M. N. SHUKLA, J.-, J. This is an appeal by special leave, granted by the High Court to the Collector of Varanasi under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam questioning the validity of a decision of the Tribunal constituted under section 371 of the Adhiniyam, awarding certain amount as compensation to the respondent for compulsory acquisition of his land. Land measuring O. 49 acres, situte in village Bhadaini, pargana Dehat Amanat, Varanasi, was acquired under project No. 3 of 1949-50 known as (Bhelupur Homing and General Development Scheme ). Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (section 36 of the U. P. Town Improve ment Act) was issued on 17-12-1949 and notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act (section 42 of the U. P. Town Improvement Act) was issued on 22-4-1952. The land in question is adjacent to a palatial building belong ing to the claimant Sri Harballabh Narain Singh (now substituted by his heirs ). The building, however, has not been acquired. The acquired land, which is approximately 15 Biswas in area, has about 95 trees and a pucca boundary wall. The respondent claimed a total compensation of Rs 76,128. 50 Paise be fore the Land Acquisition Officer who, however, awarded a total amount of Rs. 6,394. 50 Paise only as compensation, the claimant challenged the award of the Land Acquisition officer and a reference was accordingly made to the Tribunal under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Before the Tribunal the claimant reduced his claim and asked for Rs. 39,198. 00 only, apart from 15 per cent, solatium for compulsory acquisition. The Tribunal awarded a total amount of Rs. 12,83630 Paise together with interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum on the amount in excess of that which had already been deposited with effect from the date of possession. Aggrieved by this decision, the Collector of Varanasi has preferred the present appeal aud the respondent has also filed cross-objection valued at Rs. 5,164. 00 Paise only. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellant very fairly confined his submissions to only two points in the case, namely, (1) the market price of the land acquired, and (2) the question as to whether the respondent was entitled to 15 per cent, of the compulsory acquisition charges by way of solatium. 5,164. 00 Paise only. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellant very fairly confined his submissions to only two points in the case, namely, (1) the market price of the land acquired, and (2) the question as to whether the respondent was entitled to 15 per cent, of the compulsory acquisition charges by way of solatium. As regard the severance charges, the finding of the Land Acquisi tion Officer was already in favour of the claimant and the same having not been challenged earlier, the learned Standing Counsel has justly refrained from canvassing that point before me. Coming to the question of the market value of the land, again it could be borne in mind that the scope of an appeal under section 381 of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam is very limited, unlike an uninhibited right of appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I may advert in this connection to sub-section (2) of section 381 of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam which reads: "281. (2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall lie only on one or more of the following grounds, namely- (a) the decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law; b) the decision having failed to determine some material Issue of law or usage having the force of law; (c) a substantial error or defect which may have produced an error or defect in the decision of the case upon merits either on a point of fact or of law. " Even clause (c) of the above provision, which maybe said to be of the widest amplitude, among the various clauses under sub-section (2) and permits interference even on a point of fact, does not envisage that the appellate court must, as a matter of course, set aside an erroneous finding recorded by the Tribunal. The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised only for correcting a defect which is of a substantial nature and which has pro duced an error or defect in the decision of the case on merits. Thus the magnitude of the error and its bearing on the decision upon merits are both necessary for successfully invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under section 381 of the Adhiniyam. The present appeal must, therefore, be disposed of keeping that reservation clearly in mind. Thus the magnitude of the error and its bearing on the decision upon merits are both necessary for successfully invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under section 381 of the Adhiniyam. The present appeal must, therefore, be disposed of keeping that reservation clearly in mind. The market value of the land will thus include the value of the land, trees and constructions standing on the land but not any other item which the total amount of compensation in the present case. This proposition of law is well supported by authorities. See Krishna Bai v. Tlie Secretary of State for India in Council (I. L. R. (42) Alld. 555 ). Thus, when the land is acquired with trees the extra 15 per cent, is on the total amount of the value of the land and the trees. See The Government of Bombay v. Esufali Sale Bliai (I. L. R. (34) Bom. 618) and Sub-Collector of Godevari v. Seraqam Subliaroyadu and others (I. L. R. (30) Mad. 151) and Chaturbhuj Pande and others v. Collector, Raiqarli (A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 255 ). In this view the claimant would be entitled to the following compensa tion: Land Trees Constructions Rs. 6,260. 00 Rs. 2,263. 00 Rs. 639. 00 Rs. 9,162. 00 Solatium at the rate of 15% Rs. 1,374. 30 Severance charges Rs. 10,536. 30 Rs. 2,000. 00 Rs. 12,536. 