JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is a landlord's writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution against a judgment of the District Judge, Muzaffar nagar dated December 15, 1976. By the said judgment the District Judge allowed the appeal filed by respondents 3 and set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority releasing a portion of the premises in dispute in favour of the petitioners. 2. An application under section 21(l)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed by the petitioners for release against the respondent No. 3. The petitioners alleged that they were the owners and landlords of the whole of the premises described in Schedule I at the end of the application bearing Municipal No. 432/1 Dhimanpura, Shamli district Muzaffarnagar. They alleged that the respondent No. 3 had been let out the front portion of the building comprising of one shop with tin-shed and a Varandah, at a monthly rent of Rs. 175/-. The ground floor of the premises was numbered separately by the Municipal Board as 432 Mohalla Dhimanpura. It was further alleged that the remaining portion of the house in the back portion of the ground floor had been in the occupation of the petitioners themselves. Apart from the back portion on the ground floor, the petitioners were also in occupation of the two rooms on the first floor and a Barsati on the second floor and were using it as their residence. It was claimed that although the respondent No. 3 was not the tenant of the back portion of the ground floor but he forcibly entered into possession of the said portion and occupied the same on 24th May, 1974, in respect of which a first information report had also been lodged. The petitioners themselves claimed that the respondent No. 3 was a tenant only of the front portion of the ground floor of the aforesaid house and as the said portion was required by the petitioners for their son, who was studying in B.A. Final for starting a business, the premises be got vacated from respondent No. 3 and the same be given to the petitioners. 3. The application was contested by respondent No. 3. He denied that he had illegally trespassed upon the back portion of the house and that his tenancy was confined only to the front portion of the ground floor. 3. The application was contested by respondent No. 3. He denied that he had illegally trespassed upon the back portion of the house and that his tenancy was confined only to the front portion of the ground floor. Respondent No. 3 claimed that he was the tenant of both the portions and that he had been paying rent for the same to the petitioners. He also denied that the need for which the application was filed by the petitioners was bonafide. 4. The Prescribed Authority held that respondent No. 3 was the tenant only of the front portion of the house and that he had taken illegal possession of the back portion. He further found that as the need of the petitioner's for the release of the front portion was genuine, he allowed the application in respect of that portion and further observed that respondent No. 3 could confine himself to the back portion which had been occupied by him. In his opinion, the respondent no. 3 was not likely to suffer any hardship by the release of the front portion of the house for the son of petitioner No. 2. 5. Against the aforesaid judgment of the Prescribed Authority, respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal before the District Judge. The District Judge held that respondent No. 3 was likely to suffer greater hardship from the acceptance of the application, filed by the petitioners and thus rejected the application. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. 6. Shri S.N. Mishra, counsel appearing for the petitioners stated that the petitioners were prepared to accept the case of the respondent No. 3 that the said respondent was a tenant of both the portions situated on the ground floor. In this way, the petitioners gave up their case that respondent No. 3 had forcibly occupied the back portion of the ground-floor. Now the question that arises for decision is whether the finding of the learned District Judge holding that the respondent No. 3 was likely to suffer greater hardship can be sustained. 7. Before dealing with the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the need for which the application was tiled by the petitioners may also be considered. The Prescribed Authority found that the reed of the petitioners was bonafide. 7. Before dealing with the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the need for which the application was tiled by the petitioners may also be considered. The Prescribed Authority found that the reed of the petitioners was bonafide. The learned District Judge, however, observed that since the son of the petitioner No. 1 was a student of B.A. his need could not be preferred over that of respondent No. 3. He did not give any categorical finding as to whether the need set up by the petitioners' was genuine and bonafide or vague. If the learned District Judge would have found that the application filed by the petitioners was barely a pretence and had been filed by them to evict respondent No. 3, that would have been a different matter, but the learned District Judge does not give any finding on this controversy of the matter. He contented himself only by observing that since the son of petitioner No. 2 was a student of B.A. the need of respondent No. 3 was to be considered to be greater than that of the petitioners. It may be true that the son of the petitioner No. 2 was a student at the time, when the application was filed, but that by itself could not be a ground for rejecting the application. A landlord is entitled to file an application for release in respect of a need which may have to be satisfied in future. He is entitled to anticipate his requirement in reasonably foreseeable future. It may not be remote need which may not arise at all. In the present case, it cannot be said that the need of the son of the petitioner No. 2 to start a business was such a remote one that the application may be dismissed on that ground. Since this matter was not investigated by the learned District Judge, it appears proper that the judgment given by him be set aside and the case be sent back to him for giving a finding on the question of bonafide requirement of the premises by the son of petitioner No. 2. He will examine and give a finding whether the application filed by the petitioners was only being used as a weapon for evicting respondent No. 3 or that it was filed for the real need of the petitioner's son. 8. He will examine and give a finding whether the application filed by the petitioners was only being used as a weapon for evicting respondent No. 3 or that it was filed for the real need of the petitioner's son. 8. The second question that arises for determination is about comparison of need. In this case the Prescribed Authority held that respondent No. 3 could shift his business from the front portion to the back portion and by shifting the business respondent No. 3 was not likely to suffer any hardship. He held that the application filed by the petitioners was liable to be allowed. The learned District Judge however, did not address himself to this aspect of the matter. He observed that as respondent No. 3 was likely to be thrown on streets, the application of the petitioners was liable to be rejected. There was no evidence in support of the finding given by the learned District Judge. If the respondent No. 3 wanted to establish that he was likely to suffer greater hardship, burden lay on him to bring evidence on that fact on record. In the absence of any discussion of evidence, one is compelled to hold that the finding of the learned District Judge is based on conjectures. Moreover, in view of the statement made by Sri S.N. Misra, counsel for the petitioner, the whole position has changed. As the petitioners have accepted, that respondent No. 3 was the tenant of whole of the premises in his occupation, the question that arises for consideration is whether respondent No. 3 can shift his business to a part of the premises and the remaining part can be released in favour of the petitioners. Since the case is being remanded to the District Judge, it would be necessary to inquire into this aspect of the matter as well. 9. For all these reasons, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the learned District Judge dated 16.12.1975 is quashed and the case is sent back to him to decide the appeal afresh, in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. He may either decide the appeal himself or transfer it to some other court of competent jurisdiction. There shall be no order as to costs.