S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THE facts of the case in Special Civil Application No. 1954 of 1974 briefly stated are as under:the former princely State of Chhotaudepur granted certain rights to respondent No. 1. Under those rights respondent No. 1 was entitled to operate mines and win mineral products. They were jagir rights. On the coming into force of the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act 1953 there in after referred to as the Jagir Abolition Act for the sake of brevity all jagirs were abolished. The jagir which was granted to respondent No. 1 consisted of two villages Zer and Dadigam. The Act came into force some time in 1954. In 1968 respondent No. 1 (who will hereinafter be described as the claimant ) made an application to the Government under sec. 10 and claimed that he had a right to open new mines and win mineral products in these two villages and that those rights were not abolished under the Jagir Abolition Act. Therefore an enquiry under sec. 37 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code was made by the District Deputy Collector who by his order dated 21st December 1975 turned down the contention raised by the claimant and did not give him a declaration that he had a right to open new mines and win mineral products therefrom. The claimant appealed to the Collector against that order. The Collector dismissed the appeal. Further appeal was carried by the claimant to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the former princely State of Chhotaudepur had granted to the claimant a proprietary jagir therefore all rights in respect of mines and minerals which subsisted on the appointed date were saved. Therefore the Tribunal set aside the orders made by the subordinate forums and gave a declaration. It is that order which is challenged by the State of Gujarat in this petition. ( 2 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 1988 of 1974 the facts of the case are similar. Respondent No. 1 (who will hereinafter be referred to as the claimant) is the lessee in respect of 244 Acres and 15 Gunthas of land situated in village Baletia which was a Jat Inam land of the Janis of Kalol. The rights of the Inamdar were abolished under the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act. Respondent No. 1 (who will hereinafter be referred to as the claimant) is the lessee in respect of 244 Acres and 15 Gunthas of land situated in village Baletia which was a Jat Inam land of the Janis of Kalol. The rights of the Inamdar were abolished under the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act. However the claimant claimed that leasehold rights granted to him in respect of mines and mineral products by the Inamdar were saved under sec. 9 of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act 1952 The claimant therefore sought a declaration to the aforesaid effect. The Assistant Collector of Kalol negatived the Contention raised by the claimant. In appeal the Collector of Panchmahals confirmed the order made by the Assistant Collector. On further appeal to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal the orders made by the subordinate forums were set aside and it was declared that survey No. 35 admeasuring 244 acres and 20 gunthas of village Baletia had not vested in the State. That order is challenged by the State of Gujarat in this petition. ( 3 ) THE only question which arises for our consideration in both these petitions relates to the interpretation of sec. 10 of the Jagir Abolition hot and sec. 9 of the Personal Inams Abolition Act. Sec. 10 of the Jagir Abolition Act provides as follows:"nothing in this Act or any other law for the time being in force shall be deemed to affect the rights of any jagirdar subsisting on the appointed date to mines or mineral products in a jagir village granted or recognised under any contract grant or law for the time being in force or by custom or usage. "sec. 9 of the Personal Inams Abolition Act 1952 provides as follows:"nothing in this Act or any other law for the time being in force shall be deemed to affect the rights of any Inamdar subsisting on the appointed date to mines or mineral products in an inam village or inam land granted or recognized under any contract grant or law for the time being in force or a decree of a Court. "on comparative analysis of these two sections it appears to us that except for a few verbal changes they are in pari materia. "on comparative analysis of these two sections it appears to us that except for a few verbal changes they are in pari materia. ( 4 ) THE question which has been raised before us in both these petitions is as follows:- What is the connotation and amplitude of the expression mines or mineral products used in both these sections ? ( 5 ) IT has been contended by Mr. M. B. Shah on behalf of the State that mines means excavations already made on or before the appointed date and mineral products are those which were in the process of being won from such mines. In other words his contention is that mineral products hidden in the suh-soil and not opened before the appointed date are not mines within the meaning of the expression mines or mineral products used in these two sections. This question arose before Mr. Justice M. P. Thakkar in these two petitions. He found that the question which was required to be decided was of substantial importance. Therefore he referred these two petitions to the Division Bench. ( 6 ) OUR attention has been invited by Mr. M. B. Shah to the unreported decision of Mr. Justice P. D. Desai in Special Civil Application No. 1224 of 1973 decided by him on 31st and 31th January 1975. The question which arose before Mr. Justice P. D. Desai in that case was in the context of jagir rights. It was the case of a proprietary jagir as it is in this case. It was contended in that case that the abolition of jagir led to the extinguishment of the