MATHEW v. TALUK LAND BOARD — 1979 DIGILAW 104 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. The learned counsel for the appellants have categorically stated at the Bar that no question relating to the validity of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1 of 1964), hereafter referred to as the Act, or any of its provisions, arises in these appeals by special leave. We have heard them together virtually as companion appeals at the instance of learned counsel, for they arise out of several judgments of the High Court of Kerala in matters relating to the implementation of the provisions for the restriction on ownership and possession of land in excess of the ceiling area and the disposal of excess land. These are the subject matter of chapter HI of the Act, as amended from time to time. It is not necessary to refer to the dates of all the judgments of the High Court of Kerala, or to all the points of controversy there, as learned counsel have been able to channelise their arguments into three main points of controversy, which have been argued at length. It is true that all these points do not arise in all the cases before us, and some learned counsel have raised additional arguments in the peculiar facts and circumstances of their cases. It will therefore be convenient and proper to deal with the three main points first, and to take up the additional points for consideration with reference to the appeals in which they have been raised for our consideration. This, it is agreed, will be a proper and a fair course to adopt for the disposal of these appeals. It is also agreed by learned counsel that the other appeals in which such additional points have not been raised shall stand decided according to our decision on the three main points. 2. In order to understand the controversy in its proper perspective, it may be mentioned that, as in the other States in the country, the Kerala State legislature felt the necessity of making "comprehensive" land reforms in the State. The Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960 (Act 4 of 1961) was accordingly passed, and received the assent of the President on January 21, 1961. Some of its provisions were brought into force with effect from February 15, 1961. This Court struck down that Act as unconstitutional in its application to the ryotwari lands of Hosdrug and Kasaragod taluks. The Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960 (Act 4 of 1961) was accordingly passed, and received the assent of the President on January 21, 1961. Some of its provisions were brought into force with effect from February 15, 1961. This Court struck down that Act as unconstitutional in its application to the ryotwari lands of Hosdrug and Kasaragod taluks. The Kerala Ryotwari Tenants and Kudikidappukars Protection Act, 1962, was then passed for the temporary protection of tenants in those taluks. The State High Court declared it null and void in its application to the ryotwari lands of the Malabar area and most of the lands of Travancore area. So the Kerala Tenants and Kudikidappukars Protection Act, 1963, was passed to provide some protection to tenants. It was an interim legislation. Even so it repealed the Kerala Ryotwari Tenants and Kudikidappakars Protection Act, 1962, and suspended the operation of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960. 3. After re-examining the requirements in the field of land reforms as a whole, the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, was published in State gazette on September 15, 1963. It covered a wide field in the matter of land reforms and, inter alia, provided for the imposition of a ceiling on "holdings" of lands, the surrender of excess lands, grant of compensation therefor, and the assignment of the surrendered lands in accordance with the order of priority mentioned in the Bill, collection of purchase price, constitution of Land Tribunals and Land Board etc. The Bill was enacted as the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1 of 1964), and received the assent of the President on December 31, 1963. It was amended extensively, and in several material particulars by Act 35 of 1969, and then by Act 25 of 1971 and Act 17 of 1972. There were other amendments also, but it is agreed that they do not bear on the controversy before us. The three main points of controversy in these appeals have been formulated by learned counsel for the appellants as follows: 1. Whether lands converted into plantations between April 1, 1964 and January 1, 1970 qualify for exemption under S.81 (I) (e) of the Act. 2. Whether a certificate of purchase issued by the Land Tribunal under S.72K of the Act is binding on the Taluk Land Board in proceedings under Chapter III of the Act. 3. Whether lands converted into plantations between April 1, 1964 and January 1, 1970 qualify for exemption under S.81 (I) (e) of the Act. 2. Whether a certificate of purchase issued by the Land Tribunal under S.72K of the Act is binding on the Taluk Land Board in proceedings under Chapter III of the Act. 3. Whether the validity or invalidity of transfer effected by persons owning or holding lands exceeding the ceiling limit should be determined with reference to the ceiling area in force on the date of the transfer or in accordance with the ceiling area prescribed by Act 35 of 1969 whether sub-section (3) of S.84 is retrospective in operation. We shall examine the three points one by one but before doing so it will be advantageous to refer briefly to the substantive provisions of the Act which bear on the appeals before us. 4. It will be recalled that the Act came into existence when the other attempts to make legislative provision for land reforms did not work out satisfactorily for one reason or the other. The Act was therefore enacted by way of "a comprehensive legislation" to bring about land reforms in the Kerala State. While Chap.1 of