JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - The plaintiff having lost his cause in both the courts below has now come up before this court in second appeal. 2. A suit was filed by the plaintiff for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession ever a small piece of land shown by letters ABCD in the plaint map. The land is situated near the Civil Lines, Jhansi at the crossing of Civil court, Jhansi and the P.W.D. office. The case of the plaintiff was that he purchased the land from one Rewa Shanker under sale-deed dated 10-4-1963 and has constructed a Tapra thereon and was running a tea stall therein. The P.W.D. sent a notice in 1964 directing the plaintiff to remove the constructions. The Municipal employees also came in July, 1964 to remove the constructions and directed him to remove the same latest by 31st July, 1967. Because of the threat, the suit was filed. 3. The defendant contested the suit and asserted that the land did not belong to Rewa Shanker and it was part of the road side "patri"and vests in the defendant Municipal Board, that the plaintiff was given a licence to occupy 12 X 8 land in October, 1962 with the condition that he will vacate the land as and when required by the Board. The plaintiff paid licence fee upto 31-3-1963. He continued the occupation even thereafter and has encroached upon more land and now has in his possession an area of nearly 1000 sq. fts. The trial court held that the plaintiff had taken the land in question from the defendant as a licensee and was estopped from denying the defendants right. As regard the ownership said to have been acquired by the plaintiff under the sale-deed dated 10-4-1963, it was held that the plaintiff was not the owner of the land and the land belonged to the defendant. It was also held on consideration of the evidence on the record that the land in question was part of the public street being a road-side patri and vested in the defendant. On these finding the trial court dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court also maintained those findings and has not accepted the appeal. The plaintiff has now come up before this court and has restated the matter on the same lines. 4. On these finding the trial court dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court also maintained those findings and has not accepted the appeal. The plaintiff has now come up before this court and has restated the matter on the same lines. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant, Shri G.P. Bhargava has drawn my attention to the various provisions of die Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Under section 116 (g) of the U.P. Municipalises Act the property belonging to the Board has been defined and the relevant portion of the said section reads as under : - "116. Property vested in Board. - Subject to any special reservation made by the State Government, all property of the nature hereinafter in this section specified and situated within Municipality shall vest in and belong to the Board, and shall, with all other property which may become vested in the Board, be under its direction, management and control, that is to say, (a) ........ (b) ........ (c) ........ (d) ........ (e) ........ (f) ........ (g) all public streets and the pavements, stones and other materials thereof, and also all trees, erections, materials improvements and things existing on or appertaining to such streets." 5. The argument of Shri G.P. Bhargava is that according to the definition itself only the public streets are vested in the Municipal Board and as such the land in question, not being part of the public street, could not vest in tire Board. The plaintiff having purchased it from its original owners the owner of the land and was entitled to the tea stall and the same could not be demolished. 6. In order to appreciate the strength or otherwise of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, it is necessary to have the definition of the words "public street"as defined in the Act, section 2 (19) of the Act defines the public street as under : "Public street means a street - (a) which is declared a public street by the Board under the provision of section 221, or (b) which with the consent express or implied, of the owner of the land comprising the street has been levelled, paved, metalled channelled, severed or repaired out of the municipal or other public funds." 7. The definition of the word "public street"is inextricably connected with the definition of the word "street"because it is one of the streets, of a special nature which have been designated as public street within the meaning of section 2 (19) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. The word "street"has also been defined under the Act and section 2 (23) of the Act says that "street"means any road, bridge, footway, lane, square, court, alley or passage which the public or any portion of the public, has right to pass along and includes, on either side, the drains or gutters and the land upto the defined boundary of any abutting property notwithstanding the projection over such land of any verandah of other superstructure. 8. In this case a commission was issued and the plaintiff also filed a map along with the plaint. It goes to show that the land in question is situated between the P. W. D. Office compound and the metalled portion of the road leading to Sadar Bazar. On the other side of the metalled road is the office of the District Board, Jhansi. Towards, north thereof there is open "patri": on both sides of the metalled road. The disputed land is between the metalled portion of the land and the boundary of the P.W.D. office compound and is about 50ft. long and 19ft. wide towards east and 21 ft. wide towards the west. Now according to the definition of the word 'street' as given under section 2 (23) of the Act, the area upto the defined boundary of any abutting property is also included in the definition of that word ana, therefore, the land in dispute which falls within the boundary of the P. W. D. office compound and the metalled road would normally come under the definition of the word "street". It would be a public street if this street has been declared under section 221 of the Act, as public street or in the alternative if its levelled or repaired etc. out of the public funds. So the material question for consideration would be as to whether or not this piece of land formed part of the public street. It would be a public street if this street has been declared under section 221 of the Act, as public street or in the alternative if its levelled or repaired etc. out of the public funds. So the material question for consideration would be as to whether or not this piece of land formed part of the public street. Both the courts below have found as a fact, on the appreciation of the evidence on record, that this piece of land was being maintained by the Municipal Board, Jhansi out of its public funds and, therefore, it is clearly a street which must be designated as a "public street"within the meaning of section 2 (19) of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellant has tried to argue that this land was not being maintained by the Municipal Board and wanted the evidence to be looked into which, I am afraid, is not possible. There is a clear finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court on this point and there is hardly any justification for this Court, sitting in second appeal to interfere with the same, unless it would be shown that the finding of fact was based on misreading or non-consideration of the material evidence on record. This has not been shown in the case and would, therefore, be most reluctant to make any interference in the findings arrived at by the lower appellate court. 9. In view of the finding that the land in question is a street and that it was maintained by the Municipal Board and, therefore, came within the definition of public street", clearly goes to show that the plaintiff had no right in respect thereof to seek an injunction from in the court. The suit appears to have been rightly dismissed by the two courts below. 10. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.