ORDER S. D. Agarwal, J. -This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings for release under S. 16 of U. P. Act, XIII of 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Act in respect of a shop situate in Mohalla Shiamganj, Bareilly. 2. The case of the petitioner is that Rameshwar Dass, the father of the petitioner, was the chief tenant of the shop in dispute and Nand Kishore is the owner. After the death of Rameshwar Dass the petitioner Kailash Nath became the chief tenant. This property was sub-let by Rameshwar Das to Sita Ram. After the death of Sita Ram, Horilal respondent be- came the sub-tenant of the premises. Subsequently a suit was filed for ejectment by Rameshwar Dass against Sita Ram being suit No. 299 of 1955 in the court of Munsif City which was ultimately decreed and an ejectment decree was passed against Sita Ram. On 9th Feb., 1973 Hori Lal, the sub-tenant delivered possession of the premises to the petitioner chief tenant Kailash Nath. On 3rd Sept., 1974 an application for release was made by the petitioner Kailash Nath as he needed bona fide the premises in dispute for his own business. The case of respondent Nand Kishore is that originally the property in dispute was ancestral property of which Nand Kishore as well as Rameshwar Dass were the owners after the death of their father. Rameshwar Dass had let out this property to Sita Ram as the karta of the joint Hindu family on behalf of that family, and as such it is alleged by respondent no. 4 that in fact Rameshwar Dass was not the chief tenant but only one of the co-landlords of the premises in dispute. The property having been partitioned the property in dispute came to the share of Nand Kishore and as such Nand Kishore is now the owner and landlord of the premises in dispute. It may further by stated that since respondent no. 4 himself claimed to be the owner of the premises he moved an application for release before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 13th Feb., 1973. It may further by stated that since respondent no. 4 himself claimed to be the owner of the premises he moved an application for release before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 13th Feb., 1973. The position, therefore, is that before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer there were two release applications, one was the release application moved by Nand Kishore on 13th Feb., 1973 and the other was the release application moved by the petitioner on 3rd Sept., 1974. 3. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer recorded a finding that the petitioner was the chief tenant of the premises in dispute. Thereafter he was of the view that since the petitioner was the chief tenant he became the landlord of the premises and as such the application for release moved by Nand Kishore was not maintainable in law. The application of Nand Kishore for release was, therefore, rejected and the application for release filed by the petitioner was allowed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by order dated 28th June, 1975. Aggrieved, respondent no. 4 filed an appeal. This appeal was ultimately allowed by the 1st Addl. District Judge, Bareilly, by his judgment dated 8th Aug., 1977 and he remanded the matter to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for decision of the case afresh after affording an opportunity to the parties in the light of the observations made by him. Aggrieved the petitioner has filed the present petition challenging the order dated 8th Aug., 1977. 4. Sri Rajesh Tandon appearing on behalf of the petitioner has urged that the release application moved by respondent no. 4 Nand Kishore was not maintainable under S. 16 of the Act and as such the remand order was bad in law. Sri Rakesh Agarwal learned counsel for the respondent has, however, urged that the petitioner is not at all the chief tenant. It is Nand Kishore who is the landlord of the premises. The application for the release moved by the petitioner is not maintainable in law and in fact it is only respondent No. 4 who is entitled to move the release application and as such the release application of the petitioner is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. It is Nand Kishore who is the landlord of the premises. The application for the release moved by the petitioner is not maintainable in law and in fact it is only respondent No. 4 who is entitled to move the release application and as such the release application of the petitioner is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. He has further urged that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has acted illegally and with material irregularity in not considering the material evidence on record to establish the fact that in fact the petitioner is not the chief tenant of the premises in suit. In support of this submission he has relied upon Annexures 1, 2, 3 and 4 to the counter-affidavit filed in this court. These documents were part of the record before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 5. In order to properly examine the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties it is necessary to examine the correct position of law in this regard. Section 3, sub-section (j) of the Act defines the word landlord which is as follows: "Landlord in relation to building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building were let would be, payable, and includes, except in Cl. (g). the agent or attorney, of such person." 