JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The petitioner was a clerk in the Sudhakar Mahila Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalay, Khajuri, Varanasi. Certain complaints were received against him and on 14th Feb. 1975, the committee of management of the college constituted a sub-committee to enquire into those complaints. The sub-committee framed charges and served them op the petitioner on 10th May, 1975. The petitioner did not participate in the proceedings before the enquiry committee. The charges against the petitioner were found to be proved by the enquiry committee and a report was submitted by it to the committee of management. On the receipt of the findings of the enquiry committee, the committee of management convened a special meeting to consider it on 19th July, 1975, and on that date a resolution was passed that the petitioner may be dismissed from service. The aforesaid resolution was sent by the committee of management to the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, Vth Region, Varanasi, respondent No. 2, vide letter dated 28th July, 1975, seeking her approval for the dismissal of the petitioner as contemplated by Section 16-G (3) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondent No. 2, after giving the petitioner an opportunity of showing cause, passed an order on 9th Oct. 1975, granting approval but not for the dismissal of the petitioner but for his removal from service. Against that order the petitioner filed an appeal before the Joint Director of Education (Women), U.P. respondent No. 1. After giving both the parties an opportunity of hearing the respondent No. 1 dismissed the petitioners' appeal on 2nd of May, 1976. Aggrieved the petitioner has instituted this writ petition with the prayer to quash the aforesaid orders passed by respondents 1 and 2. 2. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that in view of Regulation 35 of Chap. III of the Regulations framed under the Act it was only the manager or the principal of the college who could have been appointed as the enquiry officer to go into the charges framed against the petitioner. This Regulation 35 was amended on 10th Mar., 1975, with effect from 1st Mar. 1975. Before its amendment Regulation 35 was applicable only to teachers, the Head Master or the Principal of an institution. This Regulation 35 was amended on 10th Mar., 1975, with effect from 1st Mar. 1975. Before its amendment Regulation 35 was applicable only to teachers, the Head Master or the Principal of an institution. Regulation 35, before its amendment, enabled the committee of management on receipt of a complaint or an adverse report of facts of a serious nature, to appoint the Head Master or the principal or the Manager as the enquiry officer in case of teacher and a sub-committee in case of the Head Master or the Principal with instructions to submit the report as expeditiously as possible. By the aforesaid amendment the said regulation was made applicable to other employees also of the institution. 3. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that since the charge-sheet in the instant case was delivered to the petitioner on 10th May, 1975, and Regulation 35 stood amended by that date it was in view of the amended Regulation 35 only the principal or the manager of the institution who could be appointed as inquiry officer and not a sub-committee. 4. Having given our anxious consideration to the submission aforesaid we find ourselves unable to agree with it. The said regulation contemplates appointment of an inquiry officer on the receipt of a complaint or an adverse report of facts of a serious nature. It is not the case of the petitioner that any complaint or an adverse report of facts of a serious nature was received by the committee of management after Regulation 35 had been amended as aforesaid and that it was on the basis of that complaint or adverse report that the sub-committee was appointed. As seen above the complaint against the petitioner had been received prior to 14th Feb. 1975, and the sub-committee had been constituted on 14th Feb. 1975. On that date Regulation 35 had not been amended. In fact on 14th Feb. 1975, when the sub-committee was appointed there was no provision for appointing any inquiry officer to go into the complaint made against a clerk. It has not been disputed by counsel for the petitioner that it was open to the committee of management to terminate the services of the petitioner on the receipt of the complaint even without appointing any inquiry officer and getting the complaint investigated. It has not been disputed by counsel for the petitioner that it was open to the committee of management to terminate the services of the petitioner on the receipt of the complaint even without appointing any inquiry officer and getting the complaint investigated. It thus appears that the sub-committee was appointed only to give an opportunity to the petitioner to have his say in the matter and in order to arrive at a fair decision. In this state of affairs it cannot be said that the sub-committee constituted on 14th Feb. 1975 was in violation of regulation 35. 5. There is another aspect of the matter which, in our opinion forecloses the submission of the counsel for the petitioner in this behalf. Annexure H to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the committee of management is a copy of the resolution by which the sub-committee was appointed. It indicates that since the petitioner had made certain complaints both against the manager and the principal it was considered expedient to appoint a committee to go into the charges against the petitioner of which the manager and the principal may not be members. This again makes it clear that even though the committee of management was (not) under the statutory obligation to appoint any subcommittee on 14th Feb. 1975 it did so to make a fair enquiry before punishing the petitioner and it cannot be said that in doing so the committee of management committed any such error which may justify interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Further no allegation of any bias against the members of the sub-committee so constituted has been brought to our notice by counsel for the petitioner. The impugned orders cannot, therefore, be quashed on the basis of the alleged contravention of Regulation 35. 