Judgment.-Subramaniam, the plaintiff in O.S. No. 4843 of 1969 on the file of the City Civil Court at Madras is the appellant. He entered service of the Madras branch of the respondent, the United Bank of India initially as a clerk. Soon he rose to the position of an officer in charge of the bills department which position he occupied till 1969. Before he went to the bills department he had been for a number of years in charge of the account opening section of the bank. In 1969 one T. V. S. Mani who had initially joined the service of the bank as a stenographer was in charge of the account section. At that time an account was opened in the savings bank account of the bank in the name of one A. P. Kapoor. The said account was used for discounting and negotiating cheques and bills. While so there was a report that this account in the name of A. P. Kapoor was a fictitious one. On receipt of this information the agent and other officers tried to make it appear as if the appellant had introduced A. P. Kapoor to the bank at the time of opening the account. A farce of an enquiry was held. On the basis of a prejudiced report sent by" the enquiry officer the Deputy General Manager (Administration) terminated the services of the appellant with three months’ notice. The order of termination of service of the appellant was illegal and wrongful. But for the termination the appellant would have continued in service till April, 1973. Though originally the appellant included a prayer for the relief of injunction from giving effect to the order of termination, he confined his relief finally to the recovery of a sum of Rs. 29,636 as damages for wrongful termination of service. 2. The respondent bank in its written statement contended that there was no such person by name A. P. Kapoor in existence, that one Paul Hemdev who was a customer in the bank colluded with the appellant and managed to get an account opened in the name of the said A. P. Kapoor. It was the appellant who had signed as the second introducer in the account opening form knowing full well that no such person as A. P. Kapoor was in existence. It was the appellant who had signed as the second introducer in the account opening form knowing full well that no such person as A. P. Kapoor was in existence. On coming to know of the entire facts formal charges were framed against the appellant and a full and proper enquiry was held. 3. As a result of the enquiry the appellant was found guilty and the order terminating the services of the appellant was passed. The formal enquiry was preceded by a preliminary investigation and a report. At every stage, every opportunity was given to the appellant to defend himself and let in whatever evidence he wanted. The respondent denied the allegations of want of bona fides on its part, as well as the allegations regarding the unblemished nature of the appellant’s career with the bank. The respondent further pleaded that the suit itself was not maintainable as a civil Court could not sit in appeal over the findings of the domestic enquiry. 4. On these pleadings the following issues were raised. (1) Is the suit maintainable in law? (2) Is the termination of the services of the plaintiff wrongful? (3) Is the plaintiff entitled to any damages at all? (4) Are not the findings in the domestic enquiry binding on the plaintiff and is the plaintiff entitled to question the same in a civil Court? (5) To what reliefs the plaintiff is entitled ? The trial Court found that the suit was maintainable in law. The lower Court further found that the appellant had fully participated in the domestic enquiry and that the enquiry had not been found to have been vitiated on any ground whatever. In the result, the termination of the appellant’s service was not found to be void and the appellant was not entitled to any damages. Accordingly the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit the appellant has filed the above appeal but restricting his claim to Rs. 6,000 by way of damages. 5. On 27th February, 1968 S. B. Account No. 1375 was opened in the name of one A. P. Kapoor. It is now admitted by both parties that this A. P. Kapoor was a fictitious person. At the relevant time one T. V. S. Mani was in charge of the deposit opening section. 6,000 by way of damages. 5. On 27th February, 1968 S. B. Account No. 1375 was opened in the name of one A. P. Kapoor. It is now admitted by both parties that this A. P. Kapoor was a fictitious person. At the relevant time one T. V. S. Mani was in charge of the deposit opening section. One Palu Hemdev, son of K. Chaturbhuj of the firm Chaturbhuj and Co., introduced the depositor. Palu Hemdev and his mother were both customers of the bank. On 27th February, 1968, Palu Hemdev approached the officer in charge T. V. S. Mani with the account opening form of A. P. Kapoor. But T. V. S. Mani was reluctant to accept the new account on the introduction of Palu Hemdev alone as the latter’s account, according to the officer, was not quite satisfactory. Further when he enquired Palu Hemdev where A. P. Kapoor was the latter is said to have told the Officer that A. P. Kapoor had just left the bank after signing the form in the presence of the appellant at his table. At that crucial time, the appellant also went to the officer and stated that A. P. Kapoor had signed the form in his presence and that if necessary he would himself sign as a second introducer to inspire confidence. Accordingly, he also signed the account opening form as a second introducer. It is the case of the respondent that if the appellant had not assured T. V. S. Mani that A. P. Kapoor had signed in his presence and if he had also not joined as a second introducer T. V. S. Mani would not have opened an account. The account opening form and the specimen signature card were then put up to the agent. The signature of an additional person in the account opening form viz., that of K. Subramaniam, the appellant, aroused the curiosity of the agent. When he enquired why the appellant had also joined as an introducer T. V. S. Mani had explained what had taken place. The agent immediately called the appellant and the latter told the agent that A. P. Kapoor whom he knew had signed in his presence and therefore he had signed as a second introducer. 6. A cheque book containing cheque leaves Nos. The agent immediately called the appellant and the latter told the agent that A. P. Kapoor whom he knew had signed in his presence and therefore he had signed as a second introducer. 6. A cheque book containing cheque leaves Nos. 034721-034730 relating to the account was issued to Palu Hemdev by the special assistant S. V. Nathan on his producing a requisition said to have been signed by A. P. Kapoor. Though a confirmation letter relating to the issue of the cheque book to a third party was sent to the account-holder to his recorded address, no acknowledgment was received from him. A reminder was also issued on 19th March, 1963 but the same was returned with remarks ‘no such address’. Between 27th February and 14th March, 1968, seven cheques aggregating to Rs. 65,000 drawn in favour of A. P. Kapoor by six multani bankers on their accounts with the Madras branch of the respondent were credited to the account and immediately withdrawn. On one occasion a sum of Rs. 10,000 was allowed to be withdrawn even before the cheque was realised. 7. On 22nd March, 1968 the special assistant S. V. Nathan received an anonymous telegram message stating that the account in the name of A. P. Kapoor was fictitious. Nathan reported the matter immediately to the agent. Thus started an enquiry. The agent immediately called the officer-in-charge of the deposit opening section and called for the relative files. The account opening form and the cheque requisitioning letter were found missing from the records of the banks. In the ledger folio the name of the appellant was found as one of the persons who had introduced the account, however, in a different ink. In the account opening register, the name of the appellant was said to have been scored out with a red and black ink to make it illegible. The agent then took necessary statements from the appellant, T. V. S. Mani and the special assistant Nathan and reported the matter to the Controller of Inspectors, camp Madras, under Exhibit A-40. The Controller of Inspections initiated a due enquiry into the matter. Pending investigation the appellant was placed under suspension on 4th June, 1968. During the preliminary investigation the investigating officer questioned N. S. Rajagopalan, an accountant, T. V. S. Mani, officer-in-charge of the deposit section. K. Subramaniam, the appellant and Nathan, special assistant. The Controller of Inspections initiated a due enquiry into the matter. Pending investigation the appellant was placed under suspension on 4th June, 1968. During the preliminary investigation the investigating officer questioned N. S. Rajagopalan, an accountant, T. V. S. Mani, officer-in-charge of the deposit section. K. Subramaniam, the appellant and Nathan, special assistant. He submitted an investigation report dated 21|23rd May, 1968. He came to the conclusion that there was prima facie evidence, that the appellant had helped Palu Hemdev to open Savings Bank Account No. 1375 in the name of A. P. Kapoor, a fictitious person with some ulterior object and that he removed the relative account opening form and the cheque requisitioning letter from the records which were the only documentary evidence against him. He also found that T. V. S. Mani, the officer in charge of the bills department had acted in a most negligent manner and S. V. Nathan, the special assistant had not acted intelligently in discharging his duties as special assistant. The said report is marked Exhibit P-59. 8. Pursuant to the preliminary report of the Controller of Inspections, the respondent issued charge-sheet, dated 29th June, 1968 to the appellant. The charge-sheet contained 17 counts. Charges 1 to 14 related to the opening of the account Savings Bank No. 1375 in the name of A. P. Kapoor and the operation of the said account. Charges 15 to 17 related to the fact that the appellant was engaged in the business of finance brokers and arranged loans for the members of the bank staff as well as bank constituents from multani bankers on commission and his own account with the bank showed a turnover of Rs. 4,000 that he owned immovable property worth Rs. 30,000 and had renovated his village house by spending Rs. 25,000 all of which were beyond his means. The enquiry was held by one. A. M. Bhattacharyya of the respondent bank. On 6th July, 1968, the appellant submitted a detailed explanation. The enquiry was started on 27th November, 1968. The charge memo. as well as the explanation offered by the appellant were read out to him. The appellant was given an option by the enquiry officer to defend himself by any one of his colleagues in the bank, but the appellant declined the offer on the ground that he had been denied the facility of being defended by a lawyer. as well as the explanation offered by the appellant were read out to him. The appellant was given an option by the enquiry officer to defend himself by any one of his colleagues in the bank, but the appellant declined the offer on the ground that he had been denied the facility of being defended by a lawyer. The enquiry which started on 27th November, 1968 continued till 3rd March, 1969. A number of witnesses were examined on the side of the respondent before the enquiry officer and duly cross-examined by the appellant. The appellant himself originally submitted a list of witnesses, but after the respondent closed evidence before the enquiry officer the appellant stated that he had no other witness to examine excepting himself. He examined himself in chief and was duly cross-examined by the respondant’s representatives. As already stated, the enquiry was closed on 3rd March, 1969 and judgment reserved by the enquiry officer. On 22nd July, 1969 the enquiry officer submitted his report giving his findings on the various charges. He clearly found that the appellant introduced S.B. Account No. 1375 of one A. P. Kapoor as a joint introducer with Palu Hemdev and that the account was actually opened by Palu Hemdev in the fictitious name of A. P. Kapoor with the help of the appellant and cheques totalling to Rs. 65,000 were fraudulently encashed through the said S.B. Account No. 1375 of A. P. Kapoor by Palu Hemdev a close associate and friend of the appellant between 27th February, 1968 and 14th March, 1968. He further found that the introduction of the fictitious account of A. P. Kapoor as a result of second introducer and the subsequent deposits and withdrawals in the account were acts prejudicial to the interest of the bank and were likely to put the bank into loss. He also found that the appellant was engaged in the business of finance brokers for which he used to get commission or brokerage and this was an act outside the scope of the appellant’s duties in the bank and that this was also prejudicial to the interests of the bank which would render the appellant unworthy of being retained in the service