the Act contains provisions relating, interalia, to its commencement and defines some of the important terms and expressions. Chapter II contains many provisions for the benefit of tenants and "deemed tenants", including restoration of lands and fixity of their tenure, purchase of landlords' rights by certain categories of tenants etc. The provisions of the Chapter do not apply to the leases, tenancies and transferred land and transactions mentioned in S.3. We are however primarily concerned with Chapter III under the general rubric "Restrictions on ownership and possession of land in excess of ceiling area and disposal of excess lands." S.81 deals with "exemptions", including 'plantations". S.82 prescribes the "ceiling area", S.83 prohibits the owning or holding or possessing under a mortgage lands in excess of the ceiling area. S.84 declares what voluntary transfers shall be deemed to be invalid. Sub section (3) of the section has attracted much controversy and we shall deal with it in due course. S.85 makes it obligatory to surrender the excess land, and S.86 vests such excess lands in the State Government free from all encumbrances. S.84 declares what voluntary transfers shall be deemed to be invalid. Sub section (3) of the section has attracted much controversy and we shall deal with it in due course. S.85 makes it obligatory to surrender the excess land, and S.86 vests such excess lands in the State Government free from all encumbrances. S.87 makes provision for the surrender of excess land obtained by gift, purchase or mortgage, lease, surrender or any other transfer inter vivos or by bequest or inheritance or otherwise if the total extent of land thereby exceeds the ceiling area. These are the main provisions which bear on the three points which have been raised for our consideration. 5. Point No. 1. The question is whether lands converted into plantations between April 1, 1964 and January 1, 1970 are exempt from the operation of the provisions of Chapter III of the Act in regard to the restrictions on ownership and possession of land in excess of the ceiling area prescribed by it. It will be recalled that while S.82 prescribes the ceiling area of the land, S.81 states what shall be exempted from its operation. Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of that section thus specifically provides that the provisions of Chapter III shall not be applicable to "plantations". That has been so from the inception of the Act, and the question therefore is whether those who felt tempted by the exemption in favour of plantations and converted their lands into plantations after the commencement of the Act, would get the benefit of the exemption and, if so, from which date would the conversion be recognised? 6. This has been dealt with in sub-section (4) of S.82 of the Act which prescribes the ceiling. It is not in dispute before us that the section came into force on April 1,1964. The sub-section as originally enacted in Act 1 of 1964 therefore came into force on that date. 6. This has been dealt with in sub-section (4) of S.82 of the Act which prescribes the ceiling. It is not in dispute before us that the section came into force on April 1,1964. The sub-section as originally enacted in Act 1 of 1964 therefore came into force on that date. It read as follows: "82(4) Where, after the commencement of this Act, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified therein, the extent of land that may be owned or held by a family or adult unmarried person owning or holding such land at the time of the conversion snail be determined without taking into account such conversion." S. 82 was however substantially amended by S.66 of the Amending Act of 1969 which, inter alia, reduced the ceiling area of the land and amended the wording of sub-section (4) also. That section came into force on January 1,1970. It is not necessary to refer to it as the legislature amended sub-section (4) of S.82 once again, by S.12 of the Amending Act of 1971, which, by virtue of S.1 of that Act, also came into force on January 1, 1970 and thereby supplanted, from the very inception, the amendment which had been brought about by the Amending Act of 1969. The amended sub-section, which is the subject matter of the point under consideration, reads as follows: "82(4) Where after the commencement of this Act, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or into a plantation, the extent of land liable to be surrendered by a person owning or holding such land shall be determined without taking into consideration such conversion." 7. The controversy therefore is whether the restriction of sub-section (4) of S.82 came into force from January 1, 1970 because S.12 of the Amending Act of 1971 was brought into force on that date, or whether it came into force on April 1,1964, when S.82 as originally enacted by the Act came into force. As it happens, all the three Acts contain provisions about their "commencement" and it is those which have to be interpreted for the purpose of resolving the dispute. As it happens, all the three Acts contain provisions about their "commencement" and it is those which have to be interpreted for the purpose of resolving the dispute. Sub-section (3) of S.1 of the Act provides as follows: 1 (3) The provisions of this Act, except this section which shall come into force at once, shall come into force on such date as the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, appoint: Provided that different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act, and any reference in any such provision to the commencement of this Act, shall be construed as reference to the coming into force of that provision." 