Judgment R. P. Sinha, J. 1. This is an application by the petitioner under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) against an order passed on 23-4-1977 dismissing the complaint of the petitioner under sec.203 of the Code as, according to him, taking of cognizance for the offences alleged were barred under Sec.468 of the Code. 2. An information was lodged by the petitioner at the Police Station, jamui, on 10-4-1973 for offences under Secs.279/338 of the Indian Penal Code against the opposite party no.2, The police after investigation submitted final form on 31-12-1973 mistake of fact. Thereafter the petitioner filed a complaint in the form of protest petition before the Subdivisional Magistrate, Jamui, on 5-5-1973. Somehow or the other the matter remained pending for long and ultimately, it seemes, the petitioner was examined on solemn-affirmation on 15-2-1977 and by the impugned order dated 23-4-1977 the complaint was dismissed as taking of cognizance for the offences alleged in the petition of complaint was barred under Sec.468 of the Code. As against the said order, the petitioner preferred a petition in revision before the Sessions Judge, Monghyr, but the same was withdrawn and the order was passed that Che application was rejected as withdrawn. Thereafter this present application, has been filed under the provision of Sec.482 of the Code. 3. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party no.2 has submitted that this application is actually another revision application although it has been filed under Sec.482 of the Code just to circumve it the provision of sec.399 (3) of the Code. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, has submitted that this should not be treated as a second revision application but an application under Sec.482 of the Code invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. 4. There cannot be any doubt that this present application is actually another application in revision before this Court after having got the revision application withdrawn from the Court of Sessions Judge, Monghyr. Learned counsel for opposite-party no.2 has rightly submitted that the effect of withdrawal of that application was that it was rejected and so a second revision application by the petitioner in this Court cannot be entertained under the provision of Sec.399 (3) of the Code. Learned counsel for opposite-party no.2 has rightly submitted that the effect of withdrawal of that application was that it was rejected and so a second revision application by the petitioner in this Court cannot be entertained under the provision of Sec.399 (3) of the Code. He has referred to the decision of this court in the case, of Surendra Sah and others V/s. Kanhaiya Lal Panjiyar and another ( 1975 BBCJ 684 ) where it has been held that the petitioner cannot be allowed to circumvent the law by merely changing the lebel of the section under which the application has been filed. It has been further held in this case that there is express provision in the Code to move the Sessions Judge or the High court in revision against an order passed by a Magistrate and Sec.482 of the code cannot be ordinarily invoked to override the express provision of law. However, wide the power of the High Court may be under Sec.432 of the Code, they do not extend to the court granting relief in its inherent jurisdiction when the same relief could be granted under express provision of law and that express provision has already been availed of by the petitioner. In rny opinion, the, contention of learned Counsel for opposit party no.2 is correct and this application which is actually another application in revision cannot be entertained. Besides that, the impugned order of the learned Magistrate dismissing the- complaint on the ground that cognizance is barred under Sec.468 of the Code is also correct as the occurrence is alleged to have taken place on 10th of April, 1973 and the complainant was examined on 15-2-1977 obviously after the period of limitation under Sec.468 of the Code was over. 5. For that reasons stated above, there is no ground for interfering with the impugned order. The application is, therefore, dismissed. Application dismissed.