JUDGMENT : SATISH CHANDRA, CJ. 1. Finding a difference of opinion between the Single Judge decisions of this Court, a learned Single Judge has referred the following questions to a Division Bench: (1) Whether the Full Bench decision in Ram Charan Vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1979 All 114 has by implication overruled the decision of the learned Single Judges in Ram Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1978 AWC 713 and Ghana Ram v. State 1977 AWC 415 on the question of the true scope of Section 38-B of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act? (2) If the said Pull Bench decision has not by implication overruled the said Single Judge pronouncement, then is the scope of Section 38-B, on its true interpretation, qualified in the manner as held by the learned Judges in the said Single Judge decisions? 2. Section 38-B was enacted in the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 by U.P. Amending Act No. 20 of 1976, with effect from October 10, 1975. 3. A Full Bench of this Court in Agricultural an I Industrial Syndicate v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1970 AWR 753 held that Section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, providing for abatement of proceedings for declaration of rights and interest in law governed by the notification issued u/s 4(2) of that Act* and pending on the date of the publication of that notification, shall abate, was not applicable to proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. That case went up to the Supreme Court which overruled it--See The Agricultural and Industrial Syndicate Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1974 SC 1920 . The Supreme Court took the view that the proceedings under the Ceiling Act were proceedings for declaration or adjudication of rights in land and so they would abate u/s 5 of the Consolidation Act. 4. The State Legislature intervened, and by the U.P. Laws Amendment Act No. 34 of 1974 added an explanation to Section 5(2) of the Consolidation Act. The explanation provided that for purposes of Sub-section (2), a proceeding under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, shall not be deemed to be a proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land. In the result, ceiling proceedings were not liable to be abated. The explanation provided that for purposes of Sub-section (2), a proceeding under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, shall not be deemed to be a proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land. In the result, ceiling proceedings were not liable to be abated. 5. A question arose whether the ceiling proceedings were barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act. This question was referred to a Full Bench. The Full Bench in Ram Charan Vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1979 All 114 held that Section 5(2) and Section 49 are the two faces of the same coin. They are parts of the same scheme of the Consolidation Act. Proceedings under the Calling Act were outside the purview of Section 49 as they are of Section 5(2). 6. One of the arguments raised before that Full Bench was that the ceiling proceedings ought to be stayed on the principle of comity of courts. When the question of title is already engaging the attention of the consolidation authorities, adjudication of same rights under the Ceiling Act is likely to lead to conflicting orders, and so the latter proceedings under the Ceiling Act ought to be stayed. The Full Bench held that this argument is fallacious. I he Full Bench pointed out several provisions that have been introduced in the Ceiling Act by the Amending Act No. 19 of 1975 and Act No. 20 of 1976 Some of them were noticed in paragraphs 35 to 40. It was then held that these are overriding provisions which nullify declaration or adjudication of the rights in relation to the matters mentioned above, made in any other proceeding, including consolidation proceedings. There seems little point in staying ceiling proceedings because of the pendency of consolidation proceedings. It will only mean postponing the evil day. 7. The Full Bench then referred to Section 38-B of the Ceiling Act which was introduced by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976 with effect from October 10, 1975. There seems little point in staying ceiling proceedings because of the pendency of consolidation proceedings. It will only mean postponing the evil day. 7. The Full Bench then referred to Section 38-B of the Ceiling Act which was introduced by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976 with effect from October 10, 1975. This section provided: 38-B. Bar against res judicata--No finding or decision before the commencement of this section in any proceeding or on any issue (including any order, decree or judgment) by any court, tribunal or authority in respect of any matter governed by this Act, shall bar the retrial of such proceeding or issue under this Act, in accordance with the provisions of this Act as amended from time to time. Referring to this provision, the Full Bench held: A finding or decision given in consolidation proceedings prior to October 10, 1975, when Section 38-B came into force, is of no worth in respect of matters governed by the Ceiling Act. The issues are liable to be retried under the Ceiling Act. 8. It will be seen that the Full Bench was concerned with