8. It therefore provides that: (i) S.1 of the Act shall come into force at once, (ii) the other provisions of the Act shall come into force on such dates as the Government may appoint, (iii) different dates may be appointed for different provisions of the Act, and (iv) any reference in any such provision to the "commencement of this Act" shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision. The Act was published in the Gazette on January 14, 1964, and, by virtue of S.3 of the Kerala Interpretation and General Clauses Act, S.1 came into force on that date. S.82, as has been stated, came into force on April 1, 1964, and the reference in sub-section (4) of that section to the "commencement of this Act" meant a reference to the coming into force of that provision with effect from April 1, 1964. It may be that the first three rules or directions contained in sub-section (3) (mentioned above) were spent on the coming into force of S.1 of the Act or its other provisions on the dates appointed for them, but, for obvious reasons, rule (iv) continued to hold the field in as much as it laid down the rule of construction that any reference to the "commencement of this Act" shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that particular provision. It was therefore applicable as a general rule of construction whenever it became necessary to ascertain the date of commencement of a particular provision of the Act other than S.1. 9. It will be recalled that sub-section (4) of S.12, as originally incorporated in the Act, came into force on April 1, 1964. It was therefore applicable as a general rule of construction whenever it became necessary to ascertain the date of commencement of a particular provision of the Act other than S.1. 9. It will be recalled that sub-section (4) of S.12, as originally incorporated in the Act, came into force on April 1, 1964. As has been mentioned, sub-section (4) of S.82 was amended by S.66 of the Amending Act of 1969, which came into force on January 1, 1970, but that proved to be fortuitous because it was supplanted by S.12 of the Amending Act of 1971 from the same date. 10. The sub-section, as amended by the Amending Act of 1971, also dealt with the conversion of land into any other class of land "after the commencement of this Act" but it added the words "or into a plantation" and provided that such conversion shall not be taken into consideration for determining the extent of land liable to be surrendered. It has been argued that the expression "the commencement of this Act" refers to January 1, 1970, on which date S.12 of the Amending Act of 1971 was brought into force, and not to April 1, 1964 when it was first brought into force as mentioned above. Reference in this connection has been made to sub-section (2) of S. I of the Amending Act of 1971. 11. The argument is however untenable on the plain meaning of the proviso to sub-section (3) of S.1 of the Act which clearly states that any reference in any provision of the Act to the "commencement of this Act" shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision. So when the "provision" of sub-section (4) of S.82 was brought into force on April 1, 1964, its amended version would also come into force from that date. And it will be a matter of no consequence that S.12 of the Amending Act of 1971, which amended the sub-section, came into force on January 1, 1970. So when the "provision" of sub-section (4) of S.82 was brought into force on April 1, 1964, its amended version would also come into force from that date. And it will be a matter of no consequence that S.12 of the Amending Act of 1971, which amended the sub-section, came into force on January 1, 1970. It will be remembered that S.66 of the Amending Act of 1969 which amended S.82 came into force on January 1, 1970, and as the legislature decided to amend it once again by S.12 of the Act of 1971, with retrospective effect from the same date (January 1, 1970), it made a specific provision to that effect in S.1 of the Amending Act of 1971 and left the date of commencement of the Act for purposes of S.82 to be determined according to the proviso to sub-section (3) of S.1 of the Act which, as has been stated, was a subsisting provision. It would follow that sub-section (4) as amended by the Amending Act of 1971 came into force on April 1, 1964. It may be that, as has been argued by Mr. Venugopal, the expression "commencement of this Act" is a term of "art". We have interpreted it as it stands, without detracting from the value attributed to it by Mr. Venugopal. 12. Mr. Warriyar has however argued that particular significance attaches to the use of the expression "provisions" or "provision" in S. I (3) of the Act and that the High Court erred in presuming that "at all relevant times a'provision' which resulted in certain consequences was in force from April 1, 1964 onwards." He has invited pur attention to Saidu Mohammed v. Bhanukuttan 1967. KLT. 947 for the contention that the true meaning of "provision" is a section or series of sections forming a self-contained integral whole, that S.82 to 85 should be construed as a "composite provision" dealing with the ceiling area, and that the assumption that S.82(4) alone was brought into force as a distinct provision, when S.83 had not been brought into force, is not legally sustainable. The Century Dictionary (which is an encyclopaedic lexicon of the English Language) defines "provision" as follows, "In law, a stipulation; a rule provided; a distinct clause in an instrument or statute; a rule or principle to be referred for guidance; as, the provisions of law; the provisions of the Constitution." In "Words and Phrases" "(Permanent Edition) the definition is as follows, "As applied to legislation, the word "provision" has this well-understood meaning: "Actual expression in language" the clothing of legislative ideas in words which can be pointed out on the page and read with the eye." A provision is therefore a distinct rule or principle of law in a statute which governs the situation covered by it. So an incomplete idea, even though stated in the form of a section of a statute, cannot be said to be a provision for, by its incompleteness, it cannot really be said to provide a whole rule or principle for observance by those concerned. A provision of law cannot therefore be said to exist if it is incomplete, for then it provides nothing. 