Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner is the applicant No.1 (the tenant) in a suo mote case taken by the Land Tribunal, Alleppey under S.72C of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The tenancy arrangement was not disputed and the only question that arose before the Tribunal related to the amount of compensation payable by the revision petitioner and his co-tenants to the respondent. A report of the revenue inspector was called for and he has filed a report fixing fair rent at 1/8th of the normal produce of the scheduled nilam. But the Land Tribunal, according to the petitioner, did not take that into account and has fixed the compensation based on an alleged agreement and also on the fair rent of other properties of the neighbouring jenmies. The appellate authority did not interfere with this decision in appeal. The appellate authority discarded the revenue inspector's report as not reasonable. 2. A preliminary objection is taken to this revision petition on the ground that it is not maintainable. The order directed the purchase of the landlord's rights and directed deposit of the compensation amount under the following terms: "In the result, I order that the right, title and interest of the landlord and intermediary over the scheduled property measuring 1 acre 46 cents of wet land in Sy. No 70/1A of Mararikulam south village are assigned in favour of the tenants. The tenants shall deposit with the land tribunal the sum of Rs. 1604.46 in lump within nine months of the date on which this order becomes final. The purchase price shall be a first charge on the scheduled property and if defaulted shall be recovered with interest under the provisions of the R. R.Act in force." It is clear therefore that the order imposes joint liability on the tenants to deposit the amount. What is contended by Shri Varghese Kalliath, counsel for the respondents is that one of the tenants alone is incompetent to file this civil revision petition. 3. In reply to this contention Shri Sadananda Prabhu, learned counsel for the petitioner, would urge that under the provisions of 0.41 R.4 (which provision could be applied to revisions also) though Only one of the tenants had filed the revision, in case the revisional court accepts the contention of the petitioner it could reverse or vary the order in favour of all the tenants as the case may be. That 0.41 R.4 could be made applicable to revision cannot be disputed as pointed out in Abdul Gafoor v. Wahidan Bibi (AIR. 1966 Patna 173): "There is no legal bar to apply principles governing appeals also to revision applications in suitable cases when the ground is similar that an an order can be set aside even at the instance of one of the decree holders or that a party can be added even at the time of the hearing of the appeal and as a matter of that even of ah application for revision," According to the counsel, 0.41 R.4 could be directly applicable here, which states: "Where there are more plaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit, and the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground common to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants, any one of the plaintiffs or of the defendants may appeal from the whole decree, and thereupon the Appellate Court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be. 4. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Prasad v. M/s. Shyam Beharilal Jagannath (1963 SC. 1901) the principle behind the provisions of R.4 of 0.41 is that any one of the plaintiffs or defendants, as contemplated therein, in filing an appeal represents all the other non-appealing plaintiffs or defendants as be wants the reversal or modification of the decree in favour of them as well, in view of the fact that the original decree proceeded on a ground common to all of them. I may refer here to a decision in Gouri Amma v. Gopalakrishna Panicker (1966 KLT. 715) where it was said: "The general rule is that on an appeal by one of the several plaintiffs or defendants, the appellate court can reverse or vary the decree of the trial court only in favour of the party appealing. 0.41 R.4 and 33 are exceptions to this rule and give the appellate court ample power to pass the appropriate decree needed in the interests of justice. The word 'parties' in R.33 of 0.41 is intended to connote persons who were parties in the trial court but not in the appeal. 0.41 R.4 and 33 are exceptions to this rule and give the appellate court ample power to pass the appropriate decree needed in the interests of justice. The word 'parties' in R.33 of 0.41 is intended to connote persons who were parties in the trial court but not in the appeal. Under the rules, a decree against several persons, one of whom alone appeals, can be reversed as against the rest when it proceeds on any ground common to all of them. The rules can apply only when the lower court has proceeded upon a ground common to all the plaintiffs or defendants and not when the appellate court considers that the decree is on a ground common to all." The Supreme Court, in the decision cited supra, refers to the decision in Parwati v. Manna Lal (AIR. 1956 Patna 414). There it was said that if 0.41 R.4 and 33 are read together, there can be no doubt that one of the defendants can file an appeal without impleading the other defendants as respondents, and if the appeal proceeds on a