JUDGMENT K. Bhaskaran, J. 1. In this revision under S.103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969 (for short, the Act), two questions of law have been raised by Sri T. P. Kelu Nambiar, the counsel for the revision petitioner: (1) Limitation Act, 1908, (Act IX of 1908) as a whole, having been repealed by the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act XXXVI of 1963) which came into force on 1st January 1964, S.5 of the repealed Act by itself did not survive for being incorporated into the Act (Act 1 of 1964) which came into force on 1st April 1964; and therefore a person invoking S.108 of the Act, in effect, is not entitled to pray for the condonation of delay in filing the application, revision, etc.; and (2) even assuming, without conceding, that S.5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings under the Act, it could not be availed of in the case of an application under S.16 controlled by S.18 of the Act. He has also submitted that Appellate Authority did not consider the case for resumption on its merit, though it was in issue before it. 2. On 29th June 1970 respondents 1 and 2 herein filed an application under S.16 of the Act for resumption of an extent of 3.73 acres of land held by the revision petitioners under them. Subsequently, sometime in 1971 having realised that in accordance with the conditions laid down in S.18 of the Act, no application for resumption under S.16 could be made after a period of one year from the commencement of the Act, which came into force on 1st April 1964, an application purported to be under S.148 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also filed by them for the purpose of getting the time for making the application for resumption extended, and the delay in the matter condoned, the reason stated being that till this Court pronounced the judgment in S. A. No. 1030 of 1964 on 12th January 1970, they considered the revision petitioners to be mortgagees, not tenants, in respect of the land, and the question of resumption could not be thought of. The revision petitioners, as well as respondents 3 and 4 herein, opposed the main application and the interlocutory application. The revision petitioners, as well as respondents 3 and 4 herein, opposed the main application and the interlocutory application. The Land Tribunal allowed the application for resumption, condoning the delay in filing it, treating the application filed for that purpose under S.148 and 151 C. P. C. as one filed under S.5 of the Limitation Act. The Appellate Authority having confirmed the order for resumption, the revision has been preferred. 3. The first submission made by Sri Kelu Nambiar is that, even taking it for granted that it was within the power of the Land Tribunal to treat the application filed under S.148 and 151 C. P. C. as one filed under S.5 of the Limitation Act, the Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority were in error in proceeding on the assumption that respondents 1 and 2 herein were entitled to invoke S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, overlooking the fact that it was a section of an Act, which was no longer in force, that has been sought to be made applicable under S.108 of the Act, inasmuch as the Limitation Act, 1908 (as a whole) referred to in S.108 of the Act stood repealed on 1st January 1964 with the coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, whereas the Act (Act 1 of 1964) came into force only on 1st April 1964. According to the counsel, the real position, therefore, is that in effect S.5 of neither the Limitation Act of 1908, nor of the Limitation Act of 1963, could be availed of by anyone for getting extension of the period prescribed in the matter of filing application, revision, etc. Reliance was placed by him on the following passage in Chacko v. Catholic Bank of India Ltd., 1963 KLT 1068 DB wherein, speaking for the Bench, Madhavan Nair, J., in Para.8 at page 1070, has stated as follows: "In the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act 10 of 1960, Scheduled II Art.3(iii)(A)(3) purports to deal with appeals under S.45B of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, which does not relate to any appeals at all. It appears that in the original Banking Companies Act, before its amendment by Act 52 of 1953, S.45B provided for appeals ' from every order or decision' under the same section. It appears that in the original Banking Companies Act, before its amendment by Act 52 of 1953, S.45B provided for appeals ' from every order or decision' under the same section. But by the amending Act of 1953 the entire Part IIIA of the Act was recast and appeals are now provided for in S.45N instead of old S.45B. It is unfortunate that the Kerala Legislature in drafting the Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, referred to the Banking Companies Act, 1949, as it originally emanated, and not to the Act as it stood at the relevant time. But, it is not the province of this court to remedy the defects in legislation; it can only take the Act as it is, and cannot improve upon the same. It is, for the legislature itself to rectify the mistakes or remedy the defects in its enactments. " 4. The learned Advocate General who appeared on behalf of the 5th respondent, the State, submitted that what is applicable