JUDGMENT G.S. Sial, M. - This is a second appeal by the defendant against the judgment and decree dated January 17, 1975 passed by the learned Additional Commissioner, Varanasi Division, arising out of a case under section 229-B/209 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the plaintiff brought as suit with the allegation that he is the exclusive Sirdar of the land in suit and that the decree of the earlier suit No. 563 of 1966 dated October 14, 1966 be set aside and declared null and void being passed against a dead person. It was further alleged that in case the defendant was found to be in possession, the possession be got delivered to the plaintiff. The plaintiffs claim was based on the fact that they were the heirs of Mst. Rachali wife of Sheo Narain uncle of the plaintiffs. The defendants plea was that the previous suit filed by them had been decreed where in defendant Gajar had been held to be the exclusive Sirdar with possession of the land in suit. The present respondents had filed substitution application in that suit for being substituted place of Mst. Rachali which was rejected. A revision was filed which was also rejected by the Board of Revenue and the finding that the plaintiffs were not the heirs of Rachali had become final. It was also stated that in January 3, 1965 Gajar filed a suit against Smt. Rachali and Gaon Sabha etc. Smt, Rachali died on April 2, 1965. On her death Gajar moved an application on April 23, 1965 that he be substituted in her place. Ram Chandra and others respondents also filed substituted application that they be substituted in her place. Both the applications were rejected. The suit proceeded ex parte against Smt. Rachali deceased and a decree was passed on October 4, 1966, against a deceased person. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the revenue court had no jurisdiction to cancel the confirmed decree and that the previous decision will operate as res judicata. The learned Addl. Commissioner held that the earlier decree could not be set aside as it can be cancelled by the Civil Court only, but still he has gone to grant a declaratory decree. On the question of res jurdicata it was held by the learned Addl. The learned Addl. Commissioner held that the earlier decree could not be set aside as it can be cancelled by the Civil Court only, but still he has gone to grant a declaratory decree. On the question of res jurdicata it was held by the learned Addl. Commissioner that since the plaintiffs were not parties in that suit it will not operate as res judicata. He submitted that the person through whom they make their claim i.e. Smt. Rachali was party and therefore that decree will be binding on them also. He referred to A.I.R. 1953 (S.C.) 33 wherein it has been observed that the only point to be seen is whether the court which granted the decree had jurisdiction or not. He also referred to 1976 A.L.J 532 which says that even if the decree is passed on wrong point of law it will operate as res judicata. 4. The learned counsel for the respondents referred to A.I.R. 1958 Alld. 573 which says that an order under order 22, Rule 5 involved summary inquiry as to who should be substituted in place of the deceased and such a decision does not operate as res judicata. He stated that the Board while rejecting the revision for setting aside the ex parte decree held that as a matter of fact the remedy lies by way of a regular declaratory suit. That is the reason who the respondents filed a regular suit under section 229-B. Both the courts below have held that the plaintiffs are the heirs and legal representatives of Smt. Rachali and decreed the suit for sole Sirdari rights of the land in suit. He, therefore, submitted that the second appeal is concluded by concurrent finding of fact. 5. I have considered the arguments and gone through the record of the case. The main point to be considered is whether the decree passed in previous case No. 563 of 1966 dated October 4, 1966 will operate as res judicata in this case. The facts of the case given above establish that the previous case was instituted on January 3, 1965 against Smt. Rachali who died on April 2, 1965. The application made for substituting her were rejected by the courts and the result was that the case proceeded against Smt. Rachali who was already dead. Thus, the decree came to be passed against a dead person. The application made for substituting her were rejected by the courts and the result was that the case proceeded against Smt. Rachali who was already dead. Thus, the decree came to be passed against a dead person. Such a decree is a nullity and has no binding effect. Again the substitution proceedings are of summary nature. The non-substitution of the parties by the courts in that case ill not imply that the rightful heirs cannot bring a fresh suit to establish their claim. The ruling contained in A.I.R. 1958 Allahabad page 573 also clearly says that substitution proceedings being based on summary inquiry, do not operate as res judicata. Therefore also the orders in the previous case not substituting the present plaintiffs in place of Smt. Rachali, will not operate as res judicata. Moreover, the Board while rejecting the revision for setting aside ex parte decree held that a declaratory suit could be filed to establish the claim by the plaintiffs. In this case both the courts below have held that plaintiffs are the heirs and legal representatives of Smt. Rachali and their suit had been decreed. Under the circumstances I find little force in the grounds advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. The so-called earlier decreed passed against a dead person cannot operate as res judicata and the view taken by the first appellate court is correct. Both the courts below have decreed the suit of the plaintiff and the appeal is concluded by concurrent finding of fact. Hence the second appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.