JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - In these connected writ petitions, briefly speaking, the question, which falls for determination is the validity of the imposition of fee imposed by the Municipal Board, Firozabad through its Notification No. 304/XXIII - 2 (4)-73 74, dated November 9, 1974. All these petitions have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The petitioners are engaged in manufacture of bangles and other glass articles at Firozabad. There are furnances in which glass is melted. Generally these factories have two kinds of furnaces. One of them is known as Si/car furnance, the other is known as Belan furnance. The town of Firozabad specialises in the manufacture of glass-bangles and a large number of factories, big or small, are engaged in the said business. The burning of coal in the process in manufacturing results in the emission of smoke. For the safety of the residents of the Municipal Board, the Municipal Board Firozabad framed regulations in 1927. Under this regulations, each one of the factories is required to have a 75 feet high Chimney. These bye-laws have been framed by the Municipal Board Firozahad under Section 298 - List 1 - H (m). G (b) and J-9 (d) of the U.P. Municipalities Act. A perusal of the aforesaid notification wouid show that the Municipal Board Firozabad was to issue licence to glass-bangles manufacturing factories and a licence fee was to be paid by them as per schedule The factories having Japanese type of furnance were required to pay a licence fee of Rs. 10 whereas the factories having Direct pot furnances were to pay Rs. 25 as licence fee. The licence fee thereafter was raised to Rs. 20 for both type of furnances. 3. On 9-11-1974, the Board increased the licence and renewal fee from Rs. 20 to Rs. 1,000 per year. 4. Challenging the validity of the aforesaid notification, the present writ petition was filed on the ground that the imposition of such a high rate of licence fee was not justified and that as a result thereof it ceased to be a fee and become a tax, which the Municipal Board had no power to impose. 1,000 per year. 4. Challenging the validity of the aforesaid notification, the present writ petition was filed on the ground that the imposition of such a high rate of licence fee was not justified and that as a result thereof it ceased to be a fee and become a tax, which the Municipal Board had no power to impose. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that a licence fee could be levied only for the services rendered or benefits provided and the imposition must be incommensurate with the services and advantages so rendered. Counsel for the petitioners contended that since the Municipal Board did not render any service to the petitioners, the imposition was void. 5. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of Municipal Board. In paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit, the reply given was that since .there were a number of manufacturing units at Firozabad. the Municipal Board had to employ a number of trucks for throwing garbage. For this purpose the Municipal Board was also required to employ a number of Sanitary Inspectors, Health Officer etc. Apart from the inspection staff, the Municipal Board alleged that a large number of staff had been recruited for changing and dealing the road. 6. In the counter-affidavit, filed on behalf of the petitioners, the allegations made in the writ petition have been denied. 7. Now the first question for consideration is what is the nature of a fee. This question has been the subject-matter of consideration in a number of cases by the Supreme Court. A fee is generally defined to be a charge for special service rendered to individuals by the Government or some other agency like a local authority or statutory corporation. The amount of fee is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the State in rendering the service. 8. A fee is generally defined to be a charge for special service rendered to individuals by the Government or some other agency like a local authority or statutory corporation. The amount of fee is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the State in rendering the service. 8. In State of Maharashtra v. Salvation Army Western India Territory [ AIR 1975 SC 846 ], the Supreme Court considered the nature of fee and Mathew, J observed as under : - "As a fee is regarded as a sort of return or consideration for services rendered, it is necessary that the levy of fees should be co-related to the expenses incurred by the agency in rendering the service." According to the learned Judges in this case, two elements are essential in order that the payment may be regarded as fee, i. e. firstly, it must be levied in consideration of certain services, which the individual accept either willingly or unwillingly and in the second place, the amount collected must be ear marked to meet the expenses of rendering the services and must not go to the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes. 9. In a recent case, after discussing a number of authorities, the Supreme Court, has laid down the following essential ingredients for satisfying the test for a valid levy of fee in Civil Appeal No. 1083 of 1977 - Kewal Krihua Puri and another v. State of Punjab and another, decided on May 4, 1979 : - "(1) That the amount of fee realised must be ear marked for rendering services to the licensees in the notified market area and a good and substantial portion of it must be shown to be expended for this purpose. (2) That the services rendered to the licensees must be in relation to the transaction of purchase or sale of the agricultural produce (3) That while rendering services in the market area for the purpose of facilitating the transactions of purchase and sale with a view to achieve the objects of the marketing legislation it is not necessary to confer the whole of the benefit on the licensees but some special benefits must be conferred on