ORDER C. S. P. Singh, J. -This is a revision by the plaintiff. He filed a suit for ejectment, and mesne profits on the ground that Bhullan Singh, the original tenant had sublet the premises to one Ram Niwas Gupta, and further that Smt. Surjeet Kaur, defendant-respondent, was not the wife of Bhullan Singh, the deceased tenant, and as such could not continue in occupation of the disputed premises. The suit was resisted inter alia, on the ground that Bhullan Singh had never sublet the premises, but had taken in Ram Niwas Gupta as a partner in his Arhat business, and further that Smt. Surjeet Kaur was the widow of the deceased Bhullan Singh. It was also urged that the notice terminating the tenancy was not valid. Other pleas were taken in defence, but it is not necessary to refer them for the purposes of this revision. 2. The suit of the plaintiff failed. The trial Court found that Bhullan Singh had not sublet the premises to Ram Niwas Gupta, but had only taken him in as a partner in his business. It was held that Smt. Surjeet Kaur was the widow of Bhullan Singh. The notice terminating tire tenancy was found defective, and as a result the suit for ejectment and mesne profits was dismissed. A decree for Rs. 150/- on account of rent was, however, passed in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed, and the decision of the trial Court has been confirmed. 3. Sri Joshi appearing for the plaintiff-applicant urged that Smt. Surjeet Kaur was not the widow of Bhullan Singh, and the Courts below erred in giving a finding in her favour. It is not possible to examine this contention in a revision, for the finding that Smt. Surjeet Kaur is the widow of Bhullan Singh does not suffer from any of the defects set out in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure which would justify interference in a revision. It was then urged that as both the Courts below having found that Bhullan Singh had entered into a partnership with Ram Niwas Gupta, Smt. Surjeet Kaur, and the other defendants were liable to be ejected in view of Section 20 (2) Clause (e) read with Section 25 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. This argument is misconceived. This argument is misconceived. The plaintiff had filed the suit in 1971 much before the present Act was in force. Section 25 prohibits subletting except with the permission of the District Magistrate. There is nothing in Section 25 to indicate that it is retrospective. The normal rule of interpretation is that a provision has to be read retrospectively, and applied to transactions which take place after the enactment is enforced, unless there is indication to the contrary. Inasmuch as there is no indication that Section 25 or Section 12 are retrospective none of them can be made applicable to transactions which had taken effect before the present enactment. If one looks at Section 20 (2) (e) there is clear indication that Section 25 is prospective in its operation, for Section 20 (2) (e) makes a tenant liable for eviction on two grounds; one that he has sublet the premises in contravention of Section 25, and the other that the sub-lettings have been in contravention of the old Act. If the intention of the Legislature was to make Section 25 retrospective it was not necessary to mention subletting in contravention of the old Act as one of the grounds for ejectment under Section 20 (2) (e). It is also not correct to urge that Section 12 (2) has the effect of creating a sub-tenancy. Section 12 (2) does not deal with the topic of subletting for all that it does is to create a fiction to the effect that the tenant is deemed to cease to occupy the building in the event of his admitting a person as a partner in his business other than a member of his family. The consequences of subletting under Section 25, and that created by Section 12 (2) are entirely different. In ease a tenant has sublet in contravention of Section 25 he becomes liable to ejectment under Section 20 (2) (e), while that is not so in cases where Section 12(2) comes into play. Once a notional vacancy lias occurred it may be possible to take proceedings for allotment of the premises, but Section 20 (2) does not make this a ground for ejectment of the tenant from tire premises. Once a notional vacancy lias occurred it may be possible to take proceedings for allotment of the premises, but Section 20 (2) does not make this a ground for ejectment of the tenant from tire premises. On this view it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the notice determining the tenancy of the defendant was valid, but a perusal of the notice does not disclose any infirmity, which invalidates the notice. 4. The revision fails, and is dismissed with costs. Counsel for the applicant stated that the defendant-tenant has deposited the rent in Court, and he may be permitted to withdraw it. The plaintiff being the landlord of the tenant is entitled to the rent deposited by the defendant, and as such the amount deposited may be paid to him as expeditiously as possible.