of the bank. Finally, he held that the retention of the appellant in the service of the bank which is a credit institution would greatly jeopardise the interest of the bank and might any day land the bank in serious financial loss besides loss of reputation. Though in view of his findings, the enquiry officer stated that dismissal would be the proper punishment, in view of the long service of the appellant, he recommended that the appellant’s services might be terminated with immediate effect on payment of three months salary. Under Exhibit A-1, dated 31st July, 1969, the Deputy General Manager (Administration) informed the appellant about the proposed punishment of termination of service and called upon the appellant to show cause why the proposed action should not be taken against him. Exhibit A-l stated that as per the findings of the enquiry officer the charges levelled against the appellant had been fully proved and they justified the punishment of dismissal. However, in view of the long service of the appellant the enquiry officer had recommended termination of his services with immediate effect on payment of three months’ salary in lieu of notice. In response to this show cause notice Exhibit A-l, the appellant submitted a detailed explanatory note with his letter, dated 31st July, 1969. Under Exhibit A-2. dated 2nd September, 1969, the services of the appellant were terminated on payment of three months’ salary in lieu of notice. 9. It is this termination of service of the appellant that is being challenged before me. Mr. M.Raghavan, learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contends that the termination of the appellant’s service was wrongful. The domestic enquiry was not fairly and properly held. The services of the appellant had been terminated solely on the evidence of the officer-in-charge of the account opening section, his special assistant Nathan and the agent who were all more or less in the position of accomplices and who were really the persons who were in charge of the opening of the account. The appellant had been singled out and the blame had been put on him to enable others from escaping punishment. The enquiry has been vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice. The appellant had been singled out and the blame had been put on him to enable others from escaping punishment. The enquiry has been vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice. The very fact that the appellant who stood charged with serious acts of misconduct should have been denied the opportunity of being defended by a legal practitioner would show that the principles of natural justice were violated and the enquiry itself was vitiated, and the findings arrived at on the basis of such an enquiry must be held to be non est. In any event, learned counsel pleaded that the appellant had the right to be in service till his superannuation in 1973 and therefore the three months’ notice given by the respondent was not sufficient and he should have been at least entitled to six months’ notice. On the other hand, the contention of Mr. Dulip Singh on behalf of the respondent is that the relationship between the appellant and the respondent was that of master and servant and was therefore purely contractual. It would be open to the respondent to dismiss the appellant for just cause and in the instant case his services, were terminated after charges were framed against him and after he was found guilty as a result of due enquiry. He further stated that the civil Court has only a limited jurisdiction in such matters and could not sit in appeal over the findings arrived at by the domestic tribunal. Further, in any event the respondent having terminated the services of the appellant on payment of three months’ salary in lieu of notice the appellant could not have any grievance at all. 10. The first question for consideration is whether the suit itself is maintainable, There is no doubt as to the maintainability of the suit because if the appellant is able to establish that the termination of his service was wrongful he would be entitled to damages. It is now established beyond controversy that the relationship of master and servant is purely contractual. When the master terminates the services of his servant the latter’s remedy is not to sue for specific performance of the contract of service but to ask for the relief of damages for wrongful dismissal. It is now established beyond controversy that the relationship of master and servant is purely contractual. When the master terminates the services of his servant the latter’s remedy is not to sue for specific performance of the contract of service but to ask for the relief of damages for wrongful dismissal. The incidence of the relationship of master and servant is that it would be open to the master to dismiss the servant without notice for just cause. The law on the matter does not admit of any doubt. Grounds which might give rise to just cause ‘for dismissal of a servant might range from disobedience of valid orders, misconduct, neglect, incompetency, to illness permanently incapacitating the servant from performing his work. Dealing with misconduct it is stated in Halsbury’s laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 25, paragraphs 938 and 939 thus: "938. Conduct incompatible with duty or prejudicial to master’s business.-A servant whose conduct is incompatible with the faithful discharge of his duty to his master, maybe dismissed, as where unknown to his employer, he enters into transactions whereby his personal interests conflict with his duty as a servant in his particular capacity or if he takes a secret commission even though it be an isolated act, unless he is able to discharge the burden which lies upon him of proving that there is nothing improper in the transaction in question. Dismissal is also justified in the case of a servant who claims to be a partner or if his conduct has been such that it would be injurious to the master’s business to retain him". "939. Grounds for dismissal discovered subsequently .-It is not necessary that the master, dismissing a servant for good cause, should state the ground . for such dismissal ; and provided good ground exists in fact, it is immaterial whether or not it was known to the employer at the time of the dismissal. Justification of dismissal can accordingly be shown by proof of ‘facts ascertained subsequently to the dismissal or on grounds differing from those alleged at the time". 