ground common to all the defendants, the Appellate Court may exercise the power of varying the decree in favour of the non-appealing defendants, though they have not been parties to the appeal. The effect of these two rules is that the Court is authorised to pass a decree in favour of a party who has not been heard, but the Appellate Court is not authorised to pass a decree against a person who is not a party to the appeal. Thus the appellate court has power, under the provisions of 0.41, R.4, read with 0.41 R.33 to vary or reverse the mortgage decree granted by the lower court in favour of a defendant who is not impleaded either as a party appellant or as a party respondent, and whose name is ordered to be expunged from memorandum of appeal on account of a technical defect. In such a case there is no question of abatement. To the same effect is the decision in Abdul Gafoor v. Wahidan Bibi (AIR. 1966 Patna 173 at p. 176). 5. However, it might be noted that 0.41 R.4 cannot be taken advantage of when a necessary party to the suit or appeal is omitted from being impleaded. 6. The principles underlying Order I R.9 apply to appeals also. To the same effect is the decision in Abdul Gafoor v. Wahidan Bibi (AIR. 1966 Patna 173 at p. 176). 5. However, it might be noted that 0.41 R.4 cannot be taken advantage of when a necessary party to the suit or appeal is omitted from being impleaded. 6. The principles underlying Order I R.9 apply to appeals also. No appeal should be dismissed because of non joinder of parties as such and the court may deal with the matters in controversy so far as the parties actually before it are concerned. But if the non joinder is of a necessary party the appeal itself becomes incompetent. If necessary parties have not been joined, the effect of such non joinder is fatal to the appeal because in such cases there is no proper appeal before the court at all. For example, if there is a decree against two joint persons and an appeal is filed by one alone without impleading the other, the decree against the other having become final, the appeal becomes incompetent. Otherwise if the appeal is allowed, there would be two inconsistent decrees. It will be interesting in this connection to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dwaraka Prasad v. Harikant Prasad (AIR. 1973 SC. 655). The facts of that case are as follows: A suit was filed for specific performance of a contract of sale of a property against the vendor (defendant First Party) and the subsequent purchaser (defendant Second Party) with notice of the prior agreement. There was an alternative prayer for a decree for a certain amount consisting of part consideration paid. The suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff. It was a joint decree against both the defendants. The subsequent purchaser alone appealed making the defendant vendor and the plaintiff prior purchaser the respondents. During the pendency of the appeal the vendor first defendant died and his legal representatives were not brought on record. Justice Grover holding that 0.41 R.4 could not be made available to the appellant observed as follows: "The second limb of argument of the appellants is based on 0.41 R.5 (4?), Civil Procedure Code. During the pendency of the appeal the vendor first defendant died and his legal representatives were not brought on record. Justice Grover holding that 0.41 R.4 could not be made available to the appellant observed as follows: "The second limb of argument of the appellants is based on 0.41 R.5 (4?), Civil Procedure Code. According to that rule where there are more plaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit and the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground common to all the plaintiffs or all the defendants any one of the plaintiffs or defendants may appeal from the whole decree and thereupon the appellate Court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be. As the appeal had been filed by defendants, second party, it has been contended, that it remained complete and competent in spite of the death of Guha, defendant first party, for the reason that the decree proceeded on a ground common to all the defendants. It appears that there was conflict of judicial opinion on the question whether the said rule could be invoked when one of the several appellants had died and his legal representatives had not been brought on record with the result that the appeal had abated against him. But this matter stood concluded by the decision of this Court in Rameshwar Prasad v. Shyam Beharilal Jagannath, (1964) 3 SCR 549 = (AIR.1963 SC. 1901). In that case the appeal had been filed in the High Court not by any one or some of the plaintiffs against the whole decree but had been filed by all the plaintiffs jointly. One of the appellants died and his legal representatives were not impleaded. It was laid down by this Court that 0.41 R.4 could not be invoked because the appellate Court had no power to proceed with the appeal and to reverse and vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants under that rule because if all the plaintiffs or defendants had appealed from the decree and any one of them had died the appeal had abated so far as he was concerned under 0.22 R.3. The appeal of the surviving appellant could also not be heard because of the rule.laid down in the State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram (1962) 2 SCR. 636 = AIR 1962 SC. 89). The appeal of the surviving appellant could also not be heard because of the rule.laid down in the State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram (1962) 2 SCR. 636 = AIR 1962 SC. 89). According to that rule the abatement of an appeal means not only that the decree between the appellant and the deceased respondent becomes final but also, as a necessary corollary, the appellate Court cannot in any way modify that decree directly or indirectly. The decision in Nathu Ram's case, (1962) 2 SCR 636 = (AIR. 1962 SC. 89) (supra) was referred to in Pandit Siri Chand v. M/s. Jagdish Parshad Kishin Chand, (1966) 3 SCR. 451 = (AIR. 1966 SC 1427) where the decision was somewhat similar to Rameshwar Prasad's case. (1964) 3 SCR. 549 = (AIR. 1963 SC. 1901) (supra). It was also emphasised that in a situation where two inconsistent orders or decrees would result the rule in Nathu Ram's case would be applicable. It may be mentioned that in that case an award had been made for payment of compensation in favour of two brothers L& N. The State appealed against the award to the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal respondent L died and no application was made for bringing on record his legal representatives within the requisite period of limitation. The question was that since the appeal had abated against L what was its effect in appeal against N. It was observed that the consideration which would weigh with the Court in deciding whether the. entire appeal had abated or not would be whether the appeal between the appellants and the respondents other than the deceased respondent could be said to be properly constituted or could be said to have all the necessary parties for the decision of the controversy before the Court. Another main test was whether the success of the appeal would lead to a decision which would be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent. Thus the Court will have to pass a decree contradictory to the one which had already become final with respect to the same subject matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent. It is arguable that the present case is distinguishable from the decisions in Rameshwar Prasad, (1964)3 SCR 549= (AIR. 1963 SC. 1901) and Pt. Siri Chand, (1966) 3 SCR. 451 (AIR. 1966 SC. 1427) (supra). It is arguable that the present case is distinguishable from the decisions in Rameshwar Prasad, (1964)3 SCR 549= (AIR. 1963 SC. 1901) and Pt. Siri Chand, (1966) 3 SCR. 451 (AIR. 1966 SC. 1427) (supra). Here the appellate Court could, under 0.41, R.4 of the Civil Procedure Code reverse the decree for specific performance since the defendants second party filed the appeal and Guha, the vendor, who died had not joined in the appeal. The decree for specific performance proceeded on a ground common to both sets of defendants. It could, therefore, be set aside in terms of the above provision. But there is a joint decree in favour of both sets of defendants for the receipt of Rs. 77,000/-. If the decree for specific performance is set aside that part of the decree will also have to go. It is not possible to understand how that can be done in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased Guha. Moreover, the plaintiffs had claimed against Guha, in the alternative, a decree for substantial amount consisting of the part consideration paid and certain other amounts. If Guha had been alive or if his legal representatives had been impleaded in time the Court could, while setting aside the decree for specific performance, grant the alternative prayer which was only made against Guha. This cannot be done now. In these circumstances we are of the view that 0.41, R.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be of any avail to the appellants. The abatement of the appeal, so far as Guha was concerned, will prove fatal to the entire appeal as either inconsistent and contradictory decrees will have to be passed or proper reliefs cannot be granted in the absence of a necessary party against that party or his legal representatives." 7. That case dealt with a contingency where the appeal becomes incompetent on account of the non¬impleading of the legal representatives of a deceased party and consequent abatement. On the same principle, an appeal not properly constituted by the non-impleading of necessary parties cannot be saved by invoking the provisions of 0.41 R.4. 8. That case dealt with a contingency where the appeal becomes incompetent on account of the non¬impleading of the legal representatives of a deceased party and consequent abatement. On the same principle, an appeal not properly constituted by the non-impleading of necessary parties cannot be saved by invoking the provisions of 0.41 R.4. 8. In a case where there is a joint decree where only one of the judgment debtors filed an appeal without impleading the others who are jointly liable with him, the appeal becomes incompetent and that defect cannot be cleared by taking advantage of the provisions of 0.41 R.4 or 0.41 R.33. In this case there cannot be any controversy that the order directing payment of compensation creates a joint liability on all the defendants. Therefore, the revision by one of them alone without impleading the others makes the revision incompetent. I therefore dismiss this Civil Revision Petition with costs. Dismissed.