JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is a tenant's writ petition filed against the judgment of the First Additional District Judge, Meerut dated 29-9-1977. 2. Radhelal Agarwal, respondent No. 3 was the owner and landlord of the disputed house. There were two shops on the ground floor. In between these two shops there was a staircase. The shop situated in the eastern side had been let out to the petitioner whereas the shop situated in the western side was in occupation and possession of respondent No. 3. 3. An application under section 21(1) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed by respondent 3 for release of the shop in possession of the petitioner on two grounds. The first ground was that the respondent No. 3 was in Government service and after his retirement, he wanted to start a business in the premises in dispute, after demolition and new construction. It was also alleged in this application that the shop situated in the western side was in a dilapidated condition but as the landlord wanted to reconstruct the building as a whole, he required the eastern shop to be released which was let out to the petitioner as well. 4. The application was contested by the petitioner. He denied that the respondent No. 3 required the shop in occupation of the tenant for the purposes of opening or starting a business. He claimed that the building was in a sound and good condition and that it was not required to be demolished and reconstructed. In the alternative the petitioner also suggested that the shop situated in the western side could be utilised by the respondent No. 3 for the business which he wanted to start. The Prescribed Authority treated the application filed by respondent No. 3 both under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1). He held that the allegation of respondent No. 3 that the western shop was in a dilapidated condition was incorrect. He further found that as the said respondent 3 had not complied with the requirement of rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act, he was not entitled for the relief under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 21. 5. Thereafter, taking up the prayer made under clause (a) of section 21(1) the Prescribed Authority held that the need of respondent No. 3 was not genuine. 5. Thereafter, taking up the prayer made under clause (a) of section 21(1) the Prescribed Authority held that the need of respondent No. 3 was not genuine. It was further found by him that since the tenant was likely to suffer greater hardship, the application filed by respondent No. 3 was liable to be rejected. Against the aforesaid order, the respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal before the District Judge. The appeal was transferred to the First Additional District Judge, Meerut who accepted the appeal of respondent No. 3 and set aside the judgment of the Prescribed Authority. He held that since the petitioner had been allotted another shop and was not likely to suffer any hardship, the application filed by respondent No. 3 could be allowed. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Additional District Judge, the petitioner has filed the present appeal. 6. The first thing which may be considered is as to whether respondent No. 3 had filed the application both under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1) or that the same was only an application filed under clause (a). A copy of the application has been filed to the counter-affidavit as Annexure 3. After considering the said application, I am satisfied that the same was both under clauses (a) and (b) of section 21(l). In this application he alleged that the premises was in a dilapidated condition and was required for demolition and reconstruction. In this application he also stated that he intended to open a business and for that purpose the building was required by him. But as said above, the Prescribed Authority found that since the respondent No. 3 had not complied with rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act, he was not entitled to get a release order under clause (b) of Section 21(1). In this connection it was also found that the western shop was not in a dilapidated condition. In appeal the learned District Judge did not set aside either of the two findings and contented himself by confining to the consideration of the application under clause (a) of Section 21(1). The finding given by the learned District Judge on clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 is not sustainable. 7. In appeal the learned District Judge did not set aside either of the two findings and contented himself by confining to the consideration of the application under clause (a) of Section 21(1). The finding given by the learned District Judge on clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 is not sustainable. 7. For deciding an application under clause (a) of section 21(1), a court is required to find first whether the need of the landlord is bonafide and thereafter to rind whether he is likely to suffer greater hardship. In this case, the learned Additional District Judge did not give any finding with regard to the bonafide requirement of the premises by the landlord. 8. The use of the word "bonafide" followed by "required" shows that the need of the applicant should be real or genuine. In its context here the 'bonafide' means in good faith, not for a sham or a colourable purpose invented as a part of the scheme to defraud anybody, but being in fact, what is in form. The application must not only specify the ground which is honest in fact but must have also been filed with complete frankness. The word 'required' connotes that there must be an element of need. As said by the Supreme Court in P.B. Desai v. C.M. Patel, 1974 S.C. 1059. it is not enough that the land- lord should merely desire to use and occupy the premises. What is necessary is that he must need them for satisfying his need. 9. In this case the learned Additional District Judge did not give any finding. An application filed under section 21(1)(a) cannot be allowed unless the landlord establishes his bonafide requirement. Even in a case, where a tenant may have alternative accommodation available with him, the need will have to be established. It is a pre-requisite and a landlord cannot succeed without proving it. 10. According to the Prescribed Authority the shop situated in the western side was in possession of respondent No. 3. It was, therefore, also incumbent on the Additional District Judge to record a finding whether the landlord could start the business in that shop. It is a pre-requisite and a landlord cannot succeed without proving it. 10. According to the Prescribed Authority the shop situated in the western side was in possession of respondent No. 3. It was, therefore, also incumbent on the Additional District Judge to record a finding whether the landlord could start the business in that shop. If the learned Additional District Judge, after considering the evidence could have found that the need of the landlord was genuine and the western shop was not suitable due to some reasons, he would have been justified in proceeding to consider the question of hardship. As the learned Additional District Judge did not give any finding on the bonafide requirement of respondent No. 3 the judgment given by him is liable to be quashed. 11. The finding on the question of comparative hardship also does not appear to be satisfactory. According to the learned Additional District Judge, since the petitioner had been allotted another shop, the requirement of the petitioner had been fulfilled and he was not likely to suffer any loss in the event of the application being allowed. It was further claimed in the writ petition that the statement made by the learned Additional District Judge that the petitioner had been allotted a shop was incorrect. This could not be denied in the counter-affidavit. Respondent No. 3, however, alleged that the word 'allotted' had been wrongly mentioned in the judgment and instead of it the learned Additional District Judge should have written that a shop of the petitioner had been released in his favour. Be that as it may. since the appeal is being remanded to the learned Additional District Judge for deciding the same afresh, this question will be open for a fresh decision. The learned Additional District Judge would be entitled to take additional evidence from the parties for deciding this question. 12. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the First Additional District Judge Meerut dated 29-9-1977 is quashed. He is directed to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above within three months from today. There shall he no order as to costs.