11. In Chittenden v. Walker1, a clerk employed by a company to enter proceedings in their minute book, entered on the margin of the minute book, a protest in his own name against a summons for appointing a successor to himself. 11. In Chittenden v. Walker1, a clerk employed by a company to enter proceedings in their minute book, entered on the margin of the minute book, a protest in his own name against a summons for appointing a successor to himself. Dealing with the question whether the dismissal was justified Lord Denman, CJ., said as follows: "Now it is not necessary that a master, having a good ground of dismissal, should either state it to the servant, or act upon it. It is enough if it exist, and there be improper conduct in fact. Suppose a servant had heard that his master intended to dismiss him without notice, and were to insult him in consequence. It is clear that the insult would justify the master in dismissing the servant and yet, if he intended to dismiss him independently of the insult, the motive for the dismissal would be different from such ground of justification. It is unnecessary to discuss how it would be if the master, at the time of the dismissal, had no knowledge of the fact which was to justify it; yet think the justification would be good, even if the fact, existing at the time were not known to the master." Littledale, J., observed: "The question was put to the jury, whether his making the entry of his protest was a sufficient ground of dismissal, and they found that it was. Then, there being a sufficient ground, the counsel for the plaintiff says that such a cause will not justify the dismissal, unless acted upon in fact. It seems to me that the law is otherwise. It is sufficient if the cause exist: the plaintiff is not entitled to object that that is not the cause for which he was dismissed." Patteson, J., observed: "Neither the Court nor the jury can discuss the ultimate motive. If a justifying cause exist, the master may assign it, whenever the action is brought: and whether any other cause exist is not material. It may be that a master is like a servant, and chooses to take advantage of some improper act. It was put, at one time, as if the cause arose after the dismissal; but that was not the fact. The plaintiff himself sends out the notice for the meeting of the 17th and he enters his protest as clerk. It may be that a master is like a servant, and chooses to take advantage of some improper act. It was put, at one time, as if the cause arose after the dismissal; but that was not the fact. The plaintiff himself sends out the notice for the meeting of the 17th and he enters his protest as clerk. He has therefore by his own showing acted as clerk on the 11th of April. By his own act, he has given the defendants the power of displacing him if they had it not before. If we were to hold that it was necessary to trace the dismissal to the act which is to justify it, it would follow that a master, who had made up his mind to dismiss a servant would give the servant if he discovered his master’s intention, licence to act just as he pleased afterwards. We cannot dive into the meaning of parties. If the cause exist, and the master knew of it (for on this occasion we need go no further than that) it is a good ground ‘for the dismissal." Coleridge, J., stated the law thus: "As to the existence of a sufficient cause the jury have found it, and they were right in so doing. The act of entering the protest on the minute book was inconsistent with his service: a servant of this kind, if allowed to do such acts, would be useless. But then it is said that it should have been put to the jury whether this cause was the operating motive for the dismissal. I own that I was impressed for a considerable time with the weight of this argument. But I think that when a master, sued for wages, defends himself upon the ground that he had dismissed the servant, and that there was in fact something which justified the dismissal, that presents an intelligible issue to a jury; Whereas, if the inquiry were to be, whether this justifying cause operated in the master’s mind, a jury, in the great majority of cases, could not pronounce a satisfactory verdict. I think it is enough to shew a justification existing in point of fact". 12. From the above it would be clear that it would be open to the master to dismiss a servant for a just cause. I think it is enough to shew a justification existing in point of fact". 12. From the above it would be clear that it would be open to the master to dismiss a servant for a just cause. Further, even if at the time of the dismissal of his service he might not know that a just cause existed, it would be possible for him when the validity of the dismissal is questioned to say that there was just cause for the dismissal even though he was not aware of it at the time the servant was dismissed. Viewed in the light of the principles of law above laid down, in the instant case, there is ample evidence to show that there was just cause for the termination of the service of the appellant. It is admitted that A. P. Kapoor is whose name S. B. Account No. 1375 was opened was a fictitious person. If the case that it was the appellant who assured the officer-in-charge of the account opening section and also the agent that the said A.P. Kapoor had signed the account opening form in his presence and........................that pursuant to such assurance he signed the account opening form as a second introducer, he should be found liable for very grave misconduct notwithstanding the fact that the officer-in-charge of the account-opening section and the agent were also equally negligent. There is also the further fact that the appellant is alleged to have been carrying on finance brokerage business by lending money to the members of the staff and for arranging finance to outsiders from multani bankers. If this fact is also found to have been proved, it cannot be gainsaid that it would amount to a very serious misconduct, for the conduct of the appellant, while he was employed in a finance institution in engaging himself in. lending money and arranging finance for others from multani bankers would be incompatible with his duties in the respondent bank. 13. In Pearce v. Foster and others1, the plaintiff had been employed as clerk by the defendants, who were merchants, for many years, and ultimately they agreed to retain him in their employment for a term of ten years. lending money and arranging finance for others from multani bankers would be incompatible with his duties in the respondent bank. 13. In Pearce v. Foster and others1, the plaintiff had been employed