13. Examined in this perspective, S.82 of the Act (as amended by S.12 of the Amending Act of 1971) is, to say the least, a distinct rule or clause for it provides the extent of the ceiling area in the cases mentioned in it (subsection (1) ), its effect on the lands owned or held individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or all of the members of the family (subsection (2)), the taking into account of the shares of the members of the family or an adult unmarried person (sub-section (3) ), the effect of conversion of any class of land specified in Schedule II into any other class of land specified in the schedule or into a plantation and the extent of land liable to be surrendered by a person owning or holding such land (sub-section (4)), lands owned by a private trust or a private institution (sub-section (3) ) and exemption of lands covered by S.81 (sub-section (6) ). The section is therefore a "provision" by any standard, and it is futile to argue that this is not so merely because the provisions relating to the prohibition on the owning or holding or possessing under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area and the surrender of excess land and its vesting in the State Government have been dealt with in the other sections (82, 85 and 86). S.83, 85 and 86 contain certain other provisions relating to the law of ceiling on land, but that cannot detract from the basic fact that S.82 contains a provision in fact ah important provision of the law relating to the imposition of ceiling on land dealt with in Chapter III. It may well be said that sub-section (4) of S.82 is also a provision of the law by itself, for it lays down a distinct rule relating to conversion of lands for observance by all concerned. 14. We have gone through Saidu Mohammed v. Bhanukuttan 1976 KLT. 947 but that was quite a different case where the section which authorised the launching of the prosecution of a defaulter was brought into force, but set the other provision which prescribed the period of limitation for the prosecution, and the High Court was persuaded to take the view that it was the legislative intent that the prosecution should be governed by the limitation prescribed by the other section. In the case before us, however, the application of S.82 is not dependent on any other section, so as to make it an incomplete provision by itself. It deals with "ceiling area" and is a provision by itself, so that it could be brought into force from a date different from S.83 which prohibited the holding of land in excess of the ceiling area. It may be pointed out that the "ceiling" prescribed by S.82 was material not only for the purpose of Chapter III of the Act, but had a direct corelation to some of the provisions of Chapter II e. g. S.16 and 53. 15. It has next been argued by Mr. Warriyar that in view of the decisions of this Court in State of Kerala and others v. Thomas 1976 KLT. 566 and State of Kerala and others v. K. A. Gangadharan 1977 KLT. 15. It has next been argued by Mr. Warriyar that in view of the decisions of this Court in State of Kerala and others v. Thomas 1976 KLT. 566 and State of Kerala and others v. K. A. Gangadharan 1977 KLT. 237 the High Court erred in taking the view that S.82 (4) came into force on April 1, 1964 because it has been held in both those cases that determination of the surplus land was to be on the basis of the situation existing on January 1, 1970, and that if any land had been converted into a plantation before that date, it had necessarily to be exempted from the operation in different cases. Thus State of Kerala v. Thomas 1976 KLT. 566 related to the transfer of "Kayal" lands between September 15,1963 and January 1, 1970. As Chapter III of the Act was not applicable to those lands because of the exemption under S.81, and as that exemption continued until January 1, 1970 when S.65 of the Amending Act of 1969 came into force, it was held by this Court that as the exemption was not withdrawn until January 1, 1970, the transfers made between September 15, 1963 and January 1, 1970 were valid under the provisions of the Act. The decision in that case thus turned on the meaning of S.83 and 85. That view was noticed by this Court in State of Kerala and others v. K A. Gangadharan 1977 KLT. 237 and it was held that the dominant legislative intent was the imposition of the ceiling on lands and the consequential obligation to surrender lands owned or held in excess of the ceiling area on the notified date, namely, January 1, 1970. The gifts of excess land made on March 28, 1974 were therefore ignored. That was also, therefore, a different case and cannot avail the appellants. 16. The view taken by the High Court in Ramunni Nair v. State of Kerala 1976 KLT.632 in regard to the meaning to be attached to the words" the commencement of this Act" is thus substantially correct and does not call for interference by us. That was also, therefore, a different case and cannot avail the appellants. 16. The view taken by the High Court in Ramunni Nair v. State of Kerala 1976 KLT.632 in regard to the meaning to be attached to the words" the commencement of this Act" is thus substantially correct and does not call for interference by us. It may be mentioned that learned Advocate General has pointed out that in the Act as it stands amended at present, the expression "commencement of this Act" refers to the commencement of the Act, and while referring to the commencement of the Amending Act of 1969, the words used are "commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969" and that the Amending Act of 1971 has also been referred to as such. It is therefore futile to contend that the rule of interpretation mentioned in subsection (3) of S.1 that any reference in a provision of the Act to the "commencement of this Act" shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision, shall not be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision as originally enacted. 