JUDGMENT B.N. Sapru, J. - The plaintiff is the landlord and the defendant was a tenant. This plaintiff filed a suit for the eviction of the defendant from the land in dispute. The trial court decreed the suit for eviction. The lower appellate court dismissed the appeal filed by the defendant and hence the present second appeal filed by the defendant. 2. The plaintiff's case was that open land was let out to the defendant and as such the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act did not apply to the accommodation in dispute. 3. It has been found that the plaintiff let out the land in dispute to the defendant w.e.f. 1-4-51 for a period of one year. Thereafter, the defendant continued to hold over and paid rent to the plaintiff till the tenancy of the defendant was determined by a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 4. It has been found that after the defendant had entered into possession a deed of lease was executed on 18-9-1951 which has been signed both by the plaintiff and the defendant. 5. The defendant has now filed an application under section 29-A of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation or Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 herein-after referred to as the Act) and has prayed that he be given the benefit of the provisions thereof. 6. After the letting out had been done on April 4, 1951. The lease deed was executed on 18-9-1951, the relevant recitals in the lease deed are as follows :- "The first party (tenant) has taken a open piece of land bounded below situated at Bareilly Mohalla Shahdana Faruq, Madhoparhi owned by Khudwand Tala over which there exists, eastern wall on which the construction has been made by the first party by raising its height. The entire western wall has been constructed by first party (tenant). On the existing wall a tin shed had been placed by the defendant tenant. Towards south the southern gate is owned by the first party tenant .......................................... The entire western wall has been constructed by first party (tenant). On the existing wall a tin shed had been placed by the defendant tenant. Towards south the southern gate is owned by the first party tenant .......................................... The above noted material is owned by the first party and in the future whatever material will be used for construction that shall be given to the second party at the time of eviction and the second party shall pay the costs of construction materials, if agreed otherwise the first party will remove the material from the land in dispute." 7. With regard to the constructions made on the existing land the counsel for the parties were examined by the court. The statement of the counsel for the parties on 5-2-1962 has been referred by the trial court. They are as under : "Sri Fakhruddin for plaintiff. Sri R.M. Agarwal for defendant. Sri Fakhuruddin counsel for the plaintiff states that the agreement pleaded in para 2 of the plaint had taken place between Mujeebul Hasan. Mutwalli and the defendant sometime in between 1-4-1951 to 18-9-1951 and that the entire terms and conditions of lease are incorporated in the lease deed dated 18-9-1951 executed by the parties to the suit. He further states that there was a pucca wall about 6 feet height on the eastern boundary of the land in suit at the time of inception of the tenancy and that there was no other construction on the land in suit at that time. He then stated that there were two 'Thams' about 7 feet height and 2 feet wide on the northern boundary at the time of the inception of defendants tenancy. He further states that the defendant raised constructions as mentioned in the lease deed dated 18-9-1951. The defendant fixed the iron gate about 4-5 years ago.' "Sri R.M. Agarwal counsel for defendant states that there was a Khaprail on the Southern portion of the land in suit a wooden gate on the northern side and that there were three feet high walls on the eastern and western boundaries. The western wall was Katcha and eastern wall was pacca. The western wall was Katcha and eastern wall was pacca. He further states that the defendant raised the eastern wall upto a height of about 6 feet constructed a pucca wall on the western boundary and put a tinshed on the eastern portion before executing the lease deed dated 18-9-1951 and, thereafter, the defendant raised in 1960 western wall to a height of 9-10 feet and changed wooden gate to Iron gate. The defendant further raised western wall in 1963 to a height of about 9-10 feet and the defendant constructed one Bhatti (Pucca) in 1955 on the eastern portion of the land in suit. All these constructions were made in pursuance of the agreement incorporated in lease deed dated 18-9-1951." 8. The lower appellate court went into the question of constructions raised by the parties and its findings are as follows : "There was admittedly a pucca wall about 6' high on the eastern boundary of land in suit. There were further two Thams' about 7' height and 2 wide on the northern boundary of the property in question. Now the question arises whether the existence of a 'Pucca' wall and two 'Thams' on the land in suit are sufficient to bring the property in suit within the definition of accommodation or not. In my opinion, the existence of a wall and two Thams on the land in question are not sufficient to bring the property in dispute within the definition of 'accommodation'. It is an admitted fact that the contract of tenancy was reduced into writing and a lease deed was executed on 18.9.1951. This lease deed is Ext. 3 on the record of the trial court. A perusal of this document clearly shows that it was land that was let out to the defendant appellant and that the defendant made constructions over the said land after the said land as let out to him. From the evidence it is clear that the defendant made constructions over the existing eastern wall and constructed western wall and 'Phatak' in the south and placed a tin-shed over the disputed land. From the statement of the defendant himself, given in the trial court, it is quite evident that he made constructions over the disputed land according to the terms of the contract of tenancy. No witness other than the parties has been examined by the parties in the trial court. From the statement of the defendant himself, given in the trial court, it is quite evident that he made constructions over the disputed land according to the terms of the contract of tenancy. No witness other than the parties has been examined by the parties in the trial court. The plaintiff Mutwalli Sri Mujib UL Hasan has deposed that he let out the land in dispute to the defendant-appellant and that the lease deed was executed two or three months after the creation of the tenancy. He has further deposed that the 'Phatak' and tin-shed were placed by the defendant-appellant and that eastern and western wall were constructed by him for which he took money from the defendant appellant. 9. In the affidavit filed in support of application under section 29-A it was stated as follows : "That according to the plaintiff respondent, the land in dispute was leased out to the defendant appellants and the defendant appellants were permitted by the plaintiff respondent to make the permanent constructions over the land in dispute. The constructions were raised after incurring heavy expenses by the defendant appellants." It will be noticed that immediately no details are given of permanent constructions alleged to have been made by the defendant-respondents with the consent of the landlord as has been mentioned in the aforesaid paragraph. In paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit it was stated as under : "That the allegations made in the paragraph 10 of the affidavit are not admitted as given and in reply there of it is submitted that according to the case of the plaintiff-respondent, only the open land which consisted a pacca wall and 3 thambs (Pillers) was let out to the defendant. The defendant however, subsequently placed old tin shed on the wall and thumbs already is existence. They have also fixed an ordinary iron gate prepared with iron bar and anger valuing about Rs. 100/- on place of a wooden gate. No permanent construction or structures were made or constructed by the defendant in the land in dispute. The allegations made to the contrary are incorrect. It is also denied that the defendant incurred have expenses in raising the alleged constructions". 10. 100/- on place of a wooden gate. No permanent construction or structures were made or constructed by the defendant in the land in dispute. The allegations made to the contrary are incorrect. It is also denied that the defendant incurred have expenses in raising the alleged constructions". 10. The defendant in para 5 of his rejoinder-affidavit has stated as Under : "That in reply to paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit, it is emphatically denied that there are no permanent constructions or structure over the land in dispute. The defendant appellants were permitted by the plaintiff respondent to make the permanent constructions over the land in dispute. The defendant-appellants have constructed one room, one verandah and have also constructed a bhatti for manufacturing rab galawat. The wall of the roams and the verandah have been made of bricks., surkhi and Chuna and these are permanent constructions. These construction have been made by the defendant-appellants with the permission of the plaintiff-respondent. The room as well as the verandah were constructed by the defendant appellants after incurring heavy expenses. The room and the verandah are sufficiently big and are situate in an area of 494.62 sq. feet. The entire covered area over which the permanent constructions in the shape of room and verandah have been made are sufficiently large, as mentioned above, which were constructed with heavy expenses. The room and the verandah which have been permanently constructed by bricks and surkhi etc. are covered by tin sheds. The sheets are placed over wooden beams. Thus, the nature of the construction is a permanent one and these are not temporary constructions, the allegations to the contrary, are wrong and are denied." Along with the rejoinder affidavit report of Sri Adesh Kumar, an approved architect of the Prescribed Authority, Regulated Area, Bareilly is enclosed. The building is described as having a covered area of 494.62 sq. ft. The condition of the building as described in the report is in the following words : "The building is having a room and verandah covered by tin sheets over wooden purlines." From the report, it appears that what the Architect found was that there were wooden beams over which tin sheets had been put and this is asserted to constitute a building on the land. 11. 11. From the recital given earlier, it is clear that the lower appellate court went into the questions as to what constructions existed over the land in suit prior to the occupation of the tenant and the lower appellate court also went into the question as to what construction were made by the tenant after the tenant had been inducted over the land in suit. 12. The finding of the lower appellate court is that the defendant raised the height of the eastern wall and constructed the western wall and 'Phathak' and placed in a tin shed over the disputed Land. It has further been found that the constructions aforesaid are made by the defendant-appellants with the consent of the plaintiff-landlord. These are findings of fact which have to be accepted as binding in the present second appeal. 