D. C. CHAKRAVORTI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal from the appellate decree dated March 2, 1974 passed by the learned Additional District Judge at Alipore, affirming that passed by the learned Munsif, 2nd Court, at Alipore. ( 2 ) THE plaintiffs who are the present respondents brought a suit for eviction and mesne profits against the present appellant on the following allegations: ( 3 ) THE defendant/appellant was a monthly tenant in respect of the first floor at 1, Col. Biswas Road Road, P. S. Karays, District 24-Parganas at a monthly rental of Rs. 85/- payable according to English Calendar month. He defaulted in payment of rent since February 1960. A notice dated August 16, 1960 determining the tenancy on the expiry of the moth of September 1960 was served on him. As he did not comply with the requisition contained in the said notice the present suit was brought. ( 4 ) AFTER the suit was decreed ex-parte, on an application made by the defendant under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure the suit was restored. The defence was as follows: the defendant was a tenant not in respect of the first floor alone but his tenancy also included one room in the ground floor and two rooms in the second floor. He was dispossessed from the room in the ground floor before the present suit was filed and accordingly the defendant was entitled to suspend payment of rent. The defendant was not a defaulter. The notice to quit was not legal and sufficient and was not duly served. The plaintiff no. 4 Md. Yusuf was not a minor when the notice of ejectment was served or when the present suit was filed and the notice and suit were accordingly bad. ( 5 ) THE learned Munsif who originally heard the suit dismissed the same on the ground that the defendant was entitled to protection under section 17 (4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. On an appeal being preferred from that decision the judgment and decree originally passed by the learned Munsif were set aside by the Court of Appeal as the issue whether the defendant was a defaulter or not was decided in favour of the plaintiffs. On an appeal being preferred from that decision the judgment and decree originally passed by the learned Munsif were set aside by the Court of Appeal as the issue whether the defendant was a defaulter or not was decided in favour of the plaintiffs. The Court of appeal, however, sent the case back on remand and directed the trial Court to decide the other issues on merits. ( 6 ) THE learned Munsif who heard the suit after the said order of remand found the notice of ejectment to be legal, valid, and sufficient and to have been duly served on the defendant, that the ground floor room was not included in the tenancy and that the plaintiff no. 4 was minor at the time when the notice of ejectment was issued and also when the suit was filed. In this view of the matter and in view of the further fact that the issue regarding default was decided aleady by the Court of appeal below in favour of the plaintiffs, the learned Munsif decreed the suit. From this decision of the learned Munsif the defendant preferred an appeal. The learned Additional District Judge who heard the appeal dismissed the same on contest with costs. ( 7 ) MR. R. N. Mitter, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant contended in the first place that on the materials on record the court of appeal below should have held that suit was bad inasmuch as it was for partial eviction. The courts below disbelieved defendant's contention that the tenancy also included a room in the ground floor and the defendant was dispossessed therefrom. That is a question of fact and that finding cannot be challenged before this Court in this appeal. Mr. Mitter, therefore, did not make any submission regarding that finding. In substantiating his case regarding alleged partial eviction Mr. Mitter drew my attention to the fact that the records would show that there were two rooms on the second floor and that those two rooms were included in the tenancy in question. It is significant to note here that in the court below the plaint was amended by inclusion of the words "including two garret rooms on the roof" after the words "the entire first floor" appearing in the Schedule to the plaint. In these circumstances, Mr. It is significant to note here that in the court below the plaint was amended by inclusion of the words "including two garret rooms on the roof" after the words "the entire first floor" appearing in the Schedule to the plaint. In these circumstances, Mr. Mitter contended that at the defendant was not required by the notice of ejectment to vacate the entire suit premises