30 The claimant is also entitled to interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum on the amount in excess of that which has already been deposited. Before parting with this appeal I may refer to another agreement which has also been urged on behalf of the appellant, namely, that sinoe sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act has been amended by U. P. Amending Act 22 of 1954 with effect from 19-11-1954, the claim of compensation with respect to solatium of 15 per cent, must be disallowed, it was pointed out that on the date of the award in the present case i. e. 8-8-1955 the above clause did not exist on the statute book and hence nothing could be awarded as solatium. Learned Counsel for the respondent countered this argument by submitting that the same clause had later been restored by the U. P. Amending Act 28 of 1972 with effect from 3-7-1972 and consequently the Tribunal was justified in awarding an extra amount of 15 per cent, on the market value of the property. He contended that since the market value of the land was now being determined by this Court after the coming into force of U. P. Act 28 of 1972, sub-section (2) of section 23 was attracted and its provisions must be applied to the facts of the present case. Reliance was placed on two division Bench decisions of this Court. In First Appeal No. 335 of 1968. The Collector, Agra v. Banwari decided by K. B. Asthana, C. J. and Satish Chandra, J. as he then was, on 4-5-1976, the language used in sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act as added by U. P. Act of 1972 was interpreted and it was held in that case that: "on its language the directive of this provision is operative inrespect of oases where market value is determined after coming into force of this Act. namely, 31st July, 1972. There being no restriction referable to the issuance of the notification under section 4, it cannot legitimately be submitted that the directive contained in the newly added sub section (2) of section 3 is applicable only to such oases where the notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on or after 31st July, 1972. " The same view was expressed by another divistion Bench of this Court in hirst Appeal No. 176 of 1972 connected with First Appeal No. 177 of 1972 decided by G. S. P. Singh, J. and R. N. Sahai, J. on 16. 4. 1976. The name dictum was repeated by yet another division bench of this Court in First Appeal No. 433 of 1968 connected with First Appeal No. 412 of 1968 decided by R. B. Misra, J. and J. M. L. Sinha, J. on 24. 8. 1976. In view of the aforesaid decisions it is not necessary for me to dilate on this point. It would be sufficient to any that I am in respectfull agreement with the abve decisions. 8. 1976. In view of the aforesaid decisions it is not necessary for me to dilate on this point. It would be sufficient to any that I am in respectfull agreement with the abve decisions. The law sseems to be that if at the time of the determinatin of ttie market value the provisions for granting solatium exists, the claimant is entitled to its benefit, not with standing the fact that the said provision did not exist at the time of the acqusition, I would only like to add one additionnl ground for rejecting the appellants contention in the instant case, it should be noted that section 3 of U, P. Act 22 of 1954 contains a saving clause and provides: "3. Savings.-Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 2, Section 28 of the Principal Act, shall, in respect of any acquisition of land made in pursuance of notification under Section 4 of the said Act issued prior to the commencement of this Act, have effect as if sub section (2) thereof had not been omitted. " In the case before me the notification under section 36 of the Town Improve ment Act corresponding to section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 17. 12. 1949 and hence the U. P. Act 22 of 1954 deleting sub-section 23 would not be applicable to this case. Therefore, I am satisfied that the claimant was entitled to a solatium of 15 percent on the market value of the land. The respondent also filed cross-objections for the enhancement of amount of compensation awarded by the court below but in my opinion the cross-objec tions are incompetent. The cross-objections are analogous to appeal and in substance invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. The provision for filing an appeal of cross-objections which is relevant in the present case is contained in section 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. Sub-section (1) of section 381 provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a decision of the Tribunal, if, " (a),;the Chairman of the Tribunal grants a certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal, or (b) the High Court grants special leave to appeal, provided that the High Court shall not grant such special leave unless the Chairman of Tribunal has refused to grant a certificate under Cl. (a ). (a ). " Thus, there is a clear mandatory provision which bars an appeal unless the conditions imposed by sub- section (1) have been complied with. It is incum bent on the appellant to have the bar removed by obtaining a certificate of fitness or special leave to appeal. There can be no valid reason for exempting a cross-objector from negotiating the same hurdle. Both the appeal and the cross-objections stand more or less on the same footing and the preliminary impediment created by law applies with equal force to both. The respondent contended that under sub-section (4) of section 381 of the Adhiniyam it is provided that the Code of Civil Procedure shall, so far as may be, apply to appeals under the Adhiniyam in the same manner as it applies to appeals from original decree. But the opening words of sub-section (4) of section 381 of the Adhiniyam are most significant. They postulate that subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, with respect to appeals from original decrees shall apply to appeal under this Act. It has clearly the effect of reinforcing the bar contained in sub-section (1) for the filing of appeal. I am fortified in the view that I am taking by a judgment of Asthana, J, as he then, was, in The Collector, Varanasi v. Alopi Natt and others (1972 A. W. R. 759 ). The respondents counsel has not been able to show anything on the records of this appeal even to suggest that the respondent had either applied for the grant of certificate to the Chairman of the Tribunal or for special leave to appeal. Therefore, the cross-objections are not maintain able and are dismissed. In the result this appeal is partly allowed. The extra amount of 15 per cent granted by the Tribunal as solatium is reduced from Rs. 2,000/- to Rs. 1374. 20. The claimant will he entitled to interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on the amount in excess of that which has already been deposited with effect from the date of possession. In other respects this appeal fails and is dismissed. The cross-objections are also dismissed. But no order is made as to costs. .