Judgment H.L. Agrawal, J. In this application by the defendant (Judgment debtor) the question which falls for determination of this Court is as to whether an application under section 13 of the Bihar Buildings Control Act, 1977 corresponding to section 11 Act the old Act can be made by a landlord at the execution stage. 2. The plaintiff instituted a title suit in the year 1965 in the 2nd court of Munsif at Bhagalpur against the petitioner for his ejectment from the suit premises. A decree for arrears of rent from January, 1973, to December, 1975 was also claimed. The suit was decreed by the trial court. The decree was confirmed on appeal by the court of appeal below and the second appeal was dismissed in limine by this court. 3. The said decree was then put in Execution Case No. 2678 of 1977 and in the executing court on 4.10.78 the landlord made an application 'Under section 13 of the Act for an order to the petitioner to deposit the arrears of rent. This petition was opposed by the petitioner but tae Munsif by the impugned order directed the petitioner to deposit the arrears of rent from 23.12.65 to 30.11.1977 and also to deposit the current rent in terms or section 15 of the Act. The tenant has accordingly filed the present application. 4. Shri Parmeshwar Prasad appearing for the tenant in support of this application contends that a landlord is not entitled to make such an application at the execution stage. The court below has over ruled a similar objection on reference to a decision of this court in Uma Devi Vs. Bimaldeo Narain and another under an impression that the execution was a continuation of the suit. I am afraid no such principle follows from the said authority. The question that fell for decision in the above case was as to whether an order under section 11A of the old Act would operate against the tenant even after disposal of the suit and it was held by the learned single Judge that such an order operated only so long as the suit remained pending before him, unless there was specific direction to that effect. In making that observation no doubt, it was observed that a direction could be given by the trial court to the tenant to go on depositing the rent even during the pendency or an appeal or an execution proceeding. The learned Munsif seems to have fallen prey of this observation in passing the Impugned order. I am however not called upon to examine the propriety of the said observation as to whether a trial court may give such a binding direction to a tenant. 5. The scheme of section 13 of the Act contemplates a direction to the tenant who contests the suit to deposit the arrears and current rents and on his default, his defence is to be struck out and he is exposed to the pains of suffering an uncontested decree. The question now arises if such an order is passed by the executing court and the tenant defaults, then what will be the consequences of the same, as nothing remains to be struck out at that stage. 6. There is no direct authority on the point of course, in the case of Sheikh Mohammad Rasool and another Vs. Sheikh Anisur Rahman, it was observed by a Bench of this Court that the power under section 11A could be exercised by the Court of appeal also as the expression "at any stage of the suit" could include appeal as well. This court examined the possibilities of applying the default clause against the tenant even at an appellate stage for taking the view as "there was no practical difficulty or legal bar..........to strike out the defence of the tenant against ejectment for his failure to comply with the direction given to him to deposit arrears of rent or rent month by month as even at the appeal stage there will be no difficulty in striking out the defence against ejectment and to give effect to the ensuing consequences". 7. It is, therefore, obvious that a court passing an order under section 13 of the new Act must be in a position to give effect to the ensuing consequences of the default which is mandatory. It is well settled that an execution court cannot go behind a decree and it will not be possible for that court to enforce the default clause. It is well settled that an execution court cannot go behind a decree and it will not be possible for that court to enforce the default clause. The analogy of applying it at the appellate stage will not hold good as when the matter is pending in appeal, the decree itself is under challenge and the appellate court can enforce the default clause. The executing court by no stretch of imagination achieve that end as it is bound by the decree and obliged to execute it. Striking out the defence by the executing court would amount to reopening the pre decree matters. 8. Learned counsel for the opposite party has, however cited some decisions in support of the order. Firstly, he relied upon the case of Dokku Bhushayya Vs. Katragadda Ramkrishnayya and others. In that case, the question for consideration before the Supreme Court was as to whether the provisions of Order 32 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be applied with the aid of section 141 at the stage of the execution proceedings. Refuting the argument that the said protection can be applied only during the pendency of the suit and not after it came to an end, the Court held that "for the purpose of the said rule an execution proceeding is a continuation of a suit". No support can be derived from the above decision for the proposition in question in as much as the Supreme Court has deliberately confined the application of the aforesaid provision, only to an execution proceeding and has not made any general observation that an execution proceeding would be deemed to be in continuation of the suit. 9. Reliance was next placed upon the case of Rangappa Kelavadeppa Vs. Rindawa Vasangouda and Shyamsunder Kuer Vs. Mathura Prasad Sen. In both the cases the question which fell for consideration was as to whether the principle of resjudicata would apply to execution proceeding. These decisions, therefore, arc also of no assistance to the landlord. 10. From the above discussions, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that no application under section 13 of the Act can be made by a landlord at the execution stage. I would accordingly allow this application with costs and set aside the impugned order so far as it relates to the deposit of rents under section 13 of the Act. I would accordingly allow this application with costs and set aside the impugned order so far as it relates to the deposit of rents under section 13 of the Act. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs.75/- only. Application allowed.