JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - M/s. Usha Sales limited (the petitioner) is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and is a sales organisation for selling the products of M/s. Jai Engineering Works Ltd., such as Usha Sewing Machines, Usha electric fans and their accessories parts and products of other allied concerns. 2. The petitioner took shop No. 46 Paltan Bazar Dehradun about 40 years age. In 1972 a lease was executed between the petitioner on one hand, and one Anis Ahmed, respondent No. 2 on the other. Under the aforesaid lease, the petitioner still continues in possession. An application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed in 1975 by respondents 2 to 12 on the grounds, inter alia, that the said respondents were joint owners of the shop in question, that two of them, namely, Naim Ahmed and Nafiz Ahmad, respondents 4 and 5 were tailors carrying on their business in a house bearing No. 29. Azmal Khan Road. The respondents claimed that as the place where the tailoring work was being done by respondents 4 and 5 was unsuitable, they required the shop in dispute for their personal use. The application was contested by the petitioner stating that shop had been let out by respondent No. 2, to whom the rent had always been paid and that the other respondents had no concern with the ownership of the shop. As such, the petitioner pleaded that the application filed for the personal need of tailoring business of respondents 4 and 5 was not maintainable. 3. Both the parties filed evidence in support of their respective cases. The Prescribed Authority, by its judgment dated 3rd February, 1976, rejected the application of respondents 2 to 12 on the findings inter alia, that the respondents had filed to prove that the petitioner had any other shop in the town of Debra an, either in its own ownership or as a tenant. He further held that the business of tailoring could he done at the place, where the respondents 4 and 5 had started it. In this view of the matter, the Prescribed Authority found that the need of respondents 2 to 12 was not bonafide. Against the aforesaid order, an appeal was taken by the said respondent to the District Judge. He further held that the business of tailoring could he done at the place, where the respondents 4 and 5 had started it. In this view of the matter, the Prescribed Authority found that the need of respondents 2 to 12 was not bonafide. Against the aforesaid order, an appeal was taken by the said respondent to the District Judge. During the pendency of this appeal before the District Judge, Shriniati Swarnlata wife of Harish Chandra Bansal, who is the nominated dealer of the petitioner-company at Dehradun, filed an application for dismissal of the appeal on the ground that as she had purchased the rights of two of the landlords, the appeal was not maintainable. The application was rejected by the Additional District Judge on 10.7.1976. The court, however, observed that Shrimati Swarn Lata could file an application for being impleaded as a party in the appeal. Subsequently, on 17.8.1977, the appeal was partly allowed by the District Judge and the application for release made by respondents 2 to 12 was granted with respect to the first floor. Aggrieved by judgment of the Additional District Judge, three writ petitions have been filed in this Court. Writ petition No. 1547 of 1977 was filed by M/s. Usha Sales Limited (which has been referred to as the petitioner) Writ petition No. 1571 of 1977 has been filed by Shrimati Swarn Lata wife of Harish Chandra Bansal and writ petition No. 1726 of 1977 has been filed by the landlords. 4. I would first take up the writ petition No. 1547 of 1977. The main grievance of the petitioner in this case was that Naim Ahmad and Hafiz Ahmad respondents 4 and 5 were neither the owners nor landlords of the premises nor were they members of the family of Anis Ahmad hence the application filed by respondents 2 to 12 for the need of the aforesaid two persons was not maintainable. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that an application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 can be filed by a landlord for his own need or for the need of his family members. He urged that as respondents 4 and 5 did not fall in either of the categories, the application had wrongly been allowed by the learned District Judge. The submission made has no substance. He urged that as respondents 4 and 5 did not fall in either of the categories, the application had wrongly been allowed by the learned District Judge. The submission made has no substance. It is true that in paragraph 5 of the written statement, the petitioner alleged that respondents 4 and 5 were not the landlords and, therefore, the application filed was not maintainable. It, however, appears that the allegation made in the written statement were controverted by the respondents 2 to 11. The said respondents also filed on affidavit stating that the premises in dispute belonged to respondents 2 to 12. In reply to the said affidavit, a counter-affidavit was filed by Ved Ratan, on behalf of the petitioner. In paragraph 18 of the said affidavit he admitted that "the opposite party, however, admits that all the applicants are the owners, and Landlords of the disputed property and will be deemed to have been always so." The admission made in this paragraph establishes beyond doubt that the property belonged to respondents 2 to 12. Much emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the lease-deed which had been executed by Anis Ahmad on 15th July, 1972. In this lease deed, Anis Ahmad esserted himself to be the sole owner of the building. Counsel contended that as Anis Ahmad had represented to the petitioner that he was the sold owner of the property, the case of the respondents 2 to 12 could not be accepted. The submission has no merit. It, however, appears that a power of attorney had been executed by respondents 3 to 12 in favour of Anis Ahmad, respondent No. 2. It was on the basis of this power of attorney that he mentioned himself to be the sole owner Moreover as already stated above, since the petitioner had admitted the fact of ownership of respondent Nos. 2 to 12, the question of maintainability of the application filed under section 21 does not arise. This was the precise reason that the petitioner did not press this point either before the Prescribed Authority or before the District Judge. 5. The second submission made with regard to the validity of the order of the District Judge granting eviction of the petition in respect of first floor. As already stated above, respondents 2 to 12 wanted the entire premises for the need of respondents 4 and 5. 