including the two rooms in the second floor the suit was bad on the ground that partial eviction was asked for. On behalf of the respondents Mr. Roychowdhury contended that in the circumstances of the present case it could not be said that the defendant was in any way misled by the alleged defect in the notice regarding the extent of the tenancy. As already pointed out, so far as the defence case regarding a room in the ground floor is concerned both the Courts below found that the tenancy in question did not include a room in the ground floor and there was, therefore, no question of his being dispossessed from any room in the ground floor. On the materials on record it cannot but be held that he defendant's tenancy did include not only the entire first floor but also two rooms in the second floor which were described as garret rooms by the plaintiffs. There is no doubt that the two rooms in the second floor or, in other words, on the roof of the first floor found no mention in the notice of ejectment. The question, therefore, is whether this defect was vital one and would render the notice invalid. The correctness of the description of the premises in question as it stood after the said amendment was not challenged by filing any additional written statement. The two rooms on the second floor were described in the plaint as "two garret rooms" on the roof of the premises in question. Thus, according to the plaintiffs, the "two garret rooms" were to be regarded as part of the entire first floor. According to the Shorter Oxford English dictionary (3rd Edn. revised with Addenda), "garret" it cannot be said that the description of the suit premises appearing in the plaint is in any way misleading. The "garret rooms" may accordingly be treated also as part of the entire first floor as they are rooms on the roof of the first floor. According to the Shorter Oxford English dictionary (3rd Edn. revised with Addenda), "garret" it cannot be said that the description of the suit premises appearing in the plaint is in any way misleading. The "garret rooms" may accordingly be treated also as part of the entire first floor as they are rooms on the roof of the first floor. Further it is significant to note here that on behalf of the plaintiffs the agreement (Ext. 1) dated December 5, 1956 between the parties concerned was proved in which the tenancy in question was described as tenancy of the first floor only of premises No. 1, Col. Biswas Road, at a rental of Rs. 85/- per month. The defendant, however, denied having bad executed that agreement. Both the courts below accepted agreement (Ext. 1) as genuine and I find no reason to differ from them. Further that is a question of fact which is concluded by the concurrent findings of both the courts below. In the notice (Ext. 2) the suit premises were described as the entire first floor of premises No. 1, Col. Biswas Road, P. S. Karaya, 24-Pgs. The rooms in the second floor of the premises were no mentioned. It is significant to note that the entire first floor was referred to in the notice and the monthly rental was also correctly mentioned. Now, the question is whether in the circumstances aforesaid, the notice was bad on the ground that a part of the subject-matter of the tenancy was left out. Both the learned lawyers appearing on behalf of the appellant and the respondents placed reliance on the Privy Council decision in Harihar Banerjee vs. Ramsashi Roy 23 C. W. N. 77 in support of their respective contentions. In that case, in the Schedule to the notice in question the area of the land comprised in the tenancy was inaccurately stated and one of the boundaries was also not correctly given. The area of the land mentioned in the notice was 6 cottahs even though the tenancy comprised 2 ? Bighas of land. In such circumstances, Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed :"but the fact remains that he notice required the tenants to deliver up this property originally held by Ramnidhi Majhi and for which he was paying a rental of Rs. 25/- per year. Bighas of land. In such circumstances, Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed :"but the fact remains that he notice required the tenants to deliver up this property originally held by Ramnidhi Majhi and for which he was paying a rental of Rs. 25/- per year. Nobody could doubt when he received a notice like that, that what he was required to give up was not a portion of the holding but the whole holding for which Rs. 25/- was payable. The errors in the schedule are, as the learned Subordinate Judge observes, mere inaccuracies which do not affect the validity of the notice". ( 8 ) THIS decision is still today the leading case on the