Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1979 DIGILAW 1041 (ALL)

Anguri Devi v. Additional District Judge

1979-09-25

B.D.AGARWAL

body1979
ORDER B.D. Agarwal, J. -This petition under Art, 226 of the Constitution has been filed by Smt. Angoori Devi, the owner and landlady of house No. 27/67, Umraiyawali Gali, Pathwari, Agra. In a portion of this house, one Sukhram was the tenant. After his death, Smt. Rampa, his widow, became the tenant. Smt. Rampa also later died and her two sons Sri Ram Gopal and Sri Shiv Shanker have been arrayed as respondents Nos. 3 and 4 to this writ petition. Smt. Angoori Devi applied under S 16 (b) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972), (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for release of this portion of the building in her favour. It was asserted that Smt. Rampa had substantially removed her effects from the accommodation and deemed vacancy had accordingly occurred in respect of this accommodation. It was asserted that this accommodation in question, consisting of one room and two kothries inside, was required for the residence of her large family and the existing accommodation available was not sufficient for their purposes. The Prescribed Authority under the Act, after assessing the entire evidence adduced before it, also after the report submitted as the result of spot inspection made, came to the conclusion that Smt. Rampa had substantially removed her effects; that the accommodation was mostly kept locked and she had been living in her village house since quite sometime. In other words, what was reported was that this accommodation had ceased to be occupied by Smt. Rampa, and hence in law vacant. The spot inspection report supported the case of the landlady. After recording this finding, the Prescribed Authority examined the question of the alleged need of the landlady. The Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that her need was genuine and after recording a finding to that effect directed the release of the accommodation in her favour. 2. Aggrieved, Ram Gopal and Shiv Shanker, the two sons of Smt. Rampa, who had in the meantime died, filed an appeal under section 18 of the Act. This appeal was to be decided as a revision in view of the amendment made by virtue of U. P. Act No. 2,8 of 1976. 2. Aggrieved, Ram Gopal and Shiv Shanker, the two sons of Smt. Rampa, who had in the meantime died, filed an appeal under section 18 of the Act. This appeal was to be decided as a revision in view of the amendment made by virtue of U. P. Act No. 2,8 of 1976. The learned Additional District Judge reassessed the evidence in regard to the question as to whether a deemed vacancy has occurred or not, and ultimately, took a different view, namely, that it had not been proved that Smt. Rampa has removed her goods substantially from the accommodation. He further proceeded to examine the question of the bona fide need of the landlady and again he assessed the evidence, as if he was sitting in appeal over the judgment of the Prescribed Authority and recorded a finding that the need as set up by the landlady was not genuine. 3. It is this judgment and order of the learned Additional District Judge, Agra dated 15th Nov. 1977 which has been impugned in the present writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made two submissions before me. Firstly, it has been contended by him that the learned Additional District Judge committed a manifest error of law in deciding the case before him as if he were acting as an appellate court, though, according to him, the scope of his interference was limited to errors of jurisdiction alone. 5. Section 18 provides that a person aggrieved by a final order passed by the Prescribed Authority under section 16 of the Act can prefer revision to the District Judge on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Cls. (a), (b) and (c) of sub-sec. (1) of this Section. These three clauses pertain to errors of jurisdiction alone. Learned counsel is, therefore, right in submitting that the learned Additional District Judge could have examined the matter only from this limited point of view and it was not open to him to take a different view, upon a re-assessment of the evidence. A reading of the Judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, makes it evident that he made a re-assessment of the entire evidence and only thereafter, has arrived at a conclusion different from the one arrived at by the Prescribed Authority, though no error of jurisdiction has been found by him in the order of the Prescribed Authority. A reading of the Judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, makes it evident that he made a re-assessment of the entire evidence and only thereafter, has arrived at a conclusion different from the one arrived at by the Prescribed Authority, though no error of jurisdiction has been found by him in the order of the Prescribed Authority. The order of the learned Additional District Judge, therefore, is liable to be set aside on this ground alone. 6. The next submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even assuming that the learned Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to examine the matter from the point of view from which he has examined, then too, his order suffers from a manifest error of law, in as much as the approach made by him to the case is one which cannot but be said to be perverse. I have been taken through the entire judgment of the learned Additional District Judge. My attention has particularly been drawn to the following-: observations in his judgment. "It was incumbent for the landlady Angoori Devi to adduce evidence as to what substantial goods were removed by Smt. Rampa from this accommodation. Evidence of general nature in the face of denial, does not establish at all that Smt. Rampa, the deceased tenant, had substantially removed her house-hold. effects". From this it appears clear that the approach of the learned Additional District Judge was that it was incumbent for the landlady to have adduced positive evidence to show as to what substantial goods were removed by the tenant. This, in my view, is a completely erroneous approach. Evidence had been led on behalf of the landlady which proved generally that Smt. Rampa had removed her goods substantially from the accommodation in question and only insignificant goods were left. This by itself, in the circumstances of this case, was sufficient to record a finding of deemed vacancy as contemplated by Cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 12 of the Act. It was unnecessary for the learned Judge, rather it amounted to placing an impossible burden on the landlady to further insist on specific proof of the particular goods removed from the accommodation. 7. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 12 of the Act. It was unnecessary for the learned Judge, rather it amounted to placing an impossible burden on the landlady to further insist on specific proof of the particular goods removed from the accommodation. 7. Be that as it may, since I have already held that the learned Additional District Judge erred in deciding the case before him as an appeal, rather than deciding it as a revision, the findings arrived at by him cannot be sub-stained. 8. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The order of the learned Additional District Judge, Agra, dated 15th Nov. 1977 is quashed. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs.