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1978 DIGILAW 996 (ALL)

Central Bank of India v. District Judge, Moradabad

1978-10-16

K.C.AGARWAL

body1978
JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - The premises in dispute was a three storied building situated in Mohalla Chauraha Gali Moradabad. A portion of the ground floor had been let out to the Central Bank of India, Moradabad branch. An application under section 16 read with section 12 of the U P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, was filed by one Padam Kumar on 13-11-1975 for release of the premises let out to the Bank on the ground that as the Bank had vacated the premises and shifted its business to a newly constructed premises, the premises was liable to be declared vacant. A report was given by the Inspector on 1-12-1975 stating that the bank had vacated the premises and that the same was open for allotment or release. The vacancy was notified on 11-12-1975. Subsequently, the landlords found that the application filed for release suffered from a technical defect. Thereafter the respondents 3 to 5 filed another application for release on the same ground on which the earlier application had been filed. By an order dated 19th February, 1976 the Rent Control and Eviction officer found that the need of the respondents 3 to 5 was bona fide and released the premises in their favour. Against the said order, the Bank filed an application under section 24 read with Rule 22 of the Rules framed under the Act for setting aside the order of release dated 19-2-1976, the Bank also filed an appeal against the said order under section 18 of the Act on 14.6.1976 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application filed under section 34 read with rule 22 on the ground that since the Bank had preferred an appeal against the order of release dated 19-2-1976, the application for setting aside that order was not maintainable. This order became final. It, however, appears that the Bank filed another application purporting to be under section 16(5) of the Act on 17-7-1976. In this application the Bank alleged that the Bank was in possession of the premises and that the report of the Inspector was false, baseless and contaminated. Before the application filed under section 16(5) could be heard, the appeal, filed against the allotment order dated 19-2-1976, came up for hearing before the additional District Judge Moradabad. In this application the Bank alleged that the Bank was in possession of the premises and that the report of the Inspector was false, baseless and contaminated. Before the application filed under section 16(5) could be heard, the appeal, filed against the allotment order dated 19-2-1976, came up for hearing before the additional District Judge Moradabad. Since during the pendency of the appeal, section 18 was amended, the appeal filed by the Bank was converted into a revision. Having found that the Bank was not a person aggrieved, the learned Additional District Judge dismissed the revision on 19-4-1977. After the dismissal of the revision the application filed under section 16(5) of the Act came up for hearing before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. On 27-9-1977, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer found that as the application filed by the Bank under section 34 read with rule 22 had been rejected, the application filed under section 16(5) was not maintainable. While rejecting the application the Rent Control and Eviction Officer also made an observation that "from my own inspection note it is clear that for all practical purposes the Bank has shifted business to newly acquired building and, as such, their need for the disputed accommodation ends with the shifting of their business to the new building." Against the said order, the petitioner preferred a revision to the District Judge. The revision was dismissed on 13-10-1977 on the ground that "it appears that the impugned order has been revised and reviewed earlier in vain on 19-4-77 and 27-9-1977. There is no reason to entertain this review application now." Against the said order, the present writ petition was filed. 2. The main ground urged by the learned counsel for the Bank was that the orders of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 27-9-1977 rejecting the review application and that of the District Judge dated 13-10-1977 rejecting the revision were invalid, and illegal. It is a matter of admission that the release order made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under section 16(1)(b) was passed behind the back of the Bank and without giving any notice of the proceedings to them. After the said order was passed, the Bank had two remedies available to it. It is a matter of admission that the release order made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under section 16(1)(b) was passed behind the back of the Bank and without giving any notice of the proceedings to them. After the said order was passed, the Bank had two remedies available to it. It could file a review application under section 16(5) of the Act on the ground that the release order being contrary to the provisions of law was invalid and also could prefer an appeal under section 18 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. In the instant case, the petitioner availed both the remedies. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that since the petitioner was not a person aggrieved the same did not lie. Before dealing with the merits of the order passed on the review application, it may be stated that the view of the learned Additional District Judge that the petitioner was not an aggrieved person was erroneous. Admittedly, the premises had been let out to the Bank. The Bank was in possession of the premises. That being so, the order of release made in favour of the landlord directly affected the rights of the Bank. A person aggrieved is one whose rights are jeopardised or injured by an order. In the instant case the learned Additional District Judge was incorrect in holding that the rights of the Bank were not affected by the release order. 