JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - These two connected writ petitions arise from a judgment of the Third Additional District Judge, Mirzapur, dated 17.2.1978. 2. House No. 1580, situate in Mohalla Bhatwa ki Pokhri, belonged to Smt. Lalta Devi. She had let out the accommodation, excepting two rooms on the ground floor to Nanhakoo (hereinafter referred to as the tenant). On 4.2.1972, Smt. Lalta Devi sold the house to Vishwanath Prasad (briefly stated as the landlord). 3. On 8.8.1972 the landlord filed an application under Section 21(l)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 for release of the portion in possession of the tenant. He claimed that he was residing in a tenanted building consisting of one room, and that the said building was wholly insufficient for meeting the requirement of six members of his family. The application was contested by the tenant. He alleged that the landlord was living in the ancestral house as well as in the tenanted building, and that the landlord did not require the premises in dispute for his occupation. The tenant also claimed that he had established his business as a goldsmith, and that he had earned goodwill and, therefore, if the application of the landlord was allowed, he was likely to suffer greater hardship. In this connection, he also stated that he was living in the house with two daughters who were widows, and they were permanently depended on him. 4. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application. Against the aforesaid order, an appeal was filed by the landlord. During the pendency of the appeal, an application for amendment of the application under Section 21 was moved on the ground that the tenant had purchased a house in the name of his daughter and since he had an alternative accommodation available to him, the tenant was liable to be evicted. The application for amendment was contested by the tenant. It was, ultimately, allowed and the parties were permitted to file additional evidence on this controversy. In the appeal, a commissioner was also appointed to find out the accommodation which was in possession of the landlord and also the accommodation which was available to the tenant in the house purchased by him. 5. It may be stated here that the case of the tenant with regard to the purchase of the house was that the same did not belong to him and was that of his daughter. 5. It may be stated here that the case of the tenant with regard to the purchase of the house was that the same did not belong to him and was that of his daughter. He claimed that the daughter had purchased the house from her own funds. 6. The appeal was allowed partly, and the application filed by the landlord was allowed in respect of the first floor. Aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate authority, the tenant filed writ petition no. 2678 of 1978. The grievance raised by the tenant was that the application was wrongly allowed in respect of the first floor of the premises in dispute. As the landlord was also dissatisfied by the rejection of his application in respect of the ground floor, he preferred writ petition No. 3457 of 1978. 7. The first question that is required to be considered in these writ petitions is about the bonafide requirement of the premises by the landlord. This house consisted of a ground floor and the first floor. There were only four rooms on the ground floor, out of which two were in occupation of the landlord, whereas the remaining two had been occupied by the tenant. Apart from the accommodation on the ground floor, there were two Kothris on the first floor. The appellate authority found that the case of the landlord was that he was living in one room which had been taken by him on rent. The tenant, however, contended that the landlord was residing in the ancestral house as well as in the tenanted accommodation. For resolving the controversy about the accommodation in which the landlord was living, the appellate authority appointed a commissioner. The Commissioner inspected both the houses, viz., the ancestral and the tenanted, and reported that the accommodation in possession of the landlord was wholly insufficient. About the ancestral house, the commissioner found that the brothers of the landlord were living in the ancestral house and looking to the accommodation occupied by the family members and the brothers of the landlord, there was no accommodation which could be occupied by the landlord. About the tenanted accommodation taken by the landlord, the commissioner reported that it consisted of only one room and it was impossible that all the members of the family of the landlord could be accommodated therein. About the tenanted accommodation taken by the landlord, the commissioner reported that it consisted of only one room and it was impossible that all the members of the family of the landlord could be accommodated therein. Relying on the report of the commissioner, the appellate authority found that the need of the landlord was bonafide. 8. Dealing with the question of comparative hardship, the learned Additional District Judge found that the sale deed executed in the name of the daughter of the tenant was a banami transaction, and that the house, in fact, really belonged to the tenant. It was also held that the money had been given by the tenant. 9. After the court below had found that the house belonged to the tenant, another controversy in this connection was whether the tenant had succeeded in obtaining its possession. There was again a controversy on this point between the parties. The landlord claimed that the tenant had occupied the entire house whereas the tenant's case was that he did not get possession of the house at all. 10. For finding out the correct facts, a commissioner was appointed by the appellate authority. It appears that the tenant's daughter did not permit the commissioner to enter the house. Consequently, the commissioner could not submit a report about the actual accommodation which was in possession of the tenant. 11. Although the learned Additional District Judge found that the need of the landlord was fully made out, but he did not grant the application made by him in its entirety and allowed the same only in respect of the first floor. The question that needs to be determined is whether the order of the court below granting permission to the landlord with respect to the first floor was in accordance with law. Undoubtedly, Section 21 permits an authority to allow an application with respect to a part of a premises. But, the partial eviction of a tenant is permissible where it serves the purpose of the landlord and the tenant both. If by passing an order for partial eviction of a tenant neither the need of the landlord nor that of tenant is going to be served, it would be a futile order and both the parties would be dissatisfied with the same. 12. If by passing an order for partial eviction of a tenant neither the need of the landlord nor that of tenant is going to be served, it would be a futile order and both the parties would be dissatisfied with the same. 12. In the instant case, the court below did not examine as to whether a division of the house was possible, and that could meet the requirement of the landlord without causing any inconvenience to the tenant. Counsel for the parties took me through the papers and details of the house, and after examining the same I find that the division directed by the appellate authority was wholly uncalled for. The building was a small one and was not capable of being divided into two portions. As already observed, before passing a partial eviction, the court should have satisfied itself that by passing such an order no hardship was going to be caused either to the landlord or to the tenant. As it was not possible to divide the building, the proper course appears to be that the landlord should be permitted to occupy the whole of the building. His need for occupying the whole house had been made out. 13. So far as the tenant is concerned, he has purchased a house and admittedly succeeded in obtaining possession of a portion of it. Having purchased the house and succeeded in obtaining the vacant possession, he was not entitled to claim under Explanation (3) to sub-section (1) of section 21, a finding on the question of greater hardship. 14. As Sri Markandey Katju, learned counsel for the landlord has agreed to give one year's time to the tenant for vacating the premises, the tenant is granted one year's time to vacate the portion in his possession. 15. For these reasons, writ Petition No. 2678 of 1978 is dismissed, whereas writ Petition No. 3457 of 1978 is allowed. The judgment of the learned Additional District Judge is modified to the extent indicated above, as a result thereof the application of the landlord shall stand allowed in its entirety. The tenant is granted one year's time to vacate the premises. There shall be no order as to costs.