subject in question. It lays down the principles to be applied in determining whether because of some inaccuracies in the notice of ejectment the notice would fail or in spite of the inaccuracies the notice would be good and valid. It has been laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in that case that the validity of the notice is not to be determined by what that notice would convey to a stranger ignorant of all the relevant facts and circumstances concerning the holding in question but what it would mean to the tenants who are presumably conversant with all the relevant facts and circumstances. It was further laid down that the notices were to be construed not with a desire to find faults in them which would render them defective but they are to be construed ut res magis valoat quam pereat. Here in this case, the notice mentioned the correct monthly rental and the name of the tenant. Further it required the tenant to vacate he entire first floor. Having regard to the said agreement (Ext. 1) and the meaning of the word "garret" referred to above, the omission of the words "two garret rooms" in the notice would not render the notice invalid. In the facts and circumstances the tenant very well knew what part of the premises no. 1, Col. Biswas Road, he was required to give up. He was required to deliver up possession of the entire subject-matter of the tenancy which he held under the plaintiffs at which he held under the plaintiffs at a monthly rental of Rs. 85/ -. In the circumstances aforesaid I find no substance in this contention of Mr. Mitter. 1, Col. Biswas Road, he was required to give up. He was required to deliver up possession of the entire subject-matter of the tenancy which he held under the plaintiffs at which he held under the plaintiffs at a monthly rental of Rs. 85/ -. In the circumstances aforesaid I find no substance in this contention of Mr. Mitter. ( 9 ) IN the second place, Mr. Mitter argued that it would appear from the materials on record that the plaintiff no. 4 Md. Yusuf did attain majority before the institution of the present suit, that even though he was a major at the date of the institution of the suit, he along with other plaintiffs filed the suit wherein he was shown as a minor represented by his mother and that accordingly, the court of first instance should have thrown out the suit. While pressing this point of his Mr. Mitter placed reliance of Sherija Bi vs. Vedanayakam and Ors. A. I. R. 1976 Mad 262, Sakal Singh and Ors. vs. Chanderdip Lal and Ors. A. I. R. 1919 Pat 10, Ruhul Amin vs. Shanker Lal and ors. A. I. R. 1924 AII. 54, and Sheorania vs. Bharat Singh I. L. R. 20 AII 90. In the case of Sherija Bi vs. Vedanayakam Pillai (supra), the appointment of a guardian in respect of a previous suit was not found to be proper on the ground that the guardian was not appointed on the basis of the fact that the first respondent was congenitally deaf and dumb and was, therefore, unable to manage his affairs. But the guardian was appointed on the ground that the first respondent was minor even though on the date of the institution of the suit he was a major. This case, therefore, has no application to the question with which we are concerned in the present appeal. In the case of Sakal Singh (supra) it was held that when a major defendant was described as a minor he could not be treated as a party to the suit and would not be bound by the decree passed therein. This case, therefore, has no application to the question with which we are concerned in the present appeal. In the case of Sakal Singh (supra) it was held that when a major defendant was described as a minor he could not be treated as a party to the suit and would not be bound by the decree passed therein. The case of Ruhul Amin (Supra) it was held that where the plaintiff attained majority before the institution of the suit and the plaint was signed and verified on his behalf by a nest friend verified on his behalf by a nest friend the plaint was not valid in law and there was no valid presentation of the plaint. In Sheorania's case (supra) it ws held that when a suit was instituted on behalf of a person alleged to be minor through his next friend and it transpired later that he had already attained majority before the institution of the suit, the suit should have been dismissed. ( 10 ) MR. Roychowdhury appearing on behalf of the respondent relied in this regard on Narayan Chandra Das vs. Dulal Chandra Datta A. I. R. 1927 Cal. 477. There it was held that the court did possess the power to allow a memorandum of appeal to be amended in a case where a major plaintiff though bonafide mistake was described as a minor and represented by another