ORDER S. D. Agarwal, J. -This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings for release under Section 21 of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The property sought to be released is ground floor except one room of premises No. 33, Zeri Road, Allahabad. The respondent No. 3 V. K. Verma is the landlord of the said premises. The petitioners are the tenants. The case of the respondent No. 3 is that he was posted as Chief Flying Instructor at Hind Flying Club, Varanasi. At Varanasi he was staying in an official residence. He was declared medically unfit for his job due to bilateral lenticular capacities in July, 1974 and his services were terminated with effect from 3-10-1974. After termination of service he came to Allahabad in January, 1975, got his son and daughter admitted in schools and obtained a portion of the accommodation as licensee at 23 Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Allahabad, belonging to Shri Maharaj Bahadur Asthana, his relation. His case further was that household goods were stored in the gallery of the accommodation in dispute. He, therefore, sought release on the ground of personal need for residential purposes as well as for carrying on some business therein to earn his livelihood. 3. The petitioners denied the allegation made in the said application and further urged that he is carrying on the business of wholesale agency of Bata Shoe Company in the premises in suit and that the residential accommodation available with him is not fit for business purposes and greater hardship would be caused to him in case the property is released. The prescribed authority by judgment dated 29th January 1979 allowed the release application. The petitioners thereafter filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act. The appeal was dismissed by the II Additional District Judge, Allahabad by his order dated 19th July, 1979. The petitioners have now challenged the order dated 29th January, 1979 and 19th July, 1979 by means of the present petition in this Court. 4. The petitioners thereafter filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act. The appeal was dismissed by the II Additional District Judge, Allahabad by his order dated 19th July, 1979. The petitioners have now challenged the order dated 29th January, 1979 and 19th July, 1979 by means of the present petition in this Court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged, firstly, that the respondent No. 3 being admittedly in possession of a portion of building No. 23, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Allahabad, since 1975 with the consent of the landlord of the said building, he should be deemed to be a lawful tenant of the said accommodation by virtue of Section 14 of the Act and the view taken to the contrary by the appellate court, is manifestly erroneous. Secondly, since the business of the petitioners is being carried on for the last 30 years in the premises in dispute, the court should have considered the effect of Rule 16 (2) of the Rules framed under the Act. Thirdly, it was the duty of the appellate court to have considered the effect of Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules and the landlords need could have been served by releasing only a part. The omission to consider this aspect has vitiated the release order. Fourthly, it was urged that the considerations which should have weighed with the court while considering the question of release are only those factors which are mentioned in Rules 16 (1) and 16 (2) of the Rules. 5. Before considering the above mentioned submission, it is necessary to point out the admitted facts of the case. It is admitted that the respondent No. 3 was in the service of Hind Flying Club and his services have been terminated and now he is living in a portion of bungalow No. 23, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Allahabad, since 1975 with the consent of the landlord, the portion in occupation of respondent No. 3 is not good size room and small store room with common bath-room and latrine, and that he has no other accommodation of his own in Allahabad. Shri G. N. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners has further admitted that the property in dispute was let out to the petitioners for residential purpose but subsequently they had started carrying on the business in the said house. Shri G. N. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners has further admitted that the property in dispute was let out to the petitioners for residential purpose but subsequently they had started carrying on the business in the said house. It is further admitted m the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioners that the petitioners are residing in a residential house at Rambagh and not in the premises in dispute. In support of the first submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on Sections 2 (A) and 14 of the Act. His first submission is that since the respondent No. 3 is living as licensee with the consent of the landlord of the said premises he has a permanent right to stay in the said premises as a tenant and as such, his need was fully satisfied. 6. Section 2-A of the Act covers cases of short term licensee. The landlord has been given a power under this section to permit any other person to occupy on a purely temporary accommodation for a period not exceeding three months. If the licence is to be continued for a period of more than 3 months, the District Magistrate has been empowered to permit him to do so up to the maximum of six months. It has been further provided that such a licensee would not be deemed to be a tenant for the purposes of Section 20 of the Act. Under sub-section 5 of the section if a licensee does not vacate the building after expiry of the licence the prescribed authority has been empowered to order his eviction. 7. In the case of licensee as defined under Section 2-A of the Act, if he is in possession on or before 5th of July, 1976 with the consent of the landlord then, Section 14 of the Act makes him an authorised licensee of the said premises. 8. Section 2-A read with Section 14 of the Act gives a licensee who is occupying the premises with the consent of the landlord on or before 5th July, 1976, only the status of an authorised licensee and nothing more. There is a distinction between a licensee and a tenant. The tenant has an interest in the property while the licensee does not so have it. Licence is liable to be revoked by the licenser at any point of time. There is a distinction between a licensee and a tenant. The tenant has an interest in the property while the licensee does not so have it. Licence is liable to be revoked by the licenser at any point of time. The Act does not give any protection to a licensee which it gives to a tenant under Section 20 of the Act. The submission made by the learned counsel that such an authorised licensee acquires status of a tenant and cannot be evicted from the premises, in my opinion, not correct. As stated above, the said licensee does not have protection available to tenants and as such, the respondent No. 3 cannot be treated as a tenant as submitted on behalf of the petitioners. The approach made by the lower appellate court is correct and the need of the respondent No. 3 was rightly considered treating him as a licensee. 