in this case is the well known principle of legislative incorporation by reference; and, therefore, the argument of Sri Kelu Nambiar, that the provisions are totally ineffective, cannot be accepted. To illustrate the legal position, the case in Jaora Sugar Mills v. State, AIR 1966 SC 416 = 1966 (1) SCR 523 was cited. In that case the Supreme Court upheld S.3 of the Sugarcane Cess [Validation Act, 1961 (38 of 1961)] passed by the Parliament, which laid down that S.23 of the Madhya Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1958 (1 of 1959) levying a cess on sugarcane which was struck down by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, for want of legislative competence on the part of the State in the light of its (Supreme Court's) earlier decision in the Diamond Sugar Mill's case [1961 (3) SCR 243] as well as the relevant notifications and rules made under the State Act would be treated as part of that section (S.3 of the Central Act). The learned Advocate General drew my attention in particular to the following passage from that, judgment delivered by Gajendragadkar, C. J. "S.3 does not purport to validate the invalid State Statutes. The learned Advocate General drew my attention in particular to the following passage from that, judgment delivered by Gajendragadkar, C. J. "S.3 does not purport to validate the invalid State Statutes. What Parliament has done by enacting the said section is not to validate the invalid State Statutes, but to make a law concerning the cess covered by the said Statutes and to provide that the said law shall come into operation retrospectively. There is a radical difference between the two positions. Where the Legislature wants to validate an earlier Act which has been declared to be invalid for one reason or another, it proceeds to remove the infirmity from the said Act and validates its provisions which are free from any infirmity. That is not what Parliament has done in enacting the present Act. Parliament knew that the relevant State Acts were invalid, because the State Legislatures did not possess legislative competence to enact them. Parliament also knew that it was fully competent to make an Act in respect of the subject matter covered by the said invalid State Statutes. Parliament, however, decided that rather than make elaborate and long provisions in respect of the recovery of cess, it would be more convenient to make a compendious provision such as is contained in S.3. The plain meaning of S.3 is that the material and relevant provisions of the State Acts as well as the provisions of notifications, orders and rules issued or made thereunder are included in S.3 and shall be deemed to have been included at all material times in it. In other words, what S.3 provides is that by its order and force, the respective cesses will be deemed to have been recovered, because the provisions in relation to the recovery of the said cesses have been incorporated in the Act itself. In other words, what S.3 provides is that by its order and force, the respective cesses will be deemed to have been recovered, because the provisions in relation to the recovery of the said cesses have been incorporated in the Act itself. The command under which the cesses would be deemed to have been recovered would, therefore, be the command of Parliament, because all the relevant sections, notifications, orders and rules have been adopted by the Parliamentary statute itself." If the Parliament could validly legislate by resorting to incorporation by reference to a section which was struck down by Madhya Pradesh High Court there is no reason why by the same legislative process in the present case, the contents of S.5 of the repealed Limitation Act, 1908, could not be incorporated in the Act (Act 1 of 1964) by S.108 thereof. 5. Reliance is also placed by the learned Advocate General on the following passage in the judgment of Krishna Iyer J. in Krishna Chandra v. Union of India ( AIR 1975 SC 1389 ) (Paragraph 13, at page 1394). "It. is a far constitutional cry from this position to the other proposition that where Parliament has power to enact on a topic, actually legislates within its competence but, as an abbreviation of drafting, borrows into the statute by reference the words of a State Act not qua State Act but as a convenient shorthand, as against a longhand writing of all the sections into the Central Act, such legislation stands or falls on Parliament's legislative power, vis a vis the subject viz., mines and minerals. The distinction between the two legal lines may sometimes be fine but always is real. " 6. The learned Advocate General has reinforced his stand, citing the following passage from page 70 of Corpus Juris Secundum (Volume 82, 1953 Edition): "Lapsed, repealed or invalid laws. -When there is no constitutional inhibition against it, the provisions of a law which has lapsed or has been repealed may be made a part of a new statute by referring to the law in general terms and without incorporating such provisions at length, reference may be made to an act which is repealed and succeeded by the act making the reference for the purpose of adopting provisions of the succeeded act; and repealed acts, some of which are invalid, may be adopted by reference for purposes of identification. The validity of the referring act is unaffected