ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. -This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings for release under S. 21 of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. The property in dispute is a shop situate in Pasratta Bazar, Kashipur, district Nainital. The petitioner Giri Raj Saran is the owner of the said shop. Respondent No. 3 Sudama Lal is the tenant of the said property. The petitioner moved an application for release under S. 21 of the Act on the ground that he needed the shop for his own bona fide need for carrying on his own business. The prescribed Authority by his judgment dated 7th Jan. 1977 rejected the release application. The petitioner thereafter filed an appeal under S. 22 of the Act. The appeal was allowed on 28th Oct. 1977 by the 1st Additional District Judge, Nainital. During the hearing of the appeal the petitioner gave an undertaking to the court that in case the release application is allowed the petitioner will pay the difference of rent to respondent No. 3 if he engages another shop on a rent higher than the one he is paying for the shop in question. He further undertook to get the shop of Suresh Chandra Kumartane on rent to respondent No. 3. On the specific question put by the court he undertook to deposit Rs. 9,800/-, the differences in rent for five years to be paid to Sri Suresh Chandra Kumartane. In view of the above undertaking the court passed the following operative order : "The appeal be and is hereby allowed on the condition :- (1) That the appellant would get the shop of Sri Suresh Chandra Kumartane on a rental of Rs. 200/- per month including taxes to the respondent within one month and shall also deposit within this period Rs. 9,800/- payable to Sri Suresh Chandra Kumartane after execution of the lease deed between him and Sudama Lal, respondent; (2) That in ease the appellant fails to fulfil condition No. 1 the appeal shall stand dismissed; and (3) That the respondent if objects to accept the shop of Sri Suresh Chandra Kumartane on any pretext whatsoever, the appeal shall be deemed to have been allowed unconditionally. " 3. " 3. Thereafter the petitioner did not fulfil the terms of the undertaking given by him in the court below on the oasis of which the order dated 28th Oct. 1977 was passed and instead he has challenged the order dated 28th Oct. 1977 by means of the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. Sri R.P. Goel, learned counsel for the petitioner lias urged that the appellate court could not pass an order in terms of the undertaking as it was contrary to S. 21 (1) (a) second proviso, and R. 16 (2) (c) oi the Rules framed under the Act. His second submission is that on the findings arrived at by the court the release application of the landlord would have been allowed and an undertaking was only given in the alternative. Since the findings of fact are in favour of the petitioner, therefore, the court should not have passed a conditional order on the basis of the undertaking. The third submission of the learned counsel is that the undertaking given by tire petitioner is in the nature of an agreement and since respondent No. 3 did not signify his assent to this undertaking in writing, therefore, the court had no jurisdiction to accept the undertaking and pass a conditional order on that basis. The last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the first condition namely, that the petitioner will get the shop of Sri Suresh Chandra Kumartane on rent for respondent No. 3 is a void condition and as such cannot be enforced. 5. I have heard Sri S.S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the respondent, who has supported the order passed by the appellate court and has further urged that it is not a fit case for interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. Sri R.P. Goel conceded that the petitioner did give an undertaking as recorded by the court below and his arguments are based treating this as an admitted fact that an undertaking was given. 7. 6. Sri R.P. Goel conceded that the petitioner did give an undertaking as recorded by the court below and his arguments are based treating this as an admitted fact that an undertaking was given. 7. The petitioner made an application under S. 21 of the Act on the allegations that he bona fide required the shop for his own business as the landlord whose shop was in his tenancy had been pressing for vacating that shop and also as he had no other shop in the town where he could carry on his business. Respondent No. 3 contested the application on the ground that the main source of the livelihood of the petitioner was agriculture, that the petitioner dealt in quilts seasonally and thus he could carry on business from the shop in his tenancy and also from his house, that the petitioner further carries on money lending business, business of vegetable oil and that in case he is ejected from the shop in dispute he and the business will be completely ruined. He further pleaded that he had been in possession of the shop since the last more than 30 years and as such his need is more pressing than that of the petitioner. 8. As stated above, the prescribed authority rejected the application for release, holding that the petitioner in fact did not bona fide require the shop and the need of respondent No. 3 was more pressing. The appellate court found that the petitioner bona fide needed the shop for his own use. This finding by itself was not sufficient to grant the application for release as under S. 21, fourth proviso the court has further to examine the likely hardship to the tenant from the giant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application. While considering this question the court observed that since respondent No. 3 had no other shop either as owner or as a tenant and if the shop is released respondent No. 3 would suffer hardship. While this question was being considered the petitioner gave an undertaking that he can arrange another shop for respondent No. 3 and that in case he fails to do so his appeal may be rejected. While this question was being considered the petitioner gave an undertaking that he can arrange another shop for respondent No. 3 and that in case he fails to do so his appeal may be rejected. Respondent No. 3 did challenge this undertaking but the petitioner further reiterated his stand that he is the tenant of the shop owned by Suresh Chandra Kumartane and that he undertakes that he would get this shop for respondent No. 3 on rent from Suresh Chandra Kumartane. It was in view of this undertaking that the court granted the release application. The Court initially did come to the conclusion that if the petitioners application is rejected the petitioner is likely to suffer hardship and respondent No. 3 is also likely to suffer equally. Suffering of respondent No. 3 was mitigated by the undertaking given by the petitioner and, therefore, the court passed the release order in favour of the petitioner. From the judgment it is clear that the release application would not have been allowed by the appellate court in case there was no undertaking on behalf of the petitioner. The acceptance of the undertaking was a material factor which led the court to grant the application for release in favour of the petitioner. 