them which have a direct, close and reasonable correlation between the licensees and the transactions. (4) That while conferring some special benefits on the licensees it is permissible to render such service in the market which may be in the general interest of all concerned with the transactions taking place in the market. (5) That spending the amount of market fees for the purpose of augmenting the agricultural produce, its facility of transport in villages and to provide other facilities meant mainly or exclusively for the benefit of the Agriculturists is not permissible on the ground that such service in the long run go to increase the volume of transactions in the market ultimately, benefiting the traders also. Such an indirect and remote benefit to the traders is in no sense a special benefit to them. (6) That the element of quid pro quo may not be possible, or even necessary to be established with arithmetical exactitude but even broadly and reasonably it must be established by the authorities who charge the fees that the amount is being spent for rendering services to those on whom falls the burden of the fee. (7) At least a good and substantial portion of the amount collected on account of fees, may be in the neighbourhood of two-thirds or time-fourths, must be shown with reasonable certainty as being spent for rendering services of the kind mentioned above." From the above, it isestablished that in order that a fee may be found to be valid (1) there must be an element of quid pro quo i.e., to say the authority levying fee must render service for the fee levied, (2) that the fee realised must be spent for the purpose of imposition arid should not form part of the general revenue. 10. Since the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court given in the case of Kewal Krishna Puri has laid down the principles exhaustively, it is 'die to parade the familiar learning on the question of the nature of a fee. We may, however, refer to a decision given in the case of Nagar Mahapalika Varanasi v. Durga Das Bhattacharya, (AIR 1961 SC 1119 at page 1125) where a certain bye-law under which the owners of Rikshaus were liable to pay an annual sum of Rs. 3/- and the drivers a sum of Rs. 5 had been challenged. We may, however, refer to a decision given in the case of Nagar Mahapalika Varanasi v. Durga Das Bhattacharya, (AIR 1961 SC 1119 at page 1125) where a certain bye-law under which the owners of Rikshaus were liable to pay an annual sum of Rs. 3/- and the drivers a sum of Rs. 5 had been challenged. The Supreme Court held that : - "The reason was, under Section 7 (a) of the Act.it was the statutory duty of the Municipal Board to light public streets and places and under Clause (h) of the same section to construct and maintain public streets, culverts etc., the expenditure under these two items was incurred by the Municipal Board in the discharge of its statutory duty and it is manifest that the license fee cannot be imposed for reimbursing the cost of original municipal services, which the Municipal Board was bound under the statute to provide to the general public." 11. In the instant case, the controversy is about services, which are rendered to the petitioners-. In paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit, the Municipal Board stated that the income earned from the license fee is spent, (i) on trucks employed for throwing garbage, (ii) on salaries paid to Sanitary Inspectors, Health Officers, for maintaining local hygiene and sanitation, (iii) on salaries of staff for cleaning and clearing the roads, (iv) on removing the ' spieled coal, silica, sand and other raw materials, which are brought by the factory owners for manufacturing glass articles, (v) for maintaining dumping ground for the disposal of the refuge, which is collected from the factories. 12. In paragraph 4 of the rejoinder affidavit, the allegation of the Municipal Board have been denied; The petitioner has denied that any garbage is thrown out of the factories. According to the petitioner, all the things left over after the manufacture of glass articles are sold for different purposes The petitioner denied that any special staff is maintained by the Municipal Board for cleaning the roads or removing refuge. The petitioner claims that no refuge gets collected at the factory site, which is required to be removed and dumped by the Municipal Board The allegations about the engagement of trucks for collecting the refuge and other materials have been asserted as false. 13. The petitioner claims that no refuge gets collected at the factory site, which is required to be removed and dumped by the Municipal Board The allegations about the engagement of trucks for collecting the refuge and other materials have been asserted as false. 13. Apart from the above allegations, which have been narrated above,' the petitioner has stated in paragraph 5 of the rejoinder affidavit that the Board does not have even half a dozen trucks, trollers and tractors. It has further been claimed that the Municipal Board docs not maintain any checking staff for the purpose of the facility or service to be rendered to the factories. 14. After considering the affidavits of the parties, we and that the Municipal Board has miserably failed in proving that the income realised has either been separately ear-marked for the purposes of rendering services to the factories or that a substantial portion of the same has been utilised for the purposes of the factories. The Municipal Board has not filed its accounts to establish the justification of the levy of fee The allegation that there is a correlation between the levy and the service could proved by showing that the collections are not merged in the general revenue and are set apart for rendering services to the persons from whom the same is realised but the Municipal Board did not bring any evidence on record to prove the same. 15. We had even adjourned the hearing of the case twice to enable the Municipal Board to file relevant papers which could prove the expenditure incurred by it. In compliance with that order, the Municipal Board has filed a supplementary affidavit and in paragraph 5 of this affidavit an admission has been made that before the filing of the present writ petition, the entire income, as realised on account of the licence fee, was added to the revenue of the Municipal Board and expenditure urged to be made In paragraph 6. however, the allegations are that the Municipal Board was now maintaining separate registers. The counsel for the Municipal Board, however, admitted that there was nothing in the budge', which could establish that the substantial portion of the income earned from the fee was proposed to be spent on the persons from whom the fee had to be realised. 