as clerk by the defendants, who were merchants, for many years, and ultimately they agreed to retain him in their employment for a term of ten years. Before the expiration of that period the defendants discovered that the plaintiff had for many years previously been engaged in speculating in differences upon the stock exchange to the extent of many hundreds of thousands of pounds and they thereupon dismissed him from their service. Holding that the dismissal of the plaintiff was justifiable Lord Esher, M.R., said:- "The rule of law is, that where a person has entered into the position of servant, if he does anything incompatible with the due or faithful discharge of his duty to his master, the latter has a right to dismiss him. The relation of master and servant implies necessarily that the servant shall be in a position to perform his duty duly and faithfully and if by his own act he prevents himself from doing so, the master may dismiss him. What circumstances will put a servant into the position of not being able to perform, in a due manner, his duties or of not being able to perform his duty in a faithful manner, it is impossible to enumerate. Innumerable circumstances have actually occurred which fall within that proposition, and innumerable other circumstances which never have yet occurred, will occur which also will fall within the proposition. But if a servant is guilty of such a crime outside his service as to make it unsafe for a master to keep him in his employ the servant may be dismissed by his master and if the servant’s conduct is so grossly immoral that all reasonable men would say that he cannot be trusted the master may dismiss him". Lopes, L.J., stated the law thus:- "If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful dischage of his duty in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. That misconduct according to my view need not be misconduct in the carrying on of the service or the business. Lopes, L.J., stated the law thus:- "If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful dischage of his duty in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. That misconduct according to my view need not be misconduct in the carrying on of the service or the business. It is sufficient if it is conduct which is prejudicial or is likely to be prejudicial to the interest or to the reputation of the master and the master will be justified, not only if he discovers it at the time, but also if he discovers it afterwards in dismissing the servant". 14. The next question for my consideration is whether these counts of misconduct have been proved against the appellant. It is not disputed before me that the respondent framed charges against the appellant and conducted an enquiry. The enquiry was conducted by one Bhattacharyya a senior officer of the bank. The appellant participated in the enquiry, witnesses on the said of the respondent were examined and offered for cross-examination by the appellant and he did elaborately cross-examine them. He was given every opportunity to examine himself and allowed to examine whomsoever he wished. Necessary and relevant documents were produced at the time of the enquiry and copies of the same delivered to the appellant. In fact, the appellant himself had deposed as follows before the enquiry officer in cross-examination:- "Yes, I have received copies of proceedings sheet of this enquiry upto 6th December, 1968. Whatever exhibits have been filed I have seen. I have cross-examined all the witnesses except the photographer. I have gone through the copies of proceedings and evidence of this enquiry and followed them quite well, I deny the charges even after reading and following the proceedings as according to my opinion the evidence are not correct and I consider that it is not necessary to give any supporting evidence either oral or documentary to disprove the charges levelled against me except my verbal and written denial statement including the audit reports submitted on 4th March, 1969. I was given all opportunity to defend myself except that I was not permitted to be represented by a counsel to defend legally“ 15. In view of his categoric statement before the enquiry officer it would be an exercise in futility on the part of Mr. I was given all opportunity to defend myself except that I was not permitted to be represented by a counsel to defend legally“ 15. In view of his categoric statement before the enquiry officer it would be an exercise in futility on the part of Mr. Raghavan to contend that the enquiry that was held was merely a farce of an enquiry and that every opportunity was not given to the appellant to defend himself. It is in this connection that the question arises as to what exactly is the scope of the jurisdiction of a Court in dealing with the decisions of domestic tribunals. In Maclean v. The Workers’ Union 1 , an action was brought by the plaintiff Neil Maclean against the workers union a registered trade union for a declaration that the resolution of the executive committee, of the workers union dated 28th September, 1927 purporting to expel him from the union was ultra vires and void and for certain incidental relief. In that case, the question arose as to the jurisdiction of the Courts in regard to domestic tribunals. Maugham, J., stated the law thus:- ”A domestic tribunal is in general a tribunal composed of laymen. It has no power to administer an oath and, a circumstance which is perhaps of greater importance, no party has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. It is not bound by the rules of evidence; it is indeed probably ignorant of them. It may act, and it sometimes must act, on mere hearsay, and in many cases the members present or some of them (like an English jury in ancient days) are themselves both the witnesses and the judges. Before such a tribunal counsel have no right of audience and there are no effective means for testing by cross-examination the truth of the statements that may be made. The members of the tribunal may have been discussing the matter for weeks with persons not present at the hearing, and there is no one even to warn them of the danger of acting on preconceived views“. 16. The members of the tribunal may have been discussing the matter for weeks with persons not present at the hearing, and there is no one even to warn them of the danger of acting on preconceived views“. 