9. Section 21 (1) (a), second proviso, of the Act empowers the court to grant compensation up to an amount not exceeding two years rent to the tenant in case the application for release is allowed in respect of a non-residential building. Rule 16 Cl. (2) (c) also gives power to the court to impose conditions where it finds that the landlords have other existing business. These provisions are applicable to a case where the court comes to the conclusion that the release application should be allowed on merits of the case. In the instant case, however, the release application has been allowed because of the undertaking given by the petitioner. The power given to the court to grant compensation or impose conditions under Section 21 (1) (a) and R. 16 (2) (c) does not restrict the power of the court to accept the undertaking given by a party voluntarily in order to enable it to obtain a relief from the court which otherwise he would not have got. As I have stated above if this undertaking was not there the release application would not have been allowed. As I have stated above if this undertaking was not there the release application would not have been allowed. The extent of the undertaking cannot be limited by the provision contained in S. 21 (1) (a) of the Act and R. 16 (2) of the Rules and as such the court was fully empowered to accept the undertaking given by the party. 10. In fact in the present case it appears that the court had R. 16 (2) (c) of the Rules in mind and when an undertaking was given that a suitable accommodation would be made available to respondent No. 3 then only the court granted the release application. In this view of the matter the first and the second submissions made by the learned counsel do not have any substance. 11. The third submission made by the learned counsel that the undertaking is 'in the nature of an agreement is, in my view, fallacious. In Halsburys Laws of England, Vol. 9, Fourth Edition, Para 73, it has been observed as follows : "An undertaking given to the court by a person or corporation in pending proceedings, on the faith of which the court sanctions a particular course of action or inaction has the same force as an injunction made by the court and a breach of the undertaking is misconduct amounting to contempt." This principle has been accepted by the Supreme Court in Chhaganbhai v. Soni Chandu Bhai ( AIR 1976 SC 1909 ). The argument that the undertaking was a mere agreement was rejected by the Supreme Court as impossible. In the case of Chhaganbhai (supra) the Supreme Court on a consideration of the facts of that case held that there was nothing in the conditions of the undertaking to imply that it was merely a consent order passed upon an agreement between the parties to which the order of the Court had been superseded and that it was clearly a case of express undertaking to the court incorporated in the order. 12. The position in this case is also similar. The court would not have granted the release application had the petitioner not given an undertaking. It was specifically because of the undertaking that the court granted the release. It was not necessary for respondent No. 3 to specifically give in writing his consent to the undertaking. 13. 12. The position in this case is also similar. The court would not have granted the release application had the petitioner not given an undertaking. It was specifically because of the undertaking that the court granted the release. It was not necessary for respondent No. 3 to specifically give in writing his consent to the undertaking. 13. The last submission made by the learned counsel that the undertaking given by the petitioner that he would get the shop owned by Suresh Chandra Kumartane let out to respondent No. 3 is void as that depends upon not on the volition of the petitioner but on the volition of Suresh Chandra Kumartane. The petitioner was admittedly the tenant of the shop owned by Suresh Chandra Kumartane and as such the petitioner very well knew Suresh Chandra Kumartane and he did give an undertaking on that basis. The undertaking is not void as submitted by the petitioner. 14. Allegations have come on record on behalf of the petitioner that Suresh Chandra Kumartane is not prepared to give the shop on rent to respondent No. 3. On the other hand respondent No. 3 has alleged that the petitioner has persuaded Suresh Chandra Kumartane not to let out the shop to respondent No. 3. These are counter allegations made by each party; which allegation is correct cannot be determined in these proceedings under Article 226 of tire Constitution. In case, however, it is not possible for the petitioner for any reason to comply with the undertaking given by the petitioner it is always open to him to apply before the 1st Additional District Judge, who passed the impugned order, for getting that undertaking recalled. If and when such an application would be made the court would consider the application after determining the relevant facts and may recall the order if it is so necessary in the interests of justice and thereafter consider the application for release ignoring the undertaking given by the petitioner. At present, however, in my opinion, the condition is not a void condition at all because admittedly the shop of Suresh Chandra Kumartane was in the tenancy of the petitioner who could hand it over to respondent No. 3 with the consent of the landlord. 15. There is another aspect of the case. The prescribed authority had rejected the release application. 15. There is another aspect of the case. The prescribed authority had rejected the release application. The petitioner thereafter filed an appeal and got a release order from the appellate court on the basis of an undertaking given by him. The petitioner cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold in the same breath. In the circumstances it is not a fit case for interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. In the result the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances the parties are directed to bear own costs.