16. however, the allegations are that the Municipal Board was now maintaining separate registers. The counsel for the Municipal Board, however, admitted that there was nothing in the budge', which could establish that the substantial portion of the income earned from the fee was proposed to be spent on the persons from whom the fee had to be realised. 16. Most of the activities in which the Municipal Board incurs expenditure are those which are covered by Section 7 (1) of the Municipalities Act. Under the aforesaid section, it was the statutory duty of the Municipal Board to make reasonable provision within the Municipality for cleaning public streets, places and drains. The expenditure under these items incurred by the Municipal Board is the discharge of its statutory duty, and, as such, the licence tee could not be imposed for reimbursing the cost of ordinary municipal services, which the Municipal Board was bound under the statute to provide to the general public. 17. In Nagar Mahapalika Varanasi v. Durga Das (supra), the Supreme Court held that the expenditure made in the discharge of statutory duty could not justify the imposition of licence fee to the same affair. In the decision of the Supreme Court given in Govt. of Andhra Bradesh and others v. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. [ AIR 1975 SC 2037 ], the Supreme Court held : - "laying of roads and drainage or supply of street lights or statutory functions of public authorities and it is difficult to hold in the absence of any material, that in such services as bad been mentioned thus, have, in fact, been rendered to the respondents " 18. From what we have said above, we find that the amount of fee having not been ear-marked for rendering services to the licensees and a good and substantial portion of it having not been shown to have been expended for this purpose, the levy must be held to be invalid. 19. From what we have said above, we find that the amount of fee having not been ear-marked for rendering services to the licensees and a good and substantial portion of it having not been shown to have been expended for this purpose, the levy must be held to be invalid. 19. Sri G. N. Verma, counsel appearing for the Municipal Board, placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court, given in the case of State of Maharashtra and others v. Salvation Army, Western India Territory (supra) and urged that as in the said case, the levy bad been found to be valid despite the proof and a major portion of the same had not been spent, this court should also hold that the levy was not liable to be struck down. In our opinion this decision is not of any help to the respondents We have already extracted the portion of this judgment wherein the nature of fee have been discussed. Mathew J. speaking for the Court, upheld to a certain extent the fee charged under the Public Trust Act. 1980 on the ground that taking precautionary measures to see that public Trust are administer for the purposes intended by authors of the Trust and exercising control and supervision with a view to preserve the Trust properties from being wasted were certainly special services for the benefit of the Trust. In this way the Supreme Court found that the special benefit for the payer of the lee had been established. It is, however, noteworthy that when it was demonstrated that in spite of the accumulation of the surplus from 1953 onwards, the authorities went on charging the fee of 2 per cent, which has assumed a character of tax, the Supreme Court declared the levy to be without the authority of law after 31st March, 1970. 20. Sri G. N. Verma, counsel for the Municipal Board, produced before us a register showing the accounts of expenditure incurred in hiring trucks. On the basis of this register, counsel contended that the expenditure incurred over the petitioners was established from the same. We ate unable to accept the submission. 20. Sri G. N. Verma, counsel for the Municipal Board, produced before us a register showing the accounts of expenditure incurred in hiring trucks. On the basis of this register, counsel contended that the expenditure incurred over the petitioners was established from the same. We ate unable to accept the submission. There is nothing in the register, which could indicate that the income from the licence fee was to be ear marked and was meant to be spent oo the petitioners This register does not give any idea whether the hiring charges we.e paid for the trucks needed for cleanliness of the city. These registers do not' establish the requirement of law namely that the reasonable proportion of the income derived from licence fee was being spent in rendering special services on the persons like the petitioners. 21. For these reasons, we find that the Notification No. 264/XXII - 2 (4)-73-74, dated November 9, 1974 enhancing the k-is liable to be quashed. The respondent Municipal Board is restrained from realising the enhanced licence fee at the base of Rs 1,000 from factory. However, we are not indited to disturb the imposition at the rate in operation before the afore-said notification. The petitioner will also be entitled to get cost from the respondent No. 1.