By Court One of the points involved in this case relates to the interpretation or rule 3A or Order XVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure and since the opposite party challenged the correctness of the decision of this Court in Shri Ram Maharaj V. Raj Kishore Bhagat1 this revision application has been placed before Division Bench for hearing. 2. The petitioner has been elected Municipal Commissioner from ward No. 4 of the Lalganj Municipality and the opposite party filed an election petition before the District Judge, Muzaffarpur, who is the Election Commissioner under the Bihar Municipal Elections and Election Petition Rules, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). The appellant, after examining five witnesses, wanted to examine himself. Relying upon Order XVIII Rules 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioner objected to the prayer. The Court below held that the Rule 3A does not apply to the present case which is being heard under the Election Rules. The opposite party was accordingly, permitted to examine himself. The petitioner has filed the present revision application challenging the said order. 3. Mr. A. N. Chatterjee. appearing for the petitioner, has first contended that the provisions of the entire Code of Civil Procedure will apply to election petition cases under the Rule and he relied upon Rule 82 for this purpose, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 82 (omitting the proviso) is in the following terms ;- "Subject to the provisions of these rules, every election petition shall be tried by the Election Commissioner, for Municipal Elections, as nearly as ma) be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the trial of suits," The contention as pressed on behalf of the petitioner appears to be too wide to be accepted. However, since it is not necessary to decide in this case as to whether the entire Code of Civil Procedure will apply or not, we do not consider it expedient to deal with this aspect, The powers of the Election Commissioner has been enumerated in Rule 94 In the following terms - "The Election Commissioner shall have the powers, which are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when trying a suit in respect of the following matters,- (a) enforcing the attendance of witnesses; (b) compelling the production of documents; (c) examining witnesses on oath; (d) granting adjournments; (e) reception of evidence taken on affidavit; and (f) issuing summons for examination of witnesses; and may summon suo motu any person whose evidence appears to him to be material, and shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of sections 489 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898," The Election Commissioner, therefore, undoubtedly has got power to examine witnesses on oath under clause (c) quoted above, Rule 82 appears to provide for the procedure for the exercise of the powers mentioned under Rule 94. It follows that in matter of examination of witnesses, Order XVIII of tile Code of Civil Procedure including Rule 3A must apply. 4. Mr. Yogendra Mishra appearing for the opposite party, argued that in any event, the Election Commissioner has been expressly given the power to act suo motu for summoning any witness whose evidence may appear to the Election Commissioner to be material and the order passed by the court below Is covered by this power. We do not find ourselves in a position to agree with the learned counsel. It was not the Election Commissioner in the present case who had directed the opposite part, to be examined as a witness nor did he express an opinion that examination of the opposite party would be, in his view, material for the case. The opposite party wanted to examine himself as witness and the Impugned order merely permits him to do so. It is, therefore not covered by the suo motu power of the Election commissioner and the order cannot be supported on that ground. 5. Mr. The opposite party wanted to examine himself as witness and the Impugned order merely permits him to do so. It is, therefore not covered by the suo motu power of the Election commissioner and the order cannot be supported on that ground. 5. Mr. Yogendra Mishra next contended that the decision In Shri Ram Maharoj's case (Supra) by a learned single judge of this court Is erroneous and Rule 3A does not take away the right of the court to entertain an application by a party who has already examined some of his witnesses for permission to be examined later on and in appropriate cases the court bas ample jurisdiction to allow such prayer. It will be use-full at this stage to examine the provisions of Rule 3A which read thus :- "Where a party himself wishes to appear as a witness he shall so appear before any other witness on his behalf has been examined, unless the court for reasons to be recorded permits him to appear as his own witness at a later stage." It was pointed out in Shri Ram Mahraj'8 case that by the use of the word 'shall' in the Rule, the provisions have been made mandatory. It is true that so far the party is concerned he has been premptorily enjoined, where he desires to appear as a witness, to examine himself as the first witness at the trial and we agree that if he omits to do so he can not as a matter of right come subsequently to the witness box. The question, however, which remains to be decided is as to whether the court can entertain at a later stage, an application for permission for his examination. So far the courts's powers are concerned, there are no words to indicate that an application for such permission has to be filed before the party examines his first witness. In absence of any restriction in. this regard it should be held that ordinarily an application for such permission can be made either at the initial stage or when its occasion alses. In a case where the party has already decided to examine himself as a witness but for adequate reasons he