JUDGMENT This is an application under section 4 [c] of the Bihar Consolidation of Holding and Prevention or Fragmentation Act, 1956 [Bihar Act, no. 22 or 1956] (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The prayer made by the appellants who are some of the defendants in the action is to the effect that this appeal as well as the suit in respect of Schedule 1 properties should be held to have abated under toe provisions of Section 4 [c] of the Act. 2. Admitted facts are these. The sole plaintiff, who is respondent no. 1, Instituted Title Suit no. 262 of 1973 on 18.1.1972 in the court of learned Subordinate Judge, Jehanabad. The relief’s sought in the suit were for a declaration of title, recovery of possession and mesne profits in respect of properties set out fully in Schedules 1 and 2 of the plaint. Admittedly the suit was decreed in respect of Schedule 2 properties on the basis of compromise with the consent of the parties concerned. The appellants were not concerned so far as Schedule 2 properties were concerned. The subject matter of this appeal, therefore, does not embrace Schedule 2 properties and so far as this appeal is concerned, we are not in seisin of the matter relating to Schedule 2 properties. The application under section 4 [c] of the Act, therefore, it is obvious, must be considered to relate only to the properties covered by Schedule 1 to tile plaint. 3. As already stated earlier, the suit was instituted on 18.1.72 during the pendency of the suit, admittedly again a notification order section 3 of the Act, was issued on 11.9.75 covering Schedule I properties. The suit has been decreed on 2.9.73, i.e. while the proceedings under the Act, had already commenced in respect of Schedule 1 properties. It is in this background that while passing the application under section 4 [c] of the Act, learned Counsel for the appellants. Mr. Lakshman Saran Sinha makes a prayer that this Court should hold that the suit itself in relation to Schedule 1 properties has abated under the provisions of section 4 (c) of the Act. It is in this background that while passing the application under section 4 [c] of the Act, learned Counsel for the appellants. Mr. Lakshman Saran Sinha makes a prayer that this Court should hold that the suit itself in relation to Schedule 1 properties has abated under the provisions of section 4 (c) of the Act. 4 The relevant portion of section 4 [e] of the Act, reads as follows : “Every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding stands abated.” 5. This is followed by quite a number of provision with which we are not concerned. It is evident that the suit being one for declaration of title, recovery of possession and mesne profits in respect or Schedule 1 properties the provision of section 4 [c] of the Act, is attracted since admittedly during the pendency of the suit there was commencement of consolidation proceeding by issuance of notice under section 3 of the Act. 6. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff respondent no. 1 very vehemently urged that the suit cannot be held to have abated because there is no suit which can be said to be pending today. The argument of the learned Counsel for respondent no. 1 is that once a suit is decided and the decree passed when the suit is the subject matter of appeal the appellate court cannot hold that the suit has abated in view of section 4 [c] of the Act, because there cannot be said to be a suit, which is pending on the date when the appellate Court may pass an order to that effect. 7. It was further urged by the learned Counsel that the decree which has now become executable cannot be held to have abated. 7. It was further urged by the learned Counsel that the decree which has now become executable cannot be held to have abated. This submission is again based upon a greater fallacy, for if the decree were to be put in execution is cannot be held to be executable in view of the fact that the express language of the statute is that every proceeding in respect of declaration of right etc. shall stand abated and there can be no manner of doubt that "proceedings" also covers "execution proceedings". It is well settled authority that the appeal is only a continuation of the hearing of the suit apart from the well established principle of the appeal being continuation of the suit. If any authority is to be noted, one such decision of the Supreme Court will suffice for the purpose. Such a decision is that reported in Gorakh Nath V. H. N. Singh wherein the Supreme Court was seized with a matter arising out of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, (5 of 1954) and in appeal it was held by the Supreme Court accepting the preliminary objection of the defendants respondents that the suit had abated. In principle we do not see why any exception be taken to this. The powers of the appellate court ordinarily and generally and this is no exceptional case is co-terminus with those of the court of first instance. Any relief or order which could have been allowed or passed by the trial court can also be allowed or passed by the appellate court, with the powers of remand as contemplated by Order 41, Rule 25 and Order 41, Rule 27 and so on. There is, thus, no force in the contention of the plaintiff respondent no, 1 that all that this court can hold is that this appeal has abated and not that the suit has abated in respect of subject matter of this appeal also. 8. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent no. 1 placed reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Venkata Reddy V. Pethi Reddy and Dayawati V. Indrajit Both these cases, in our view instead of being in favour of plaintiff-respondent no. 1 are against his contention. In the case of Venkata Reddy (supra) the Supreme Court was considering die term "final decision" under proviso (1) to section 28-A of the Provincial Insolvency Act. 1 are against his contention. In the case of Venkata Reddy (supra) the Supreme Court was considering die term "final decision" under proviso (1) to section 28-A of the Provincial Insolvency Act. 1920 as amended in 1948 and it was being considered as to whether the preliminary decree for petition was final decision within the meaning of the provisions. In that context the Supreme Court held that in suits which contemplate making of two decrees a preliminary decree and a final decree the decree which would be executable would be the final decree, But the finality of the decree or decision does not necessarily depend upon its being executable. The Legislature in its wisdom had thought that the suits of certain types should be decided in stages and though the suit in such cases can be regarded as fully and completely decided only when final decree is made the decision of the court arrived at the earlier stage also has finality attached to it. We do not see why this principle can be brought in aid of the submission of the learned counsel for respondent no. 1. This instant case is not one in which the Legislature has contemplated the decree being passed in two stages. The suit is one for declaration of title recovery of possession and realization of mesne profit, simplicitor. There is no question of finality of the decree or the trial court in a suit like the instant one. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dayavati (supra) is rather contrary to what has been submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent no. 1 in that case the Supreme Court has held that if a statute speaks in language, which expressly or by clear intendment taken in even pending matters, the court of trial as well as the court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed and the court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the Court of first instance. The language of section 4 (c) of the Act, as we have noticed earlier expresses in unequivocal terms the intention of the legislature that from the date specified in the notification till the close of the consolidation operation every suit in respect of declaration of right or interest in any land lying in the area or for declaration or adjudication of interest and right in regard to which can or ought to be taken under this Act, shall stand abated. In such circumstances, when the statute speaks of the suit, which is pending to stand abated clearly embrace within its scope such an order being passed by an appellate court since the appellate court as already stated earlier, is entitled to pass such order as may have been legally palled by the trial Court. The notification under section 3 of the Act, admittedly having been issued and the proceeding under the Act, commenced during the pendency of suit the intention of the legislature was clear that the suit stood abated as from the date specified in the notification till the close of the consolidation proceedings. It is no one's case here that the consolidation operation has come to a close. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff respondent no. 1 also invited our attention to the fact that as in the case of Schedule 2 properties, so also in the case of Schedule 1 properties the matter has been decided according to the terms of compromise between the parties. We have stated at the outset that so far as Schedule 2 properties are concerned all the interested parties thereto have entered into a compromise resulting in a compromise decree. That compromise decree is not subject matter of appeal in this Court. As to whether in such circumstances the suit in respect or which property is covered by Schedule 2 can be said to have abated or not is wholly academic for us. In so far as Schedule 1 properties which are the subject matter of this appeal are concerned, suffice it to say that defendant appellants are challenging the legality and validity of the decree. It is not the case of the plaintiff-respondent no. 1 that this appeal is not maintainable. The matter may have been a little different if this appeal were held to be maintainable. It is not the case of the plaintiff-respondent no. 1 that this appeal is not maintainable. The matter may have been a little different if this appeal were held to be maintainable. In that event it is doubtful as to whether the appellate court would apply power exercisable by the Trial Court. But admittedly the present appeal is maintainable and there is nothing in law, either general or special precluding the exercise of appellate power by this court taking into consideration the statutory provisional which the Court below was enjoined to take notice of. 9. For the aforesaid reasons we are constrained to hold that this appeal as also the suit, out of which this appeal arises in so far as Schedule 1 lands are concerned, stands abated till the close of the consolidation operation. Order accordingly. Appeal and suit abated.