Ramsankar Banerjee v. Regional Transport Authority
1979-01-15
M.N.Roy
body1979
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. THE short, but important and interesting point involved in this case is, whether the Secretary, regional Transport Authority, with out any delegation or appropriate resolution, can discharge the function of such authority. 2. ADMITTEDLY, the petitioners were holders of a permanent stage carriage permit bearing No. Pst. P. 738 in respect of stage carriage No. WGA 2504, in Route No. 2 (Serampore to bandel), which was issued by the Regional Transport Authority, chinsurah Hooghly. This route, for convenience sake would hereinafter be referred to as the said route. It also appear from the statements in the petition that both the petitioners are residents of Chinsurah and petitioner No. 2 Ram Raghab banerjee, was to remain away from such place on account of his service. The petitioner no. 1 Ram Sankar Banerjee of course, appears to have been staying at Chinsurah. There was a closure of How rah Amta Light Railway and as a result thereof, the inhabitants of Seakhala and the surrounding areas were suffering much and to obviate such difficulties, the Regional Transport Authority, Chinsurah, respondent no. 1, directed chat two out of the total number of buses, plying on the said route would ply under temporary permits to be granted it. Notation, between Serampore and Siakhnla. The petitioners' turn for such plying the said stage carriage fell within the period from 15th May 1973 to 21st May 1973. It has been stated that on 16th may 1973, that is during the period a of such temporary plying, Ram Sankar banerjee, petitioner No. 1, who was in charge of the vehicle and was looking after and supervising the same, had to leave Chinsurah and he was detained upto 22nd May 1973. During the said period, the petitioners have stated that the concerned vehicle remained in charge of their drivers and conductors, as on duty. It further appear from the statement in the petition that during the absence of the petitioners in the manner as Indicated above and within the course of such temporary plying, the concerned vehicle played on hire for a marriage party and met with an accident. Such accident, caused the death of a person traveling in such vehicle. It is the categorical assertion of the petitioners that they never got the concerned vehicle hired out to the marriage party and neither of the petitioners were responsible for the incident that had happened.
Such accident, caused the death of a person traveling in such vehicle. It is the categorical assertion of the petitioners that they never got the concerned vehicle hired out to the marriage party and neither of the petitioners were responsible for the incident that had happened. It is their case that if any one was responsible, they would either be the conductor or the driver under whose care the concerned vehicle was, during the absence of the petitioners. In short, the petitioners have sought to get themselves out of the liability, which I think they cannot. As owners, they are really bound and responsible for acts of their agents and as such, the defense as taken in the manner as indicated above, would be of no avail. The petitioners have also mentioned that for such action a Criminal case under section 279/320a/ 337 of the Indian Penal Code has been initiated, against the conductor and the proceeding is still pending. In the meantime, it further appears that the secretary of the Regional Transport authority concerned, being respondent no. 2, issued a notice to show cause to the petitioners as to why their permit in respect of the said route and the vehicle as mentioned above, should not be cancelled. This notice, the petitioners have stated, was not served on either of them because of their temporary absence. In any event, they have mentioned that from a subsequent happening in annexure A to this petition, which is dated 18th June 1973 and whereby the said Secretary, respondent No. 2, informed them that the Regional Transport authority, Hooghly would consider the case on the next meeting, they came to know about the initiation of the proceeding. Such initiation, has been claimed in this proceeding, to be void and without jurisdiction or authority, because it has been contended that there has, neither been any delegation of such power too the Secretary concerned nor he was authorised to take such steps by a specific resolution of the Regional Transport authority concerned. 3. THE case of the petitioners on the proceeding as initiated, appears to have been considered by the Regional transport Authority on 26th December 1973, although it was initially informed that such consideration would be on 26th june 1973.