13. It is obvious that if the defendant made any constructions after the institution, of the suit, it cannot be held that those constructions were made with the consent of the landlord as the plaintiff -landlord had already instituted a suit for eviction of the defendant-tenant. Thus apart from the constructions found as a fact to have been made by the defendant tenant by the lower appellate court all other constructions must be held to have been made without the consent of the plaintiff-landlord. 14. It is in the light of these factual findings that the question as to whether the defendant-tenant is entitled to the protection of section 29-A of the Act has to be determined. Section 29-A did not exist in the Act when it was enacted but was inserted in it by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Amendment Act, 1976 (U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976) by section 20 thereof. The provisions of section 29-A in so far as they are relevant for the purposes of the present case are reproduced below 29-A (1) Protection against eviction to certain classes of tenants of land on which building exists, For the purposes of this section the expressions 'tenant' and landlord' shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in clauses (a) and (j) of section 3 with the substitution of the word 'land' for the word building'. (2) This section applies only to land let out either before or after the commencement of this section where the tenants, with the landlords's consent has erected any permanent structure and incurred expenses in execution thereof. (6-a) In any suit or appeal or other proceeding pending immediately before the date of commencement of this section, no decree for eviction of a tenant from any land to which this section applies, shall be passed or executed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in sub-Section (2) of section 20 provided the tenant, within a period of three months from the commencement of this section by an application to the court unconditionally offers to pay to the landlord, the enhanced rent of land for the entire period in suit and onwards, at the rate of ten percent per annum of the prevailing market value of the land to gather with costs of the suit (including costs of any appeal or of any execution or other proceedings). (b) In every such case, the enhanced rent shall notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (5) be determined by the court, seized of the case at any stage". 15. The provision crucial for determination of this appeal is contained in sub-section 2 of the Section 29-A reading of the Sub-section discloses that it applies only to land which has been let out either before or after the commencement of the section. In the instant case, the letting out is before commencement of section 29-A and would fall within the purview of section. It has been found that certain constructions have been made with the consent of the landlord. The finding of the lower appellate court in this regard has already been reproduced above. The question that requires determination is whether the constructions made over the land in suit are permanent structures within the meaning of section 29-A (2) and whether the structures found to exist on the land would entitle the defendant tenant to the benefit of the provisions of section 29-A. The words 'building' has been defined in the Act in Section 3(i) as under : "Building means a residential or non-residential roofed structure and includes (i) any land (including any garden) garages and out houses, appurtenant to such buildings. (ii) any furniture applied by the landlord for use in such building. (ii) any furniture applied by the landlord for use in such building. (iii) any fittings and fixtures affixed to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof". 16. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that throughout most of the provisions of the Act, the word 'building' has been used, whereas when the legislature enacted section 29-A it omitted the word 'building' and used the words 'permanent structure'. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant appellant that the use of the word 'permanent structure' instead of a building is significant. He submits on this basis that there can be 'permanent structure' other than a building and if a tenant builds a permanent structure with the consent of the landlord which is not a 'building' even then the tenant is entitled to the benefit of section 29-A of the Act. 17. The scheme of section 29-A unlike the rest of the provisions of Act is to apply it to Urban vacant land let out by landlords to tenants where tenants have with the consent of the landlord erected permanent structures and incurred expenses in erecting them. 18. Prior to the coming into force of this Act, the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 was in force. Section 1 deals with the application of the Act section 2-A runs as follows : "It shall apply to every municipality and notified area established under the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 and to areas situate within 2 miles of such municipality or notified area." The third proviso to that section runs as follows "provided also that nothing in this Act shall apply 1................... 2................... 3. To any tenancy or other relationship in any plot of land not covered by roofed structure." 19. Thus it is clear that the earlier Act which governed relations between landlords and the tenants in Urban areas did not apply to any land which was not covered by a roofed structure. In section 2 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, the word 'accommodation' has been defined in clause (a) means residential in any building or part of a building. 20. In section 2 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, the word 'accommodation' has been defined in clause (a) means residential in any building or part of a building. 