Judgment B.P.JHA, J. 1. The petitioners M/s. North Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Sugar Mills) have in an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenged the validity of the award as contained in Annexure-6. 2. The Government of Bihar vide Notification No. III/DI-804 75 L & E- 2491 dated 12th July, 1975 referred under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to the Labour Court the following industrial dispute for adjudication : "Whether the removal of Sri Shy am Sunder Singh from the permanent post by the management is proper and justified? If not, whether he is entitled to be posted on the permanent post in accordance with the order of the ex- General Manager ?" 3. The Labour Court held that the removal of Shyam Sunder Singh (respondent No. 4) from the permanent post by the management of the Mills (petitioners) was unjustified. The Labour Court further held that respondent No. 4 was entitled to the entire back wages from 16th July, 1974 till the date of his posting on the permanent post less what he had already received in the capacity as a seasonal clerk. 4. Shyam Sunder Singh (respondent No. 4) was appointed as a seasonal junior clerk by the Management on 29th January, 1973, Prior to that, he was in the employment of the Management as a temporary employee. The workman worked on the post in the sugar cane crushing season 1972-73. He again joined his duties in the crushing season 1973-74. He was paid off the salaries for the crushing season 1972-73. On 21st May, 1974, his service was made permanent by the order of the General Manager of the petitioners as contained in. Annexure-3. The General Manager of the Management made the service of Shyam Sunder Singh permanent with immediate effect. It is relevant to quote Annexure 3 which runs as follows: "Please note that the services of Sri Shyamsunder Singh, Junior clerk, is made permanent with immediate effect. He will work in cane Section during the seasons and in the workshop to note the work of the persons there during the off seasons. General Manager. Copy to Sri Shyamsundar Singh for information and to note for compliance. Sd. T.C.Malhan. General Manager" Relying on Annexures-3, the Labour Court accepted the case of the workman. He will work in cane Section during the seasons and in the workshop to note the work of the persons there during the off seasons. General Manager. Copy to Sri Shyamsundar Singh for information and to note for compliance. Sd. T.C.Malhan. General Manager" Relying on Annexures-3, the Labour Court accepted the case of the workman. The Labour Court also rejected the order contained in Annexure-I. It is relevant to quote Annexure-1 which runs as follows : "All the departmental Heads and sectional Incharges are to please note that Sri T. C. Malhan is no longer in the services of this concern with effect from 1st June, 1974 as per order of the Managing Director. As such, any order passed by Shri T. C. Malhan bearing any date prior to 1st June, 1974 but presented after 1st June, 74, if any, shall not be treated as valid. For North Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. Sd. B.R.Chorasia. Asstt. Manager" 5. On these facts, Learned Counsel for the petitioners raised these questions for consideration: 1. The dispute is not an industrial dispute. 2. The reference of the Industrial dispute to the Labour Court is not in accordance with law. 3. The Labour Court erred in law in relying on Annexure-3. 6. I shall first take up point No. 1, The permanent service of the petitioner was terminated by the Management, Hence, the Government of Bihar referred the industrial dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication. The dispute will fall within the definition of Section 2 (k) of the Act. The dispute between the employer and the workman which is connected with the employment of the workman comes within the purview of Section 2 (k) of the Act. Hence, in my opinion, it is an industrial dispute between the employer and the workman, and, as such, it is covered by Sec. 2 (k) of the Act. In this connection, a reference was made to Section 2-A of the Act which runs as follows : 2-A Dismissal, etc. Hence, in my opinion, it is an industrial dispute between the employer and the workman, and, as such, it is covered by Sec. 2 (k) of the Act. In this connection, a reference was made to Section 2-A of the Act which runs as follows : 2-A Dismissal, etc. of an individual workman to be deemed to be industrial dispute where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a part to the dispute." According to Section 2-A of the Act, if an employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman any dispute arising out of such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute. In the present case, the workman was removed from the permanent service of the Sugar Mills, and, as such, such termination of service shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute within the purview of Section 2-A of the Act. Hence, I hold that the matter which was referred to the Labour Court under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Act was an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. 7. So far as point No. 2 is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the appropriate Government can refer any dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication if it relates to any matter specified in the second schedule. In this connection, he refers to item No. 3 of the second schedule which runs as follows : "Discharge or dismissal of workmen including reinstatement of, or grant of relief to, workmen wrongfully dismissed;" He means to say that the case of removal of a workman is not included in item No, 3 of the second schedule, I am unable to accept this contention. In my opinion, item No. 3 includes the removal of the workman from the permanent service or permanent post. The words "discharge or dismissal" are wide enough to include removal and termination. In my opinion, item No. 3 includes the removal of the workman from the permanent service or permanent post. The words "discharge or dismissal" are wide enough to include removal and termination. If S. 2-A of the Act is read with item No. 3 of the second schedule, the only irresistible conclusion will be that any type of termination of workman shall be covered by item No. 3. There are two types of workmen in Sugar Mills seasonal and permanent, Seasonal workmen work in cane crushing season whereas permanent workmen work during the whole year. Earlier Shyam Sunder Singh was a seasonal workman later on he became permanent workman vide Annexure-3. Later on, the management terminated his permanent services and allowed him to continue as seasonal workman. The question is: Whether such termination of permanent service will come within the purview of view of item No. 3 of second schedule or not? In my opinion, such removal or termination of service will come within the purview of item No. 3 of the second schedule. 8. In this connection, I may refer to Article 311 (1) of the Constitution which runs as follows : "No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed". On a perusal of Art. 311 (1), it is clear that, there is no substantive difference between dismissal or removal. If a workman is removed from permanent service or permanent post, it means that he is dismissed from permanent service or post. If it is so, item No. 3 of Schedule 2 will be attracted even in a case of removal of a workman. Hence, I reject the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the case of the workman shall come within item No. 7 of the third schedule, that is, classification by grades. I am unable to accept this argument. In the present case, Shyam Sunder Singh was removed from the permanent service of a junior clerk and, as such, it is not a case of classification by grades. It is a case of a solitary workman Shyam Sundar Singh. I am unable to accept this argument. In the present case, Shyam Sunder Singh was removed from the permanent service of a junior clerk and, as such, it is not a case of classification by grades. It is a case of a solitary workman Shyam Sundar Singh. His services were made permanent by the General Manager vide Annexure 3, and his permanent services were terminated by the Management of the Sugar Mills. It is, therefore, clear that this dispute affects only one person. If it is, so, then in that case, the appropriate Government shall be at liberty to refer such a dispute to the Labour Court under clause (c) of Section 10 (1) of the Act in pursuance of proviso to Section 10 (1) (d) of the Act. It is relevant at this stage to quote Section 10 (1) of the Act. "10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals (1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a court for enquiry; or (c) refer the dispute on any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the second schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule to a Tribunal for adjudication; Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it so thinks, make the reference to a Labour Court under clause (c): xxxxxxxxx" The proviso to Section 10 (1) (d) of the Act provides that if the dispute is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen and it relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule, the appropriate Government will be at liberty to make the reference to a Labour Court under clause (c). In the present case, the dispute is likely to affect only one person, and, as such, even though the matter may fall under Sec. 10 (1) (d), the appropriate Government will be at liberty to refer such a dispute to the Labour Court under clause (c). Even if it is held that the case may fall within the Third Schedule (though I have rejected this argument), the appropriate Government was justified in referring the dispute under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Act. Hence, I hold that there is no merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners. In my opinion, the case will fall under item No. 3 of the Second Schedule and not under the Third Schedule. 10. Now, I shall take up point No. 3, In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the Labour Court erred in law in relying on Annexure-3, because the workman failed to prove the contents of the document by examining T. C. Malhan. General Manager of the Sugar Mills. In other words, he means to sav that Annexure-3 is inadmissible in evidence. I am unable to accept this contention. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act do not apply to an enquiry before the Industrial Tribunal (See Union of India v. T. R. Varma ( AIR 1957 SC 882 )). In the present case, the signature of T. C. Malhan on Annexure-3 was not challenged either before us or before the Labour Court. Shri Ranen Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, conceded that actually, T. C. Malhan had signed Annexure-3. In view of the genuineness of the signature of T. C. Malhan on Annexure-3, it must be held that the document is genuine. The case of the petitioners as it appears from the order of the Labour Court, is that Annexure-3 is a fabricated document. Thus the onus lies upon the petitioners to show that it is a fabricated document which has not been proved by the petitioners. When the genuineness of the signature is accepted, the onus shifts on the petitioners to prove that it is a fabricated document. In this circumstance, it was not the duty of the workman to prove the contents of the document by examining T. C. Malhan. When the genuineness of the signature is accepted, the onus shifts on the petitioners to prove that it is a fabricated document. In this circumstance, it was not the duty of the workman to prove the contents of the document by examining T. C. Malhan. It is also not possible for the workman to examine T. C. Malhan as he might not know the whereabouts of T. C. Malhan. When the genuineness of the signature is admitted the onus was on the petitioners to examine T. C. Malhan in order to prove that it is a fabricated or false document. 11. In this connection, he relies on a decision of the Supreme Court in B. E. Supply Co. v. The Workmen, (1972 Lab IC 188). In that case, the dispute was relating to the payment of bonus. In that connection, the management produced the balance sheet. The entries in the balance sheet were challenged by the workmen. Hence, the Supreme Court held that the management was required to prove the entries in the balance sheet. In that connection, their Lordships held that "If a letter or other document is produced to establish some facts which is relevant to the enquiry, the writer must be produced". Relying on this observation, the learned counsel for the petitioners contends that in view of the non-examination of T. C. Malhan by the workman, Annexure-3 is inadmissible in evidence. In the present case, the genuineness of the signature of T. C. Malhan has been accepted by the Management and, as such, it is admissible in evidence. 12. There is another aspect of the matter and that is this. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the Labour Court ought not to have relied on Annexure-3 (quoted above) in view of Annexure-1 (quoted above). Annexure-1 is a letter issued by B. R. Chorasia, Assistant Manager, to the effect that any order passed by T. C. Malhan bearing any date prior to 1st June, 1974 but presented after 1st June, 1974 shall not be treated as valid. The order contained in Annexure-3 is dated 21st May, 1974. By virtue of Annexure-3, the service of the workman as Junior clerk was made permanent with immediate effect. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that Annexure-3 cannot be looked into for non-examination of T. C. Malhan. The order contained in Annexure-3 is dated 21st May, 1974. By virtue of Annexure-3, the service of the workman as Junior clerk was made permanent with immediate effect. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that Annexure-3 cannot be looked into for non-examination of T. C. Malhan. I have rejected his contention on the ground that the genuineness of the signature on Annexure-3 has not been disputed. On the other hand, the validity of Annexure-1 was challenged by the workman on the ground that though B. R. Chorasia was alive and was in the service of the Sugar Mills, yet the petitioners did not produce B. R. Chorasia to prove the genuineness of the letter (Annexure-1). No explanation has been given by the petitioners as to why B. R. Chorasia who was in the service of the petitioners at the relevant time of the enquiry was not examined to prove the genuineness of Annexure-1. According to the submission of the learned Counsel for the workman, Annexure-1 is inadmissible in evidence. In my opinion, there is sufficient force in the contention of the learned Counsel of the workman. If Annexure-1 is excluded, then Annexure-3 remains a valid document which was duly issued by the General Manager on 21st May, 1974. By virtue of Annexure-3 T. C. Malhan, General Manager, made the service of the workman as junior clerk permanent with immediate effect. The petitioners, without any show cause notice, removed or terminated the service of the workman which is contrary to law and contrary to the principle of natural justice. Hence on this question also, the Labour Court held that there was no reason to hold that Annexure-3 was not a genuine document. On the facts and circumstances of the case, the Labour Court held Annexure-3 to be a genuine document which was duly issued by T. C. Malhan. In labour matters, we should not go by the technicalities of the Indian Evidence Act. We should see as to whether substantial justice has been done to the workman or not in accordance with law. I am of opinion that in the present case, the permanent service of respondent No. 4 was illegally terminated. Hence, the Government of Bihar was justified in making the reference under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Act to the Labour Court. I am of opinion that in the present case, the permanent service of respondent No. 4 was illegally terminated. Hence, the Government of Bihar was justified in making the reference under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Act to the Labour Court. The Labour Court, after examining the evidence and the documents and materials brought on the record, rejected the arguments of the petitioners. 13. So far as points Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, they were never raised before the Labour Court. They have been raised for the first time before this court which are mixed questions of fact and law. 14. In the result, the application is dismissed and I uphold the order of the Labour Court which is in accordance with law. The parties will bear their own costs. VISHWANATH MISHRA, J. 15 I agree.