the question whether ceiling proceedings are liable to abate or are liable to be stayed because of the pendency of the proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It emphasised that certain provisions of the Ceiling Act are such that no finding or decision given by courts in proceedings other than the Ceiling Act are likely to be helpful. Section 38-B emphasised that in matters governed by the Ceiling Act the proceedings will be decided in accordance with the Act as amended from time to time. Any finding or decision will not bar the retrial of an issue which necessarily arises for decision because of the provisions of the Ceiling Act. It is also noticeable that Ram Charan's Full Bench was not at all concerned with the finding or decision given in proceedings under the Ceiling Act prior to the coming into force of Section 38-B. 9. Section 38-B of the Ceiling Act came up for consideration before a Division Bench in Satya Pal Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1979 AWC 217. The Bench held: A finding or decision given, before Section 38-B came into force on October 10, 1975, are, for purposes of Ceiling Act, not final. They can be reopened and the question involved in it, retried. The Bench held: A finding or decision given, before Section 38-B came into force on October 10, 1975, are, for purposes of Ceiling Act, not final. They can be reopened and the question involved in it, retried. But, in a case where no retrial takes place, the finding or decision is binding. 10. Hence Section 38-B does not obliterate all decisions or findings given by courts of law either under the general law or under the Consolidation Act from being given effect to in ceiling proceedings. Section 38-B makes the provisions of the Ceiling Act to have an overriding effect and so the findings which are in conflict or at variance with the provisions of the Ceiling Act will not bar retrial of the involved issues in proceedings under the Ceiling Act. But otherwise the decisions are to be recognized even in proceedings under the Ceiling Act. To this effect is the decision of Gopi Nath, J. in Ramlal v State of Uttar Pradesh 1978 AWC 713 . In that case, the question was whether after the coming into force of the Amending Act No. 2 of 1975 and Act No. 20 of 1976 a redetermination of ceiling area of a tenure-holder has to follow as a matter of course in respect of cases decided by the Ceiling Authorities or is it confined to cases affected by amendments incorporated in those Amending Acts. It was held that a fresh notice for redetermination of surplus land was to issue not in all cases but only in such of them as were likely to be affected by amendments. Section 9 of Act No. 2 of 1975 provided: Where an order determining the surplus land in relation to a tenure-holder has been made under the Principal Act, before the commencement of this Act, the Prescribed Authority may at any time within a period of two years from the commencement of this Act, redetermine the surplus land in accordance with the Principal Act as amended by this Act. 11. The learned Judge rightly pointed out that the redetermination was to be done in so far as it was required by the amendments introduced by the Amending Act of 1975. 12. Section 31 of the Amending Act No. 20 of 1976 provided: (1).... (2).... 11. The learned Judge rightly pointed out that the redetermination was to be done in so far as it was required by the amendments introduced by the Amending Act of 1975. 12. Section 31 of the Amending Act No. 20 of 1976 provided: (1).... (2).... (3) Where an order determining surplus land in relation to a tenure-holder has been made under the Principal Act before the tenth day of October, 1975, the Prescribed Authority (as defined in the Principal Act) may, at any time within a period of two years from the said date, redetermine the surplus land in accordance with the Principal Act as amended by this Act, whether or not any appeal was filed against such order and notwithstanding any appeal (whether pending or decided) against the original order of determination of surplus land. (4).... (5).... (6). 13. The learned Judge observed that re-determination was required only when it was necessitated by the amendments made in the Principal Act, notwithstanding the existence of a decision determining the surplus land either by the Prescribed Authority or in appeal the learned Judge concluded that the general review of the earlier orders was not intended by the aforesaid provisions permitting re-determination. Only such cases are liable to be reopened which required redetermination in view of the amendments incorporated in the Principal Act. Section 38-B was to be interpreted in the light of these provisions of the Amendment Act by which Section 9 of Act 2 of 1972 was introduced in the Ceiling Act. Section 38-B facilitated the re-determination directed to be done by Section 9 of Act No. 2 of 1975 and Section 31 of Act No. 20 of 1976, by specifically providing that the findings or decisions given before October 10, 1975 shall not debar the retrial of the issues governed by the Act as amended. 14. Ghana Ram v. State 1977 AWC 415 is to the same effect as Ramlal. 15. The decision in Ramlal's case was neither brought to the attention of the Full Bench in Ram Charari's case, nor was it commented upon. The Full Bench cannot be said to have impliedly overruled it. In our opinion, Ramlal's case lays down the correct propositions. 