ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution arising out of proceedings for release under Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. The premises in dispute consists of one room bearing No. 31 in the building called Jag dish Ashram Kharkhari, Harid-war which belongs to a trust named Jagdish Ashram Trust situate in Haridwar. The petitioners alleged themselves to be the tenants and respondent is the trust. The prescribed authority rejected the release application by an order dated 14th Dec. 1976. Aggrieved respondent No. 3 filed a revision under Section 22 of the Act:. This appeal was allowed by the Vth Addl. District Judge by his judgment dated 5th Oct. 1977. The petitioner has challenged the judgment dated 5th Oct. 1977 by means of the present petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two submissions before me. His first submission is that the view taken by the revisional court that the fourth proviso to Section 21 of the Act would not apply to a case where the need is for a public charitable trust for the objects of the trust is manifestly erroneous. His second submission is that after holding that the fourth proviso was not applicable the revisional court should not have gone into the question as to whether the petitioners are the tenants of the property in dispute as also the question of comparative hardship. This finding is, in fact, based on wholly irrelevant considerations and has been dealt with in a most cursory manner. 4. In support of the first submission the learned counsel has relied on Nihal Singh v. 6th Addl. District Judge, 1978 (UP) RCC 654. 5. The fourth proviso to Section 21 (1) of the Act clearly provides that the prescribed authority shall, except in cases provided for in the Explanation, take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application. This proviso does not restrict its application to only a portion of Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. This proviso does not restrict its application to only a portion of Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. It applies to the entire S- 21 (1) (a) of the Act and would, therefore, apply to a case where the application is by a Trust and the property is required for the objects of the Trust. In this view of the matter the fourth proviso was applicable. I am in complete agreement with the view taken in the case of Nihal Singh (supra). In the circumstances the submission made by the learned counsel is well founded and the view taken by the revisional court is manifestly erroneous. 6. I would have set aside the order passed by the revisional court if the revisional court had stopped at this stage. The revisional court further went into the evidence on record and recorded a i categorical finding of fact that Shiam 'Das alone was the tenant and that his brother Sukhdeo was living with him only as a licensee. The court has further found that Shiam Das has got allotted another accommodation and comparing the needs of the petitioners along with that of the landlord the court came to the conclusion that greater hardship 'would be caused to the landlord in case the release application is rejected. The court having come to the conclusion that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord in case the application for release is rejected, the ultimate order of ;the court does not call for any interference. 7. The second submission made by the learned counsel that the court has cursorily considered the comparative hardship is in my opinion not sound. The re visional court has considered the question in detail. It has considered that Shiam Das has got more accommodation with him that has been allotted than he had earlier and that the family of the petitioners can easily be accommodated in the said accommodation. This being a finding of fact cannot be interfered with under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 8. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs. The petitioners are granted four months time to vacate the premises. Immediately after the expiry of four months the petitioner shall vacate the property in dispute.