JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is a landlord's writ petition filed against the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad dated 30th May, 1977 allowing the appeal filed by Bankey Lal, respondent No. 3. 2. The dispute relates to shop No. 114 situated in Moballa Khirki Bazar, Hapur. The shop belonged to a joint family of which the petitioner was a member. The shop had been let out to respondent No. 3 on a monthly rent of Rs. 40/-. According to the case of the petitioner taken in the application filed under Section 21(l)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 the petitioner and his brothers Krishna Nand and Basu Deo were the co-owners of this property. Under an agreement arrived at between the three co-sharers, Kishori Lal was realising rent from respondent No. 3. The ejectment of respondent No. 3 was sought by the petitioner on the ground that he needed the shop in dispute for setting his third sou Shyam Mohan in business who was not interested in studies and had failed several times. The petitioner also alleged that his son would run a business of the sale of readymade clothes and that Krishna Nand, who was a co-owner of the shop in dispute, would also join Shyam Mohan in the business after his term of extension from the service expires. 3. Respondent No. 3 filed a written statement and contested the claim of the petition. He alleged that the petitioner was not entitled to file the application all alone and that the need of the shop set up by the petitioner was not genuine. He claimed that he was doing business for the last several years in the shop in question and that he was likely to suffer irreparably in case he was made to leave the premises in dispute. 4. The Prescribed Authority hold that the need of the petitioner was bonafide and also found that the likely hardship to the landlord would be greater from the rejection of the application than that which would have otherwise been suffered by the tenant from its acceptance. 5. Aggrieved, respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal before the District Judge. The appeal was transferred to the Additional District Judge who allowed the same by the impugned order dated 30th May, 1977. Feeling aggrieved the landlord has filed the present petition. 6. 5. Aggrieved, respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal before the District Judge. The appeal was transferred to the Additional District Judge who allowed the same by the impugned order dated 30th May, 1977. Feeling aggrieved the landlord has filed the present petition. 6. The first question which arises for determination is about the maintainability of the application filed under section 21(1)(a) of the Act. The appellate authority held that the application was filed by the petitioner for the need of Krishna Nand as well apart from the need of his son. Former being the cousin brother of the petitioner, the application was not maintainable. The reason given was that as a cousin is not covered by the definition of family given in Section 3(g) of the Act the application filed by the petitioner, was liable to be rejected on that ground. 7. It is true that an application can be filed under section 21(1)(a) of the Act by a landlord for the need of himself or for the need of his family members. In the present case, the property in dispute belonged to a joint family consisting of Kishori Lal, the petitioner and Krishan Nand and Basu Deo. Although the application was essentially made for the need of the son of Kishori Lal. But even if it was assumed that it was required for the purposes of Krishna Nand as well, the Court below was not justified in holding that the same was not maintainable. The maintainability of the application for the need of Krishna Nand was not justified on the basis that he was a member of the family but on the ground that he was also a co-owner along with the petitioner. Krishna Nand being a co-owner was as much an owner of the property as the petitioner himself. That being on the first ground given by the learned Additional District Judge fails. 7-A. The second basis for rejecting the application was that as the son of the petitioner did not possess technical knowledge, the application filed by the petitioner for the need of the son was not maintainable. For taking this view the Court below placed the reliance on sub-rule (2) rule 16 of the rules framed under the Act. 7-A. The second basis for rejecting the application was that as the son of the petitioner did not possess technical knowledge, the application filed by the petitioner for the need of the son was not maintainable. For taking this view the Court below placed the reliance on sub-rule (2) rule 16 of the rules framed under the Act. It is no doubt true that the said rule provided that if a premises is required by a person having acquired technical knowledge, the same will be taken into account. While considering an application under Section 21(1 )(a) of the Act sub rule (2) of Rule 16 can be availed by a person where the requirement of the same is satisfied or where it applied. It will be not a factor going against a landlord. If a person for whose requirement a premises is required is not a technical hand the application could not be rejected on that ground. The interpretation made by the learned Additional District Judge, is not correct that as the son of the petitioner was not a technical hand the application made by him could not be allowed. In fact, he misconstrued sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 and arrived at a wrong finding against the petitioner. 8. The next question linked with the above question which arises for determination, is that the premises was needed by the son of the petitioner. It was brought in evidence by the petitioner that his third son Shyam Mohan was weak in studies and that he had no aptitude for the same. The petitioner claimed that the said son was required to be settled in a business. The learned Additional District Judge refused to accept the case of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner had not filed any proof to show that the son was not a brilliant scholar. In arriving at this finding, the Additional District Judge omitted to consider the affidavits of the petitioner himself and that of Shyam Mohan. These two affidavits were placed before me. In these affidavits it was clearly recited that Shyam Mohan was poor in studies and that he wanted to start a business for him. 9. In arriving at this finding, the Additional District Judge omitted to consider the affidavits of the petitioner himself and that of Shyam Mohan. These two affidavits were placed before me. In these affidavits it was clearly recited that Shyam Mohan was poor in studies and that he wanted to start a business for him. 9. Emphasis was also laid by the learned Additional District Judge that in the application, the petitioner mentioned that he proposed to start a business, the need mentioned was merely an expression of intention and that the application was not filed for satisfying the need or requirement of the petitioner. It may be correct that the 'words bonafide requirements' laid down that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough and there must be an element of need. In the instant case, however the learned Additional District Judge erred in finding that the petitioner had only an intention to open a business. In the affidavit which was filed by the petitioner at that time the petitioner could only say that he required the shop because he proposed to get a business started for his son, unless the learned Additional District Judge would have found that the machinery of the application filed under section 21 of the Act was used as a pretence or a device for the purpose, of evicting respondent No. 3 the learned Additional District Judge was not justified in holding that the petitioner merely had a desire and not a requirement. If the learned Additional District Judge would have found that the son of the petitioner had already engaged himself in some business or that he intended to study further that would have been a different matter. It was, however, submitted, by the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 that as the learned Additional District Judge found that the petitioner was not possessed of capital to start a business, the finding of the Court below that the premises was not required by the landlord has to be upheld. At one place the learned Additional District Judge has definitely observed that it was not proved that the petitioner had capital to start the business of readymade garments but at another place he himself remarked that the two sons of the landlord were well-settled and he himself was also earning a handsome salary as he was employed in Akashvani. At one place the learned Additional District Judge has definitely observed that it was not proved that the petitioner had capital to start the business of readymade garments but at another place he himself remarked that the two sons of the landlord were well-settled and he himself was also earning a handsome salary as he was employed in Akashvani. These two findings are contradictory and cannot be reconciled. It is not possible to hold as the learned Additional District Judge held that the petitioner had only intention in the mind and that this intention was not honestly held by him. In order to decide this point the learned Additional District Judge should have considered the evidence and then given a finding. 10. Next comes the question of comparative hardship. The shop in dispute was occupied by respondent No. 3 for his business. There was a dispute between the parties as to the business which respondent No. 3 was doing in it. According to the petitioner he was carrying on a goldsmith business which he could also run in his residential house. But the case of the tenant, however, was that he was doing sarrafa business and that he had no other suitable place for doing the same. The parties had filed affidavits in support of their respective cases of this controversy. The Prescribed Authority held that respondent No. 3 was a goldsmith and that he was doing the work as a goldsmith on the shop and that he was not doing sarrafa business. The learned Additional District Judge did not examine the evidence himself and reversed the finding of the Prescribed Authority and assumed that respondent No. 3 was doing Sarrafa business in the disputed premises. Without considering evidence and reversing the finding of the Prescribed Authority, the learned Additional District Judge had no justification to take that view. As a result of this mistake, the finding given on the question of comparative hardship is clearly vitiated. The two businesses were different. It may be possible to shift the business of manufacturing gold ornaments to another place but it may not be true in the case of Sarrafa. As the finding of the learned Additional District Judge on the question of comparative hardship got coloured due to his view that respondent No. 3 was doing goldsmith business, the same cannot be upheld. 11. As the finding of the learned Additional District Judge on the question of comparative hardship got coloured due to his view that respondent No. 3 was doing goldsmith business, the same cannot be upheld. 11. For these reasons, it appears appropriate to set aside the judgment of the appellate authority and to ask him to decide the appeal, afresh. The learned District Judge will consider the evidence of the parties and will give a fresh judgment in the appeal filed by respondent No. 3. 12. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the learned Additional District Judge dated 30-5-1977 is set aside. The case is sent back to him for a fresh decision according to law. There shall be no orders as to costs.