16. In writ petition No. 3073 of 1977 (Krishna Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh), the only dispute on the merits was whether the family of the tenure-holder was of six members. The Full Bench cannot be said to have impliedly overruled it. In our opinion, Ramlal's case lays down the correct propositions. 16. In writ petition No. 3073 of 1977 (Krishna Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh), the only dispute on the merits was whether the family of the tenure-holder was of six members. This depended upon the dispute whether the daughter Charu was born before or after June 8, 1973. In the previous ceiling proceedings, it was held that the family of the tenure-holder consisted of six members. This issue could not be reopened because none of the amendments introduced by the Amending Acts of 1975 or 1976 reflected in any manner on this dispute. Section 38-B was not a blank cheque permitting reopening of such issues and ignoring findings given on issues about which no amendment was involved. 17. Similarly, in writ petition No. 4094 of 1977 (Inder Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh) the principal question was whether the three sons of the Petitioner were major or minor on June 8, 1973. None of the amendments introduced by the Amending Acts of 1975 or 1976 impugned on the determination of such an issue. The finding given in the earlier ceiling proceedings could not be ignored and the issue retried. 18. Section 38-B does not have the effect of excluding the applicability of the doctrine of res-judicata in respect of findings on such issues or matters. 19. For the Petitioners Sri B.B. Paul submitted that the notice seeking to reopen the proceedings is invalid because no fresh notice u/s 9(1) of the Act was issued. The submission is misconceived. Section 9(1) contemplates a general notice to tenure-holders; such a notice is published in the official gazette. There is no dispute that such a notice was issued once. Sub-section (2) of Section 9 provides for the issuance of a like general notice to be issued after the enforcement of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972, but there is no provision for a similar general notice to be issued if the proceedings are sought to be reopened as a result of the Amending Act of 1975 or 1976. On the other hand, the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 9 provides for an individual notice to be issued at any time after October 10, 1975 calling upon the tenure-holder holding land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him on October 10, 1975 to submit to him within thirty days from the date of service of such notice a statement referred to in Sub-section (1) or any information pertaining thereto. This proviso by implication excludes the necessity of issue of general notice u/s 9(1). The notice reopening the proceedings cannot hence be held invalid on this ground. 20. It was also submitted that Section 38-B applies to proceedings held in any court, tribunal or authority other than the Prescribed Authority under the Ceiling Act. Section 38-B was introduced by the Amending Act of 1976 along with many other amendments. The proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 9 mentioned above entitled the Prescribed Authority to issue a notice notwithstanding the fact that proceedings for the determination of surplus land under the Ceiling Act may have been taken previously. Similarly, Section 9(2-A) requires every tenure-holder to submit a fresh statement of land, held by him, on October 10, 1975 provided that in respect of him no proceedings under the Act were pending on October 10, 1975. This provision would apply where proceedings under the Ceiling Act have taken place and have terminated. In the light of these provisions, it is apparent that Section 38-B which removes the bar of retrial on any issue or proceeding would include findings or decisions given by the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate Authority under the Ceiling Act also. On its language, Section 38 is general and applies to decisions and findings in any proceeding or on any issue by any court, tribunal or authority. The wide of Section 38-B captures findings or decisions given under the Ceiling Act as well prior to the commencement of Section 38-B. 21. Our attention was invited to Section 31(5) of the Amending Act of 1976 by which Section 13-A has been made applicable to proceedings initiated after October 10, 1975. Section 13-A provides for rectification of any mistake apparent on the face of the record. Proceedings for such rectification can be undertaken within two years from the date of the notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 14. Section 13-A provides for rectification of any mistake apparent on the face of the record. Proceedings for such rectification can be undertaken within two years from the date of the notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 14. Section 31(5) made Section 13-A applicable to the fresh proceedings to enable the Prescribed Authority to rectify any mistake apparent on the face of the record in such newly commenced proceedings. It has no impact on the applicability of Section 38-B. 22. Our answer to the questions referred to us are: (1) in the negative; (2) in the affirmative. 23. Let the papers be returned to the learned Single Judge with this opinion and answer.