JUDGMENT : K.N. GOYAL, J. 1. The Petitioner had applied for allotment of a certain building for residential purposes. The last tenant of the building was one Sri W. Bond who vacated the same in February or March, 1975. After the building fell vacant, opposite-party No. 3 applied for release of the same u/s 16(1)(b) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies), exercising the powers of the District Magistrate under the Act, considered both the applications together. He rejected the opposite-party's release application and having regard to the fact that the Petitioner was the sole applicant for allotment, he allotted the building in favour of the Petitioner. Opposite-party filed a revision before the District Judge. It was heard by an additional District Judge. He allowed the revision and directed the building to be released in favour of the opposite party. Consequently, the allotment order in favour of the Petitioner also stood set aside. The Petitioner thereafter applied for review, but that application was dismissed by the Additional District Judge. Aggrieved by these two orders of the Additional District Judge, the Petitioner has come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The main ground, on which the application of opposite-party No. 3 for release of the building was rejected by the Additional District Magistrate, was that the building was originally owned by one Hanery Fanthome, who had died in 1911 and that after his death, there was a dispute between various persons claiming to be his co-heirs. Some of the claimants had supported the application of the Petitioner for allotment and had opposed opposite-party No. 3's application for release. The Additional District Magistrate held that if the building was released in favour of opposite party No. 3, the interest of other co-sharers in the property would be prejudiced and opposite-party No. 3 would get an undue advantage. On revision, the Additional District Judge held that it was the opposite-party No. 3 who had been realising rent from the previous tenant, Sri W. Bond, and, as such, was to be treated as the landlord for the purposes of application u/s 16(1)(b) of the Act. On revision, the Additional District Judge held that it was the opposite-party No. 3 who had been realising rent from the previous tenant, Sri W. Bond, and, as such, was to be treated as the landlord for the purposes of application u/s 16(1)(b) of the Act. He further found that the building was genuinely required by opposite-party No. 3 as she was running a Nursery School in the adjacent premises, and if this building was also made available for the school, it would be helpful to her in running the school properly. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has placed considerable reliance on the provision of Rule 13(2) of the Rules made under the Act. This sub-rule provides that "If there are more than one landlords, the application may be signed by one of them, but in any such case the co-landlords shall be arrayed as proforma-opposite-parties." As the opposite-party No. 3 had not arrayed the rival claimants who were co-heirs of Sri Fanthome, the application was, according to this contention, not maintainable. It was further argued that the jurisdiction of the District Judge u/s 18 was limited to the three grounds mentioned in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of that section. He had, therefore, no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings given by the Additional District Magistrate. 4. We may take the argument regarding Rule 13(2) first. In the context of an application for release u/s 16(1)(b) there can be two situations. Either the application is made in anticipation of vacancy. In that case there is already a sitting tenant who is likely to vacate in the near future. In that event the expression "landlord" can only mean the person to whom rent was payable by that sitting tenant who was expected to leave. The other situation can be when the previous tenant has already left and the building is vacant. When there is no tenant occupying a building, the expression "landlord" would appear to be a misnomer, if strictly construed. Either this expression could mean the owner of the building or ex-landlord of the outgoing tenant. In the instant case, the application for release was given at a time when Sri Bond was continuing to occupy the building as tenant. At that time, opposite-party No. 3 was undisputedly the landlady of Sri Bond. Either this expression could mean the owner of the building or ex-landlord of the outgoing tenant. In the instant case, the application for release was given at a time when Sri Bond was continuing to occupy the building as tenant. At that time, opposite-party No. 3 was undisputedly the landlady of Sri Bond. The mere fact that Sri Bond vacated the building, should not have the effect of depriving the landlady of her status as "landlord" for the purposes of Section 16(1)(b). There being no sitting tenant at the time of the final disposal of the release application, the expression "landlord" should mean the landlord of the outgoing tenant. Proceedings under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, cannot be allowed to be converted into proceedings for investigation of title of rival claimants to ownership of a building. Even if opposite-party No. 3 was not still owner, but only a co-sharer in the property, she could continue to enjoy her possession as such co-owner until dispossessed by the co-owners through a suit for partition. Proceedings under the Act cannot be utilised by other co-sharers to deprive one co-sharer of her actual possession over joint property. Thus, the Additional District Magistrate had clearly acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction u/s 16(1)(b) by allowing this title dispute to stand in the way of consideration of opposite-party No. 3's application for release on merits. 5. So far as the alleged need of the landlady was concerned, the Additional District Magistrate had merely stated that she was running the school at present in tin-sheds on open land and, therefore her need did not appear to be very reasonable, considering particularly the fact that there were other co-sharers. This is not a finding negativing her claim of bona fide requirement in terms of Section 16(2). This so-called finding was itself based on the irrelevant consideration that she was not the sole owner of the building. 6. When it is thus clear that the Additional District Magistrate acted in the exercise of the jurisdiction illegally, it follows that the Additional District Judge was justified in interfering u/s 18(1)(c). It is not a case of interfering with the findings of fact of the Additional District Magistrate or of interference merely on the basis of a wrong view of law on a matter not affecting jurisdiction. It is not a case of interfering with the findings of fact of the Additional District Magistrate or of interference merely on the basis of a wrong view of law on a matter not affecting jurisdiction. The wrong view of law taken by the Additional District Magistrate in the present case affected the exercise of his jurisdiction. Thus, Section 18(1) was fairly attracted. 7. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider the further argument of learned Counsel for the opposite party that under Rule 13(4), as it stood before May 25, 1977, the Petitioner had no locus standi to contest opposite-party No. 3's release application. 8. There is thus no force in this writ petition which is hereby dismissed. No order is made as to costs.