as his nest friend. There was previously a conflict of decision regarding the question whether in a case where a suit was filed by a person through his nest friend on the allegation that he was minor and it was subsequently found that he was a major on the date of institution of the suit, the defect was a formal one and could be cured by amendment or whether such defect went to the root of the matter and affected the merits of the case. The two Allahabad cases referred to above lend support to the view that such a defect would not be a mere irregularity but would affect the merits of the case. The Patna High Court case referred to above also indirectly supports that view. The two Allahabad cases referred to above lend support to the view that such a defect would not be a mere irregularity but would affect the merits of the case. The Patna High Court case referred to above also indirectly supports that view. But it will appear from the discussion that will follow that the High Courts of Calcutta, Lahore, Madras, Assam and Nagaland, Orissa and Allahabad (Special Bench) and the Court of Judicial commissioner, Manipur, took the correct view that the defect referred to above did not affect the merits of the case but can be remedied by suitable amendment of the plaint and removal of the nest friend. A later Division Bench decision of Patna High Court in Bibi Asghari vs. Muhammad Karim A. I. R. 1919 Pat 323 does not support the view taken by a single Bench of that High Court in Sakal Singh's case (supra ). In Wali Mohd. Khan vs. Ishak Ali Khan A. I. R. 1931 AII. 507, a Special Bench of the Allahabad High Court over-ruled the decision in said Ruhul Amin's case (supra) which followed Sheorania's case (supra ). The Special Bench of Allahabad High Court decisions in Taqui Jan vs. Obidulla (1894) I. L. R. 21 Cal. 866 and Narayani Chandra Das's case (supra ). Ultimately, the said Special Bench of Allahabad High Court held that if the plaintiff acted in good faith and without gross negligence, and it was fair and just to allow the defect to be cured, the court would undoubtedly do so. In that Special Bench case when a suit was filed in the name of a plaintiff by his mother acting as guardian and nest friend and he was described as a minor even though, he was then of age and the suit was prosecuted by him in person, the suit was not thrown out on the technical ground that the plaint as originally filed described the plaintiff as a minor. Such a defect would be cured if it was due to a bonafide mistake. In the Orissa High Court case of Khetrabasi Parida vs. Chaturbhuj Parida and ors. A. I. R. 1968 Orissa 236, the contention of the appellant was that the decree in a rent su9it obtained against defendant Nos. Such a defect would be cured if it was due to a bonafide mistake. In the Orissa High Court case of Khetrabasi Parida vs. Chaturbhuj Parida and ors. A. I. R. 1968 Orissa 236, the contention of the appellant was that the decree in a rent su9it obtained against defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and the plaintiff was a nullity so far as the plaintiff was concerned as he ws a major but was wrongly impleded as a minor. There the learned lawyer appearing for the appellant relied on the said Patna High Court decision in Sakal Singh's case (supra) but the Orissa High Court rightly held that Sakal Singh's case was decided by a single Judge of the Patna High Court and that decision was considered subsequently in Division Bench case namely, Bibi Asghar's case (supra ). The learned Judge in the said Orissa High Court case relying on the Madras decision in Sheshagiri Rao vs. T. Jagnadham A. I. R. 1970 Mad 318, held that he did not accept the appellant's contention that the decree or sale so far as the plaintiff's interest was concerned would be treated as a nullity simply on the ground that he was described as a minor, though in fact, he was a major by the date of the suit. In Dulal Ch. Majumdar vs. Umesh Ch. Majumdar A. I. R. 1966 Assam and Nagaland 93, G. Mehrotra C. J. , following the decisions in the said case of Bibi Asghari (supra), R. Sami Naidu vs. Manga A. I. R. 1940 Mad 522, Wali Mohd. Khan vs. Ishak Ali (supra), and the case of Narayan Ch. Das vs. Dulal Chandra (supra) observed that where the suit for ejectment of a lessee was filed by the mother for self and as mother guardian of two minor sons while in fact the sons were major on the date of the suit and the suit was prosecuted by them the suit could not have been thrown out merely on the ground that the plaintiffs though major had sued as minors. The defect, according to the learned Chief Justice, would not a vitiate the entire suit when it was due to a bonafide mistake and