JUDGMENT M.P. Saxena, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under section 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter called the Act). 2. Briefly stated the facts culminating in this writ petition are that Flat No. 3/1 forms part of B B.C. Building Kulri, Munsoorie. One Miss C. Ram was admittedly a tenant of this flat which is a residential quarter. She vacated it but placed Shri B. Prasad, the opposite party no. 1, in possession of it. The petitioner moved an application under section 16 of the Act for allotment of this flat in his favour on the ground that the opposite party no. 1 was in unauthorised possession of the same and it should be deemed to have fallen vacant. On his application the Rent Control and Eviction Inspector was directed to inspect the building and submit his report. On 29.7.1975 he reported that Miss. C. Ram was a tenant of this flat. She vacated it but placed Shri A. Prasad in unauthorised possession of the same. He found Sri A. Prasad, his father, and children residing in it. In his opinion the house should be deemed to have fallen vacant and vacancy be notified. This report is Annexure II. The building was accordingly declared vacant and applications for its allotment were invited. Three persons applied for its allotment. They were Sushil Kumar Agarwal, the petitioner, A. Prasad the opposite party no. 1 and one Shri J.P. Singhal. Since Sri J P. Singhal did not take any interest in the matter he is not in the picture at all. The petitioner's application for allotment was prior in point of time. He prayed for allotment of this flat on this ground as well as on the ground that the accommodation already, in his possession is much too small to meet the requirements of a growing family. 3. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer came to the conclusion that Sri A. Prasad being in unauthorised occupation of this building was not entitled to have it allotted in his name. 3. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer came to the conclusion that Sri A. Prasad being in unauthorised occupation of this building was not entitled to have it allotted in his name. He also held that the need of Sushil Kumar was greater than that of Shri A. Prasad, who was already in possession he allotted it in favour of Sri Sushil Kumar, the petitioner, and observed that if Sri A. Prasad had really any need of any accommodation he could apply for allotment of the flat which Sri Sushil Kumar was prepared to vacate. Sri A. Prasad, opposite party no. 1 filed an appeal under section 18 of the Act as it stood at that time. The learned Additional District Judge came in the conclusion that the need of Sri A. Prasad was more pressing than the need of Sushil Kumar. Secondly, Sri A. Prasad being a public servant and his application having been recommended by the Medical officer of Health, City Board, Mussoorie his case fell in category I of Rule 1 l framed under the Act and he was entitled to priority over Sri Sushil Kumar. He further observed that Sri A. Prasad had no other accommodation and he would be thrown on the street if he was required to vacate this flat. Therefore, he set a side the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction officer and allotted this building to Sri A. Prasad, opposite party no. 1. This order was passed on 2.4. 1976 and the present writ petition has been filed to quash it - 4. At first this petition was allowed ex parte on 19.11. 1977 and the order passed by the learned District Judge was quashed but later on the opposite party no. I got that order set aside as he had no knowledge of he petition on the date of hearing. Hence it has come up for hearing again. 5. There is no controversy that Miss. C. Ram was originally a tenant of the disputed flat and she placed the opposite party no. I in unauthorised occupation of the same. Section 12 of the Act lays down that a landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or part thereof if he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family. I in unauthorised occupation of the same. Section 12 of the Act lays down that a landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or part thereof if he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family. Admittedly the opposite party no. I is not a member of the family of Miss. C Ram and the flat will be deemed to have fallen vacant within the meaning of section 12 of the Act. There is also no controversy that the petitioner's application for allotment was prior in point of time to the application moved by opposite party no. 1. The question, however, for consideration is whether the order of the learned Additional District Judge suffers from any such manifest error of law that it is liable to be quashed. The learned counsel for the petitioner has pressed four main points before me while at tacking the order of the learned Additional District Judge. 