proprietary rights of jagirdar in the soil and that the jagir lands came to vest in the State. In that context Mr. Justice P. D. Desai observed that the rights and interests in the mines and mineral products in jagir villages had been recognized by the Act itself. He further held that by virtue of sec. 10 of the Jagir Abolition Act which we have quoted above those rights were not affected notwithstanding anything contained in the Jagir Abolition Act. He also referred to the proviso to sec. 69 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and observed that nothing in sec. 69 could be deemed to affect the subsisting rights of any occupant of such land in respect of such mines or mineral products. He also referred to the proviso to sec. 69 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and observed that nothing in sec. 69 could be deemed to affect the subsisting rights of any occupant of such land in respect of such mines or mineral products. Therefore according to him even if the State Government acquired the right of ownership over the lands comprised in an erstwhile jagir those rights did not affect the subsisting mineral rights of a jagirdar. This decision does not help us in answering the question which has been raised before us. The question which has been raised before us to repeat is not whether mines and minerals as such are saved by sec. 10 but the question is whether unopened and hidden mines are within the contemplation of sec. 10 of the Jagir Abolition Act and sec. 9 of the Personal Inams Abolition Act. The distinction which is sought to be made in the present case was not made in that case. This very decision rendered by Mr. Justice P. D. Desai was examined by the Supreme Court in appeal. The appellate decision is reported in State of Gujarat and Another v. Maharaj Shri Amarsinhji Himatsinhji AIR 1978 S. C. 1167. In paragraph 7 of the report the Supreme Court has observed that the object of the Jagir Abolition Act is to abolish jagirs of all kinds in the merged territories and merged areas and to convert all jagir villages into unalienated villages liable to the payment of land revenue in accordance with the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. In respect of mines and mineral products it has been observed by the Supreme Court that compensation is made payable under sec. 11 of the Jagir Abolition Act to Jagirdars whose Jagirs and other incidental rights have been extinguished. In that context the Supreme Court has made a further observation that it would be pertinent to note that no provision has been made for payment of compensation in respect of rights to mines and mineral products in a Jagir village obviously because if by the grant in question the Jagirdar has not been given any rights to mines and mineral products no compensation is payable and if there be a grant of mines and mineral products it has been saved to the Jagirdar under sec. 10 of the Act. 10 of the Act. It has also been observed by the Supreme Court in the same paragraph that it is not possible to accept the contention that a determination under sec. 2 (4) (i) of the Jagir Abolition Act to the effect that a particular Jagir is a proprietary one necessarily implies that the grantee is entitled to mines and mineral pro. ducts in the villages comprised in the grant especially when having regard to the definition given in sec. 2 (xviii) a Jagir could be proprietary with. Out a right to mines and mineral products. The Supreme Court made these observations in the context of an inquiry made under sec. 37 (2) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. The principal question which arose before the Supreme Court was whether an enquiry under sec. 37 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code was competent after a declaration that a particular jagir was a proprietary jagir was made under the Jagir Abolition Act. This decision of the Supreme Court does not help us in resolving the controversy which has arisen before us. Suffice it to say that it did not deal with the connotation and amplitude of the expression mines or mineral products used in sec. 10 of the Jagir Abolition Act and sec. 9 of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act. What this expression connotes was not the question which arose before Mr. Justice P. D. Desai in the unreported decision against which appeal was preferred to the Supreme Court in the case above referred to. ( 7 ) OUR attention has then been invited to the decision of this Court in Dinshawji Bamanji Dalal and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Another 11 G. L. R. 193. It was a case udder the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act which does not contain a provision similar to sec. 10 of the Jagir Abolition Act and sec. 9 of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act. However an argument was raised before Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta who decided that case that since no mines were worked on the appointed date and since no minerals were won on that day there were no subsisting rights. Answering that contention Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta observed that it was wholly immaterial whether the land was put to such use or not. According to his opinion what was material was the potential capacity of the land. Answering that contention Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta observed that it was wholly immaterial whether the land was put to such use or not. According to his opinion what was material was the potential capacity of the land. He therefore differed from the conclusion recorded by the Revenue Tribunal in that behalf. Emphasis has been laid on the potential capacity of the land. Bearing that emphasis in mind it has been argued that mines and mineral products do not necessarily mean only the excavations and the products won therefrom but they also mean unopened land which