ORDER Murlidhar, J. - This is a landlord's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arising out of an application for release under Section 16 of Act 13 of 1972. 2. The petitioner is residing on the first floor of a house the second floor of which has fallen vacant on account of acquisition of another house by the tenant Shanti Swaroop. The petitioner applied for release of the accommodation. Certain other persons applied for allotment of the same. It may also be mentioned that earlier the petitioner had applied under Section 21 for release of the premises but since during the pendency of the application the vacancy was notified those proceedings lapsed. The main ground on which the claim for release seems to have been pressed was that the petitioner and her husband were old having heart trouble and required the ground floor for their residence. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application mainly on the ground that her family consisted of only the couple and an adopted child and they had not shown that the accommodation on the first floor was insufficient. Also that they were not agreeable to vacate the first floor in case the ground floor was allotted to her on health grounds. The Additional District Judge dismissed the revision against this order mainly on the same grounds. 3. The first point pressed that the need of the petitioner was not properly considered by the authorities below is concluded by the finding of fact recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the revisional authority. No legal defect could be pointed out by the learned counsel in this finding. 4. It was, however, contended that the finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as well as the revisional order of the District Judge were vitiated by the illegality that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer permitted an applicant for allotment to file an objection to the petitioner's application and virtually accorded him the status of a contesting party allowing him to file an affidavit in support of the objection and also giving him an opportunity of addressing the Court. This is said to be contrary to Section 16(l)(b) the correct import of which is said to be that no opportunity is to be given to any applicant for allotment to file objection or lead evidence or of hearing while dealing with the landlord's application for release. 5. Section 16 (1) (b) after its amendment by U. P. Act 28 of 1976 runs as follows : "16. Allotment and release of vacant building: (1) Subject to the provisions of the Act, the District Magistrate may by order : (a) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (b) release the whole or any part of such building, or any land appurtenant thereto, in favour of the landlord (to be called a release order). Provided that in the case of a vacancy referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 12, the District Magistrate small give an opportunity to the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, of showing that the said section is not attracted to his case before making an order under clause (a). The argument is that the proviso specifically lays down the cases in which the opportunity to any other party is to be allowed to participate in the proceedings. In order to appreciate the controversy it will be proper to refer to Rule 13 which relates to release under Section 16 (1) (b). The former Rule 13(4) specifically barred applicants for allotment from participating in the release proceedings. It was as follows : "13. Application for release of vacant buildings. (Section 16(1) (b).- (1) .... .... (2) ... .... (3) ... .... (4) Every application under this rule shall, as far as possible, be decided within one month from the date of its presentation, and no allotment in respect of a building covered by an application under this rule shall be made unless such application has been rejected." Rule 13 was substituted with effect from 25th May 1977 by a new rule and this new rule does not contain any provision similar to rule 13 (4) or in any way bearing upon the right of the applicant for allotment to participate in the release proceedings. In Raghunandan Lal v. District Judge, 1978(2) R.C.J. 567, S.D. Agarwal, J., held that rule 13 (4) was not ultra vires of Section 16 and went on to observe that on vacation by tenant the property reverts to the landlord and the question whether it should be released or not is a question between the District Magistrate and the landlord and, therefore, even if rule 13(4) was not there "than too, in my opinion the out going tenant or the prospective allottee cannot have a right to object to the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord." In Ashok Kumar Misra v. District Judge and others, 1979(1) R.C.J. 321 the same learned Judge reiterated this view and held that deletion of rule 13(4) does not confer any right on the prospective allottee. Even so inasmuch as the Prescribed Authority had permitted the applicant for allotment to contest the release application, it was observed that he should be impleaded as a party to the revision filed by the landlord and the order of the District Judge rejecting the prayer of that applicant to be impleaded as a party was quashed. On the other hand, in Smt. Indrani Mehrotra v. Addl. District Judge, 1978 U.P.R.C.C. 515, K.C. Agarwal, J., took the view that after the amendment of Rule ?3 on 25th May 1977, and deletion of rule 13(4) "there is no bar contained either in any provision of the Act of the rules laying down that an applicant for allotment would have no right to contest an application for release." 5. With respect I am of the opinion that the question whether an applicant for allotment has a right to file an objection and participate in the proceedings for release is distinct from the question whether such participation where it has actually taken place would vitiate the release proceedings and the orders of the authorities concerned. Only a party or one having legally recognised present interest in the subject matter can have a right to object and participate. An applicant for allotment has no interest in the accommodation. The point which comes into the picture is when the accommodation is treated as vacant and open to allotment. This happens only if it is not released in favour of the landlord. An applicant for allotment has no interest in the accommodation. The point which comes into the picture is when the accommodation is treated as vacant and open to allotment. This happens only if it is not released in favour of the landlord. This principle has been incorporated in old rule 13(5) and present rule 13(4) which specifically directs that no allotment in respect of a building covered by a release application shall be made unless such application is rejected. There is, therefore, no difficulty in holding that the applicants for allotment cannot claim the right of file an objection, lead evidence or be heard in proceedings for release. However, while the applicant for allotment may have no right to participate in release proceedings, the District Magistrate has his powers under Section 16(2). Under the relevant part of this provision no release order under Section 16(l)(b) is to be made "unless the District Magistrate is satisfied that the building........is bona fide required....by the landlord for occupation by himself or for any member of his family......." This restriction on the right of release is to ensure that accommodation in the allotment pool is not withdrawn from it on flimsy grounds. The objection of the Act of 1972 is to provide in the interest of general public regulation of letting and rent and the eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situated in urban areas and for matters connected therewith. The District Magistrate's power of release is to subserve this object. Power to obtain material bearing on the landlord's claim of bona fide requirement is, therefore, an essential incident of the power under Section 16 (2) for without it the power would be illusory. Amongst others there is nothing to preclude the District Magistrate from obtaining material from the applicants for allotment who ultimately use the other persons likely to be affected by the release order under the scheme of the Act. It, therefore, seems that while these persons may have no right of their own, the District Magistrate is competent to permit any of them to file an objection. He can also permit such a person to file affidavits or other documentary evidence and may even provide an opportunity of hearing. It, therefore, seems that while these persons may have no right of their own, the District Magistrate is competent to permit any of them to file an objection. He can also permit such a person to file affidavits or other documentary evidence and may even provide an opportunity of hearing. All this, however, has to be for his own satisfaction for he can obviously feel more confident in deciding upon the bona fide requirement after having both sides of the picture. It follows that this power should be consciously and intelligently exercised and not converted into an opening for applicants for allotment to harass a landlord by participating in the release proceedings as contentants. This can only lead to quite undesirable results like blackmailing of the landlords. It is for the District Magistrate to strike the balance between the obtaining of the relevant information and evidence about the claim for release and not opening a door needless litigation by applicants for allotment. This being the position in a case where the objection, affidavits or arguments have been entertained in release proceedings on behalf of an applicant for allotment without any objection at that stage by the landlord, the participation can be sustained on the ground of implied permission of the District Magistrate dealing with the matter. Ordinarily such participation cannot vitiate the proceedings for it is calculated to help the District Magistrate in the decision on the release application by providing him relevant date. The present case is also one where no exception was taken to the admission of the objection, evidence or arguments by the applicant for allotment before the District Magistrate. This participation therefore, cannot in any way vitiate the proceedings and the petitioner cannot be allowed to make any grievance of it. 6. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. The interim order dated 30-11-1977 is vacated. Parties to bear their own costs.