6. The next submission which was made by counsel for the petitioner was that the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, respondent No. 2, did not supply a complete copy of the report of the sub-committee to the petitioner in spite of the fact that a prayer was made in this behalf and this has resulted in the denial of a fair opportunity to the petitioner. We find no substance in this submission also. It would be pertinent to note in this behalf that before the sub-committee the petitioner had chosen not to appear and to defend himself. We find no substance in this submission also. It would be pertinent to note in this behalf that before the sub-committee the petitioner had chosen not to appear and to defend himself. His stand is that when he appeared on the date fixed before the sub-committee, viz., on 30th June, 1975, there were some outsiders also, and therefore, he boycotted the said proceedings. It is Annexure 15 to the writ petition which purports to be copy of an application given by the petitioner to the sub-committee on 30th June, 1975, which indicates that this has been the case of the petitioner. The ease of the committee of management in its counter-affidavit on the other hand is that the petitioner did not appear on 30th June, 1975, at all nor was any application of which annexure 15 purports to be a copy ever presented. Be that as it may, it is apparent that the petitioner even according to his own case boycotted the proceedings before the sub-committee. In Shahoodul Haque v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bihar ( AIR 1974 SC 1896 ) it has been held that where sufficient opportunity is given to a delinquent officer to explain his conduct but it is not availed of by him, requirements of natural justice or Art. 311 cannot be said to have been contravened. In so far as the grievance of the petitioner that the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, respondent No. 2, did not supply a complete copy of the findings of the sub-committee, is concerned, it is apparent even from the writ petition and Annexures 17 and 20 thereto that a copy of the resolution of the managing committee and a detailed summary of the findings of the sub-committee were supplied to the petitioner. Their perusal indicates that they contained all such material which was necessary to be brought to the notice of the petitioner to enable him to submit a suitable reply thereto. Further as seen above against the order passed by the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools granting approval as aforesaid an appeal was filed before the Joint Director of Education (Women), U.P. respondent No. 1. The impugned order of respondent No. 1 dated 2-5-1976 does not indicate that any plea was raised before her that on account of non-supply of a complete copy of the findings of the sub-committee the petitioner was put to any prejudice. The impugned order of respondent No. 1 dated 2-5-1976 does not indicate that any plea was raised before her that on account of non-supply of a complete copy of the findings of the sub-committee the petitioner was put to any prejudice. In the writ petition it has not been stated that this point was pressed before respondent No. 1 and yet she has not considered it. On the other hand on the basis of the pleas which were raised before respondent No. 1 a clear finding has been recorded by the said respondent that reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend himself both by the sub-committee and by the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools. It is for these reasons that we find no substance in the second submission also made by counsel for the petitioner. 7. It was then urged that the respondent No. 1 in recording the finding that the petitioner was publishing and printing a newspaper without the permission of the committee of management has ignored material evidence which indicated that such a permission had been granted to the petitioner and consequently the finding of respondent No. 1 on this point was vitiated. So far as this submission is concerned it may be pointed out that the only material which according to counsel for the petitioner was placed before respondent No. 1 in regard to the alleged permission having been granted by the committee of management for printing and publishing a newspaper by the petitioner was the carbon copy of a letter of Varmeshwar Pande purporting to grant the necessary permission. In this connection it is noteworthy that the original letter, even on the petitioners' own case was never produced before respondent No. 1. On the other hand a letter of Varmeshwar Pande stating that he had never granted any such permission as alleged by the petitioner was placed on the record of respondent No. 1 on behalf of the committee of management. In this background it cannot be said that there was any admissible evidence on the record of respondent No. 1 in the matter of granting permission to print and publish a newspaper which can be said to have been ignored by the said respondent. 8. In this background it cannot be said that there was any admissible evidence on the record of respondent No. 1 in the matter of granting permission to print and publish a newspaper which can be said to have been ignored by the said respondent. 8. Lastly it was urged that at the time of the hearing of the appeal before respondent No. 1 the committee of management was represented by Jagat Narain Dubey, Advocate, which was in contravention of Regulation 93 of the Regulations referred to above. This submission too in our opinion has no substance. The case of the respondents is that Jagat Narain Dubey was a patron member of the society which runs the college and he had appeared before respondent No. 1 in this capacity and not as an advocate. Regulation 93 relied on by counsel for the petitioner is in the following terms;- "No party before, a Regional Appellate Committee, shall be represented by a legal practitioner as such." The words "as such" are of significance. Regulation 93, as is clear from its plain language, does not prohibit an advocate from appearing before the appellate committee in his capacity as a party to the proceedings. It prohibits his appearance only in the capacity of an advocate. Since in the instant case Jagat Narain Dubey had appeared not as an advocate but as a patron-member of the society which runs the college, Regulation 93 cannot be said to have been in any manner contravened, 9. No other point has been pressed. 10. In the result we find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.