has the potential capacity of becoming or turning out to be a mine. ( 8 ) IT has then been argued by Mr. M. B. Shah that the expression right. . . subsisting on the appointed date to mines or mineral products means those rights which were actually exercised on the appointed date in respect of mines and mineral products. According to him that expression does not connote the rights which may be exercised in future by opening new mines and excavating them. He has tried to fortify his arguments by referring to other sections of the Act. Both under the Jagir Abolition Act as well as under the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act rights of jagirdars and inamdars in the lands have been abolished and the State has resumed them. Therefore according to Mr. M. B. Shah the position that will emerge will be this. The land below which there is a hidden mine vested in the State Government on the appointed date. The State might or might not give it over for cultivation to an agriculturist. Does sec. 10 contemplate dual ownership of such land the surface belonging to the State and the hidden unopened and unexcavated mine belonging to the jagirdar or inamdar. The second question which is raised for our Consideration is this. Do sec. 10 and sec. 9 to which we have referred mean that after the land vested in the State on the appointed date a jagirdar or an inamdar can claim the rights to hidden minerals at any time in future even after 50 years or after 100 years 7 The arguments which Mr. M B. Shah has raised are quite weighty and demand serious consideration. ( 9 ) MR. M B. Shah has raised are quite weighty and demand serious consideration. ( 9 ) MR. B. R. Shah has tried to repel these arguments by inviting our attention to certain provisions of the Mines Act 1952 and the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957 Sec. 2 (j) of the Mines Act 1952 to which he has invited our attention defines the expression mine in following terms:- ". . . . any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on and includes- (I) all borings bore holes and oil wells; (II) all shafts in or adjacent to and belonging to a mine whether in the course of being sunk or not (III) all levels and inclined planes in the course of being driven (IV) all open cast workings; (V) all conveyors or aerial ropeways provided for the bringing into or removal from a mine of minerals or other articles or for the removal of refuse therefrom; (VI) all adits levels planes machinery works railways tramways and sidings in or adjacent to and belonging to a mine; (VII) all workshops situated within the precincts of a mine and under the same management and used solely for purposes connected with that mine or a number of mines under the same management; (VIII) all power stations for supplying electricity solely for the purpose of working the mine or a number of mines under the same management; (IX) any premises for the time being used for depositing refuse from a mine or in which any operation in connection with such refuse is being carried on being premises exclusively occupied by the owner of the mine; (X) unless exempted by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette any premises or part thereof in or adjacent to and belonging to a mine on which any process ancillary to the getting dressing or preparation for sale of minerals or of coke is being carried on. "he has also invited our attention to sec. 2 (jj) of the Mines Act which defines the expression minerals in the following terms:". . . . . ALL substances which can be obtained from the earth by mining digging drilling dredging hydraulicing quarrying or by any other operation and includes mineral oils (which in turn include natural gas and petroleum ). "sec. 2 (jj) of the Mines Act which defines the expression minerals in the following terms:". . . . . ALL substances which can be obtained from the earth by mining digging drilling dredging hydraulicing quarrying or by any other operation and includes mineral oils (which in turn include natural gas and petroleum ). "sec. 3 (d) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation And Development) Act 1957 to which he has invited our attention defines mining operations in the following terms:" "mining operations" means any operations undertaken for the purpose of winning any mineral. "these provisions have been pressed into service to show that the expression mines does not necessarily mean an excavation but that it includes also any preparatory act resorted to for the purpose of opening a mine. He has therefore argued that the grant of mining rights to the claimants not only included the right of operating mines and winning mineral products but also included the right to resort to preparatory acts with the object of winning mineral products. Therefore according to him if we accept the contention which Mr. M. B. Shah has raised the right to take preparatory steps to open new mines granted to the claimant will be defeated. The preliminary question which we are therefore required to determine is whether we shall be justified in resorting to the definitions given in the Mines Act 1952 and the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957 for the purpose of finding out the Width and amplitude of the expression mines or mineral products used in the Jagir Abolition Act and the Personal Inams Abolition Act. It is necessary to note that the legislative object underlying the Mines Act 1952 and the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957 is radically different from the object underlying the enactment of the Jagir Abolition Act and the Personal Inams Abolition Act. The first mentioned two Acts are intended to regulate the power of the Government in respect of mines and minerals. They are also intended to bring about the development of mines with the object of Winning subsoil wealth or the benefit of the nation. The object underlying the