6. In the first place it is urged that rule 10 (5) (c) bars allotment of any accommodation in favour of opposite party no. I because he is already in possession of another residential building viz a flat in Pushp Batika, which is governed by the Act. Before going into the merit of this contention rule 10 (5) (c) may be reproduced. It reads : "A building shall not ordinarily be allotted to the following persons or for the following purposes (a) ........................... (b) ........................... (c) for residential accommodation of a person already occupying a building governed by the Act or any public premises other than any premises granted to him free of rent in connection with the discharge of any duties of public nature and situated anywhere in the state or any member of the family of such person or any person whose family he is a member except where such person will vacate the other building or public premises at the time of allotment." 7. The crucial point, therefore, for consideration is whether at the time of allotment the opposite party no I was in possession of any residential building. When the proceedings were going on before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer the opposite party no. 1 categorically denied that he was in possession of any portion of the Pushp Batika. The crucial point, therefore, for consideration is whether at the time of allotment the opposite party no I was in possession of any residential building. When the proceedings were going on before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer the opposite party no. 1 categorically denied that he was in possession of any portion of the Pushp Batika. For reasons best known to him the petitioner did not chose to bring any material on the record to show that the opposite party no. I was occupying a flat in the Pushp Batika. Therefore, on the date of allotment the application of the opposite party no. 1 could not be rejected far on this score. 8. During the pendency of the appeal before the learned Additional District Judge Sushil Kumar again reiterated his plea that Sri A. Prasad was in possession of a flat in Pushp Batika which was owned by Sri Talwar but he did not chose to file any paper upto the time the arguments were heard in the case. After the conclusion of the arguments a letter purporting to have been written by A. Prasad to his erstwhile landlord, a receipt issued by Sri Talwar to Sri A. Prasad and a certificate issued by Sri Talwar to the effect that Sri A. Prasad continues to be a tenant were filed. That these papers were sought to be filed after the arguments were over is borne out by the fact that the judgment in the case was delivered by the learned Additional District Judge on 2.4.1976 and on the same day an application was moved for filing these papers. It was rejected by him on the ground that they were being filed at a very late stage. Obviously those papers could not be admitted at that stag as Sri A. Prasad had no opportunity to meet them. It will not be out of place to mention here that before the learned District Judge Sri A. Prasad had given out that he had vacated the flat in Pushp Batika in November, 1974 and since then he was not in occupation of any portion of that building. Before the Rent Control and Eviction officer he had further stated in his affidavits that he has no other place to shift and he will be thrown on the street if he was required to vacate the disputed premises. Before the Rent Control and Eviction officer he had further stated in his affidavits that he has no other place to shift and he will be thrown on the street if he was required to vacate the disputed premises. The contention of the opposite party even in this Court is that all these papers are forged and were got prepared for purposes of these proceedings. Under the circumstances the learned Additional Districts Judge was perfectly justified in rejecting them and more so when no satisfactory reason was forth coming as to why they could not be filed before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Photostat copies of these papers have been filed with the writ petition also and, in my judgment, they cannot be taken into consideration. If they are ruled out, there remains not an iota of evidence on the record to show that the opposite party no. 1 is in possession of any flat in Pushp Batika. Therefore, no advantage can be claimed from the aforesaid clause and on its basis the opposite party no. 1 could not be debarred from having the disputed flat allotted in his favour. It will not be out of place to mention here that the petitioner himself is in possession of a portion of the building forming part of B.B.C. building. Its number is 5/1. His application for allotment proves this fact as well as that he was not prepared to vacate that building and it would not be available for allotment. It is only at the time of arguments before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that his learned counsel gave out that the petitioner was prepared to vacate that building. It would, however, show that the petitioner did not come with clean hands. Be that as it may, clause (c) was not applicable to the opposite party no. 1 and his application for allotment could not be rejected on this score. 9. The second contention is that by virtue of clause (d) of rule 10 (5) the opposite party no. 1 was not entitled to have the flat allotted in his favour. This clause reads as follows : "A building shall not ordinarily be allotted to the following persons or for the following purposes (a) ........................ (b) (c) ........................ 