JUDGMENT I.B. Singh, Member - This is a revision against order dated 22-11-1976 passed by Tahsildar/Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Tahsil Konch, district Jalaun in a case under section 122-B of Act I of 1951 ordering ejectment of Nathu Ram and Virendra applicants and imposing Rs. 600/- and Rs. 900/- respectively as damages. The learned Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division by his order dated 14-2-1977 has recommended to partly allow the revision in respect of damages and to partly dismiss it and to confirm the order of ejectment. Against this recommendation objection has been filed by applicant Nathu Ram. 2. Briefly the facts of the case are that one Suraj Singh made a complaint to the SDO mentioning the alleged trespass over the Gaon Sabha public utility land by Nathu Ram and Virendra Singh with the allegations that the Pradhan is in collusion with the trespassers so an enquiry be made and the trespassers be ejected. The SDO directed the Tahsildar concerned to enquire into the matter under Rule 115-C. The preliminary enquiry was made by the Supervisor Kanungo/Lekhpal and he submitted his report along with a site plan giving details of the encroachments. 3. The trial court issued show cause notices in - Form 49-A to Nathu Ram and Virendra Singh separately. They filed their separate written statements. Nathu Ram claimed that plot in dispute is abadi and the alleged garrage was constructed on the old existing kuchha construction. It was also mentioned that the notice given to him does not contain the site plan and the boundaries. Virendra Singh also objected to the notice on the similar grounds with the allegation that the alleged area upon which the bricks are lying is the land appurtenant to his house and does not belong to Gaon Sabha. The trial court on the basis of the evidence found that plot No. 654/1 belongs to Gaon Sabha and the revisionists are trespassers. The Additional Commissioner in his recommendation upheld the trial courts order regarding eviction but made recommendation that the damages of Virendra Singh be reduced to Rs. 450/-. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the revisionists and the learned DGC (R) Jhansi at a great length and have perused the record. 5. The learned counsel for the revisionist Sri N.C. Vaish, Advocate attacked the trial court's order mainly on 4 points as. 450/-. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the revisionists and the learned DGC (R) Jhansi at a great length and have perused the record. 5. The learned counsel for the revisionist Sri N.C. Vaish, Advocate attacked the trial court's order mainly on 4 points as. given below :- (1) That the notice in Form 49-A which were issued to the revisionists were invalid for want of the details regarding duration of the trespass, rent and the boundaries of the area in dispute. He referred rulings Surya Bux Singh v. Gaon Sabha, 1977 RD 425, Majid v. Gaon Sabha, 1978 RD 245 and Pyare v. Gaon Sabha, 1979 RD 59. (2) That the land in dispute was alleged to be appurtenant to the building and did not belong to Gaon Sabha. (3) That there was misjoinder of parties as there were different portions of trespass by different persons namely Nathu Ram and Virendra Singh. (4) That the damages awarded were not according to rules. 6. In reply, Sri P.N. Verma, DGG (R) Jhansi vehemently opposed the above contentions. He referred to a number of rulings which will be mentioned later on. His main and crucial part of the argument was focused on the point of the interpretation of various provisions of law, law of precedence and submitted that earlier view taken by the Board in the above mentioned rulings is no more good law in view of the legislative changes made by the U.P. General Clauses Act. 7. Before dealing with the main contentions of the parties I would like to say that section 122-B of ZA and 3-(Revenue) LR Act (as amended up to date) hereinafter called the Act imposes a duty upon the Collector to proceed to take action to recover damages and to eject the trespassers of Gaon Sabha land after issuing a show cause notice. The provision to issue a show cause notice has now been made part of the Section itself vide sub-Section (3) of section 122-B and it is mandatory in nature. In section 122-B (5) of the Act the relevant rules from 115-C to 115-H which includes the Form 49-A were validated and it has been provided that those rules shall continue in force until altered or repealed or amended. In section 122-B (5) of the Act the relevant rules from 115-C to 115-H which includes the Form 49-A were validated and it has been provided that those rules shall continue in force until altered or repealed or amended. Now going to main dispute I will deal point wise as below:- Point (1)-Rule 115-D (1) provided that if the LMC fails to take action, the Collector after making such enquiry and obtaining such further information as may be necessary shall thereafter issue a notice in Form 49-A. In sub-Rule (2) of 115-D it is provided as below- * * * * 8. A plain reading of the above provision shows that the Collector may collect information on the above mentioned points (a) to (d) before issuing a show cause notice in Form 49-A to the person concerned. In my opinion the collection of the information on those points is meant to use it for filling up the Form 49-A. The above provision nowhere lays down that all the facts collected on points (a) to (d) shall be incorporated in the notice in Form 49-A. It may be mentioned here that principle of interpretation of law is that the language of a statute is to be given its natural meaning, if there is no ambiguity. In 1952 RD 46 a Division Bench of the High Court Madan Gopal Bhadwan v. Ramesh Chandra, supports the above view. In light of this basic principle of law it is clear that the above rule cannot be employed to say that all the particulars of points (a) to (d) are to be incorporated in Form 49-A. To hold otherwise it would definitely amount to misreading the rule 115-D as well as the Form 49-A itself. In Megh Singh v. State, 1979 AWC 247 , the High Court observed as under- " It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that when the language of the Act is clear and specific one must give effect to it whatever may be its consequences, for the words of the statutes speak of the intention of the legislature, A court of law cannot read words in a statute which do not exist. It must give effect to the intention of the framers of the Act. It must give effect to the intention of the framers of the Act. The argument of inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and it is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the statute is obscure and there are alternative methods of construction". As the language of Rule 115-D does not say that all the particulars of points (a) to (d) as mentioned above are to be incorporated in Form 49-A, the court is not competent to say that the above particulars shall be so incorporated. It is true that the Form 49-A is to be filled up completely and no material column should be left blank. 9. Form 49-A was prescribed by the Legislature. Recently Form 49-A has been amended vide U.P.Z.A. and L.R. (twelfth amendment) Rules, 1979, which has come into force and was published in U.P. Gazette extra, dated 9th February, 1979 pp. 4-5. A comparison of the new and old Forms which existed prior to the said amendment would reveal that the new Form contains more details than the previous one. In the new Form 49-A apart from other particulars, boundary, period of wrongful occupation, damages or misappropriation, class of soil of the plots numbers involved and the rates applicable etc. have been incorporated which did not exist in the previous Form. Thus the contention that in the absence of boundaries the notices given to the revisionist were invalid cannot be upheld. If the court insists on mentioning the particulars which are not to be mentioned in the prescribed form that will amount to alteration of the form itself. The functions of the courts and the rule making authority are limited to their own scope and the one cannot trespass into the province of the other. The courts of law have not been given power to alter or modify the law. Court merely declares the existing law and does not make the law. The functions of the courts and the rule making authority are limited to their own scope and the one cannot trespass into the province of the other. The courts of law have not been given power to alter or modify the law. Court merely declares the existing law and does not make the law. Here a reference may be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in Hansraj v. H.H. Dave, AIR 1970 SC 755 at page 759 as under :- "..............we cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of the Act, we cannot add, and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there." ".................But the operation of the notifications has to be judged not by the object which the rule making authority had in mind but by the words which it has employed to effectuate the legislative intent". This being a law of the land, Courts are not concerned with the defective phrasing. The argument of the inconvenience and hardship without giving the details of boundaries etc. cannot be upheld because the rules had the sanction of the Act itself viz. sub - Section 5 of Section 122-B. 10. The learned DGC (R) brought to my notice the amendment made by U.P. General Clauses (amendment) of 1975 (U.P. Act 54 of 1975) which introduced a new section 10-C which reads as under- "10-C, Deviations from forms :- Where, by any U.P. Act, a form is prescribed, slight deviations therefrom not affecting the substance or calculated to mislead, shall not invalidate it." This Section stands incorporated with retrospective effect in view of amendment made in section 3 of the U.P. General Clauses Act by providing that the provisions of this Act shall apply to this Act and to all the Uttar Pradesh Acts, whether made before or after commencement of this Act. In view of the above Legislative amendment the invalidity of the notice cannot be challenged now on the ground of slight deviation in the form. Now the invalidity of the notice can only be challenged if a party concerned establishes that the deviation in the form was calculated to mislead him or that the form did not contain the pith and substance of the form. Now the invalidity of the notice can only be challenged if a party concerned establishes that the deviation in the form was calculated to mislead him or that the form did not contain the