3. Reverting to the merits of the order dated 27-9-1977, it may be noticed that the review application was rejected on the ground that since the application filed under section 34 read with rule 22 had been rejected, the present application was not maintainable. In arriving at this finding, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer committed a manifest error. The application under rule 22 was filed for the recall of the order of release on the ground that the same having been passed behind the back of the Bank was liable to be set aside. Contrary to this, the application under section 16(5) was not confined to this ground. In the application under section 16(5) the Bank had alleged that as the release order was not made in accordance with clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 16, the same was liable to be recalled. Contrary to this, the application under section 16(5) was not confined to this ground. In the application under section 16(5) the Bank had alleged that as the release order was not made in accordance with clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 16, the same was liable to be recalled. In this way, not only the scope but the controversy arising for decision in the two matters were altogether different. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer was not justified in rejecting the application filed under section 16(5) on the aforesaid ground. 4. Shri B.D. Agrawal, counsel for the landlords, however, urged that the application filed under section 16(5) was not rejected on the aforesaid preliminary ground alone but also on merits, hence the judgment and order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer cannot be quashed on the ground suggested by Sri A.K. Yog, counsel appearing for the petitioner. I am unable to find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the landlords. It is true that while rejecting the application the Rent Control and Eviction Officer also made observations to the effect that the Bank had shifted its business to the newly constructed building. But those observations were of a casual nature. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not examine the evidence of the parties and record a finding thereon. An objection had also been filed to the inspection note of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by the Bank. In the objection the Bank had challenged that the inspection report was incorrect and that the Bank was in occupation of the premises in dispute. In this view of the matter the proper course for the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was to have permitted the parties to adduce evidence on the aforesaid controversy and should have thereafter decided the rights. 5. That apart, vacancy is a sine qua non for making a reease or allotment order. Such an order of allotment or release can be passed on the basis of an actual vacancy or on which may be imminent. It can also be passed on the ground of deemed vacancy contemplated by Section 12 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of section 12 contemplates three contingencies in which a vacancy would be deemed to have occurred. In the instant case, the nearest provision to which reliance could be placed was section 12(1)(a). It can also be passed on the ground of deemed vacancy contemplated by Section 12 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of section 12 contemplates three contingencies in which a vacancy would be deemed to have occurred. In the instant case, the nearest provision to which reliance could be placed was section 12(1)(a). This contemplates a vacancy in a case where the effects had been substantially, removed by the tenant. In the instant case there is no finding given by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the effects had been removed substantially by the Central Bank. That being so, the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 27-7- 1977 thus cannot be upheld. 6. Shri A.K. Yog, counsel for the petitioner is also right in saying that the learned District Judge Committed a manifest error in dismissing the revision on the ground that as a revision filed against the order dated 19-2-77 had already been dismissed, the present revision was not maintainable. Had the learned District Judge examined the judgment dated 19-4-77, he would have found that the revision was dismissed merely on the ground of its maintainability. The merits of the case had not been examined by the learned District Judge. A case where a revision filed against an allotment or release order under section 18 is dismissed on the ground of limitation stands on a footing different than the one where a court holds the same to be not maintainable on the basis that the person filing it had no cause to prefer it. 7. Sri B.D. Agrawal, counsel appearing for the landlord also contended that the revision filed by the petitioner-Bank under section 18 of the Act against the order rejecting the review application was not maintainable. I am unable to find any substance in this argument. Section 18 provides that any person aggrieved from any final order made under section 16 or 19 can prefer a revision. Several orders are contemplated by different provisions contained in section 16. Sub-section (5) of section 16 also contemplates of an order which has to be passed on a review application. An order passed on a review application under section 16 (5) would be a final order and hence such an order can be challenged by means of a revision under section 18 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of section 16 also contemplates of an order which has to be passed on a review application. An order passed on a review application under section 16 (5) would be a final order and hence such an order can be challenged by means of a revision under section 18 of the Act. The language employed in section 18 is wide enough to cover a case of an order passed under section 16 (5) of the Act. 8. As would be seen from the facts narrated above, the Central Bank was not heard on merits at any stage of the proceeding. Hence it is not possible to accept the contention of Sri B.D. Agrawal, learned counsel for the landlords that as substantial justice has been done between the parties, this court should not interfere. Had the Bank been heard, the position might have been different. A decision given behind its back cannot be sustained on the ground suggested by the learned counsel for the landlords. In this view of the matter, I set aside the orders of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 27-9-1977 and that of the District Judge dated 13-10-1977. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer is directed to decide the case on merits, without being affected by the decision given in earlier proceedings. He will also permit the parties to file evidence as they may chose to do in support of their respective cases. 9. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 27-9-1977 and that of the District Judge dated 13-10-1977 are quashed and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is directed to decide the application under section 16 (5) of the Act afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above within two months from the date of the filing of the copy of the judgment of this court before him. In the circumstances, I direct the parties the bear their own costs.