9. The second contention is that by virtue of clause (d) of rule 10 (5) the opposite party no. 1 was not entitled to have the flat allotted in his favour. This clause reads as follows : "A building shall not ordinarily be allotted to the following persons or for the following purposes (a) ........................ (b) (c) ........................ (d) for accommodating a person who has entered into unauthorised occupation of the building or any part thereof without the written consent of the landlord. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the opposite party no. 1 being an unauthorised occupant, could not have the flat allotted in his name. The petitioner cannot claim the benefit of this clause because it was introduced in the rule by means of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Third Amendment) Rules, 1977, with effect from 25-5-1977. The gazette notification clearly provides that this amendment shall come into force with effect from the date of notification, i.e. 25-5-1977. Therefore, it cannot be given retrospective effect. In the instant case the petitioner had applied for allotment of this flat in June or July 1975. The Rent Control Inspector had given his report on 29-7-1975 and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had passed the allotment order on 6-2-1976. The appeal against the order was decided by the learned Additional District Judge on 2-4-1976 and the writ petition was filed on 19-7-1976. Therefore, the said clause could not be given effect to and the opposite party no. 1, though an unauthorised occupant, could not be denied the right to have it allotted prior to the introduction of the said clause. Even this contention does not affect the merit of the order passed by the learned District. Judge. 11. The third contention of the petitioner is that his application being prior in point of time he was entitled to priority by virtue of rule 11. This rule prescribes the following order of priorities in allotment of residential buildings : Firstly, for public purpose, Secondly for accommodating a person against whom an order has been passed for eviction under section 21, Thirdly, by accommodating others. This rule further provides that in each of the aforesaid categories subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) the principle first come "first serve" shall be followed. 12. This rule further provides that in each of the aforesaid categories subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) the principle first come "first serve" shall be followed. 12. In the instant case there is no manner of doubt that the petitioner's application was prior in point of time but the learned District Judge allotted the accommodation in favour of opposite party no. 1 as it was required for public purposes. I have looked into the material on this point and, in my opinion, the order of the learned District Judge does not suffer from any infirmity. Allotment of a building in favour of a public servant has always been held to be a 'public purpose'. In the instant case the material on the record clearly shows that the opposite party no 1 is a Lab Assistant and is working in the City Board, Mussoorie under the control of the Medical Officer of Health of that place. He will, therefore, be deemed to be a public servant inasmuch as he is discharging public duties and is under the control of the Local Self Government. His application for allotment was recommended by the, Medical Officer of Health, City Board, Mussoorie. His case, therefore, fell in the first category while the case of the petitioner fell in the third category. The opposite party no. 1 was entitled to preference over the petitioner and the learned Additional District Judge made no mistake when he allotted the premises to the opposite party no. 1. 13. Lastly, it is argued that the need of the petitioner is greater than the need of the opposite party inasmuch as the former has got very little accommodation in his possession while the opposite party no. 1 has got a flat with him which he is not even prepared to vacate in case the disputed building is allotted to him. It carries absolutely no force because I have already discussed that there is no material on the record to show that the opposite party no. 1 has got any residential building in his possession at present. According to him, he occupied a portion of Pushp Batika till November 1974 which the petitioner could not rebut by any convincing evidence. The material which he sought to file at a very late stage was rightly rejected by the learned Additional District Judge. The opposite party no. 1 has got any residential building in his possession at present. According to him, he occupied a portion of Pushp Batika till November 1974 which the petitioner could not rebut by any convincing evidence. The material which he sought to file at a very late stage was rightly rejected by the learned Additional District Judge. The opposite party no. 1 is admittedly in possession of the disputed flat and is living with his family which consists of six persons. Obviously he will suffer considerable hardship if he is asked to vacate the same. The petitioner has at least got some accommodation with him. 14. For all these reasons the order passed by the learned District Judge does not suffer from any infirmity and the writ petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case the parties shall bear their own costs.