16. It is apparent and it is well settled by authority that the decision of such a tribunal cannot be attacked on the ground that it is against the weight of evidence, since evidence in the proper sense there is none, and since the decisions of the tribunal are not open to any sort of appeal unless the rules provide for one. 17. The same judgment contained a quotation of Bowen, L.J., in Leeson’s case to the following effect: — ”There must be due inquiry. The accused person must have notice of what he is accused. He must have an opportunity of being heard, and the decision must be honestly arrived at if he has had a full opportunity of being heard. With respect to the charge made, the charge of which he has notice, it is a charge of infamous conduct is some professional respect and the particulars which should be brought to his attention in order to enable him to meet that charge ought to be particulars of conduct which, if established, is capable of being viewed by honest persons as conduct which is infamous. That is all. We have seen these conditions have been fulfilled by the inquiry and by the tribunal which instituted it. The function’s of the Court of law are at an end. It appears to me that we have no power to review the evidence any more than we have a power to say whether the tribunal came to a right conclusion. If indeed it could be shown that nothing was brought before the tribunal which could raise in the minds of honest persons the inference that infamous conduct had been established, that would go to show that the inquiry had not been a flue inquiry; but if there is no blot of that kind upon the proceedings the jurisdiction of the domestic tribunal which has been clothed by the Legislature with the duty of discipline in respect of a great profession must be left untouched by Courts of law". In State Medical Faculty v. Kshiti Bhusan1, a Bench of the Calcutta High Court has stated the law thus: "The decision of a domestic body or a tribunal or a board particularly of a professional body can only be interfered with by the Courts of law on three main principles, namely, (1) that such domestic authorities have acted under or in bad faith and mala fide, (2) that such authorities have violated the principles of natural justice in the proceedings and conclusions before it; and (3) that such domestic authorities have exceeded their jurisdiction under the statutes, rules and regulations, regulating their duties and procedure. What the Court has to see is whether any of these three principles have been infringed. If not, then the law is that it is not for the Court to substitute its own view or opinion of the merits for the decisions of the domestic authorities". 18. This decision has been followed by the same High Court in two later cases viz., Sri Gopal Jalan and Company v. Singhania Brothers and another2and Ujjal v. Netai Chand3. In the the latter of the above two cases Bijavesh Mukherji, J., stated the law thus:- "A domestic tribunal cannot do anything it likes throwing everything to the winds. But the jurisdiction of the Court is of a very limited character. Generally speaking the Court can set aside the decision of a domestic tribunal on one of the three basic considerations set out below:- (1) when the tribunal oversteps the limits of its jurisdiction; (b) when it violates the principles of natural justice; (c) when it acts dishonestly, actuated by bias, bad faith and the like. A domestic tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence and, indeed is ignorant of such rules, and is never to be equated with a Court of law, wedded to just that: the law of evidence. A party appearing before a domestic tribunal when it fails to make a point when the tribunal has not followed a correct procedure, it can be inferred that it has waived its right. Where a party appearing before a domestic tribunal alleges dishonesty or mala fide on the part of the tribunal the civil Court will need first rate evidence to enable it to arrive at so serious a finding". Where a party appearing before a domestic tribunal alleges dishonesty or mala fide on the part of the tribunal the civil Court will need first rate evidence to enable it to arrive at so serious a finding". In T. P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria4, in dealing with the validity of expulsion of a member from the Masonic Lodge it is stated that the jurisdiction of a civil Court is limited. It cannot sit as a Court of appeal from decisions of such a body. It can set aside the order of such a body if the said body acts without jurisdiction or does not act in good faith or acts in violation of the principles of natural justice. Mr. Raghavan, learned counsel for the appellant appreciated the limits of the power of interference on the part of the civil Court but he made a valiant attempt to bring his case within one or the other of the three exceptions referred to above. I have already extracted the statement of the appellant before the enquiry officer that he was given every opportunity to participate in the enquiry and defend himself. He also did take advantage of the opportunity and participate in the enquiry and invited a decision by the enquiry officer on the truth or otherwise of the charges framed against him. In the circumstances, there are absolutely no materials in the case to hold that the enquiry was anything other than fair and complete. Mr. Raghavan was not able to substantiate his allegation that the enquiry was vitiated by bias, bad faith and the like. There is absolutely no evidence to support this line of argument. 19. The next question is whether the enquiry itself has been vitiated by the violation of the principles of natural justice. In Lekh Raj v. Union of India1, Grover, J., speaking on behalf of the Constitution Bench held as follows:- "As regards the applicability of the rule of natural justice it has not been shown to us how under the general law of master and servant in the absence of any protection conferred by Article 311 of the Constitution such a rule can be invoked". In view of this the appellant cannot at all plead that principles of natural justice "have not been followed by the respondent while the appellant’s services were terminated. In view of this the appellant cannot at all plead that principles of natural justice "have not been followed by the respondent while the appellant’s services were terminated. However, in view of the fact that the respondent had conducted an enquiry and in view of the further fact that the matter has been elaborately argued at the Bar I shall proceed to consider whether there is any substance at all in the contention of Mr. Raghavan that the domestic enquiry in the instant case has been vitiated by a failure to conform to the principles