JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings for release of a house initiated under Section 21 (1) (b) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act XIII of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The property in dispute is house bearing municipal Nos. 34 and 37 situate in Mohalla Swamx Para, Meerut, The petitioner is the landlord. Respondent No. 3 Deep Chand Jain is the tenant of the said house. The case of the landlord was that though two separate numbers were given by the Municipal Board, House Nos. 34 and 37 was in fact, one house. The prescribed authority allowed the application in respect of a portion of house No. 34. He directed the release of two rooms and verandah of house No. 34 on the ground that it was in a dilapidated condition. The rest of the application was. rejected. The tenant did not file any appeal but the landlord filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act. In appeal it was again contended by the appellant that in fact the house No. 34 and 37 was one house and only different numbers have been given by the Municipal Board. It was further contended that the prescribed authority had no jurisdiction to grant the release of only a portion of house No. 34, but having found that a portion was in a dilapidated condition, the release application should have been allowed in respect of the full house No. 34. The appellate court did not agree with the submission made by the appellant but allowed the appeal in part only in regard to the direction of the prescribed authority regarding apportionment of the rent. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present petition challenging tire order dated 26th August, 1977 by means of the present writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two submissions before me. His first submission is that the finding of the appellate court that the house No. 37 is distinct from house No. 34 is vitiated in law. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present petition challenging tire order dated 26th August, 1977 by means of the present writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two submissions before me. His first submission is that the finding of the appellate court that the house No. 37 is distinct from house No. 34 is vitiated in law. His second submission that even if house No. 34 is separate from house No. 37 then too, the release application should have been allowed in respect of whole of the house No. 34 and not a portion, once having found that a portion of the house No. 34 was in a dilapidated condition. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. In regard to the first submission made by the learned counsel, the appellate court has recorded a finding of fact that the house No. 37 is not a portion of house No. 34. In fact both the houses are separate entities. In view of the finding that the house No. 37 has a distinct entity, the first submission made by the learned counsel has no substance. Learned counsel has failed to point out any error of law in the said finding. 5. In regard to the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the counsel for the respondent supporting the appellate order has urged that Section 21 (1) clearly lays down that the court may order eviction of a tenant from a building under tenancy or any specified part thereof. In view of this expression specified part thereof, it has been urged that it was open to the court to grant the release application with respect to only a portion of house No. 34. The question therefore, which needs consideration is as to what meaning has to be given to the words specified part thereof in Sec. 21 (1) of the Act. 6. Prior to the coming into force of the Act the old Act, namely, U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 was in force in the State of U. P. In Brij Kishore v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, AIR 1954 All 428 , a Division Bench of this Court held that the tenancy could not be split up. To the same effect was the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in N. C. Agarwal v. Krishan Lal Mehra, AIR 1961 All 104 . The Full Bench held that the authorities had no jurisdiction to create several accommodations out of one unit of accommodation and then order the landlord to let out the divided portions of the accommodation to different persons. In view of these decisions the-difficulty was faced by various landlords:, in getting their properties released as they were not in a position to split up the tenancy. In order to avoid this difficulty when the new Act was enacted Sec. 21 (1) specifically provided that the prescribed:: authority may on an application of the-landlord in that behalf order the eviction; of a tenant from the building under the-tenancy or any specified part thereof. 7. This clause clearly entitles the landlord now to move All application for releasing either the entire Building under tenancy or a specified part of the building under tenancy and a similar power has. been given to the prescribed authority to-order accordingly. It is, therefore, landlords discretion as to in respect of which specified part he applies for release either under sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b). Once this application is made for a specified part of the building under tenancy then it is the prescribed authority who has to consider this application in accordance with the facts and circumstances of; the case. 8. The use of the expression specified part thereof in Section 21 (1) is only for the purposes of permitting splitting of the tenancy. For example, when a building under one tenancy consists of residential portion; and shops the landlord can now by virtue of this expression apply in respect of residential portion only or in respect of shops or a shop. In sub-clause (a) and sub-clause (b) of Section 21 (1) the word building used therein means either the building under tenancy or any specified part of the building under tenancy. The building would refer to the building sought to be got released by the landlord. 