JUDGMENT - S.K. DESAI, J.:---This civil revision application is at the instance of the plaintiff, Sangli Municipal Council, Sangli, in Special Civil Suit No. 5 of 1972 on the file of the Civil Judge, Senior Division at Sangli. In the suit the plaintiff has claimed from the three defendants (the respondents before me) an amount of Rs. 76,914/- with future interest and costs, and the said amount is the aggregate of four cheque indicated in paragraph 12 of the plaint, which I perused. The earliest of these cheque is one dated 6th January of the defendants to the said suit are the Syndicate Bank, Sangli Branch, and the Sangli Bank Ltd. 2. It appears that after the defendants were duly served and they filed their written statements, an application was made under Order 14, Rule 2(2) of the C.P.C. to decide issue No. 5, which was even the defendants plea as to limitation, as a preliminary issue. By the impugned order the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, has allowed the application and directed that issue No. 2 will be heard and disposed of as a preliminary issue. It is against the said order that the present revision application has been filed by the plaintiff. 3. Order 14 deals with settlement of issues and Rule 2(2) thereof, with which we are concerned, roads as follows : (1) ..... ...... ...... (2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issues first if that issue relates to--- (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, any may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue." This sub-rule (2) has been substituted by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. The original sub-rule (2) was in a slightly different language and the same may be extracted, as the judgments to which I have been referred at the bar are on the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code prior to its amendment; the same reads as follows : "(2) Issue of law and fact---Where issues both of law and of facts arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issue of law have been. 4. Without referring to the authorities it would appear that the principal change sought to be effected by the amendment pertains to the substitution of the word "shall" occurring in sub-rule (2) by the word "may", which would imply that after the amendment it is no longer obligatory on the courts to frame and try a preliminary issue of law as such even though it may be of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the basis of the decision given on such issue. Further, the nature of the points on which it would be normal for the courts to frame preliminary issues has been indicated by the amended sub-rule (2) by providing that the issue would refer to the question of jurisdiction of the Court or a bar to any suit created by an existing law. 5. Mr. Naik on behalf of the petitioner (original plaintiff) has submitted that the phraseology employed in Order 14, sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 would suggest that only a pure issue of law could be tried as a preliminary issue and that in view of the clear finding given by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangli, that issue No. 2 is not purely a question of law, the impugned order was obviously and patently erroneous. 6. It is conceded by the learned Advocates for the respondents that certain evidence on facts may be required to be taken before Issue No. 2 is answered. It was, however, submitted that Mr. 6. It is conceded by the learned Advocates for the respondents that certain evidence on facts may be required to be taken before Issue No. 2 is answered. It was, however, submitted that Mr. Naik was in error in his proposition that the Court had no discretion whatsoever to direct the trial of a mixed question of law and fact as preliminary issue. 7. To summarise, the argument of the respondents was that Issue No. 2 was an issue as to limitation. It was submitted further that this was predominately an issue of law, though certain facts would be required to be elicited. It was contended that there was discretion in the Court to direct the issue to be tried separately as a preliminary issue. It was submitted that the discretion was not exercised perversely and was not contrary to any specific provision of the Code of Civil Procedure and accordingly it was contended that the matter was not one in which any interference under the revisional powers of the High Court was required. 8. The plaintiff had before the trial Court relied very strongly on the observations to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in (Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig, F.J. Dillon)1, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 497. Before adverting to these observations I may refer to two other decisions, on of this High Court and the other of the Gujarat High Court, which appear to be directly on the point. In (Watanmal Beslchand v. N.V. Stoonvsart)2, 63 Bom.L.R. 702, Mody, J. was dealing directly with the provision contained in Order 14, Rule 2, C.P.C. After referring to several authorities, including (Shiv Bhagwan v. Onkarmal)3, 54 Bom.L.R. 330, decided by a Division Bench of this Court, the learned Single Judge proceeded to observe (at page 706) as under : "The word used is obligation which negatives Mr. Jhaverys contention that the provision of Order XIV, Rule 2 is discretionary. Jhaverys contention that the provision of Order XIV, Rule 2 is discretionary. The decision in this case, however, makes it clear that if an issue is not purely as to law only but raises a mixed question of law and then it would be discretionary for the Court whether to try it as a preliminary issue or not." The view taken by the learned Single Judge was that under the provision of Order 14, Rule 2, as it stood prior to its amendment, it was obligatory on the Court to frame a preliminary issue on a pure question of law if in the opinion of the Court the case or any part thereof may be dispose of on that issue, whereas if there was a mixed question of law and fact on which such result may follow, the Court could in the exercise of its discretion frame a preliminary issue or direct that the issue or issues framed be disposed of as a preliminary issue or issues. Thus Order 14, Rule 2 was read as not containing any implied bar on the power of the Court to direct trial of issues of mixed questions of law and fact as preliminary issues. 9. The true scope of Order 14, Rule 2, C.P.C. was considered by Bhagwati, J. in the Gujarat High Court in (Patel Premji Jivraj v. Patel Shantilal Kanji)4, 1966(7) Gujarat L.R. 931. The learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court was considering a case where the trial Judge had refused to frame a preliminary issue although the same was on a pure question of law and the decision thereon could have disposed of the entire suit. It was observed (at page 933 of the report): "....If there are issues of law arising in a suit and the suit or any part thereof is capable of being disposed of on such issues of law only. It was obligatory on the Court to try such issues of law as preliminary issues......" 