when it is complete within itself when read in the light of the matter so identified. An act which purports to incorporate within itself solely by reference and to supplement the provisions of an act which has been declared unconstitutional and void is itself invalid. A statute which in part attempts to incorporate by reference a void statute, although ineffective to revive such statute, may be effective in so far as the provisions of such reference statute does not become supplemental and cumulative of a later independent statute so as to taint it with invalidity merely because the later statute provides that its provisions shall be cumulative of each other and of all laws in any way affecting them now in force in the state. In order that a repealed act may be adopted by reference it is essential that a clear legislative intent to do so appear." The legislative intendment behind S.108 of the Act clearly was to ensure that applications, revisions, etc., might be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the applicant, revision petitioner, etc., has sufficient cause for not filing the application or revision, etc., within such period. It is nobody's case that this is beyond the competence of the state legislature. To borrow the words of Krishna Iyer, J. what the legislature did while enacting S.108 of the Act was to adopt "shorthand as against a longhand writing, " for making provision to the effect that "any application for a review of judgment or for leave to appeal or any other application may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor when the appellant or applicant satisfies the court (which expression shall include Tribunal, Appellate Authority, Taluk Land Board, Land Board, etc.) that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. " 7. " 7. The principle of incorporation by reference as a legislative process has received the approval of the Supreme Court as is evident from the two decisions in Jaora Sugar Mill's case ( AIR 1966 SC 416 =1966 (1) SCR 598) and Krishna Chandra's case ( AIR 1975 SC 1389 ) and therefore it is not necessary to examine the relevance to the facts of the present case, or the correctness, of the ruling given by the Division Bench of the Court in Chacko v. Catholic Bank of India Ltd. ( 1963 KLT 1068 ). The contention of Sri Kelu Nambiar that S.108 of the Act in effect is inoperative for the reason that it seeks to enforce the provisions of a dead (repealed) Act cannot be accepted, as the object of the Legislature evidently was to incorporate the provisions contained in S.5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing applications, etc., in cases where there is sufficient cause for doing so, by reference without copying the contents of that section. 8. The learned Advocate General, however, extended his support to Sri Kelu Nambiar in his contention that in so far as the cases covered by S.18 of the Act are concerned, the provisions of S.108 cannot be availed of. He pointed out that it is not a case where a period of limitation has been prescribed for enforcing a right; on the other hand, the making of the application within one year from the commencement of the Act is a condition precedent to the very survival of the right. Great emphasis was laid by him on the use of the expression "shall also be subject to the following conditions and restrictions" appearing at the beginning of S.18 of the Act, the right of resumption itself being circumscribed by the conditions and restrictions mentioned in S.18. Condition No. 1 contained in S.18 is that in respect of tenancies subsisting at the commencement of the Act "No application for resumption shall be made after a period of one year from such commencement". The Bombay High Court in Simon Reubon v. Haji Shaikh Mahomed Shustary (AIR 1922 Bombay 404) has interpreted a clause in an agreement, reading "subject to the conditions and entering into regular lease" to mean "entering into a regular lease as a condition precedent to the parties coming to a definite agreement. " 9. The Bombay High Court in Simon Reubon v. Haji Shaikh Mahomed Shustary (AIR 1922 Bombay 404) has interpreted a clause in an agreement, reading "subject to the conditions and entering into regular lease" to mean "entering into a regular lease as a condition precedent to the parties coming to a definite agreement. " 9. In a Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court in Madras Province v. Balakrishna Chetty (AIR 1956 Madras 377) Krishnaswami Nayadu, J., agreeing with Mack, J., has observed as follows: (Paragraph 15, page 381). "I am in agreement with my learned brother that the correct judicial interpretation of the words 'subject to' is 'conditional upon' and the introduction of the words 'subject to' in a document or in a statutory provision amounts to a conditions or a proviso. The restrictions and conditions that may be prescribed and the conditions as to license and license fees have to be observed before the dealer could claim exemption from taxation. * * * * * * * * The license and its conditions do form an integral part of the rules, especially R.5, which requires the dealer to obtain a license to claim the benefit of the exemption. The proper meaning therefore that should be given to the qualifying phrase, 'subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed including conditions as to licences and license fees would be that the dealer should in the first instance obtain a license and carry on the business in accordance with the conditions of the licence and would also be liable to observe such other restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed in the rules. The failure to observe, or the contravention of, any of the rules or any of the conditions of the licence would deprive him of the benefit of the section. It therefore follows that the observance of the provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act being a condition subject to which the licence was issued and S.13 being a provision of that Act, which has been found to have been violated by the respondents, they have lost the exemption to which they would otherwise have become entitled to, if they had scrupulously observed and complied with the several provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder, apart from the two express conditions specified in the licence. " 10. " 10. The decision of the Supreme Court in Balakrishna and Sons v. State of Madras ( AIR 1961 SC 1152 ) has also been relied on by the learned Advocate General; therein, in Para.5, it is stated as follows: "The contention raised on behalf of the appellants was that as long as they held the licence it was immaterial if they were guilty of any infraction of the law and that they were not liable to any assessment of sales tax under the provisions of the Act and the only penalty they incurred was to have their licence cancelled and / or be liable to the penalty which under the criminal law they had already suffered. The contention comes to this that in spite of the breaches of the terms and conditions of the licence having a licence was sufficient for the purpose of exemption under the Act. This contention, in our opinion, is wholly untenable. S.3 is the charging section and S.5 gives exemption from taxation but that section clearly makes the holding of a licence subject to restrictions and conditions prescribed under the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder because the opening words of that section are 'subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed'. " 11. It is also submitted by the learned Advocate General that the provisions of S.18 are mandatory, not directory in character. While making this submission, he emphasised in particular the significance of the negative expression "no application for resumption shall be made" used in the section. Support was also sought to be drawn from the decision of the Supreme Court in Lachmi Narain v. Union of India ( AIR 1976 SC 714 ), wherein Sarkaria, J. has in Para.66 at page 726 observed as follows: ".... The primary key to the problem whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory is the intention of the law maker as expressed in the law, itself. The reason behind the provision may be a further aid to the ascertainment of that intention. If the legislative intent is expressed clearly and strongly in imperative words, such as the use of 'must' instead of 'shall' that will itself be sufficient to hold the provisions to be mandatory, and it will not be necessary to pursue the enquiry further. The reason behind the provision may be a further aid to the ascertainment of that intention. If the legislative intent is expressed clearly and strongly in imperative words, such as the use of 'must' instead of 'shall' that will itself be sufficient to hold the provisions to be mandatory, and it will not be necessary to pursue the enquiry further. If the provision is couched in prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory, the use of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory ...... "(emphasis supplied). 12. In Mannalal v. Kedar Nath ( AIR 1977 SC 536 ), Para.16 and 17, dealing with the provisions of S.108 of the Companies Act, it has been observed that where the provisions are couched in negative, prohibitory or exclusive words, it is indicative of the fact that the statute is a mandatory one, not directory. The decision in Lachmi Narain v. Union of India ( AIR 1976 SC 714 ) (paragraphs 66 to 68, starting on page 726) also makes this provision clear. In this context the philosophy behind the legislation also will be of relevance. As has been laid down by Bhagawati, J. in Mohd. Shafi v. VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad and others ( AIR 1977 SC 836 ) -- (paragraph 6 at page 840). "There is one principle of interpretation which offers some guidance in the interpretation of the rather obscure language of this Explanation and it is that since the Explanation raises a conclusive presumption in favour of the landlord in a legislation which is intended to protect the tenant against unreasonable eviction, it must be construed strictly against the landlord so as to cut as little as possible into the protection afforded to the tenant. If the language of the Explanation is susceptible of two interpretations, we should prefer that which enlarges the protection of the tenant rather than that which restricts it." The same principle has been emphasised by Krishna Iyer, J. in the following passage in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai, AIR 1976 SC 1455 : "Statutory interpretation, in the creative Indian context, may look for light to the lodestar of Part IV of the Constitution e. g., Art.39(a) and (c) and Art.43. Where two judicial choices are available, the construction in conformity with the social philosophy of Part IV has preference. " 13. The statement of objects and reasons of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (35 of 1969) clearly indicates that the object of the amendments was to confer greater benefits on the landless and the tiller of the soil. The amendment to S.2(57) by adding clause (hh), (hhh) and (j), incorporation of S.4A, 6A, 6B and 7A to 7D, and amendments to S.14, 15, 17 and 18(4) are some of the instances which clearly indicate that it was the definite intention of the legislature to cut the rights of the landlords and to enlarge the rights of the tenants and the landless. 14. The rights to resume under S.16 having been made dependable on the fulfilment of the mandatory conditions laid down in S.18, and making the application in that behalf within one year from the date of the coming into force of Act 1 of 1964 being one of such conditions, viewed in the background of the social philosophy of the legislation, there is no justification for this court to stretch itself in favour of the landlord to enable him to exercise the right of resumption in breach of one of the conditions contained in S.18 by resorting to S.108 of the Act or S.5 of the Limitation Act. This is not a case where a right has been conferred, and a time limit has been prescribed for the exercise of that right. If the conferment of the right is without subjecting itself to the fulfilment of any condition, and for the exercise of that right a time limit has been prescribed, it might be possible to seek an extension of such time, or condonation of delay in filing the application in that behalf, if sufficient cause exists. Take for instance the right of revision conferred under S.103 of the Act; R.94(2) of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, 1970, prescribes the time limit of forty five days for filing revision under S.103 of the Act if sufficient cause for the delay is made out. S.108 of the Act could be applied to give relief. The very caption of S.18 makes it clear that the filing of the application within one year from the commencement of the Act is an unavoidable condition attached to the right. S.108 of the Act could be applied to give relief. The very caption of S.18 makes it clear that the filing of the application within one year from the commencement of the Act is an unavoidable condition attached to the right. What S.18 has prescribed is not a period of limitation for instituting an application for resumption, but on the other hand, a condition precedent to the right to avail of the benefit. The failure to comply with this condition would entail the forfeiture of the right which cannot be revived by resort to S.108 of the Act. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority were in error in condoning the delay in filing the application for resumption on an application filed under S.148 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and treating it as one under S.108 of the Act or S.5 of the Limitation Act. 15. The counsel for the first respondent made a feeble attempt to sustain the order of the Land Tribunal and the judgment of the Appellate Authority by putting forward a contention that in effect the application before the Land Tribunal was one under S.16A, not under S.16 of the Act. The application itself shows that it is one under S.16. Moreover, there are no particulars furnished; column 14 of the pro forma has not been filled up, and without that it could not be treated as an application under S.16A of the Act. Before the Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority the parties have treated the application as one falling under S.16 of the Act. The application is seen to have been presented before the Land Tribunal on 29th June 1970, and if it were one under S.16A there was no need for an application for extension of time or condonation of delay. I do not think that at this belated stage it will be open to the first respondent to spring a surprise by putting forward the plea that the application is not under S.16, but under S.16A, without any foundation whatsoever, either in pleadings or in facts. This contention is therefore rejected as baseless. 16. I do not think that at this belated stage it will be open to the first respondent to spring a surprise by putting forward the plea that the application is not under S.16, but under S.16A, without any foundation whatsoever, either in pleadings or in facts. This contention is therefore rejected as baseless. 16. The counsel for the first respondent also submitted that the decision of the Land Tribunal is arrived at without considering the merit of the application for resumption, and the Appellate Authority has confirmed it without applying its mind to this aspect of the matter. I do not think it necessary to go into that question inasmuch as I have already held that the application was not maintainable, as one of the conditions laid down in S.18 was not fulfilled. The result is that the revision is allowed, and the impugned order of the Land Tribunal and the judgment of the Appellate Authority are set aside. There will be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.