JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a reference made by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division recommending that the revision filed by Atiqur Rahman and others against the order of the Judicial Officer, farrukhabad, dated March 9, 1971 in a suit under Section 229-B/209, UPZA and LR Act may be rejected. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Jhunku and Rameshwar, opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 had filed a suit under Sections 229-B/209, UUPZA and LR Act against Atiqur Rahman and others. This was dismissed for default on December 18, 1968. The same day the plaintiffs moved an application for restoring the case. This application was also dismissed for default on June 21, 1969. Again on the same day, i.e., June 21, 1969 the plaintiffs made another application for restoration. This application was also dismissed in default on October 3, 1969. On the same day, i.e. October 3, 1979 the plaintiffs prepared an application for restoration and presented it to the trial court the next day, i.e. on October 4, 1969. By the order dated March 9, 1971 the Judicial Officer allowed the restoration application. 4. The grounds taken in the revision are, firstly, that the trial court has acted illegally and with material irregularity in setting aside the various defaults and restoring the suit; secondly, that unless good and sufficient cause is made out, no restoration can be made thirdly, that the fact that the applications were made the same day would not by itself be a sufficient cause for restoration unless the reason for absence is given and proved; fourthly that the trial court has not given valid and good reasons for restoration the suit was dismissed for want of proper compliance of the order of the Court. 5. A perusal of the record shows that the trial court had dismissed the suit on the ground of absence of the plaintiffs and on no other ground. But, in fact, the plaintiffs were present in the Court on December 18, 1968 as well as on June 21, 1969. However, in the present revision the relevant order is of October 3, 1969 on which date the application of the plaintiffs was dismissed in default. On that date also the plaintiffs were, in fact, present. But, in fact, the plaintiffs were present in the Court on December 18, 1968 as well as on June 21, 1969. However, in the present revision the relevant order is of October 3, 1969 on which date the application of the plaintiffs was dismissed in default. On that date also the plaintiffs were, in fact, present. This is proved by the fact that they had moved an application in the trial court dated October 3/4, 1969. On this application the the counsel for the defendants has endorsed as follows : "Noted for defendants 12 to 31. Sd./October 3, 1969." The trial court has in this connection observed as follows : "It appears that on various dates the applications were dismissed. The applicant was not present when the case was called out. The fact that same day applications were made for restoration seems to show the bona fides and keenness of the applicant to prosecute the case." In other words, the plaintiffs were present in the Court on the date of hearing but did not respond when the case was called out. 6. The relevant provisions in the Civil Procedure Code are as follows : "Order 9, Rule 8. Where the defendant appears, and the plaintiff does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed, unless the defendant admits the claim, or part thereof, in which case, the Court shall pass a decree against the defendant upon such admission, and where part only of the claim has been admitted, shall dismiss the suit so far as it relates to the remainder. S. 9. (1) Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under Rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the second cause of action. But he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called on hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit and shall appoint a day for proceedings with the suit. (2) No order shall be made under this rule unless notice of the application has been served on the opposite party." 7. (2) No order shall be made under this rule unless notice of the application has been served on the opposite party." 7. It is true that Rule 8 refers to the appearance of the plaintiffs at the time when the suit is called on for hearing. But it would be a negation of justice if a mechanical view is taken to intercept that words "When the suit is called on for hearing." Generally the lower courts are very crowded and a number of Courts function in adjoining rooms in the same building. It is thus quite conceivable that a party, even though present either in the Court or in the verandah of the Court, is not able to respond when his case is called on for hearing. When the Court dismisses a suit in default in such an event, it only acts on the presumption that the party is not present. But that presumption is rebutted if the party concerned moves an application for restoration on the same days. Thus, interest of justice demands that in such a case the court should act in accordance with law and restore the suit. 8. The very fact that the restoration application was of the Court that there was sufficient cause for the non-appearance, when the suit was called on for hearing. Since Rule 9 refers to the satisfaction of the Court, it is enough that the Court is reasonably satisfied without recording a precise finding about the whereabouts of the defaulting party when the suit was called on for hearing or for enquiring into the circumstances under which the party could not respond when the suit was called. 9. The learned counsel for the opposite parties has cited certain rulings which may be referred to here. The first in Parmarati v. Krishna Dayal AIR 1933 Allahabad 517 which lays down that 'for the revocation of an erroneous order no sufficient cause other than the irregularity of the order itself need be considered, and the Court has inherent power to rectify its own errors inadvertently committed.' 10. The first in Parmarati v. Krishna Dayal AIR 1933 Allahabad 517 which lays down that 'for the revocation of an erroneous order no sufficient cause other than the irregularity of the order itself need be considered, and the Court has inherent power to rectify its own errors inadvertently committed.' 10. The second ruling is Krishnakumar v. Jawand Singh AIR 1947 Nagpur 236 which states that 'If there is one principle more fundamental than any other underlying the whole system of jurisprudence, it is this viz., that no party is to suffer for a mistake of Court when that party is not in wat to be blamed.' 11. The third in Dildar Hussain v. Abail Mohd. AIR 1957 Allahabad 238. In this case two rival suits had been consolidated and an application for adjournment was made in one suit by the plaintiff and the suit was adjourned. The second suit was also adjourned because it was connected with the former. When the plaintiff of the second suit failed to appear on the adjournment date and his counsel did not make an application for adjournment, but stated that he had no instructions the Court dismissed the second suit. It was held that 'the order of dismissal was one under Order IX, Rule 8, CPC and not on merits, and as such the application for setting aside the order of dismissal lay to the Court under Order IX, Rule 9, CPC.' 12. In the present case, the trial court has not committed any illegality or irregularity in allowing the restoration Application. The requirements of Order IV, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure were fully met and the order of restoration is in accordance with law. I, therefore, find no force in the revision. Agreeing with the recommendation of the learned Additional commissioner, I hereby dismiss this revision.