10. I must now deal with the observations in Major S.S. Khannas case A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 497 on which reliance was placed before the trial Court and on which considerable reliance has been placed by Mr. Naik before me. In Khannas case the Supreme Court was principally considering the powers of precise connotation of the expression "any case which has been decided". Naik before me. In Khannas case the Supreme Court was principally considering the powers of precise connotation of the expression "any case which has been decided". Certain observations are to be found in paragraph 18 of the report which are made in the context of considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. These observations may now be extracted and read as follows : ".....Under Order 14, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issue first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issue of fact until after the issues of law have been determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact may be exercised only where in the opinion of the Court the whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should be tried by the Court, not to do so, especially when the decision on issues even of law depends upon the decision of issues of fact, would result in a lop-sided trial of the suit." (pp. 502, 503) Mr. Naik, placed great emphasis on these observations and in particular on the statement to be found therein that the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues. He further pointed out that these observations have also been made part of the head-note by the reporter. 11. In the impugned order the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, has tried to distinguish the said judgment by observing that the passage above extracted did not lay down that there was no power in the Court of trying a mixed question of law and of fact as a preliminary issues. 12. It is unnecessary in my opinion to determine precisely what these observations in the majority judgment of the Supreme Court mean. 12. It is unnecessary in my opinion to determine precisely what these observations in the majority judgment of the Supreme Court mean. It may be stated with respect and humbly that the scope of Order 14 and particularly of Order 14, Rule 2, had not arisen directly for determination, before the Supreme Court and these observations, therefore, cannot be regarded as laying down this ratio of the case or even as obiter dicta. If considered properly, they must be evaluated as observations made in passing and, therefore, no having binding authority although emanating from the highest Court of the land. 13. It is true that the Code does not contain a specific enabling provision enabling the trial Court to try a mixed issue of law and fact as a preliminary issue. The question, however, is whether any such enabling provisions is required and whether in the absence of some enabling provision it must be held that any order directing such mixed issue of law and fact to be tried as a preliminary issue is contrary to the Code and devoid of jurisdiction. In other words, is the enabling provision of Order 14, Rule 2, to be considered as containing an impled bar on the discretion and powers of the Court? 14. In connection with this question one may very usefully refer to the discussion to be found in the appellate decision in Shiv Bhagwan Moti Ram Reroji v. Onkarmal Ishar Dass, 54 Bom.L.R. 330. At page 354 of the report Bhagwati, J., who was a member of the Bench, has referred to an earlier decision of this Court in (Sowkabai v. Sir Tukojirao Holkar)5, 34 Bom.L.R. 6, and extracted a passage there from which may have some bearing on the question whether a separate preliminary trial of certain mixed questions of law and fact is permissible or not. It was observed in Sowkabais case as under : "Order XIV of the Civil Procedure Code gives no power to the Court to frame a preliminary issue of fact. It was observed in Sowkabais case as under : "Order XIV of the Civil Procedure Code gives no power to the Court to frame a preliminary issue of fact. Where, however, the Judge has framed all issues which properly arise in a case, he may select one or more of those issues to be tried first and independently, where the evidence on such issue or issues can be conveniently separated from the rest of the evidence and the finding on that issue or those issues may render the trial of other issues unnecessary." (p. 354 of the report). 15. A review of the foregoing authorities would indicate the following position in law : (1) There is no express provision in Order 14, Rule 2, conferring power on the Court or making it obligatory on the Court to direct trial of a mixed question of fact and law as a preliminary issue. (2) There is, however, no bar under Order 14 against the Court selecting such issue and deciding its trial first and independently of the other issues when it is of opinion that a finding on that issue or those issues may render the trial of the other issues unnecessary. (3) Normally all the issues in a suit must be tried together, but this is subject to the discretion of the Court to try certain issues as preliminary issues which may be designated as preliminary issues strictly speaking as covered by Order 14, Rule 2, as also its discretion to direct separate and earlier trial of other issues which may be described as preliminary issues outside Order 14, Rule 2. 16. The next question is that if the trial Court has framed issues and has after considering the pleadings and the scope of the controversy between the parties decided to try certain issues as preliminary issues, then, would it be proper for the High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to interfere with such order? Such interference would be proper and permissible if the action of the trial Court is in conflict with and contrary to the provisions of Order 14, Rule 2. Such conflict has not been shown in this case. Such interference would be proper and permissible if the action of the trial Court is in conflict with and contrary to the provisions of Order 14, Rule 2. Such conflict has not been shown in this case. Such interference, further would be proper if the trial Court had decided to select a particular issue for earlier trial and the decision was so improper as to be characterised as perverse in the sense in which the term is used in law. In other words, is the impugned decision one which no reasonable Tribunal acting properly could have given? Once the question is posed in this manner, the answer is fairly simple in this case and that is that the decision of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangli, has been given carefully after considering the pleadings properly and the same can in no way be characterised as perverse. Merely because another view is possible or because another Court may have decided not to try the issue as a preliminary issue will not entitle interference with the order of the Civil Judge, Senior Division. 17. It may be mentioned that during the course of arguments no reliance was placed by Mr. Naik on the provisions contained in Order 14, Rule 2(1), C.P.C., nor was it urged that the said sub-rule had any bearing on the question to be decided. Accordingly I have disposed of the Civil Revision Application wholly on the basis of the provisions contained in sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order 14. 18. In this view of the matter, the rule will stand discharged. But as the matter was fairly arguable, the parties are directed to bear their own costs of their revision application. 19. The stay to stand vacated. 20. This order to be communicated forth with to the trial Court. -----