is not in a 'position to examine himself at the initial stage. it Is desirable that he files such application in the very beginning. In a case where the party has already decided to examine himself as a witness but for adequate reasons he is not in a 'position to examine himself at the initial stage. it Is desirable that he files such application in the very beginning. There may be, however, cases where necessity for examination of a party may itself arise at a belated stage and he may be advised by the counsel to do so. In such a case be could not have filed an application in the beginning. Does it mean that in these cases the court is left helpless in not coming to the aid of the party although convinced that he had a good case for not examining himself as his first witness. There may be other situation in which a party may be justified in asking for necessary permission later on. Considering the language of Rule 3A in the best of the light for the petitioner, it can be said that there is some ambiguity in it. The point is whether the Rule should be so interpreted as to put a rigid and inflexible restriction on the power of the court to reject all applications for permission filed later on. Mr. Misra relied upon the decision in Maguni Dei v. Gourange Sahu and others2. After elaborate consideration of the object of the Rule and the principle of interpretation applicable to procedural law the Orissa High Court, overruling an earlier decision of the Court decided by a single judge held that a liberal interpretation must be put on the restriction Imposed by Rule 3A. We are in agreement with that approach, though not subscribing to the view that howsoever a party may be negligent or careless, evidence should never be shut out. The rules of procedure are intended to aid the administration of justice and not to hamper it and all rules of court are nothing but provisions intended to secure proper administration of justice, The object of the rules of procedure is to sub-serve and facilitate the cause of justice and not to govern or obstruct it as has been observed by the Supreme Court in State of Gujrat V. Ram Prakash P. puri3. The rules of procedure must be construed so as to promote the cause, the main cause being to arrive at the truth on a consideration of the evidence led by the parties. The rules of procedure must be construed so as to promote the cause, the main cause being to arrive at the truth on a consideration of the evidence led by the parties. We, therefore, hold that Rule 3A must be so interpreted as to clothe the Court with the authority to permit a party to examine as a witness later on in a proceeding if be makes out sufficient cause for it on an application which may be tiled in appropriate case even later. 6. Mr. Chatterjee referred to Rule 2(4) and argued that the language of this sub-rule suggests a strict Interpretation of Rule 3A. He said that the rule mentioned In sub-rule (4) which is quoted below is the general rule and rule 3A is an exception to it and as such Rule 3A must be construed strictly: - "Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the Court may, for reasons to be recorded direct or permit any party to examine any witness at any stage," We do not think rule 2(4) lays down any general role in this regard- The general procedure in regard to the manner in which parties have to produce their evidence is mentioned in sub rule (1) to (3). When a party begins his case he has to normally produce all his evidence at a stretch and then to close his case. It is thereafter that the other side starts leading his evidence. Then the party beginning, may reply. Sub-rule (4) which has been introduced by an amendment in the year 1976: authorises the court to permit a party to examine a witness out of turn. The necessity for such a course nay arise in many circumstances, for example, party may be desirous to examine a witness who may not be available liter on, long before the trial commences, or he may be under the necessity to examine a witness after he closed his case and the other side started leading his evidence. We do not find any thing in Rule 2(4) to help interpret Rule 3A as suggested. 7. Mr. Chatterjee next submitted that the object of Rule 3A is to suppress tbe mischief, a party desiring to fill up the lacunas in his evidence led by him, and this object would be defeated if the rule is construed liberally. We do not find any thing in Rule 2(4) to help interpret Rule 3A as suggested. 7. Mr. Chatterjee next submitted that the object of Rule 3A is to suppress tbe mischief, a party desiring to fill up the lacunas in his evidence led by him, and this object would be defeated if the rule is construed liberally. We do not think any Injustice will be caused by our Interpretation for, it is expected that the Court while entertaining an application filed later, will examine the circumstances and will refuse permission if it Is going to be misused by the party. We accordingly, hold that the decision given in Shri Ram Maharaj's case was not given correctly. 8. In the present case, however, it appears that the opposite party did not file a regular application for permission and the court permitted him to be examined as a witness without any consideration arising under Rule 3A. The order must, therefore' be set aside with the direction to the Court that if the opposite party applicant In the Court below files an application under Rule 3A before, it, the same will be considered on merit. We may observe that in view of the decision in Sarat Kumar Acharya Vrs. Mahesh Prasad Sahu4 it has rightly been not suggested that the High Court has no power under section 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure to interfere with the impugned order. 9. In the result, this revision application is allowed, the order passed by the Court below is set aside and the matter is sent back as stated above. There will be no order as to costs. Application allowed.