3. THE case of the petitioners on the proceeding as initiated, appears to have been considered by the Regional transport Authority on 26th December 1973, although it was initially informed that such consideration would be on 26th june 1973. Be that as it may, by the resolution in Annexure B, being Resolution No. 3 dated 26th December 1973, the Regional Transport Authority concerned cancelled the petitioners' permit for allowing the concerned vehicle to ply on an unauthorised route without taking any permit or permits. From such determination, a representation which the petitioners have contended an application for review was filed. The fact whether the Regional Transport authorities have such power of review was doubted, but Mr. Maitra appearing in support of the Rule has submitted that even if they have no power of review, yet when they have accepted the same and considered the same in a manner as in Annexure D and more particularly by resolution no. 8 of 24th September 1974, the same would be within the jurisdiction of this Court for its scrutiny. A reference to the concerned resolution of 24th September 1974, would show and that was appropriately ted by Mr. Bose to be an improper resolution, because no reason has been given. Mr. Maitra of course contended that when the very basis of the initiation of the proceeding by the Secretary of the concerned Regional Transport Authority, respondent no. 2 has been doubted or disputed, a determination so far as such rights are concerned, should be made, even if this Court comes to he conclusion that the resolution in Annexure D, as agreed to by Mr. Bose, was not a proper resolution. 4. THE Transport Authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), are created under section 44. Such authorities are required to be created by notification in Official Gazette and they may be State Transport or a Regional Transport Authorities. The constitution of such authorities have also been mentioned in the said Act. As mentioned above, the constitution of either the State Transport Authority or the Regional transport Authority, is to be made in terms of section 44 of the said Act and section 60 of the same deals with the cancellation and suspension of permits.
The constitution of such authorities have also been mentioned in the said Act. As mentioned above, the constitution of either the State Transport Authority or the Regional transport Authority, is to be made in terms of section 44 of the said Act and section 60 of the same deals with the cancellation and suspension of permits. The said section specifically lays down that the transport authority may order cancellation or suspension of a permit for such period as it thinks fit. On construction of section 60, Mr. Maitra contended that when the Transport Authority which granted the permit has the power to cancel or suspend such permit as granted, so such authority would have the jurisdiction, subject to further delegation to initiate disciplinary proceedings, as in this case. In short, on construction of section 60 Mr. Maitra contended that the Secretary of the Regional Transport authority concerned, without the necessary delegation authorising him to take such steps or authorising him to initiate even the disciplinary proceeding as was done in the present case could not have taken the steps in this case. For the purpose of authority and power of the secretary of the Regional Transport authority, first we have got to refer to rule 52 of the Motor Vehicles Rule 1940 as amended. The said Rule lays down that the State Government shall appoint an officer in the service of the state Government to be the Secretary of the Authority. Here, the Authority would mean the State Transport Authority. The conduct of the business of the transport Authorities are also regulate by Rule 54 of the Rules as refereed to hereinbefore and the Rules relevant for our purpose would be sub-rules (b), (c) and (d) under Rule 54. This Rule 54 as submitted by Mr. Maitra does not include cancellation. Although this Rule was made ready as regards service on 20th of september 1975 and Mr. Malay Kumar bose has appeared for the respondents, he has not filed any opposition for and on behalf of his client. He has also not produced any record showing the delegation of powers to the Secretary of me regional Transport Authority concerned and more particularly for taking such disciplinary action as in the instant case. He, of course, argued that even if the necessary resolution was bad, for the reasons as argued by Mr.
He has also not produced any record showing the delegation of powers to the Secretary of me regional Transport Authority concerned and more particularly for taking such disciplinary action as in the instant case. He, of course, argued that even if the necessary resolution was bad, for the reasons as argued by Mr. Maitra, this court should not look into such initial determination and consider the authority of the same, in view of the subsequent and final determination as in annexure D and more particularly by resolution No. 8 dated 24th September 1974, which again, he has conceded to be an improper determination. He further argued that in fact the Secretary has not cancelled the permit and the cancellation was done by the Regional Transport Authority concerned, by due and proper exercise of his power. It was contended by him that the Secretary concerned, respondent no. 2, had only issued the show cause notice which was an administrative act and for which he was authorised. 5. AFTER hearing the learned Advocates and considering the relevant provisions of the said Act and the Rules as framed there under, I find that the act as impeached in this case, could have been initiated by the Regional Transport authority alone or by the Secretary concerned, if he was duly authorised. When, such delegation, by any document or by any resolution is not available, the action as sought to be initiated by the Secretary concerned, appears to me to be without jurisdiction. 6. THUS, I am of the view that the action as initiated was thoroughly without jurisdiction and as such, even if the original order has merged in a subsequent order on representation, this Court would be justified in passing and making the order as proposed hereinafter. The Rule is thus made absolute. There will be no order for costs. Let appropriate writs be issued quashing orders in Annexure B and D. The respondents, of course, would have the liberty, they are so advised, to have the proceeding duly and properly initiated, and also to have the same determined in accordance with law. Rule made absolute no costs.