Judgment :- 1. The short point that arises for consideration in this Civil Revision Petition filed by a judgment-debtor against the order of the Execution Court rejecting his claim for no interest under S.7 of the Kerala Debtors (Temporary Relief) Act 30 of 1975 is whether the benefits conferred by a temporary statute can be claimed after the statute has ceased to be in force and if so, under What circumstances. The petitioner judgment-debtor filed his objections to the execution application filed by the respondent decree holder after the repeal of Kerala Act 30 of 1975 by Kerala Ordinance 1 of 1977. The Execution Court rejected the petitioner's objections. In the order it is said: "The other contention that the interest is not claimable during the period of Act 30 of 1975 is also unsustainable since there is absolutely nothing to show that the respondent was a person coming within the provisions of that Act and he ever claimed benefit under that Act." 2. S.7 of Act 30 of 1975 insisted that no interest shall accrue during the period mentioned in S.3 in respect of a debt due at the commencement of the Act from a debtor entitled to the benefits of S.3. Act 30 of 1975 did not contain any saving provision. The Kerala Debt Relief Ordinance 1 of 1977 which repealed Act 30 of 1975 also did not contain any saving provision. The Kerala Debt Relief Ordinance No. 9 of 1977 which was promulgated on the expiry of Ordinance No.1 of 1977 though contained a saving provision that did not relate to Act 30 of 1975. The Kerala Debt Relief Act 17 of 1977 which replaced Ordinance No. 9 of 1977 though repealed Act 30 of 1975 also did not save any of the provisions of Act 30 of 1975. No doubt, Act 30 of 1975 was a temporary statute. It is clear from the preamble itself that the Act was meant only to give temporary relief to certain debtors. The petitioner claimed the benefits under S.7 of the Act only after the Act ceased to be in force. It cannot be said that the benefits already accrued to him when the Act was in force. It is clear from the preamble itself that the Act was meant only to give temporary relief to certain debtors. The petitioner claimed the benefits under S.7 of the Act only after the Act ceased to be in force. It cannot be said that the benefits already accrued to him when the Act was in force. As S.4 of The Interpretation and General Clauses Act 7 of 1125 is not applicable in the case of a temporary statute, a party who did not claim and establish his rights when the statute was in force cannot claim the rights under the statute after it has become an incident of the past. So, in the absence of any saving provision in Act 30 of 1975 or in the Ordinances and Act 17 of 1977 by which Act 30 of 1975 was repealed, the petitioner cannot now claim the benefits of S.7 of the Act. So, there is no scope for interference in revision. 3. In coming to the above conclusion I am fortified by the following authorities. In Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administration (AIR. 1959 SC. 609) Gajendragadkar J. (as he then was) has extracted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Patanjali Sastri J. in Krishnan v. State of Madras (AIR. 1951 SC. 301): "The general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that, in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires. It is true that the Legislature can and often enough does avoid such an anomalous consequence by enacting in the temporary statute a saving provision, and the affect of such a saving provision is in some respects similar to the effect of the provisions of S.6 of the General Clauses Act which deals with the effect of repeal of a permanent statute." In Craies on Statute Law it is said: "As a general rule, and unless it contains some special provisions to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired, no proceedings can be taken upon it and it ceases to have any further effect." (Page 409 Seventh Edition). 4. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Dismissed.