JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS order shall also dispose of Misc. Petition No. 505 of 1976 (M. H. Hashmi v. Bhopal Vishwa Vidyalaya and others) and Misc. Petition No. 669 of 1976 (5. 5. Raghuwanshi v. Bhopal Vishwavidyalaya and others ). The three petitioners, namely, V. M. Vihite, M. H. Hashmi and s. S. Raghuwanshi, were all employed as Upper Division Clerk, Grade II, and were working in the examination section of the Registrars office in the bhopal University. By a common order dated 16-6-1975, the services of all these three petitioners were terminated. The petitioners challenge the termination of their service in this manner. ( 2. ) THE material facts in respect of these three petitioners are as under:-V. M. Vihite: On 16-3-1971, he was appointed temporarily until further orders as a Lower Division Clerk in the Bhopal University. On coming into force of the M. P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973, with effect from 5-5-1973, he was declared to be on probation on the post of lower Division Clerk with effect from 1-6-1973 for a period of one year. On 26-7-1973, he was promoted to officiate temporarily until further orders as Upper Division Clerk, Grade II. On 7-9-1974, his period of probation as Lower Division Clerk was extended until further orders. His service was terminated by the impugned order dated 16-6-1975. M. H. Hashmi: He was appointed temporarily until further orders as Lower Division Clerk in the Bhopal University on 8-1-1971. On coming into force of the M. P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973, he was declared to be on probation as Lower Division Clerk for a period of one year commencing on 1-3-1973. On 26-7-1973, he was promoted to officiate temporarily until further orders as Upper Division Clerk, grade II. On 28-2-1974, his period of probation as Lower Division Clerk was extended by another three months. On 7-9-1974, his period of probation was further extended until further orders. During the continuance of this probationary period, his service was terminated by the aforesaid common order dated 16-6-1975. S. S. Raghuwanshi: He was appointed temporarily until further orders as Lower Division Clerk in the Bhopal University with effect from 13-10-1970. He was promoted to officiate temporarily until further orders as Upper Division Clerk, Grade II on 14-7-1972. During the continuance of this probationary period, his service was terminated by the aforesaid common order dated 16-6-1975. S. S. Raghuwanshi: He was appointed temporarily until further orders as Lower Division Clerk in the Bhopal University with effect from 13-10-1970. He was promoted to officiate temporarily until further orders as Upper Division Clerk, Grade II on 14-7-1972. On coming into force of the M. P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973, he was declared to be on probation as Lower Division Clerk with effect from 1-3-1973 for a period of one year. This probationary period was extended by three months on 28-2-1974. On 7-9-1974, his probationary period as Lower division Clerk was further extended until further orders. During the period of probation, his service was terminated by the same order dated 16-6-1975. ( 3. ) THE contentions of Kumari Kanti Rao, who appears for the petitioners V. M. Vihite and S. S. Raghuwanshi, as well as the contentions of shri D. M. Dharmadhikari, who appears for the petitioner M. H. Hashmi, are the same. Their contentions are as under :- (1) In accordance with clause (5) (1) of Statute No. 31, framed under the M. P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973, the petitioners would be deemed to be confirmed Lower Division Clerks on the expiry of the period of three years from the date of their initial appointments which commenced on 16-3-1971, 13-10-1970 and 8-1-1971 respectively in the case of all these three petitioners. On this basis, they contend that they could not be treated merely as probationers to permit termination of their service. (2) Alternatively, even if the petitioners were mere probationers, the termination of their service was founded on misconduct and as such the impugned action was penal in nature, which could not be taken without holding a full-fledged prior enquiry and giving the petitioner an opportunity to defend themselves in the enquiry. (3) The enquiry, which was held in the case of the petitioners before terminating their service by the impugned order dated 16-6-1975, did not satisfy the essential requirements of the principles of natural justice, which had to be followed in the absence of any express statutory provision regulating the procedure of an enquiry required to be held in such cases. ( 4. ) HAVING heard learned counsel, we are satisfied that these petitions must fail. ( 4. ) HAVING heard learned counsel, we are satisfied that these petitions must fail. Clause (5) (1) of Statute No. 31 is the foundation of the first contention advanced in support of these petitions. Clause (5) (I) lays down that ordinarily an appointment against a permanent post shall, in the first instance, be on probation for a period of two years, which period may be further extended, but in no case the total period of probation shall exceed three years. The result is that the total probation period of an appointment against a permanent post cannot exceed three years. In the case of these three petitioners, express orders were issued declaring them to be probationers and stating that in the case of V. M. Vihite, the period of probation commenced on 1-6-1973 and in the case of the other petitioners it commenced on 1-3-1973. Computing the period of probation from these dates, it is obvious that they had not completed the period of three years on 16-6-1975, when the impugned order, terminating their service, was passed. It is for this reason that the learned counsel contend that the period of probation commenced on the date of their initial appointments prior to the coming into force of the M. P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973. It is difficult to appreciate how the benefit of Statute No. 31, which was framed under the M. P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973, and which Statute came into force with effect from 4-5-1974 can be extended to the petitioners in the manner they claim. Moreover, clause (5) (I) is attracted where the appointment is against a permanent post. The orders of initial appointment in the case of all these three petitioners do not show that their appointment was against permanent posts and it was expressly stated therein that their appointment was purely temporary until further orders. There is nothing in the initial orders of appointment of any of these three petitioners to indicate that their appointment was against permanent posts. According to the contents of that order, their appointment was purely temporary and could be terminated at any time without giving prior notice. Even assuming that clause (5) of Statute No. 31 could have retrospective