JUDGMENT Murlidhar, J. - This landlady's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out of proceedings under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 2. The petitioner owns a three storeyed building at Haldwani. Her husband was in private employment in Aligarh, but admittedly in 1969 he retired and returned to settle at Haldwani. The premises in question were on rent with one Sanni Lal (predecessor of the respondents) who was a distant relation of the petitioner, except for one shop in the ground floor with another person. The respondent tenants allowed the petitioner and her husband the rest of the ground floor accommodation which appears to consist of 2 rooms and a court yards besides the amenities. It, however, appears from the material on record including copy of the commissioner's report that 4 down pipes from the upper floors all in the courtyard and one of the rooms containing a latrine due to which the commissioner opined that it was unsuitable for being used for any purpose other than a passage. The first and second floors of the building are in possession of the respondents for residential purposes. 3. In this background the petitioner in September 1976 applied under Section 21 for the release of the whole building in her favour for her own bona fide needs. Her pleas were that the ground floor was damp, dingy and unsuitable for living and that her daughters and sons were well placed but she was unable to call them for their children to stay with her though because of their old age she needed that some body be their, to look after her and her husband. These allegations were denied. The prescribed Authority after considering the evidence led by the parties observed that the old couple had only one room worth living with them. Thereafter, noting that the respondents had 10 members in their family and no other accommodation it observed that a unit on the first floor consisting of a room and a varandah, which had a separate access, could be spared by the respondents and would satisfy the needs of the petitioner. The Authority also observed that the claim for the whole house made by the petitioner did not seem to be justified and that release of the whole house would cause are greater hardship to the respondents. The Authority also observed that the claim for the whole house made by the petitioner did not seem to be justified and that release of the whole house would cause are greater hardship to the respondents. The application under section 21 was disposed of accordingly. Both the parties appealed against this order. The Addl. Distt. Judge dismissed the petitioner's appeal and allowed the tenants appeal. The reasons recorded by him are that the time lag in making the application in September 1976 when the petitioner moved to Haldwani in 1969 went against the genuineness of the petitioner's need and that the petitioner had adequate and reasonable accommodation on the ground floor for herself and her husband. He disbelieved the petitioner's averment that she wanted to keep the children of her band manager son for education purposes with her permanently at Haldwani. He also recorded the finding that the test of comparative hardship operated in tenant's favour . 4. While unexplained delay in making the application under Section 21 may have some relevance it cannot be the basis for deciding that the requirement was not bona fide The Addl. Distt. Judge has considered and rejected only one aspect of the claim, namely, that the petitioner wished to keep her grand children with her for their education and has not discussed for recorded any finding about the other two grounds, namely, that the accommodation in the ground floor was damp, dingy and unsuitable and that she required more space for her family commitments and old age due to which she wanted that her children may be able to come and stay with her. Since these are relevant considerations a finding has to be recorded on these before rejecting the claim of bona fide requirement. The test of comparative hardship cannot be properly applied until the matter of bona fide requirement has been correctly decide upon because it is the pressure of requirement that goes to determine hardship. Inasmuch as relevant considerations have been ignored the order of the Additional District Judge is unsustainable. 5. Accordingly, the petition is allowed, the order of the Additional District Judge dated 25-8-1977 to set aside and he is directed to decide the appeal a resh and according to law in the light of observations made above. Inasmuch as relevant considerations have been ignored the order of the Additional District Judge is unsustainable. 5. Accordingly, the petition is allowed, the order of the Additional District Judge dated 25-8-1977 to set aside and he is directed to decide the appeal a resh and according to law in the light of observations made above. As the matter is quite old Additional District Judge (or any other officer to whom the District Judge may choose to assign this case) may dispose it of expeditiously and within three months of the receipt of this order, it possible. Parties to bear their own costs.