9. Rule 16 (2) of the Rules framed under the Act clearly lays down that while considering the application for release under clause (a) sub-section (1) to Section 21 of the Act in respect of a building let out for the purposes of any business the prescribed authority shall also have regard to such facts as are mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d). It is significant to note that sub-clause (2) to Rule 16 will only come into effect when a building is let out only for the purposes of business. In the instant case, it is admitted by the petitioners that the building was let out for residential purposes and it is only subsequently that the petitioners started carrying on business in the said building. In view of this fact, it is clear that the petitioners cannot rely upon the various clauses of Rule 16 (2) of the Rules framed under the Act. The submission, therefore, made by the learned counsel in this regard is not well founded. 10. In view of this fact, it is clear that the petitioners cannot rely upon the various clauses of Rule 16 (2) of the Rules framed under the Act. The submission, therefore, made by the learned counsel in this regard is not well founded. 10. In any case however, even if Rule 16 (2) applies to the case, then too, the court had considered a fact that the petitioner has been carrying on business for the last 30 years in the property m dispute and it is only after consideration of this fact that the court came to the conclusion that greater hardship would be caused to the respondent No. 3, the landlord in case his application is refused than the petitioners in case the application is allowed. This being a finding of fact cannot be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In either case the second submission made by the learned counsel lacks substance. 11. Rule 16 (1) (d) does empower the prescribed authority to release only a part of building where it comes to the conclusion that the tenants need would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building in tenancy and the landlords need would be served by releasing the other part. 12. The petitioners did not in the written statement take any such plea. They did not even urge this question before the appellate court and, therefore, no occasion arose for determining this question by the appellate court. A party who seeks to take the benefit of a particular clause must bring the relevant facts to the notice of the court to support the said plea. It is not the duty of the court in every case to consider tho effect of Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules. By this do not mean to say that in an appropriate case where fact are on record the court cannot apply Rule 16 (1) (d) in the absence of such a plea in the written statement. 13. In the instant case the petitioners as stated above neither took up a plea in the written statement nor urged the said point either before the prescribed, authority or the appellate court. 13. In the instant case the petitioners as stated above neither took up a plea in the written statement nor urged the said point either before the prescribed, authority or the appellate court. It cannot now be permitted to be urged in the present petition as the consideration of this Rule 16 (1) (d) involves determination on questions of facts which cannot be gone into the present petition. In the circumstances, the third submission made by the learned counsel has also no substance. 14. The last submission made by the learned counsel, namely, that the appellate court could only consider the factors laid down in Rule 16 and none else, is also in my opinion not well founded. Both Rule 16 (1) as well as Rule 16 (2) clearly state that while considering the requirement of personal occupation for the purposes of residence or for the purposes of any business, the prescribed authority shall also have regard to such other factors as mentioned in the subclauses. Using of the word 'also in both the parts of Rule 16 clearly indicates that besides the factors mentioned in this rule, other factors can also be considered by the court. Rule 16 does not place any restriction on the power of the court to consider factors other than those mentioned in Rule 16 depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Section 21 (1) (a) as well as 4th proviso is widely worded and if restrictions are placed on the power of the court, then it will go against the legislative intent. The rules simply provide some of the relevant factors which may be taken into consideration by the Court, but they are only illustrative and not exhaustive. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon two cases of this court, Go-karan Prasad v. Smt. Shanti Devi, 1978 All Rent Cas 511 and Basant Lal v. 8th Addl. District Judge, Allahabad, 1978 All Rent Cas 183. In Gokaran Prasads case (supra) it has been observed by the court that Rule 16 (2) only lays down consideration which should be kept in mind while disposing of the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. It does not lay down that the factors other than those mentioned in Rule 16 (2) are not to be considered. In Gokaran Prasads case (supra) it has been observed by the court that Rule 16 (2) only lays down consideration which should be kept in mind while disposing of the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. It does not lay down that the factors other than those mentioned in Rule 16 (2) are not to be considered. In Basant Lals case (supra) also the court was considering the effect of Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules framed under the Act, but did not held that the factors other than those mentioned in Rule 16 shall not be considered by the court. In the circumstances, both the cases relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners are distinguishable on their own facts. 15. Both the courts below have found that the need of the respondent No. 3 is bona fide and genuine. It has been further found that greater hardship would be caused to the respondent No. 3 by refusal of the application than to the petitioners from the grant of the application. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in this petition. 16. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioners prays for one months time to vacate the premises. The prayer so made is granted. The petitioner is granted one month's time to vacate the premises in dispute. Immediately after expiry of one month, the petitioner shall hand over vacant possession of the premises in dispute to the respondent No. 3.