20. The Act when it was enforced basically applied to buildings which were defined in section 3(1) as a residential or non-residential roofed structures including appurtenant land furniture supplied with the building and fittings and fixture supplied to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. 21. The provisions of Section 29-A of the Act therefore, represent a departure from the scheme of the legislature for regulating the relations of landlords and tenants in Urban areas within the State of Uttar Pradesh. The new Act has in section 29-A taken within its sweep the cases of tenancies over open pieces of land in urban areas where the Act applies. It is laid down that whenever a 'permanent structure' has been erected over an open piece of land either before the coming into force of the Act or after coming into force of the Amendment Act, the provisions of the section will apply. The word 'erect' is like so many words in the English language not a word with a fixed definite meaning and is capable of being used in many senses. Some of the senses in which the word 'erect' or 'erection' has been used are given in words and phrases permanent edition volume 15 Illustration of the senses in which the word has been used are given below : "In the common understanding and language of the people when we speak of the 'erection or construction' of a house or building, we mean the erection of a new house or building, and not to repairing of an old one." A statute authorising a mechanic's lien for labour performed or materials furnished in erecting or constructing a building does not warrant a lien for remodeling or repairing a house the walls of which were allowed to stand though newly faced and in which the labour continued to live while the work was being done. Where the structure of a building is so completely changed that in common parlance it may be properly called a new building or a rebuilding, the process of change is such as erection or construction of a building as to be within the meaning of that phrase as used in laws giving mechanics liens. Where the structure of a building is so completely changed that in common parlance it may be properly called a new building or a rebuilding, the process of change is such as erection or construction of a building as to be within the meaning of that phrase as used in laws giving mechanics liens. Adding a story to a house already erected is erecting a building, within the meaning of an ordinance providing that no person shall erect any building in a certain portion of the city, except of certain materials. There is no difference in the meaning of the word 'erect' when applied to the whole building, and when applied to a part of a building. In both cases it means to build. It is not necessary that a new building should be distinct from and independent of an older building in order to be deemed a building erected. Thus wings added to a house are regarding as buildings." The word 'erected' was explained thus in a case. "Where a building, partly brick and partly, frame was observed and after its removal a celler was drug under it and walled, up, and a new chimony built and the house newly weather boarded and plastered it was a building, 'erected' within the meaning of the mechanic's lien law. In re Burling's Estate Pa 1 Ashm, 377, 378." 22. Before proceedings further with the judgment it is necessary to give some of the meanings of the word structure, which has been used in section 29-A of the Act. 23. The word, structure, has been defined in words and phrases permanent Edition Volume 40 in a number of ways. In re Burling's Estate Pa 1 Ashm, 377, 378." 22. Before proceedings further with the judgment it is necessary to give some of the meanings of the word structure, which has been used in section 29-A of the Act. 23. The word, structure, has been defined in words and phrases permanent Edition Volume 40 in a number of ways. Some of the definitions are given below :- "A 'structure' is something constructed or built." "The word, structure in Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 section 2, Laws 1913 page 335 means anything that is built or constructed." "the terms structure when applied to a material thing made by human labour means something composed of parts or portions which have been put together by human exertion." " 'structure' is defined to be that which is built or constructed an edifice or a building of any kind in the widest sense, any production or piece of work, artificially built up or compound of parts and joined together in some definite manner, any construction." "The word 'structure' has been defined with reference to a fence in the aforesaid volume in the following words :- "In its broadest sense a structure is any production or piece for work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner and in such sense a fence is a structure." 24. In volume IX of a New English Dictionary' Historical principle, the meanings of the word structure have been given : "One of the meanings is that which is built or constructed." 5-A. A building or edifice of any kind specially a pile of building of some considerable size or imposing appearance. 6. In a wider sense a Fabric frame work of material parts put together." 25. The two questions which have to be decided in this case are :- 1. Whether the constructions erected over the land by the tenant with the consent of the landlord are of a nature contemplated by the word structure in section 29-A of the Act ? And the second question is in a sense subordinate question :- (i) whether the constructions which have been made by the defendant- tenant are a permanent structures ? 