17. Mr. Balakrishnan tried to raise the argument that a landholder, is, in any event, entitled to the benefit of the exemption under S.81 as amended by the Act of 1969 in respect of the "extent of plantation within the ceiling area" even if it were converted into a plantation during the period April 1, 1964 to December 31, 1969. The argument is untenable because while sub-s. (1) of S.81 provides that the provisions of Chapter III shall not apply to the lands and plantations mentioned in it, that is overridden by, and is subject to, the requirement of sub-s. (4) of S.82. Point No.1 is decided against the appellants. 18. POINT NO.2 The question is whether a certificate of purchase issued by the Land Tribunal under S.72K of the Act is binding on the Taluk Land Board in proceedings under Chapter III of the Act. 19. The provisions relating to the purchase of the landlord's rights by cultivating tenants appear under that heading, and are contained in S.53 to 74 of the Act. The Tribunal is competent to pass orders on the application for purchase, including the determination of the compensation and the purchase price under S.72F. 19. The provisions relating to the purchase of the landlord's rights by cultivating tenants appear under that heading, and are contained in S.53 to 74 of the Act. The Tribunal is competent to pass orders on the application for purchase, including the determination of the compensation and the purchase price under S.72F. S.72K provides for the issue of the certificate of purchase. Sub Section (2) of that section reads as follows: "(2) The certificate of purchase issued under sub-s. (1) shall be conclusive proof of the assignment to the tenant of the right, title and interest of the land owner and the intermediaries, if any, over the holding or portion thereof to which the assignment relates." The real question for consideration therefore is whether the certificate is binding on the Taluk Land Board for the purpose of taking a decision in regard to the ceiling area under sub-section (5) of S.85. 20. It may be mentioned in this connection that while the Land Tribunal deals with most of the matters relating to tenants and is constituted under S.99, the Taluk Land Board is constituted under S.100A and deals with statements filed under sub-section (2) of S.85 by persons owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area. Taluk Land Board shall (a) cause the particulars mentioned in the statement to be verified, (b) ascertain whether the person to whom the statement relates owns or holds any other lands, and (c) by order determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered. A reading of sub-section (1) of S.85 shows that the question for examination is not that relating to the existence of the tenancy rights of the person who files the statement, but that relating to the bona fides of his belief that the land sought to be excluded by him is liable to be purchased by a cultivating tenant. The Land Tribunal and the Taluk Land Board thus operate in their respective fields and serve the purpose of the Act. 21. Now the certificate of purchase which the Land Tribunal issues (in the prescribed form) evidences the "assignment" of the assigned land to the purchaser. The Land Tribunal and the Taluk Land Board thus operate in their respective fields and serve the purpose of the Act. 21. Now the certificate of purchase which the Land Tribunal issues (in the prescribed form) evidences the "assignment" of the assigned land to the purchaser. Sub-S. (2) of S.72K of the Act mentioned above merely declares that the certificate shall be conclusive proof of that "assignment" of the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries (if any) to the tenant in respect of the holding concerned (or portion thereof). There is nothing in the sub-section which could be said to declare that the finding recorded by the Tribunal in those proceedings would be conclusive proof of any other matter which it may determine so as to bind the Taluk Land Board or any other authority. Sub-s. (2) of S 72K therefore does not, in terms or in substance, impinge on the authority of the Taluk Land Board to discharge its own functions under S.85(5) of the Act. 22. The Board is thus quite free to cause the particulars mentioned in the statement filed under sub-section (2) of S.85 to be verified and to ascertain whether the person filing the statement owns or holds any other land, and to determine the "extent" as well as the "identity" of the excess land which he is required to surrender. If a certificate of purchase is issued by the Land Tribunal to any such person and he tenders it in proceedings before the Taluk Land Board, the Board is required by law to treat it as conclusive proof of the fact that the right, title and interest of the land owner (and intermediary) over the land mentioned in it has been assigned to him. It is however not the requirement of the law that the certificate of purchase shall be conclusive proof of the surplus or other land held by its holder so as to foreclose the decision of the Taluk Land Board under sub-section (5) of S.85. 23. Mr. Warriyar is not justified in arguing that the Taluk Land Board has power only to determine the "identity" of the surplus land, leaving every other matter to the Land Tribunal. 23. Mr. Warriyar is not justified in arguing that the Taluk Land Board has power only to determine the "identity" of the surplus land, leaving every other matter to the Land Tribunal. The argument loses sight of requirement of sub-section (5) of S.85 that the Board shall, inter alia, by order, determine not only the "identity" of the land to be surrendered but also its "extent." 