was not afforded, as admittedly it was not done, the order was liable to be struck down on the ground that it was in violation of principles of natural justice. After recording these findings, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the State Government and directed the competent authority to consider the question de novo after giving to the appellant a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed against him. 10. A close analysis of the said decision reveals that the Supreme Court accepted the principle that although there may not be a specific provision requiring the authorities to afford reasonable opportunity to show cause yet such a duty may be spelt out by implication. 10. A close analysis of the said decision reveals that the Supreme Court accepted the principle that although there may not be a specific provision requiring the authorities to afford reasonable opportunity to show cause yet such a duty may be spelt out by implication. If the nature of the order is such that it affects the rights of the parties the very nature of the function, according to the Supreme Court, implies the duty to act judicially and in such a case the opportunity to show cause against the action was required to be afforded. 11. In the instant case the order of acquittal passed (in) Departmental proceedings was set aside by opposite party No. 1 in exercise its power under paragraph 511 of the Police Regulations. Opposite Party No. 1 is required to act quasi judicially. The order of acquittal in favour of the petitioner passed earlier had conferred a valuable right on him. On the strength of the said order he could very well assume that his chances of promotion would not be in jeopardy. The moment the order of acquittal was set aside the petitioners prospects of future promotion were put in jeopardy. It is true that after the Departmental Inquiry the petitioner will be afforded an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken but that guarantee would be a very poor consolation to him if an order of acquittal passed on a consideration of the facts of the case is set aside ex parte leaving the petitioner susceptible to a Departmental inquiry in which he may or may not be exonerated. We have given the matter our anxious consideration and we find that the principles of fair play demand that if the order of acquittal was to be set aside the petitioner should have been afforded an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken. Even though the provisions of paragraph 511 of the Police Regulations do not prescribe for a show cause notice the requirement of giving show cause notice is to be implied in the rule, regard being had to the nature of the order which vitally affects the interests of the petitioner. 12. Even though the provisions of paragraph 511 of the Police Regulations do not prescribe for a show cause notice the requirement of giving show cause notice is to be implied in the rule, regard being had to the nature of the order which vitally affects the interests of the petitioner. 12. The learned counsel for the opposite parties placed reliance on Union of India v. J. N. Sinha ( AIR 1971 SC 40 ): (1971 Lab IC 8) for the proposition that if a statutory provision could be read consistently with principles of natural justice, the Court's should do so. If a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. The facts of the case would indicate that the observations made in paragraph 7 of the report were in relation to the facts of that case. J. N. Sinha was compulsorily retired under Fundamental Rule 56 (j). One of the questions raised on behalf of J. N. Sinha was whether the Court was right in holding that in making the impugned order the Union of India had violated the principles of natural justice. While discussing the scope of Fundamental Rule 56 (j) the Supreme Court observed that an order of compulsory retirement did not involve any civil consequences. The delinquent officer in such a case does not lose any of the rights acquired by him before retirement. The rule contained in Fundamental Rule 56 (j) according to the learned Judges, merely embodied one of the facts of the pleasure doctrine embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution of India. Once the conclusion is reached that the order does not affect the rights of the parties, there is no room for the application of principles of natural justice. It would thus be clear that the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 7 of the report have relevance only to the facts found in that case. We have already held that the order setting aside the acquittal visits the delinquent officer with adverse consequences. In such a situation, the principles of natural justice will have to be read in the statutory provisions. We have already held that the order setting aside the acquittal visits the delinquent officer with adverse consequences. In such a situation, the principles of natural justice will have to be read in the statutory provisions. The view that we are taking finds supports from the following observations of the Supreme Court in J. N. Sinha's case (supra) at page 42 of the report :- "It is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the Court's should do so because it must be presumed that the legislatures and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice". We are, accordingly, of the opinion that the principles enunciated in Union of India v. J. N. Sinha (supra) do not in any manner support the contention raised on behalf of the opposite parties. On the other hand, the observations quoted above, seem to support the contention of the petitioner that compliance of the principles of natural justice must be presumed unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excluded the application of principles of natural justice. 13. For the reasons stated above, we allow the writ petition, set aside the order passed by opposite party No. 3, U.P. Public Services Tribunal, dated 14-6-1977, Annexure 3 to the writ petition, by the issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As a consequence of this order, the order passed by opposite party No. 1 dated 24-4-1976, Annexure 1 to the writ petition, is also quashed. It is, however, clarified that it will be open to opposite party No. 1 to revise the order of acquittal after affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to show cause why the said order be not set aside. An opportunity of showing cause in the present circumstances will mean an opportunity of giving explanation as the opportunity contemplated in a revision will be of a similar character as the opportunity of hearing is contemplated in cases of appeal under regulation 508 of the Police Regulations. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs.