JUDGMENT M.P. Saxena, J. -These are two criminal appeals, viz., 632 of 1977 and 679 of 1977, against the order dated 7-4- 1976 passed by the Judicial Magistrate Lucknow. Both these appeals have been filed by the State against Sarvasri B. R. Bhatia and Prem Bhatia. 2. The point in controversy is very brief. The Chief Inspector of Factories had filed two complaints against opposite parties under Section 92 of Factories Act, 1948. In one of them violation of Section 87 of the Factories Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Rule 109 of U. P, Factories Rules 1950 framed thereunder was alleged. It relates to Government Appeal No. 632 of 1977. In the other, violation of Provisions of Sections 20 and 25 of the Act was alleged. Criminal Appeal No. 679 of 1977 relates to it Knowledge of both the offences came to the notice of the Chief Inspector of Factories on 12-9-1975. He sent complaints in both the cases on 11-12-1975 which reached the court of the Judicial Magistrate-Lucknow on 12-12-1975. 3. The opposite parties put in appearance in both the cases and raised a preliminary objection that the complaints were barred by time because they were filed beyond the expiry of three months contemplated by Section 106 of the Act. This contention found favour with the learned Judicial Magistrate and holding the complaints as time barred he dismissed them. Hence these two appeals. 4. Section 106 of the Act lays down 'limitation of prosecution. It states:- "No court shall take cognisance of any offence punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector:- Provided that where the offence consists of disobeying a written order by an Inspector, complaint thereof may be made within six months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed." There is no controversy that in both the cases the Chief Inspector got knowledge of the offence on 12-9-1975 and the complaints reached the court on 12-12-1975. The crucial point for consideration is whether these complaints should be deemed to have been filed within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Chief Inspector. The crucial point for consideration is whether these complaints should be deemed to have been filed within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Chief Inspector. Learned counsel for the State has vehemently contended that Section 12 of the Limitation Act is applied, the day on which the Chief Inspector got information of the offence shall be excluded and the complaints will be within time. There is force in this contention because Section 12 (1) Limitation Act lays down that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. Section 29 (2) of Limitation Act further says that:- "Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 inclusive shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." This provision makes it clear that if any special or local law prescribes any period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the provisions of Section 12 shall be applicable to it unless there is a provision in the special law to exclude it. There is no provision in the Factories Act to exclude the application of Section 12 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, I am of the view that Section 12 of Limitation Act is applicable to the Factories Act. I am fortified in this view by a host of decisions. In B. P. Thakur v. State ( AIR 1959 All 787 ) Desai, J. (as he then was) observed:- "Section 29 (2) (at Limitation Act makes Section 12 of that Act applicable to any special or local Act which prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from that prescribed in the Limitation Act and the Factories Act is such a special Act. Therefore, Section 12 of the Limitation Act is applicable in computing the period of limitation prescribed by Section 106 of the Factories Act and the date on which the offence came to the notice of the Chief Inspector is to be excluded in computing the period of three calender months " He further observed:- "This is also the rule of interpretation under the common law. The first day is to be excluded in computing the period of limitation." In the aforesaid case reliance was placed on the case of Burnet v. Willingham Loan and T. Co. (1930) 282 US 437 in which Holmes J. had observed that, "When we say "four years after the return was filed", by common usage we think of four years after the day on which the return was filed." 5. The question again cropped up in the case of Sita Ram v. State ( AIR 1961 All 151 ) in which it was held that the date on which the offence under the Act came to the notice of the Inspector is to be excluded in computing the period of three months for filing the complaint. This view was taken on the ground that Limitation Act prescribes no period of limitation for a complaint under the Factories Act. Therefore, the period prescribed by Section 106 of the Act must be held to be different and the first limb of sub-section (2) of Section 29 Limitation Act would apply. It was also observed that even if it were held that the first limb does not apply, the second limb of sub-section (2) of Section 29 would apply. Thus Section 12, Limitation Act, would apply because it has not been expressly excluded by the Factories Act. 6. The expression "within three months of date of knowledge" used in Section 106 of the Act has also been the subject-matter of discussion in several cases. In Damodaran v. State of Kerala (1961 (2) Cri LJ 102) the Kerala High Court held that where the expression used is within three months of the date of knowledge, the first day is to be excluded. The same view was taken in the case of Sita Ram v. State (Ibid). 7. Section 3 (35) of the General Clauses Act says that "month" shall mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar. 8. The same view was taken in the case of Sita Ram v. State (Ibid). 7. Section 3 (35) of the General Clauses Act says that "month" shall mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar. 8. In the instant case there is no controversy that the offence came to the knowledge of the Chief Inspector on 12-9-1975 and the complaint reached the court on 12-12-1975. As discussed above the date of knowledge is to bet excluded. Computing the period according to English Calendar Month three months expired on 12-12-1975 and the complaints were clearly within limitation. 9. Learned counsel for opposite parties has vehemently contended that Sections 12 and 29 (2) of the Limitation Act relate to suit, appeal or application. The complaints filed by the Chief Inspector did not belong to any of these categories. Therefore, these provisions would not be applicable. I am reluctant to find much force in this contention. "Complaint" has been defined in Section 2 (d) Cr. P. C. as follows:- "Complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report." The definition makes it clear that no nomenclature is prescribed for the document which may be moved before a Magistrate to take action. In order that it may be treated as a complaint it should contain the allegation that a person known or unknown has committed an offence and action be taken against him. Therefore, an application if it contains the requisite allegations can also be treated as a complaint. In Sita Ram v. State (Ibid) it was also held that "complaint" referred to in Section 196 of the Act is application within the meaning of Section 29 (2) Limitation Act and Section 12 is applicable to it. For all these reasons I am in judgment that both the complaints were within time and the learned Judicial Magistrate was wrong in dismissing them. 10. Both the appeals are allowed and the order dated 7-4-1976 passed in both the cases are set aside. The complaints in both the cases are held to be within time. The learned Judicial Magistrate shall proceed according to law.