26. While interpreting section 29-A of the Act, one has to remember what was stated by Lindlery M. R. in Victoria Sporting Club, Ltd. v. Harnam 1969(2) W.L.R. 254. And the second question is in a sense subordinate question :- (i) whether the constructions which have been made by the defendant- tenant are a permanent structures ? 26. While interpreting section 29-A of the Act, one has to remember what was stated by Lindlery M. R. in Victoria Sporting Club, Ltd. v. Harnam 1969(2) W.L.R. 254. "In order properly to interpret any statute it is as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydon's case consider how the law stood when the statute to be construed was passed, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide, and the remedy provided by the statute to cure that mischief." 27. In Maxwell Interpretation of statutes, Twelfth Edition (Second impression) 1976 it is stated that : "Although judges are unlikely to propound formerly in their judgments the four questions in Heydon's case consideration of the mischief or object of the enactment is common and will often of then provide the solution to a problem of interpretation." 28. The lower appellate court has found that the defendant made constructions over the eastern wall. The findings, therefore, is that the defendant-tenant raised the height of the existing wall. In one sense it can be urged that whatever was added to the original height is a structure, and the structure is permanent. However, it appears that when the legislature used the words a 'permanent structure' being raised by the tenant, it contemplated the creation of a new structure as such. A mere raising of the height of an existing boundary wall by tenant will not ordinarily amount to the erection of a permanent structure within the meaning of section 29-A of the Act. This will be so despite the fact that the raised portion of the boundary wall is a permanent construction. A raising of the height of the boundary wall by the tenant is not on par with a case where a tenant had a new wing added to an existing building or constructed upper story. Such, constructions may possibly come within the scope of the words erections of a permanent structure but the mere raising of height of the boundary wall does not. 29. Such, constructions may possibly come within the scope of the words erections of a permanent structure but the mere raising of height of the boundary wall does not. 29. The next finding of the lower appellate court is that the defendant tenant has constructed a western wall and added a phatak made of Iron instead of wood in the gate and placed a tinshed over the disputed land. The description of the tin shed is given by Adesh Kumar the Architect and has been quoted above. The description discloses that the tinshed is a building having a room and a verandah covered by tin sheets over wooden purlines. A wooden beam has a certain life, but is not of great durability. Secondly the tin shed is easily removable. Therefore, prima facie, the erection of tin shed on the facts found would not amount to the erection of permanent structure over the land by the defendant appellant. 30. The learned counsel for the tenant submits that the tin shed must be deemed to be a permanent structure. He submits that the existence of a room and a varandah covered by a tin shed, though they are supported by wooden purlines (beams) would not prevent them from being a permanent structure with in the meaning of section 29-A of the Act. The concept of a permanent structure 'according to him has been explained in the case reported in Sri Barakandeoshwar Mahadeoji Maharaj v. Gopal and others 1969 A.L.J. 440. wherein it was held that for the purposes of section 108 (p) of the Transfer of Property Act a permanent structure was one that had a life-co-existensive with the duration of the lease. One division bench observed as follows : "As against that learned counsel for the plaintiff has placed reliance on the case of M/s. Surya Properties Private Limited v. Bimalendra Nath Sarkar, AIR 1965 Calcutta 408. where in the above mentioned Allahabad case is expressly dissented from we are inclined to accept the view point expressed in 1965 Calcutta case. The phrase 'permanent structure' cannot possibly be construed to mean everlasting evidently the word 'permanent' has been used in section 108 (p) of the Transfer of Property Act in order to distinguish it from temporary. where in the above mentioned Allahabad case is expressly dissented from we are inclined to accept the view point expressed in 1965 Calcutta case. The phrase 'permanent structure' cannot possibly be construed to mean everlasting evidently the word 'permanent' has been used in section 108 (p) of the Transfer of Property Act in order to distinguish it from temporary. We are thus unable to follow the reasoning's of the learned single Judge of this court when he says that a construction raised with a particular purpose even though the same way last till the expiry of tenancy can in no circumstance be taken to be a "Permanent structure" within the meaning of that expression as used in Section 108 (p) of the Transfer of Property Act. If the word permanent is a relative term the question naturally arises relative to what. For purpose of section 108 (p) the answer cannot but be that it is relative to the term of the lease. So we are driven to the conclusion that the word "Permanent" means "Which last till the end of the term of the lease and cannot be construed to mean everlasting or to mean 'which would last 100 years 50 years. In 1965 Calcutta case Chatterjee J. observes in paragraph 7 on page 412. I would therefore, be inclined to under-stand a permanent structure for purposes of section 108 (p) to mean a structure which is capable of lasting till the terms of the lease and which is constructed in the way of being built up as is a building." This Allahabad cases came up for consideration is another Calcutta case Atul Chandra Lahiry v. Sonatan Daw, AIR 1962 Calcutta 78. Bose J. observes : "Although we are not inclined to subscribe our approval to all the propositions that have been formulated in this case by the learned Judge, we agree with him that the question whether a particular construction is a permanent structure or is merely of a temporary nature is a question which depends on the facts each case and on the nature and extent of the particular construction and the intention or purpose for which the construction is made may also be a relevant consideration in certain circumstances but no hard and fast rule can be laid down with regard to this matter." Learned counsel for Gopal Das argued that in so far as the disputed constructions stands on open land away from the building itself, it is not possible to hold them permanent structure, within the meaning of what expression as used in section 108 (p). We are unable to accept the contention. The very letter dated 25th April, 1953 Ext. A 2 (Page 64 of the paper book of the plaintiff's appeal by which Gopal Das sought permission of Badshah Hussain to make the disputed constructions indicates that his intention in making the disputed constructions was to retain the same till be continued to be a tenant of the portion of Hamid Manzil allotted in his favour. It is thus obvious that it was never the intention of Gopal Das in making the disputed constructions to have them temporarily for a certain purpose. Badshah Husain DW 1 examined by Gopal Das as his witness states that as it was dangerous to fix a press in the building, so he gave permission for the tin shed. It shall thus appear that the main purpose of Gopal Das for taking Hamid Manzil on rent was to run his business of press and when he found that the building was not suitable for the purpose he obtained the permission of Badshah Husain to erect a construction of his own on the open land appurtenant to the building in order to run his business therein. Thus considering the nature of construction and its purpose as also the intention of Gopal Das in making it to be gathered from his own letter Ext. A-2. The inevitable conclusion is that the disputed constructions are 'Permanent structure' within the meaning of Section 108 (p) of the Transfer of Property Act. We conclude accordingly. Thus considering the nature of construction and its purpose as also the intention of Gopal Das in making it to be gathered from his own letter Ext. A-2. The inevitable conclusion is that the disputed constructions are 'Permanent structure' within the meaning of Section 108 (p) of the Transfer of Property Act. We conclude accordingly. 31. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel turned on an interpretation of Section 118 (p) of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with the liabilities of the lessor and the lessees. Sub-Section (p) of Section 108 provide as follows : "He must not without a lessor's consent erect on the property any permanent structure except for agricultural purposes." 32. The object of section 108 of the aforesaid provision was to perverse the property leased by a lessor to a lessee is basically the same condition that was leased the framers of the statute in order to protect the lessor enacted sub-clause (p) of section 108. 33. The question, however, is whether the interpretation placed on the words 'permanent structure' in section 108 (p) should be applied while determining the nature of same words used in section 29-A of the Act. 34. Section 108 (p) as seen earlier was enacted in the interests of the lessor, whereas section 29-A was enacted in derogation of the rights of the landlord and in the interest of the tenant. Thus the object of both the sections are different. 35. There can be cases coming under section 29-A where there is no lease executed by the landlord in favour of tenant. In the instant case, the lease was only for a period of one month at the rate of rent of Rs. 12/- per month. A structure which has a life of only a month for instance wooden that huts would not be a 'permanent structure' within the meaning of section 29-A though expenses may have been incurred in the erection of such hut. The lease executed between the parties in the instant case gave the tenant a right to remove the malba (material) on the determination of the lease if no price was agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee. The lease executed between the parties in the instant case gave the tenant a right to remove the malba (material) on the determination of the lease if no price was agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee. The nature of the construction shows that it was essentially of a permanent character and cannot be deemed to be a permanent structure within the meaning of section 29 (2) of the Act. 36. Another finding of the lower appellate court is that the tenant replaced a wooden (Phatak) by an iron 'Phatak'. The change was in the nature of an improvement and cannot be treated as the erection of a new structure. There was no construction or activity involved in replacing the old wooden (Phatak) gate by a new iron 'Phatak' gate. These mere act of the affixation of the 'phatak' to the place where it is fixed is not an act of erection. Thus, it cannot be said that the tenant erected a new structure when he attached the 'phatak' to the property in dispute. 37. According to the defendant-tenant he had constructed a 'bhatti' over the land in dispute. There is no clear finding by the lower appellate court that the 'bhatti' was built by the tenant with the express consent of the landlord. However, from a reading of the judgment, it appears that tenant the bhatti' was constructed by the tenant after he was indicated over the land. Even assuming that the Bhatti was constructed with the consent of the landlord and as used for the preparation of 'Rab Golwat' it should not be deemed to be a permanent structure within the meaning of section 29-A of the Act. The Bhatti while it may be constructed of masonary is a very trivial structure. The legislature when it enacted section 29-A could not have, however, intended that every trivial structure would attract the provisions of section 29-A of the Act. 38. There remains, however, the western boundary wall. It is certainly a permanent structure because it is made of masonary. It is true that the tenant had a right to remove the malba (material) on the expiry of the lease if the price for the malba was not agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant but that will not change the character of the structure. It is certainly a permanent structure because it is made of masonary. It is true that the tenant had a right to remove the malba (material) on the expiry of the lease if the price for the malba was not agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant but that will not change the character of the structure. It has been seen earlier even a fence has been held to be a structure. A boundary wall would be more so. A structure need not necessarily be a building within the meaning of the Act. The legislator has deliberately left the word, structure undefined so that the cases where tenants have incurred expenses in erecting constructions over vacant land for their more beneficial enjoyment of the land given to them on rent would be protected. 39. The boundary wall was obviously erected by the tenant for the more beneficial enjoyment of the land. The tenant raised the height of the eastern wall and constructed a new boundary wall on the west side and placed a 'Phatak' made of Iron it appears that the business of the tenant was such that it required an enclosed space. 40. The provisions of section 29-A as noticed earlier are a departure from the previous state of law which left the tenants of vacant Urban land outside the purview of previous legislation in regard to the urban buildings. The legislature realised that such a tenant needed protection. It, therefore, enacted section 29-A. At the same time, there are provisions in section 29-A in the interest of the landlord in a sense it is self contained code governing the relations of landlords and the tenants where there has been a letting out by a landlord to a tenant of an open land and where the tenant with the consent of the landlord has erected a permanent structure thereon and spent money on the erection of those structures. 41. For getting the benefit of section 29-A the tenants has to show that not only the vacant land was let out to the tenant and that the tenant has erected a permanent structure thereon with the consent of the landlord after incurring expenses in the execution thereof but will also have to show that the permanent structure is erected over a substantial portion of the land leased to him. Small structure on a large piece of land in a corner may not entitle the tenant to claim the benefit of section 29-A in respect of the entire land, even though he has incurred expenses in the erection of the structure with the consent of the landlord. 42. The court has necessarily to take into account the area of the vacant land let out and the extent of the permanent structure erected thereon with the consent of the landlord by the tenant. An interpretation of the statute which does not take these two factors into account is likely to defeat the intention of the legislature as landlords are unlikely to give their consent in future to fresh constructions by tenants. At a time when there is a shortage of accommodation of many types in Urban areas the legislature could not have intended to retard further constructions. 43. In this case, the area of the land is about 283 sq. meters and the boundary wall has been erected with the consent of the landlord for the more beneficial enjoyment of the tenant, who was doing the business of preparing Rab 'Golawat', on the land in dispute. The boundary wall was erected for the beneficial conduct of the business of the tenant. 44. In the circumstances, of the case, it must be held that the tenant is entitled to the benefit of section 29-A of the Act. 45. The tenant who is appellant in this case has valued the land at Rs. 40/- to 50/- per sq. meter. The respondents has valued the land at the rate of Rs. 100/- per sq. meter. A fair estimate of the value of the land would come to Rs. 60/- per sq. meter calculating the value of the land at the rate of Rs. 60/- per sq. meter the rental of the land comes to Rs. 1698/- per annum and the rent is determined at that figure. The arrears of rent calculated from the date of institution of the suit till 19th January, 1969 comes to Rs. 20,778/-. The appellant is directed to pay the same to the plaintiff-decree holder along with the costs of the suit and the appeals to deposit the same in the trial court. The aforesaid amount of Rs. 20,778/- will be paid or deposited within a period of six months from the date of judgment. 46. 20,778/-. The appellant is directed to pay the same to the plaintiff-decree holder along with the costs of the suit and the appeals to deposit the same in the trial court. The aforesaid amount of Rs. 20,778/- will be paid or deposited within a period of six months from the date of judgment. 46. The appellant will, after having made the payment or deposit file an application in this court supported with an affidavit and a receipt duly signed by the plaintiff-decree holder or his counsel or a receipt from the trial court showing the payment of this aforesaid in this court. As soon as such an application is filed, the matter shall be listed for orders before the court. In the event of no such application being filed within a period of six months the case shall be listed for orders.