operation, the very first requirement of that clause is that the appointment should have been against a permanent post. According to the contents of that order, their appointment was purely temporary and could be terminated at any time without giving prior notice. Even assuming that clause (5) of Statute No. 31 could have retrospective operation, the very first requirement of that clause is that the appointment should have been against a permanent post. The petitioners have not shown that this requirement was satisfied in their case at any time prior to the order declaring them to be on probation since the specified date in 1973. We are, therefore, unable to accept the first contention for which there is no factual basis. This contention, therefore, fails and is rejected. ( 5. ) THE second contention also cannot be accepted. Admittedly, the impugned order dated 16-6-1975 ex facie is innocuous. It only says that the service of the employees named therein was terminated with immediate effect and that they would be paid one months salary in lieu of notice. There is nothing more stated in this order. The contents of the order, therefore, do not cast any stigma or visit these employees with any evil consequences. The order also does not give any indication that it is founded on any misconduct. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that even though the order ex facie is innocuous, but there is enough material to show that the only reason for making the order was the allegation of misconduct against the petitioners. For this reason, learned counsel have invited us to look into the other material in support of their contention. The first question, therefore, is whether it is permissible for us to embark on that enquiry. In our opinion, this is not permissible course for us to adopt. The test to be applied and the general principles to be followed in such cases were reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1976 SC 2547 . On a conspectus of the earlier decisions on the point, the general principle carved out from the earlier decisions was stated as under :- "the order to which exception is taken is ex facie an order of termination of service simpliciter. It does not cast any stigma on the respondent nor does it visit him with evil consequences, nor is it founded on misconduct. It does not cast any stigma on the respondent nor does it visit him with evil consequences, nor is it founded on misconduct. In the circumstances, the respondent could not invite the court to go into the motive behind the order and claim the protection of article 311 (2) of the Constitution. We therefore, agree with the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was in error in arriving at the finding that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment by probing into the departmental correspondence that passed between the superiors of the respondent overlooking the observations made by this Court in I. N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1967 MPLJ 481 = (1967)2s C R 496=air 1967 SC l264. that when there are no express words in the impugned order itself which throw a stigma on the Government servant the Court would not delve into Secretariat files to discover whether some kind of stigma could be inferred on such research. " ( 6. ) THE above extract from the decision in Ramchandras case (supra} clearly shows that where the order ex facie is- innocuous, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the motive behind the order and for that purpose delve into the record to discover the same. It has been clearly laid down that where the order ex facie is an order of termination simpliciter, no further enquiry by the Court is contemplated for the purpose of discovering the motive which led to the making of the order. Applying the law laid down in Ramchandras case, we find that the impugned order dated 16-6-1975 being ex facie an innocuous order, any further enquiry as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioners is totally shut out. ( 7. ) LEARNED counsel lor the petitioners contended that notwithstanding the decision in Ramchandras case (supra), it is open to this Court to examine the other materia) pertaining to the case in order to see whether the termination of the petitioners service, even though ostensibly by an innocuous order, was really for the purpose of punishing the petitioners. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the decision in Bishan lai v State of Haryana, AIR 1978 S C 363. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the decision in Bishan lai v State of Haryana, AIR 1978 S C 363. We are unable to read anything in Bishan Lals case (supra), which may water-down the law laid down by their Lordships in rani Chandras case. In Bishan Lals case it was pointed out that a summary enquiry held for the purpose of determining the suitability of a probationer did not vitiate the ultimate order terminating service during the probationary period and such termination of service could not be challenged on those facts on the basis that a fuller enquiry should have been held for that purpose. This in substance was the principle laid down in Bishan Lals case (supra ). It is reasonable to assume that if their Lordships intended to modify the law laid down by them in the earlier decision in Ram Chandras case, they would certainly have referred to Ram Chandras case and expressly said so. Moreover the Bench deciding Bishan Lals case was not a larger Bench than that which decided Ramchandras case. That is also a reason for inferring that there was no intention in Bishan Lals case to modify or supersede the law laid down in Ram Chandras case. We are, therefore, unable to accept the suggestion of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Bishan Lals case modifies the law laid down in Ram Chandras case. It was contended by kumari Kanti Rao that notwithstanding the decision in Ram Chandras case, some High Courts have continued to hold that it is still open for them to delve into the record in order to see the background in which the termination of service simpliciter is made, even where the order ex facie is innocuous. It is sufficient for us to say that this is a thing expressly forbidden by the supreme Court in Ram Chandras case (supra) and for that reason alone we find ourselves unable to accept such a suggestion. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners also, therefore, fails and is rejected. ( 8. ) IN view of the above conclusions reached by us, no occasion arises to consider the third contention on merits. No discussion on that point is, therefore, called for. ( 9. ) CONSEQUENTLY the petitions fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. ( 8. ) IN view of the above conclusions reached by us, no occasion arises to consider the third contention on merits. No discussion on that point is, therefore, called for. ( 9. ) CONSEQUENTLY the petitions fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioners. Petitions dismissed.