of natural justice. The very answer given by the appellant himself in cross-examination would show that the enquiry was conducted in a very fair manner and that known principles of natural justice have been complied with. It has been repeatedly held that whether the principles of natural justice have been complied with in a particular case or not would depend upon the ‘facts of each ease. In the instant case nothing has been shown to me to compel me to hold that the principles of natural justice have been violated. In Russell v. Duke of Norfolk and others2 , Tucker, L.J., observed: "There are, in my view no words which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth. Accordingly, I do not derive much assistance from the definitions of natural justice which have been from time to time used, but whatever standard is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case. In Ridge v. Baldwin3, Lord Reid described natural justice as ‘unsusceptible of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances". In State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh4, Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Court stated: 20. "In a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to heresay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. In State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh4, Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Court stated: 20. "In a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to heresay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. The departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Evidence Act." 21. The sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by 3. domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the Court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. 22. Viewed in this light I do not find that the enquiry proceedings in the instant case are, in any way violative of the principles of natural justice. 23. The next contention of Mr. Raghavan is that the very fact that his client has been denied an opportunity, to defend himself through a legal practitioner would be destructive of all principles of natural justice. In this connection Mr. Raghavan relied on C. L. Subramanian v. Collector of Customs, Cochin1. That was a case where the appellant before the Supreme Court who was a preventive officer was charged with having canvassed business for his wife who was running a taxi and thereby contravened the provisions of rule 12 (1) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955. Sub-rule (5) of rule 15 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. Provide that the delinquent Government servant may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose mentioned in that clause ‘unless the disciplinary authority having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits’. In that case the appellant was not permitted by the disciplinary authority to be defended by a legal practitioner. On the facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court held that since the appellant was being handled by a trained prosecutor before the disciplinary authority he should have been allowed to engage a legal practitioner to defend him lest the scales should he weighed against him and the failure to give him that opportunity vitiated the departmental enquiry. Mr. Mr. Raghavan, relied upon the following observations of Lord Denning M. R. in Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association Limited1, in dealing with the decision of stewards that they will not hear lawyers:- "I cannot accept this contention. The plaintiff is here facing a serious charge. He is charged either with giving the dog drugs or with not exercising proper control over the dog so that someone also drugged it. If he is found guilty he may be suspended or his licence may not be renewed. The charge concerns his reputation and his livelihood. On such an inquiry I think that he is entitled not only to appear by himself but also to appoint an agent to act for him. Even a prisoner can have his friend ...... I should have thought, therefore that when a man’s reputation or livelihood is at stake, he not only has a right to speak by his own mouth. He has also a right to speak by counsel or solicitor". However, Hegde, J., himself in the above mentioned Supreme Court case stated that the rule laid down in Pett’s case2, did not commend itself to the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the learned Judge referred to the decision is Brooke Bond India v. Subba Raman3, in which it was held that the workman against whom an inquiry is being held by the management has no right to be represented at such enquiry by a representative of his union, though the employer in his discretion can and may allow him to be so represented and it cannot be said that in any enquiry against a workman natural justice demands that he should be represented by a representative of his union. Following this it was further held" that refusal by the enquiring officer to the workman being represented at the domestic enquiry by a lawyer or by an outsider would not vitiate the enquiry. My attention has not been invited to any decision of any Court where it has been held that in a domestic enquiry the delinquent officer should be given an opportunity to be defended by a lawyer. My attention has not been invited to any decision of any Court where it has been held that in a domestic enquiry the delinquent officer should be given an opportunity to be defended by a lawyer. In Maclean v. The Workers’ Union1, which was already referred to by me dealing with a domestic tribunal it is stated that "before such a tribunal counsel have no right of audience and there are no effective means for testing by cross-examination the truth of the statements that may be made". In Rajagopala v. Collector of Salt Revenue2, Beasley, CJ., speaking for himself and Cornish, J., stated that "There is in British India no common law right in a party to be represented by counsel in a discliplinary proceeding" . The correctness of this proposition was canvassed before a Division Bench of this Court in Veeraswami v. Provincial Government of Madras3, wherein it is held as follows:- "In the absence of a statutory right, such as is indicated in section 240, a Government servant has no right if the Government wishes to dispense with his services, other than to reasonable notice. Such further rights as he might have were created by the Government of India Act and by the various statutes and rules in existence prior to that Act. If the rights of a Government servant are created by statute or by rule the extent of his rights must be gathered only from a reading of those statutes or those rules; and he cannot have any right apart from those rules or statutes. There is therefore, no common law right in a Government servant to be represented by counsel in enquiry against him". 