24. It would thus appear that eventhough the certificate of purchase issued under sub-section (1) of S.72K is conclusive proof of the assignment of the right, title and interest of the landowner in favour of the holder in respect of the holding concerned under sub-section (2), that only means that no contrary evidence shall be effective to displace it, unless the so-called conclusive effective proof is inaccurate on its face, or fraud can be shown (Halsbury's Laws of England, fourth edition, Vol. 17, page 22 Para.28). It may be stated that "inaccuracy on the face" of the certificate is not as wide in its connotation as an "error apparent on the face of the record." It will not therefore be permissible for the Board to disregard the evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase merely on the ground that it has not been issued on a proper appreciation or consideration of the evidence on record, or that the Tribunal's finding suffers from any procedural error. What sub-section (2) of S.72K provides is an irrebuttable presumption of law, and it may well be regarded as a rule of substantive law. But even so, for reasons already stated, it does not thereby take away the jurisdiction of the Taluk Land Board to make an order under S.85(5) after taking into consideration the "conclusive" evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase according to S.72K (2) as far as it goes. 25. We are therefore of the opinion that the view taken in Kunjanujan Thmapuran and others v. Taluk Land Board 1976 KLT 716 is not quite correct. While the High Court was justified in taking the view that the scope of the enquiry in the Taluk Land Board is that relating to the surplus land with which the Land Tribunal is not concerned, the certificate of purchase has its own "conclusive" evidentiary value to the extent provided in S.72K (2) in proceedings before the Taluk Land Board. While the High Court was justified in taking the view that the scope of the enquiry in the Taluk Land Board is that relating to the surplus land with which the Land Tribunal is not concerned, the certificate of purchase has its own "conclusive" evidentiary value to the extent provided in S.72K (2) in proceedings before the Taluk Land Board. It will therefore be for the Board to arrive at its own decision under sub-section (5) of S.85, according to the law, and it will be permissible for it to examine, where necessary, whether the certificate is inaccurate on its face, or has been obtained by fraud or collusion. Point No. 2 is decided accordingly. 26. Mr. Bhandare tried to raise an ancillary argument in C. A. No. 2585 of 1977 that if on the date on which the Taluk Land Board undertakes an enquiry for the determination of surplus land, a proceeding is pending before the Land Tribunal for the grant of a certificate of purchase, the Board will have no jurisdiction to examine a matter which falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. We find, however, that no such question was raised for the consideration of the High Court, where the controversy was confined to the genuineness of the lease, and we are therefore not required to examine the abstract point of law set out by Mr. Bhandare. It will be sufficient for us to say that the ancillary argument can easily be answered in the light of our decision on point No. 2 if and when it arises for consideration in a given case, for the function of the Board is to determine the extent and the identity of the land to be surrendered and not matters relating to the issue of a certificate of purchase. If a certificate of purchase has a bearing on what the Board is called upon to decide, we have no doubt that the Board will take it into consideration, if it is produced for its consideration, with due regard to the evidentiary value assigned to it under S.72K(2) in the light of our decision on point No. 2. Point No. 3: Some of the persons who owned or held lands exceeding the ceiling prescribed by the Act, had voluntarily transferred some of their lands after the publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, in the State gazette on September 15,1963. Point No. 3: Some of the persons who owned or held lands exceeding the ceiling prescribed by the Act, had voluntarily transferred some of their lands after the publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, in the State gazette on September 15,1963. S.84 of the Act therefore provides that, except for the transfers mentioned in the section, the transfers so made shall be deemed to be transfers calculated to defeat the provisions of the Act, and shall be invalid. The section has thus been linked with S 82 which specifies the ceiling area. As has been stated, the ceiling area was considerably reduced by the amendment which was made in S.82 by the Amending Act of 1969. That Act amended S.84 also with effect from January I, 1970. It was again amended by Act 17 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act of 1972) with effect from November 2,1972, when that Act came into force. It, inter alia, inserted sub-section (3) in S.84 as follows: "(3) For the removal of doubts it is hereby clarified that the expression "ceiling area" in sub-sections (1) and (2) means the ceiling area specified in sub-section (1) of S.82 as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, (35 of 1969)." The question therefore is whether the validity of the voluntary transfer is to be determined with reference to the ceiling area in force on the date of transfer, or the reduced ceiling area prescribed by the Amending Act of 1969. As has been stated, sub-section (?) of S.84 was inserted on November 2,1972, and the point for determination is whether it was retrospective or retrospective in operation so as to govern the transfers effected after September 15,1963 (date of publication of the Bill of 1963) even though the original S.84, read with the original S.82, invalidated only those transfers which were in excess of the higher ceiling prescribed by the original S.82. 27. S.84 follows S.82 which, it will be recalled, prescribes the ceiling area, and S.83, which prohibits the owning or holding or possession (under a mortgage) land in excess of the ceiling area. As has been observed by this Court in Gangadharan's case, 1977 KLT. 237, S.84 has been enacted with a view to making the provisions of S.83 and 85 effective. As has been observed by this Court in Gangadharan's case, 1977 KLT. 237, S.84 has been enacted with a view to making the provisions of S.83 and 85 effective. It makes reference to "ceiling area" in sub-sections (1) and (2), and sub-section (3) states what exactly is meant thereby. The sub-section clarifies that the expression "ceiling area" in sub-sections (1) and (2) of S.84 means the area specified in sub-section (1) of S.82 "as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (35 of 1969)". As has been mentioned, that amendment was made by S.66 which came into force on January 1,1970. It is true that S.15 of the Amending Act of 1972 (which inserted sub-section (3) in S.84 of the Act) does not state that it has been made with retrospective effect, and sub-section (3) does not, in terms, state that it shall be deemed to have come into force from the date of the amendment which was made by the Amending Act of 1969. Even so, it is necessary to examine the true effect of the insertion of the sub-section and to decide whether it is retroactive. In doing so, we shall be guided by the plain and clear language of the sub-section as that is the primary rule of construction, for the legislature is intended to mean what it has expressed. We shall also bear in mind the other equally important rule of interpretation that a statute is not to be read retrospectively except for necessity. 28. S.84 has been enacted for the purpose of making certain voluntary transfers invalid on the ground that they are deemed to be calculated to defeat the provision of the law relating to imposition of ceiling on land. It is therefore co-related to S.82 (which fixed the ceiling), and if the Legislature decided that the ceiling should be reduced, it is natural that the deeming provision of S.84 should attach to transfers in excess of the reduced ceiling because the crucial date of invalidation has been stated in S.84, right from the inception of the Act, to be September 15, 1963, irrespective of the law relating to the ceiling. It will be remembered that the Act had not even come into force on September 15,1963, but it, all the same, invalidated the transfers made after that date in excess of the ceiling it prescribed. It will be remembered that the Act had not even come into force on September 15,1963, but it, all the same, invalidated the transfers made after that date in excess of the ceiling it prescribed. So, as long as September 15, 1963 continues to remain the date with reference to which the transfers are to be invalidated, the variation in the extent of the ceiling has necessarily to work back to that date. The legislature therefore inserted subsection (3) in S.84 to clarify that the expression "ceiling area" in the earlier sub-sections would mean the ceiling area specified in S.82 (1) as amended by the Amending Act of 1969, i. e., the reduced ceiling. In taking this view we have only taken into consideration the plain and clear wordings of the subsection, and if in doing so it so happens that sub-section (3) becomes retroactive in operation, we must hold that it is so. Any other view of the meaning and effect of sub-section (3) will amount to disregarding what the legislature has expressed and reading more in the law than what it provides . 29. It has to be appreciated that, from the inception, the Act frowned on voluntary transfers effected after September 15,1963, for the obvious reason that the Bill was published on that date in the State gazette and those concerned knew that they would be required to surrender the excess lands. It is not surprising that voluntary transfers of land should have been made to get over that eventuality. S.84 therefore provided from the very beginning that such transfers shall be deemed to be calculated to defeat the provisions of the Act and shall be invalid. When the ceiling fixed by the original S.82 was considerably reduced by the Amending Act of 1969, and when the reduced ceiling was to govern the liability to surrender the excess land, it was only natural that provision should have been made to invalidate voluntary transfers effected after September 15,1963 with reference to that reduced ceiling. When the ceiling fixed by the original S.82 was considerably reduced by the Amending Act of 1969, and when the reduced ceiling was to govern the liability to surrender the excess land, it was only natural that provision should have been made to invalidate voluntary transfers effected after September 15,1963 with reference to that reduced ceiling. It has to be appreciated that even those who did not want to defeat the provisions of the Act by voluntary transfers after September 15,1963 and retained the lands themselves, were affected by the amendment which was made by the Amending Act of 1969 and were not entitled to claim that this should not be so merely because the Amending Act came into force later. A doubt was however raised about the matter in V. N. Narayanan Nair and others v. State of Kerala and others. 1970 KLT. 659. It was therefore considered necessary to introduce the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill, 1972, Clause.13 of which, inter alia, provided for the insertion of the following as sub-section (3) of S.84 of the Act, "(3) For the removal of doubts it is hereby clarified that the expression "ceiling area" in sub-sections (1) and (2) means the ceiling area specified in sub-section (I) of S.82 as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (35 of 1969)." Notes on clauses were appended to the Bill. In Para.10 thereof it was stated as follows, "There have been some doubts as to the scope of the expression "Ceiling area" as used in the section. It is proposed to provide that the ceiling area referred to in the section is the ceiling area under the principal Act as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (35 of 1969)." The legislature inserted the sub-section without any change. 30. It is proposed to provide that the ceiling area referred to in the section is the ceiling area under the principal Act as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (35 of 1969)." The legislature inserted the sub-section without any change. 30. It is true that the intention of the legislature cannot be ascertained from any statement by way of a note on the clauses of a Bill or breviate and, as has been stated, the duty of the court is to find the natural meaning of the words in a statute, in the context in which they are used, but it has always been considered permissible, and even desirable, for a court, while interpreting a statute, to take note of the history of the statute and the circumstances in which it was passed or the mischief at which it was directed. The reason is that the meaning which is to be given to a statute should be such as will carry out its object. If sub-section (3) of S.84 is examined with due regard to all these factors, it will appear that, as has plainly been stated in it, the. "ceiling area" referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2) of that section for examining the question of the validity of the transfers made after September 15, 1963 is the reduced "ceiling area" specified by the Amending Act of 1969. 31. In fact as has been stated in Craies on Statute Law, seventh edition, at page 395, to explain a former statute, the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the earlier Act was passed. In such a case, as the Act is "declaratory", the presumption against construing it retrospectively so as to respect vested rights, is not applicable. As sub-section (3) of S.84 in terms clarifies the meaning of the expression "ceiling area" with reference to which certain voluntary transfers are to be invalidated, it is clearly retrospective as it is meant to invalidate the transfers made after September 15,1963 when the Bill of 1963 was published. 32. We are therefore satisfied that the view taken in Narayana Pattar v. State of Kerala 1977 KLT. 64 in this respect is quite correct and point No. 3 is decided accordingly. In the result, the appeals in which only points Nos.1 and 3 have been raised for our consideration fail and are dismissed. 32. We are therefore satisfied that the view taken in Narayana Pattar v. State of Kerala 1977 KLT. 64 in this respect is quite correct and point No. 3 is decided accordingly. In the result, the appeals in which only points Nos.1 and 3 have been raised for our consideration fail and are dismissed. We shall now examine those appeals in which point No. 2 and/or additional points have been raised for our consideration. x x x x x x C. A. Nos. 869,876 to 879 of 1979 and 2623 of 1977 are disposed of in the light of the earlier decision.) C. A. No. 1015 of 1976 Chettiam Veetil Ammad and another v. The Taluk Land Board, Badagara and others It has been argued by Mr. Warriyer that a child in the womb on January 1,1970 is a member of the family for purposes of S.82 (1)(c) of the Act and the contrary view taken by the High Court on the basis of its decision in Balakrisna Kurup v. State of Kerala and another 1976 KLT. 421 is incorrect and should be set aside. Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of S.82 of the Act provides that in the case of a family consisting of more than five members, the ceiling area of the land shall be ten standard acres increased by one standard acre for each member in excess of five, subject to the limit prescribed by the clause. The expression "family" has been defined in clause (14) of S.2 as follows, "'family' means husband, wife and their unmarried minor children or such of them as exist" 33. And the expression "minor" has been defined by clause (36A) to mean "a person who has not attained the age of eighteen years." So two postulates are necessary for obtaining the benefit of the increase of one standard acre for each member of the family in excess of five, namely, that the member should be in existence, and it should be possible to ascertain that he had not attained the age of eighteen years on the appointed date. Both these conditions cannot be said to exist in the case of a child en ventre sa mere and it will not therefore be regarded as a member of the family for purposes of S.82. Both these conditions cannot be said to exist in the case of a child en ventre sa mere and it will not therefore be regarded as a member of the family for purposes of S.82. We are aware that a child en ventre sa mere has been regarded in some legal systems as a person "in being for the purpose of acquisition of property by the child itself, particularly in regard to gifts, but S.82 of the Act with which we are concerned does not deal with any such contingency or benefit to the unborn child. The view taken by the High Court in Balakrishna Kurup's case 1976 KLT. 421 is therefore correct and as it has been rightly followed in the appeal before us, the appeal has no merit and is dismissed. x x x x x x (Other connected C. As. were disposed of in the light of the earlier decision). 34. In the result C. A. Nos. 869/ 79, 876/ 79, 877/ 79, 878/ 79, 879/ 79, 227/ 78, 895/ 79, 2584/ 77 and 2586/ 77 are allowed to the extent mentioned above. All the other appeals fail and are dismissed. The parties are left to pay and bear their own costs.