pith and substance of the form. In the light of the above observations I am definitely of the view that the rulings of the Board relied upon by the revisionist do not stand in the light of the amendment in the General Clauses Act. It may here be recalled that wherever there is any conflict between the declaration of law made by court and the exercise of Legislative power the declaration of law made by the court will yield to the legislative enactment. This principle was laid down in Ram Niranjan Singh v. Ram Oudh Singh, 1973 RD 446 by High Court (DB), therefore, I am of the view that the previous rulings reported in 1974 RD 326, 1975 RD 192 and 1976 RD 208 including the rulings referred to above by the learned counsel for the revisionist do not hold good and cannot be allowed to stand in the field in view of the above legislative amendment in the General Clauses Act. Further it is also established principle of law of interpretation that the points raised before me were neither argued nor decided in the earlier rulings. In Smt. Somawati v. State of Punjab, AIK 1963 SC 151(152) Supreme Court observed as under :- "The binding effect of a decision does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or not, provided that the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced was actually decided." In a Full Bench case of Jammu Kashmir High Court Gulam Rasool v. State, AIR 1956 J & K 17, it was held that whereas certain point of law is not brought to the notice of the court in determining the cause, the decision is not a precedence calling for the same decision in a similar case in which the point is brought before the court. The Division Bench Case of the Board reported in 1977 RD 425 was mainly concerned whether a notice in Form 49-A is mandatory or not. The reference was answered in affirmative. The Division Bench Case of the Board reported in 1977 RD 425 was mainly concerned whether a notice in Form 49-A is mandatory or not. The reference was answered in affirmative. The other observations in that ruling can only be said to be obiter-dicta and they have no binding effect as laid down by the High Court in State v. Smt. Ramsri, AIR 1976 All. 121 (122) Division Bench. The result is that the notices in Form 49-A (as it existed prior to its amendment mentioned above) were not invalid and they were completely according to the requirements of law and rule and do not suffer from any defect. Point No. 1 is answered accordingly. 11. Point No. 2 :- The land in dispute does not appear to be appurtenant to the house of applicant Nathu Ram because encroachment is adjacent to the house of another person Nathu Ram Gupta and between house of Virendra Singh and the disputed land alleged to have been encroached by him a Rasta exists but the other matter is left open because it has to be determined by the trial court whether any Kuchcha construction of Nathu Ram applicant existed and there he constructed his pucca garrage in its place, if so, its affect ? 12. Point No. 3 :- The case of Nathu Ram and Virendra Singh should have been registered separately as their trespass is separate on separate pieces of land although on areas out of the same plot such trials are likely to cause prejudice to them and as the case is liable to be remanded for the determination of point No. 4, the trial court is directed to proceed against them separately. 13. Point No. 4 :- The Id. 13. Point No. 4 :- The Id. counsel for the revisionist has rightly pointed out that rule 115-F (2) (as amended up to date) lays down that the damage or loss caused through misappropriation is of such nature as is not capable of being repaired or made good (as in the case of cutting of trees or grazing plants or gross) the Collector shall assess the amount of damage or loss in terms of money at the prevailing market rate in the locality while in the case of a wrongful occupation of land the damage caused to the Gaon Sabha shall be assessed for each year or part thereof at 100 times the amount of rent computed at the sanctioned hereditary rates applicable to the plot concerned. In the instant case I find there is no proof of the rate of the hereditary circle rate. Consequently it requires evidence which can be recorded by the trial court. For these reasons I am of the view that the damages assessed by the trial court were not according to the rule. It was agitated by the learned DGC (R) that the land being abadi may not have the sanctioned hereditary rate but it cannot be said definitely. The trial court will have to summon the relevant record and the evidence to ascertain the truth. In case no hereditary rate is available for the said abadi, the trial court shall have the option to calculate the damages or a reasonable amount of rent which a similar type of land would have normally fetched as income had it been let out. 14. In view of the above, the order of the trial court is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court to proceed afresh separately against the applicant's giving them fresh required notices in Form 49-A and to decide the matter afresh according to law after affording full opportunity to the parties to adduce their evidence. Learned counsel for the parties have been informed for appearing in the trial court on 19-11-1979. Let the record be sent immediately.