24. Horwill, J., relied upon the decision of the Federal Court in Quadrat-ullah v. North West Frontier Province4, where the Federal Court rejected an argument that the enquiry against the delinquent officer in that case was violative of natural justice since he was not allowed to be represented by an advocate. In Cyriac v. Vice-Chancellor, Kerala University5, Isaac, J., had to deal with a question whether a student against whom the Kerala University had initiated an enquiry for malpractice in the examination had a right to engage a lawyer to cross-examine the witnesses and the failure on the part of the enquiry officer to accord permission for engaging a lawyer was violative of the principles of natural justice. Isaac, J., observed: "While it is a fundamental right of a person to be heard before he is condemned of any charge, that right would not comprehend the right to be represented by an agent including an advocate, except where on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, principles of natural justice require that he should be allowed a hearing through any agent or advocate. Physical incapacity to defend himself would be one instance. Engagement of a legally trained person or advocate by the prosecution may be another ground which would entitle an accused to engage an agent or advocate to defend him. There are several statutes in our country which expressly prohibit representation through an advocate before statutory tribunals. There is no doubt that advocates form part of the machinery for administration of justice..... The right to be heard through an agent or advocate is not a common law right in this country. All that is required is that the principles of natural justice should be complied with, a person accused of a charge should have a reasonable opportunity for being heard before he is condemned. In the absence of any statutory provision or other rule of procedure, the question whether denial of representation through an advocate amounts to denial of natural justice is one of fact to be decided on the particular facts and circumstances of the case. In this case, Isaac, J., also referred to section 30 of the Advocates Act which reads as follows: — “Subject to the provisions of this Act, every advocate whose name is entered in the common roll shall be entitled as of right to practise throughout the territories to which this act extends:- (i) in all Courts including the Supreme Court, (ii) before any tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence; and (iii) before any other authority or person before whom such advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practise.” 25. The learned Judge observed that the above provision defines the extent of the right of an advocate to represent a client and it also lays down the limits of the right of a person to be represented by an advocate. The learned Judge observed that the above provision defines the extent of the right of an advocate to represent a client and it also lays down the limits of the right of a person to be represented by an advocate. In the instant case, the appellant was given an opportunity to have the assistance of any of his colleagues in the bank which he declined on the ground that he had been refused the facility of engaging a counsel. On the basis of the decisions referred to above by me I hold that the enquiry officer committed no breach of rules of natural justice in not according permission to the appellant to be represented by a lawyer. 26. It could therefore be seen that no grounds have been made out before as to interfere with the finding of the enquiry officer that the appellant was guilty of misconduct. It is not for the civil Court to say that the enquiry officer should not have acted upon the testimony of the officer in charge of the account opening section, the special assistant, the agent and the other witnesses to the effect that it was the appellant who introduced the account in the name of A. P. Kapoor and as a matter of fact he has signed as a second introducer. There was ample evidence that it was on the basis of the assurance of the appellant that the account was opened, otherwise the officer and the agent would have insisted upon the physical presence of Kapoor himself before them. There was also evidence of the ledger clerk Mahadevan that he had himself written the name at the appellant as a second introducer to the account in the ledger. There was also relevant and sufficient evidence before the enquiry officer that the appellant was carrying on finance brokerage business by lending money to members of the staff and arranged finance for others through multhani bankers. Both these acts amount to serious acts of misconduct which would be injurious to the very institution in which the appellant was working. When once the respondent was satisfied that the appellant was guilty of these acts of misconduct it was within the respondent’s power to terminate the services of the appellant. Both these acts amount to serious acts of misconduct which would be injurious to the very institution in which the appellant was working. When once the respondent was satisfied that the appellant was guilty of these acts of misconduct it was within the respondent’s power to terminate the services of the appellant. It is not for me to reappraise the evidence or the conclusions of the enquiry officer which was arrived at on his own appreciation of the evidence. That is beyond the jurisdiction of the civil Court. When once I come to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry was not vitiated by any violation of the principles of natural justice or was not mala fide or vitiated by any bias or want of good faith I have no other option but to hold that the termination of the services of the appellant was for ‘just cause’. The respondents themselves have taken a lenient view and given him three month’s salary in lieu of three months’ notice though in the nature of misconduct proved against the appellant it was not necessary on their part to have given any salary in lieu of notice. 27. In the result, I confirm the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismiss the appeal. In the peculiar circumstances of. the case there will be no order as to costs.