6. From this definition it is clear that the landlord does not necessarily mean the owner of the property. A landlord is a person to whom rent is payable. In case the tenant lets out the property to a subtenant then the said tenant, who is the chief tenant for purposes of the sub-tenant, would become the landlord of the said premises. Learned counsel for the respondent lias tried to draw distinction because of the use of the words in relation to a building and his submission is that since, here the words used are in relation to a building and, therefore, the chief tenant cannot be a landlord within the meaning of Section 3 (j) of the Act. In my opinion no such distinction can be drawn as suggested by the learned counsel. The words in relation to a building if they were not landlord would always be used in relation to a building. In my opinion no such distinction can be drawn as suggested by the learned counsel. The words in relation to a building if they were not landlord would always be used in relation to a building. Therefore the mere use of the words in relation to a building does not create any distinction between the landlord who is the owner or the landlord who is the chief tenant. In this view of the matter the chief tenant is included in the definition of the word landlord as defined in S. 3 (j) of the Act. In this connection learned counsel also relied upon Section 13 of the Act. Section 13 is as follows :-- "Where a landlord or tenant ceases to occupy a building or part thereof, no person shall occupy it in any capacity on his behalf, or otherwise than under an order of allotment or release under S. 16, and if a person so purports to occupy it he shall, without prejudice to the provisions of Section 31, be deemed to be an unauthorised occupant of such building or part." 7. The legislature has put a restriction on any person occupying the said building unless there is an order of allotment or a release as the case may be. This again also indicates the fact that in case the chief tenant is the landlord then he cannot occupy it unless he gets a release of the property. If however, a tenant vacates it then any person who is not the landlord can occupy it by virtue of the allotment order. This would depend on facts and circumstances of each case. 8. In the case of a sub-tenant the chief tenant is the landlord within the meaning of Section 3 (j) and as such under S. 16 of the Act he cannot be permitted to occupy the premises after the sub-tenant vacates the premises. In this view of the matter a chief tenant only gets legal possession of the property in dispute and he is entitled to apply for release under Section 16 of the Act. Therefore the application under Section 16 of the Act moved by the chief tenant would be maintainable in law. 9. The landlord or the chief tenant can get a property released either under Section 16 or under Section 21 of the Act. Therefore the application under Section 16 of the Act moved by the chief tenant would be maintainable in law. 9. The landlord or the chief tenant can get a property released either under Section 16 or under Section 21 of the Act. The question of release under S. 16 would only arise if the property is either vacant or deemed to be vacant under S. 22 of the Act. The question of deemed vacancy would only arise if the case comes within the purview of S. 12 of the Act. 10. In the instant case the sub tenant vacated the property then automatically the chief tenant who is the landlord would get possession of the property. He can only occupy the same if his application for release is allowed. In either case none of the clauses of Section 12 of the Act are applicable and as such no application for release on the ground of deemed vacancy under Section 12 of the Act is maintainable by the landlord or the chief tenant. 11. In view of the above the application moved by respondent No. 4 under S. 16 of the Act was not maintainable in law. An application, however, for release moved by the petitioner is maintainable. This however (does) not debar the respondent No. 4 from moving an application for release under Section 21 of the Act. 12. There is, however, another aspect of the matter. Sri Rakesh Agarwal learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently contended as stated above, that the petitioner is not the chief tenant at all and as such the question of the non-maintainability of application of respondent No. 4 does not arise. This submission made by the respondent is well founded. In case the petitioner is not the chief tenant then only the application of Nand Kishore can be maintainable under Section 16 of the Act. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer has recorded a finding that the petitioner is the chief tenant but I have examined the judgment and I find that he has ignored to consider the material evidence on record and as such his finding is vitiated in law. The material evidence Annexures 1, 2, 3 and 4 to the counter-affidavit which were part of the record of the prescribed authority, have not at all been considered. The material evidence Annexures 1, 2, 3 and 4 to the counter-affidavit which were part of the record of the prescribed authority, have not at all been considered. In the circumstance it is necessary that the matter be remanded to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for decision on this question also whether the petitioner is at all the chief tenant of the premises in dispute. In case it is found that the petitioner is not the chief tenant then his application would not be maintainable under Section 16 of the Act while that of respondent No. 4 would be maintainable. 13. In view of he above I allow the petition in part, quash the order of the 1st Additional District Judge, Bareilly, dated 8th Aug. 1977 and send back the case to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for decision afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above after affording opportunity to the parties to lead evidence as is open to them in law. In the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs.