ORDER K.N. Seth, J. - This petition by the landlord arises out of proceeding under section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for release of the premises in dispute which was in occupation of the Punjab National Bank as a tenant. The case set up by the petitioner was that he bona fide required the building for residential purposes as well as for maintenance of the office of the industry to be set up by him. The respondent Bank contested the application. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application principally on the ground that the need of the landlord was not bona fide. On appeal, the learned District Judge held that the requirement of the landlord for the accommodation was bona fide and pressing. The appeal was, however, dismissed on the ground that the building in dispute was a "public building" within the meaning of the. Act as amended by U.P. Act 28 of 1976 and was outside its purview. The legality of the view-taken by the learned Judge has been challenged by the petitioner on two grounds (I) that the premises in dispute was not a public building within the meaning of the Act, and (2) that Section 2(1)(a) inserted by Act 28 of 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act) was not retrospective in operation and did not apply to the proceeding initiated before the enforcement of the Amending Act. 2. The relevant portions of Section 2 as it stood before the amendment read as follows : Exemptions from operation of Act-(1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to (a) any building belonging to or vested in the Government of India or the Government of any State of any local authority, (f) any building built and held by a University or any other statutory corporation or by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or by a co-operative society, company or firm, and intended solely for its own occupation or for the occupation of any of its officers or servants whether on rent or free of rent, or as a guest house, by whatever name called, for the occupation of persons having dealing with it is the ordinary course of business." 3. By section 2 of the Amending Act for clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 2 the following clause was substituted : "(a) any public building." 4. By section 4 of the Amending Act, for clause (n), clauses (n) to (s) were substituted. Clauses (o) and (p), which are the relevant clauses for our purpose, run as follows : "(o) "public building" means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State), and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation; (p) "public sector corporation" means any corporation owned or controlled by the Government, and includes any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the Government." 5. It is obvious that after its amendment, the Act exempts a "public building" from its operation. "Public building" as defined in Section 3(o) of the Act means, among others, a building taken on lease by a "public sector corporation. Public sector corporation as defined means any corporation owned or controlled by the Government. The question for consideration is whether the Punjab National Bank is a public sector corporation. It was urged that since the Punjab National Bank, although a nationalised hank, is neither owned nor controlled by the Government, it is not a "public sector corporation" and the building in dispute is not a "public building" within the meaning of the Act. We find no merit in the contention. On enforcement of the Banking Companies Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings Act, 1970 (Act 5 of 1970) in place of existing banks specified in column 1' of the First Schedule corresponding new banks as specified in the First Schedule were constituted and the Punjab National Bank is one of such Banks. By sub-clause (3) of Section 3 it is provided that the entire capital of each corresponding new bank shall stand vested in, and allotted to, the Central Government. By sub-clause (3) of Section 3 it is provided that the entire capital of each corresponding new bank shall stand vested in, and allotted to, the Central Government. Sub-section (4) provides that every corresponding new bank shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provisions of the Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and to contract, and may sue and be sued in its name. Section 6 provides payment of compensation to the existing bank in respect transfer to the corresponding new bank of the undertaking of the existing bank. Chapter IV of the said Act provides for management of corresponding new banks. By section 7 it is provided that the head office of each corresponding new bank shall be at such place as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf. This section further provides that the general superintendence direction and management of the affairs and business of a corresponding new bank shall vest in a Board of Directors which shall be constituted by the Central Government in consultation with the Reserve Bank. Section 8 provides that every corresponding new bank shall, in the discharge of its functions, be guided by such directions in regard to matters of policy involving public interest as the Central Government may, after consultation with the Governor of the Reserve Bank, give. Section 9 provides that the Central Government may, after consultation with the Reserve Bank, make a scheme for carrying out the provision of the Act which would include matters relating to capital structure, the constitution of the Board of Directors etc. etc. Sub-section (5) of Section 9 provides that every scheme made by the Central Government under the Act shall be laid as soon as may be after it is made before each House of Parliament. 6. The above provisions clearly indicate that the banks mentioned in the First Schedule are public sector corporations wholly owned and controlled by the Central Government. It may be that in the day to day working of the nationalised banks, as in the case of other banks, some control is exercised by the Reserve Bank of India under the Banking Regulation Act but that would not change the intrinsic nature of the banks specified in First Schedule appended to Act 5 of 1970. It may be that in the day to day working of the nationalised banks, as in the case of other banks, some control is exercised by the Reserve Bank of India under the Banking Regulation Act but that would not change the intrinsic nature of the banks specified in First Schedule appended to Act 5 of 1970. The entire assets of these banks vest in the Central Government and the general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs and business of these Banks is under the control of the Central Government in accordance with the scheme framed by it for which approval of both Houses of Parliament is obtained. In our opinion, the learned Judge rightly took the view that the building in question is a public building and the Act is not applicable to it. 7. It was next contended that the Amending Act was prospective in its operation and the amendments introduced under it did not affect the proceeding initiated before its enforcement. There is no dispute that the Amending Act came into force while the appeal was pending before the appellate authority. 8. The general rule of law is well established that the statutes are not to operate retrospectively and that a retrospective operation has not to be given to a statute so as to impair the existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure. Sometimes it is expressly enacted that an enactment shall be retrospective. In such cases no difficulty arises. It is equally well settled that the Courts will give it such an operation if it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular provision to have a retrospective operation. In such cases, the Court has to look to the general scope and purview of the statute, and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former state of the law, and what it was that the legislature contemplated. Act No. 28 of 1976 has not been expressly made retrospective in its operation, but section 26 provides a clue to the intention of the legislature. Sub-section (2) provides that all appeals under section 18 of the principal Act, pending immediately before the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to be revisions preferred under the said section as amended by this Act and shall be disposed of accordingly. Sub-section (2) provides that all appeals under section 18 of the principal Act, pending immediately before the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to be revisions preferred under the said section as amended by this Act and shall be disposed of accordingly. Obviously the Act operates retrospectively with relation to the pending appeals. Sub-section (3) provides : "(3) where an order of eviction under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 21 of the principal Act in respect of a building let out to the State Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation or a recognised educational institution has been passed before the commencement of this Act but such tenant has not been actually evicted and continues to be in possession of the building at such commencement, then the order of eviction so passed by the prescribed authority or by an appellate authority shall, on the tenant's application to the prescribed authority in accordance with sub- section (4), stand discharged and no such order of eviction shall be executed." 9. It is obvious from the aforesaid provision that the legislature intended to relieve the State Government, the local authority, the public sector corporation and a recognised educational institution from the effect of order of eviction passed under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 21 of the principal Act where such a tenant has not been actually evicted and continues to be in possession of the building at the commencement of the Amending Act. The obvious intention being that the remedy provided by section 21(1)(a) should not be available against the State and other authorities and bodies mentioned in the above noted provision. If the amendments introduced in sections 2 and 21 are held to be prospective only, the intention of the legislature would be defeated. 10. In this connection reference was also made to sub-section (8) of section 21 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 added by the Amending Act 1976 which provides. "(8) Nothing in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall apply to a building let out to the State Government or to a local authority or to a public sector corporation or to a recognised educational institution unless the prescribed authority is satisfied that the landlord is a person to whom clause (ii) or clause (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) is applicable." 11. It may be noticed that sub-section (8) refers to a recognised educational institution, to which the definition of "public building" as contained in clause (o) of section 2(1) is not applicable. Thus a building let out to a recognised educational institution is not a public building. Further sub- section (8) applies only to a building let out to the State Government or to a local authority or to public sector corporation or to a recognised educational institution but it does not apply to public buildings which either belong to or are requisitioned by the Government. It is obvious that sub-section (8) is not co-extensive with clause (o) which defines public building. In some respect it is narrower, while in other aspects it is wider in operation. 12. While section 2 (1) excludes the applicability of the Act in its entirety to a public building, yet sub-section (8) of section 21 makes clause (a) of section 21 (1) applicable to a building which can fall within the definition of public building provided the landlord is a person to whom clause (ii) or clause (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 21 is applicable. Applying the principle of harmonious construction it may be said that sub- section (8) of section 21 is a proviso or an exception to section 2 (1) (a). Reading the two provisions in this manner the result will be that though the Act will not generally apply to a public building, yet clause (a) of sub- section (1) to section 21 will apply to buildings mentioned in clause (8) of section 21, provided the landlord is a person to whom clause (ii) or clause (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 21 is applicable. 13. The real problem, however, is created by the fact that by Amending Act of 1976 clauses (ii) and (iv) to the Explanation to section 21 (1) have been committed. They no longer remain in the statute. In such a situation it is not possible to apply sub-section (8) as if clause (ii) or clause (iv) was hypothetically in existence. 14. In ultimate analysis, sub section (8) cannot usefully be employed at all in any circumstances. They no longer remain in the statute. In such a situation it is not possible to apply sub-section (8) as if clause (ii) or clause (iv) was hypothetically in existence. 14. In ultimate analysis, sub section (8) cannot usefully be employed at all in any circumstances. After deleting clauses (ii) and (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 21 their reference in sub-section (8) is rendered meaningless It is an example of clumsy and confused legislation and of no assistance in finding out the legislative intent behind the Amending Act of 1976. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the contention that the intention of the legislature was not to make the Amending Act retrospective in its operation sought assistance from the U P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977 (U.P. Ordinance No. 11 of 1977) Promulgated on 27-7-1977. Assuming that the provisions of the Ordinance could be looked into, although it stood repealed by lapse of time, we find nothing in the said Ordinance which may justify an inference that the legislature intended the Amending Act to be prospective in its operation. 16. The view taken by the learned Judge that the building in question is a Public Building to which the Act does not apply and the petitioner is not entitled to any relief under section 21 of the Act must be upheld Petition fails.