enactment of the Jagir Abolition Act and the Personal Inams Abolition Act in so far as mines and minerals are concerned is to abolish the rights of intermediaries and to bring about the agrarian reforms. The object underlying the enactment of the Jagir Abolition Act and the Personal Inams Abolition Act in so far as mines and minerals are concerned is to abolish the rights of intermediaries and to bring about the agrarian reforms. In other words the object underlying these two enactments is to remove from the social life of the country the archaic and outdated features. It cannot be gainsaid that both the Jagir Abolition Act and the Personal Inams Abolition Act abolish all rights of the jagirdars and inamdars except those which have been expressly saved and that in respect of all rights so abolished by them the jagirdar and the inamdar have been given compensation. Therefore it is difficult to accept the contention that the expression mines or mineral products used in the Jagir Abolition Act and the Personal Inams Abolition Act must bear the same construction which flows from the definitions of similar expressions given in the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957 and the Mines Act 1952. ( 10 ) IN the State of Maharashtra v. Mohanlal Devichand Shah A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 189 the Supreme Court has referred with approval to its observation in Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1957 S. C. 18 that it is no sound principle of construction to interpret the expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act. It has also been observed that the meanings of the words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they are used. In Halsburys Laws of England Third Edition Volume 26 page 317 it has been observed that the word mine is not a definite term but is one susceptible of limitation or expansion according to the intention with which it is used. The original or primary meaning of the word is an underground excavation made for the purpose of obtaining minerals. ( 11 ) THE expression mine has been defined in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Third Edition so as to mean as follows:-"an excavation made in the earth for the purpose of digging out metallic ores or coal salt precious stones etc. "it is clear therefore that the expression mine means an excavation. ( 11 ) THE expression mine has been defined in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Third Edition so as to mean as follows:-"an excavation made in the earth for the purpose of digging out metallic ores or coal salt precious stones etc. "it is clear therefore that the expression mine means an excavation. In our opinion the expression mine used in the Jagir Abolition Act and in Personal Inams Abolition Act means an excavation or an open mine and does not mean an unopened mine because it is difficult to imagine which unopened area will have a mine and which will not have it. We do not think that the Legislature contemplated to introduce by enacting sec. 10 of the Jagir Abolition Act and sec. 9 of the Personal Inams Abolition Act a state of uncertainty by creating dual ownership vesting the land in the State so far as surface was concerned and again vesting it in the jagirdar if a mine was found later therein. Therefore what the Legislature meant by enacting sec. 10 of the Jagir Abolition Act and sec. 9 of the Personal Inams Abolition Act is to save excavations or opened mines subsisting `on the appointed date and the mineral products which were won therefrom That in our opinion is the width and the amplitude of the expression the rights. . . . . subsisting on the appointed date to mines or mineral products used in both these Acts. The view which we are taking is consistent with the other provisions of these Acts which vest in the State uncultivated lands belonging to a jagirdar or an inamdar and make actual tillers of agricultural lands occupants under the State therefore under sec. 69 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 the right of the Government to mines and mineral products in all such lands was reserved. Proviso to sec. 69 lays down that. . . . . nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any subsisting rights of any occupant of such land in respect of such mines or mineral products. Proviso to sec. 69 does not help in construing the expression mines or mineral products used in the Jagir Abolition Act and the Personal Inams Abolition Act because sec. 69 is intended to regulate the rights of the grantees as against the State which is the owner of all mines. Proviso to sec. 69 does not help in construing the expression mines or mineral products used in the Jagir Abolition Act and the Personal Inams Abolition Act because sec. 69 is intended to regulate the rights of the grantees as against the State which is the owner of all mines. ( 12 ) WE have taken the view which we have done because we are concerned primarily with construing the expression mines or mineral products used in these Acts which were passed by the Legislature in order to abolish all rights of the intermediaries and return all lands to the State except those lands and such rights which have been expressly excepted. In that view of the matter the impugned orders made by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in both these cases cannot be sustained. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 13 ) IN the result both the petitions succeed and the impugned orders are quashed. The appellate orders made by the Collector are restored. Rule is made absolute in each of the two petitions with no order as to costs. In Special Civil Application No. 1988 of 1974 we may state out of abundant caution that by our judgment we have not disturbed in any manner whatsoever what the Collector or the Assistant Collector has held in favour of the claimant. Petitions allowed: Leave to appeal granted. .