as the two plaintiffs were considered to be parties to the suit, the Court could allow amendment of the plaint at any stage of the proceeding. The defect, according to the learned Chief Justice, would not a vitiate the entire suit when it was due to a bonafide mistake and as the two plaintiffs were considered to be parties to the suit, the Court could allow amendment of the plaint at any stage of the proceeding. In Kangaban Selungha Singh vs. Keisam Ningol Leipuban Onghi Manjuri Devi A. I. R. 1958 Manipur 13, Datta, J. C. , following the Alahabad, Clacutta, Madras and Lahore High Courts' decisions held that the order of the learned Munsif whereby the plaint was returned for amendment was not bad in law in a case where a suit was instituted by a next friend on behalf of a person alleged to be a minor and it was found that the plaintiff was not in fact a minor at the date of the institution of the suit. In view of the discussions aforesaid I cannot but hold that when through bonafide mistake the plaintiff sues as a minor represented by a next friend even though at the date of the suit he came of age, the defect may be remedied by suitable amendment of the plaint. In the present case the Court below after considering the relevant circumstances of the case allowed the plaint to be amended by striking out form the cause title the words, "minor represented by natural guardian mother". There is nothing wrong in this. On other hand the Court below rightly allowed the amendment. In the circumstances aforesaid, the second contention of Mr. Mitter is also of no substance. ( 11 ) THE only other question raised in this appeal on behalf of the appellant is that the notice of ejectment which was serve on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents one of whom was said to be a minor and was represented by his natural guardian mother was bad inasmuch as the mother was not a natural guardian under the Mohmmedan Law and was at best a defacto guardian. Mr. Mitter contended that the mother who was not a natural guardian under the Mohammedan Law could not have the legal authority to act on behalf of a minor son and the notice so given would be bad in law. Under the Mohammedan Law. Undoubtedly, the mother is not the natural guardian. Mr. Mitter contended that the mother who was not a natural guardian under the Mohammedan Law could not have the legal authority to act on behalf of a minor son and the notice so given would be bad in law. Under the Mohammedan Law. Undoubtedly, the mother is not the natural guardian. But the acts of mother in dealing with the estate of her minor son are valid if they are to the manifest advantage of the minor or caused by urgent or imperative necessity. What, in such cases, is of paramount importance is whether the act of the defacto guardian was done for the benefit of the minor or his estate. Reference in this regard my be made to Ameer Ali's Mohammedan Law (5th Edn. Vol. II) page 552 and the decision in the case of Thandan Vallapil Easuf's son Hyderman Kutti vs. Jikyseru Vallapi Koypa's son Syed Ali and Anr. 15 I. C. 576, Mafuzzal Hossain vs. Basid Sheikh I. L. R. 34 Cal. 36 and Ram Charan Sanyal vs. Anukul Chandra Acharya I. L. R. 34 Cal 65. In the present case, so far as the plaintiff No. 4 is concerned the notice was served on his behalf by the mother describing her as his natural guardian. Natural guardian she could not have been but in view of the fact that the mother was acting as the defacto guardian of the minor and the fact that in the present case where the defendant appellant was sued for eviction on the ground of default, there can be no doubt that the de facto guardian mother while serving the notice on behalf of her minor son, was doing an act which ws for the manifest advantage of the minor and was imperatively called for by reason of the minor and was imperatively called for by reason of the fact that the tenant/defendant defaulted in payment of rent. Accordingly, in the circumstances aforesaid, it cannot be said that the notice of ejectment which was served by the major plaintiffs and by the mother on behalf of the plaintiff No. 4 who at the date of the notice was minor was bad. The mother was acting for protecting the pecuniary interest of that plaintiff who was then a minor. This last contention of Mr. Mitter also fails. The appeal is accordingly dismissed and the judgment and decree impugned are affirmed. The mother was acting for protecting the pecuniary interest of that plaintiff who was then a minor. This last contention of Mr. Mitter also fails. The appeal is accordingly dismissed and the judgment and decree impugned are affirmed. In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.