5. The second submission made with regard to the validity of the order of the District Judge granting eviction of the petition in respect of first floor. As already stated above, respondents 2 to 12 wanted the entire premises for the need of respondents 4 and 5. The learned District Judge found that the respondents 4 and 5 were carrying on their tailoring business in their own house and since the house was situated in a lane, their desire to shift to a market was genuine. It has come in evidence that Paltan Bazar where the shop is situated is an important business area. Hence the requirement of respondent 4 and 5 to shift to this area was rightly considered by the learned District Judge as a bonafide requirement of the premises by them. The learned District Judge, however, held that the need of the two respondents could be met by making them available the room on the first floor. Shri Sudhir Chandra learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the finding of the court below on the question of need given in favour of respondents as also the validity of dividing the premises let out to the petitioner. 6. So far as the first question is concerned, it would suffice to mention that the question of bonafide requirement of the premises by respondents doing this tailoring business in the residential house, which was situated at the Azmal Khan Road, the residential house was not suitable for doing the tailoring business. Hence the finding of the court below that the need to occupy the premises in dispute was bonafide cannot be said to be erroneous. 7. Coming to the second question, it would be noticed that the total accommodation in possession of the petitioner was described by the Prescribed Authority as "one room 8' x 15' a room 12' x 8' and another room 12' x 8' on the first floor." Out of the aforesaid accommodation, the room on the first floor was released in favour of respondents 2 to 12. According to the petitioner the ground floor is used as the show room where the sales are made and the room on the first floor is the workshop where after sale service to the customers is carried out and the products sold by the petitioner are assembled. According to the petitioner the ground floor is used as the show room where the sales are made and the room on the first floor is the workshop where after sale service to the customers is carried out and the products sold by the petitioner are assembled. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the entire premises was required by the petitioner for doing its business and that as the division of the premises was arbitrarily done by the learned District Judge, the order was vitiated. He contended that if the petitioner was deprived of the room situated on the first floor, the entire purpose of taking the premises could be defeated. This was however, controverted by Shri B.D. Agarwal, counsel for the landlords. He invited my attention to Para 5 of the counter affidavit where the respondents had alleged that the petitioner did not have his workshop on the first floor of the room and the first floor was lying vacant. While holding that the room on the first floor should be released in favour of the respondents 2 to 12 the learned District Judge held that for the purposes of the show room and shop the ground floor was sufficient. It was also held that there was nothing to warrant a conclusion that the petitioner needed the first floor, the question as to how much accommodation was needed by the petitioner to carry on its business is one of act. The District Judge found that respondents 2 to 12 had made out a case with respect to the first floor and also held that the petitioner did not require the same. That being so, the finding of the district Judge can not be set aside. 8. The next comes the question of comparison of need. The 4th proviso added to subsection (1) of section 21 lays down that except in cases provided for in the Explanation, the Prescribed Authority shall take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the landlord's hardship from the refusal of the application. The requirement of comparing the need of a landlord with that of a tenant will apply even to a case of partial eviction. The Prescribed Authority would have to strike a just balanced between the landlord and the tenant so that no injustice is done to either of the two parties. The requirement of comparing the need of a landlord with that of a tenant will apply even to a case of partial eviction. The Prescribed Authority would have to strike a just balanced between the landlord and the tenant so that no injustice is done to either of the two parties. It may be that an authority is entitled to grant an application filed under section 21 in respect of portion of building alone but in doing so it must act reasonably, that is to say, that the division should be made in a manner that the needs of both are satisfied. The power to release a part of the premises does not entitle an authority to divide the premises whimsically and capriciously in a manner which may not be useful for either of the two parties. Accordingly before passing any such order, the court must satisfy itself that no hardship is going to be caused either to the landlord or to the tenant. The division of the property made must be workable. 9. In the instant case, on the facts and the circumstances, the learned District Judge found that the division of the property into two parts is eminently just and that it will suit the requirement of both the parties. I hold the same view. That apart, the learned District Judge also found that since the need of the landlord for the first floor was more than that of the tenant and the hardship caused to the landlords by refusal would be more than the hardship caused to the tenant by releasing the first floor the judgment of the learned District Judge cannot be interfered with. 10. Coming to the writ petition No. 1726 of 1977, it may suffice to mention that the landlords could not establish their requirement with respect to the ground floor. The learned District Judge found that the respondents required only one room fer the tailoring business for respondents 4 and 5. The finding about the requirement of respondents 4 and 5 was one of fact. It is not amenable to correction in the present proceedings. 11. Next comes the writ petition No. 1571 of 1977 filed by Shri. Mati Swain Lata. The finding about the requirement of respondents 4 and 5 was one of fact. It is not amenable to correction in the present proceedings. 11. Next comes the writ petition No. 1571 of 1977 filed by Shri. Mati Swain Lata. As already observed above, she was the wife of H. C. Bansal who was the nominated dealer of M/s. Usha Sales Ltd. She filed an application before the District Judge on the ground that she had purchased the share of two of the landlords. The transfer was not admitted by the landlords and was a subject matter of separate litigation. In this view of the matter, petitioner had no right which could be enforced through the proceedings of the present case. The learned District Judge was, therefore, fully justified in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner. 12. For these reasons, all the three writ petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. Under the circumstances, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.