9. Rules 16 and 17 have to be read along with Section 21 (1) (a) and (b). Where an application is made under Section 21 (1) (a) Rule 16 is applicable while where an application is made under Section 21 (1) (b) Rule 17 is applicable. When an application is made under sub-cl. 9. Rules 16 and 17 have to be read along with Section 21 (1) (a) and (b). Where an application is made under Section 21 (1) (a) Rule 16 is applicable while where an application is made under Section 21 (1) (b) Rule 17 is applicable. When an application is made under sub-cl. (1) (a) of Section 21 by virtue of rule 16 (1) (d) the prescribed authority has been empowered to grant release in respect of only, part of the building where the tenants need would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlords need would be served by releasing the other part. Such a situation is not contemplated in respect of an application made under Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act. 10. Section 21 (.1) (b) has to be read along with Section 24, sub-clause (2) of - the Act and Rule 17 of the Rules. Sub-clause (b) clearly lays down that when a building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for the purposes of demolition and new construction the whole building has to be released. The words, demolition and new construction indicate that the whole of the building sought to be released has to be demolished and a new construction brought about in its place. This is further indicated from Section 24 (2) of the Act where the construction of a new building is contemplated on the site of the old building. The legislative intent appears to be clear that it is open to the landlord to apply for construction of a new building from its very foundation and that is why under rule 17 he had to satisfy the authority that he has a sanctioned plan, that a proper estimate of expenditure over the proposed demolition and construction has been prepared and that he has the financial capacity for constructing the same. The intention, therefore, is clear. Where the court once comes to the conclusion that the building is in a dilapidated condition then the release application has to be granted in respect of that whole building mid not only a portion thereof, namely one or two rooms, either on the first floor or on the ground floor. It is entirely the discretion of the landlord as to which property he would rebuild. It is entirely the discretion of the landlord as to which property he would rebuild. The authority cannot compel him to reconstruct only a portion of the building. If this power was there with the prescribed authority then Section 24 would never come into play. Section 24 (2) clearly provides that once a new building has been made it is open to the old tenant to get the building allotted in his name provided he agrees to pay the rent as prescribed thereunder. If the tenant does not exercise that option then the building is exempt from the operation of the Act. It is only when the entire building is a new construction then the exemption of that new building would arise not where one or two rooms are directed to be reconstructed. 11. In view of the above, on a reading of Section 21 (1) (b) along with Sec. 24 of the Act and rule 17 of the Rules it is clear that the prescribed authority can grant release of the building not a portion thereof provided he comes to a conclusion that it is in a dilapidated condition. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon Smt. Sarju Devi v. Prescribed Authority, 1977 (UP) RCC 17. The principle laid down in this case is in accord with the view I have taken in regard to splitting of tenancy and the question in regard to a portion of the building involved in the present case was not considered by the Bench in that case. From what I have stated above, I should not*be meant to hold that even in a case where the landlord applied for a demolition and reconstruction of a building and that court comes to the conclusion that in fact the building sought to be demolished consists of two separate distinct entities, then too, the court has no power to direct that only one of the said entities be demolished and not the other. The intention of the legislature in my opinion is that once a distinct entity is found to be in a dilapidated condition, the prescribed authority has no power to release only one portion of the same and letting the other portion stand in its original condition. The intention of the legislature in my opinion is that once a distinct entity is found to be in a dilapidated condition, the prescribed authority has no power to release only one portion of the same and letting the other portion stand in its original condition. There is inherent power with the court to grant only part of the relief claimed and it is not necessary to fall back on the expression specified part thereof mentioned in Section 21 (1) of the Act for the said purpose but the power has to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In the instant case also the application was made for demolition of house Nos. 34 and 37 on the allegation that in fact both the houses taken together is one house. The court came to the conclusion that house No. 37 was a distinct entity and as such the court rightly refused the relief in respect of house No. 37. 13. In Civil Misc. Writ No. 7283 of 1978 decided on 20-7-79. Smt. Chandrawati v. District Judge, Pauri, I have held that even if a part of the building is in a dilapidated condition the entire building would be held to be dilapidated. Similar is the view taken by K. C. Agarwal, J. in R. D. Guota v. Addl. District Judge, 1976 Ren CJ 502 (All). In the instant case both the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate court have found that material portion on the ground floor as well as on the first floor of house No. 34 is in a dilapidated condition. In the circumstances the prescribed authority should have allowed the release application in respect of the entire house No. 34 and not only of such portion which is in a dilapidated condition. 14. In the result I allow the petition in part, quash the operative order of the VIth Additional District Judge Meerut dated 26th August 1977 only in regard to release of a portion of house No. 34 and direct that the entire house No. 34 be released in favour of the petitioner for demolition and new construction. In the circumstance of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs.