JUDGMENT - TULPULE R.D., J.: - This revesion application has been placed before us on the order of the single judge passed on 25th of August 1975, referring the question raised before him to the division bench, though no question as such had been specifically framed or referred to the division bench for its decision it is implicit in the matter making the reference that the question which was referred to the division bench for decision was whether in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, if a defence is raised by the defendant that he was a tenant, has the issue to be referred to the tenancy authorities. 2. We may incidentally mention that after the matter was placed for hearing before the division bench of this Court consisting of Dharmadhikari and Gadgil JJ., the division bench felt that as some important question of law were raised in the revision application which were of vital importance and likely to arise in many more matters, the matter should be decided by a larger bench. The revision application was then placed before a full bench consisting of Deshmukh, C. J. and Gadgil and Jamdar J J, when the full bench quashed the reference on the ground that it was not competent, and the division bench could decide all questions of importance which arise and therefore, referred the matter back to the division bench. That is how this matter has how been placed before us. 3. At the outset we may refer to one of the contentions which is raised by Mr. Choudhari that the suit out of which this revision application has arisen was not a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Mr. Choudhari contended that the recitals in the plaint have to be construed as a whole and if they are so construed then since the plaintiff has prayed in the plaint that he be awarded mesne profits and an enquiry into future mesne profits be directed, the suit is taken out of the ambit of section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. We have not allowed Mr. Choudhari to raise this contention before us, for the simple reason that the reference to a larger bench by the single Judge has proceeded on the footing that the suit was one under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. We have not allowed Mr. Choudhari to raise this contention before us, for the simple reason that the reference to a larger bench by the single Judge has proceeded on the footing that the suit was one under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Were this contention to be urged before the Single Judge and were to succeed, it is plain that no reference could have been made Incidentally we think that Mr. Choudhari is not well advised in raising this contention inasmuch as there is authority to the proposition that in a suit under section 6 (former section 9 of the Specific Relief Act) of the Specific Relief Act, relief of mesne profits or damages could be joined. An authority for this proposition may be found in the case Ram Parekh Bai(Dffendant) v. Sheodibai .Joti(plaintiff)1 I.L.R., Vol. XV, All. 384. 4. That takes us to the principal question which is agitated before us. The contentions raised by Mr. Choudhari, to put them briefly, are that a Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide all suits of a civil nature, excepting suits of which cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. A suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is a suit of a civil nature and therefore, cognizable by a civil Court. 5. Mr. Choudhari contended that therefore, in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act (former section 9) if a contention was raised by the defendant in regard to the nature of his claim to the property, that contention was required to be decided Further it was his contention that in the Civil Procedure Code there is no bar to the defendant from raising any particular plea. Where a plea is irrelevant or scurrilous or defamatory there is provision for striking out that plea or defence. Where a plea is irrelevant or scurrilous or defamatory there is provision for striking out that plea or defence. He, therefore, urged that as long as a plea was not struck off or declared to be irrelevant, and ordered to be expunged from the written statement, a Civil Court competent to decide a dispute of a civil nature was obliged to decide upon that dispute as a further part of the argument, it was his contention, that if the decision on such a specific plea raised by the defendant and not expunged is precluded from the cognizance and jurisdiction of the Civil Court and a certain particular forum is created as a Court or forum for determination of the plea, then the dispute has to come before that exclusive Court or forum. 6. In a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act which is analogous to section 9 of the former Specific Relief Act(hereinafter referred to as section 6 of the Specific Relief Act), where the defendant claims title in himself, he urged, would be entitled to defeat the plaintiffs claim for possession and must be allowed to do so He urged that it cannot be said that in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, a question as to the character and right of possession of defendant is not raised Of cannot be raised. In other words, Mr. Choudhari challenged the correctness of the decision in (Atmaram v. Prabhawatibai and others)2 1970 Mh.L.J., 806. It is this contention- which found favour with the learned Judge of the Single bench, causing the reference. The question, therefore, which we have to consider in this reference is, whether in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, for possession of agricultural lands, where the defendant claiming to be a tenant of such agricultural lands, raises a plea that he is a tenant and, therefore, entitled to protection of the relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act, the issue has to be referred to the Tenancy Court. 7. Before proceeding further we may state a few facts just to clear the ground for the purpose of understanding the controversy in this revision application. 7. Before proceeding further we may state a few facts just to clear the ground for the purpose of understanding the controversy in this revision application. The plaintiffs filed this suit claiming to be in possession of land survey No. 49, situate at village Jagjai, taluka Kelapur in Yeotmal district after the death of Janabai, the former owner of the land from March, 1967. The plaintiff claims that he has been in possession as hereof Janabai of the land in suit from March 1967 and cultivated the same for the years 1967-68, 1968.69 and 1969-70. It is his further case that he has been dispossessed by the defendants on 6-6-1970. He brought this suit on 24th of September 1970 i. e. within six months, and in paragraph 10 clearly referred to that fact so as to bring this suit within the terms of section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Actually in paragraph 13 he erroneously made a reference to section 9 of the former Specific Relief Act. He also made certain other statements and allegations in the plaint relating to the status of defendant No.2, who, he claimed was his employee. He also stated, though it was unnecessary for him to do so that Janabai had purported to transfer the lands in suit in favour of five persons namely (1) Mahadeo Domaji(2) Narayan Nagoji (3) Ramchandra Narayan (4) Ganpat Raoji and (3) Ruprao Mahadeo, and that the transfer was invalid, sham and a hollow transaction. 8. The defendants filed their written statement and amongst other contentions denied that the plaintiff was in possession in the years 1967- 68, to 1969-70 or that he was dispossessed on 6th June 1970. These contentions were squarely, therefore, within the ambit of section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. A further contention which was also raised by the defendants was that the defendants were the tenants of the land in suit having been let out to them by Ramchandra, one of the joint owners of this land in the year 1969-70 that the transfer by Janabai was valid. It was also his further contention that the alleged Nokarnama got from the defendant was in order to circumvent the provisions of the Tenancy Act. It was also his further contention that the alleged Nokarnama got from the defendant was in order to circumvent the provisions of the Tenancy Act. The plaintiff bad given to him his two lands on yearly lease in the year ]969-70 called Mohacha and Baraki of a different village and for that purpose executed the Nokarnama. That is how he explained the Nokarnama. 9. On these pleadings the learned Civil Judge, Kelapur raised a number of issues which, in our opinion, did not properly arise looking to the scope and ambit of the suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The only issues which really and properly arise in a suit of this kind are issues Nos. 1, 3 and 5 and of course the general issue No.9. Amongst the issues framed, however, issue No.5 and issue No.6 related to the defendants contention that he was a tenant of the suit land on account of a lease by Ramchandra, and his actual cultivation of the suit land from the year 1969-70. After the framing of the issues the defendant filed an application (Ex. 19) praying that issues Nos. 5 and 6 be referred to the tenancy authorities for determination. That was obviously an application under section 125 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Vidal bha Region) Act, 1958, as applied to the Vidarbha Region. The trial Court rejected that application and being aggrieved by that decision of the trial Court rejecting the application that the present revision application came to be filed. That is the genesis of the dispute before us 10. Turning now to the facts of the decision in Atmaram v. Prabhawatibai and others, with which we are in agreement, it will be seen that, that was a case which was also filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, though originally it was not so. Prabhawati had filed that suit claiming recovery of possession, having lost possession within six months prior to suit and had been dispossessed within that period by Atmaram, the applicant in that case. Similar contentions were raised by Atmaram. It appears that he was a tenant in respect of this land. However, he executed a document of surrender in favour of the landlord Dattatraya, the former landlord before the land in suit 1980 Mh.L.J ] PANDHARI V. MEERABAI 43 came to Prabhawatibai. Dattatraya and Prabhawatibai were husband and wife. Similar contentions were raised by Atmaram. It appears that he was a tenant in respect of this land. However, he executed a document of surrender in favour of the landlord Dattatraya, the former landlord before the land in suit 1980 Mh.L.J ] PANDHARI V. MEERABAI 43 came to Prabhawatibai. Dattatraya and Prabhawatibai were husband and wife. Dattatra)a there after partitioned the land after getting possession, and on 7th of December 1964, by the partition deed the land came to Prabhawatibiji. She claimed that she was in possession from that time till she was ultimately dispossessed somewhere in July 1966. Atmarams defence to the suit was similar like the defence in the present case. He also contended that the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 afforded him the necessary protection, and that since he was a tenant the question had to be referred to the tenancy authorities. Nain, J., before whom the revision application came, was of the view that in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, these questions are not involved and, therefore, the Civil Judge was right in not referring them to the tenancy Court. He observed :- “This is a suit of a summary nature only in the sense that no question of title is involved in it and no appell lies from the decision.” Referring to the contention raised before him that the question arises under section 125 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region). Act, 1958, be observed:- “Section 125 of the said Act provides that if any suit is instituted in any Civil Court which involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a revenue authority, the civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issue to the revenue authority. . . . . . . . . . . .. In this suit, there is no question whether the defendant No.1 was or was not a tenant. Even if the defendant No. 1 be a tenant he has no right to recover forcible possession from a person except by due process of law. . . . . . . . . . . .. In this suit, there is no question whether the defendant No.1 was or was not a tenant. Even if the defendant No. 1 be a tenant he has no right to recover forcible possession from a person except by due process of law. The only question for determination in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is whether the plaintiff was in possession within six months prior to the date of suit and whether the plaintiff has been dispossessed within that period.” . 11. It will thus be seen that notwithstanding that a question was raised by the defendant that he was a tenant under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, and the determination of which question was barred from the civil Court, the learned single Judge was of the opinion that in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, the question as to the title or status of a person did not arise and it was not required to be decided, the issue in his opinion was not involved as contemplated by section 125 of the Tenancy Act. . 12. We may now refer firstly to the provisions of section 6 of the Specific Relief Act :- “(1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immoveable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any possession claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof not with standing any other title may be set up in such suit. *** *** *** *** (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof.” 13. It may be seen that sub-section(l) lays down and prescribes the nature of a suit which can be brought under that section and also limits the questions which may be considered and gone into. The right to recover, therefore, is clearly dependant upon two factors. It may be seen that sub-section(l) lays down and prescribes the nature of a suit which can be brought under that section and also limits the questions which may be considered and gone into. The right to recover, therefore, is clearly dependant upon two factors. One, the plaintiff being in possession of immoveable property within a period of six months having been dispossessed without his consent Second that, that was done otherwise than in due course of law; Sub-section(1) also precludes determination of any question of title and says that the relief to the plaintiff, of possession would be granted notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such a suit. In other words, even if any title is set up in a suit of this kind that title for the purposes of the relief to be granted to the plaintiff who has brought his case within the first part of section 6, has to be given, whether his title is defective or the defendants title sufficient to defeat the claim of the plaintiff. In other words, where the plaintiff succeeds in showing that he was in possession of the immoveable property, and sues to recover possession within a period of six months from his dispossession by a suit, if he was dispossessed without his consent and otherwise than in due course of law, whatever title the defendant may have would be entitled to be placed in possession. A Court would, therefore, be precluded from considering the title of the defendant and any such claim by the defendant in such a suit, would be outside the pale of the controversy. Where the plaintiff does not succeed in establishing the first two aspects namely that he was in possession within six months and was dispossessed without his consent and otherwise than in due course of law, the plaintiff must fail. But where the plaintiff succeeds in proving these circumstances no other questions arise. The only question, therefore, which is involved under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, is the question of prior possession of the plaintiff and his dispossession without his consent and otherwise than in due course of law. 14. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, therefore, clearly limits the scope of the suit and also determines the questions which may be placed in controversy. 14. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, therefore, clearly limits the scope of the suit and also determines the questions which may be placed in controversy. It keeps the relative titles of parties intact and they are not affected by any decision which may be reached. Obviously section 6 of the Specific Relief Act provides a summary remedy to the plaintiff who is dispossessed and the intention of the Parliament is to place a person who has been wrongly dispossessed, back in his possession, who may have a title to possession or not. A recourse to forcible taking of possession from a person except by due process of law, even if he may have a superior or better title than the person in possession, the Legislature thinks is improper. It is a section providing or immediate relief, as, in the opinion of the Parliament it is necessary to do so, that persons who are in possession and dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law ought to be first placed in possession before any question as to their right to possession is decided. It must be borne in mind that sub-section(4) of sect ion 6 of the Specific Relief Act, reserves, protects and keeps those rights intact for a decision at later date in a subsequent proceeding. 15. Before going to the case to which reference has been made, we may advert to sections 124 and 125 of the Tenancy Act which have been the basis of the argument advanced before us. Section 124 of the Tenancy Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil Courts, and while so barring that jurisdiction confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Tahsildar to decide whether a person is a tenant. Section 124 of the Tenancy Act which bars the jurisdiction of the civil Courts, to settle, decide or deal with any question which by or under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, is required to be settled and decided by the Tahsildar. The question therefore, which arises in a suit before the civil Court, must be one which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with in that suit, the jurisdiction to decide, deal with or settle is conferred upon the Tahsildar. That is, therefore, a condition precedent for the attraction of sections 124 and 125 of the Tenancy Act. The question therefore, which arises in a suit before the civil Court, must be one which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with in that suit, the jurisdiction to decide, deal with or settle is conferred upon the Tahsildar. That is, therefore, a condition precedent for the attraction of sections 124 and 125 of the Tenancy Act. Where such question does not arise or is not required to be decided even if raised, on account of the peculiar nature of the suit, no question of the bar of jurisdiction will arise. Section 125 provides that if a question which is under the provisions of the Tenancy Act required to be decided, dealt with or settled by the Tahsildar is involved in the suit, then it shall refer those issues to that authority. It is implicit, therefore, that the questions must be involved in the suit before they can be referred to the authority. A question involved is not to be confused with a question raised. A contention may be raised by a party. But its determination is not involved in the suit either on account of its nature or on account of his limitations placed by the Statute upon the nature of the suit as in a suit under section of the Specific Relief Act. Mr. Chaudhary wants to identify questions raised with questions involved. 16. A provision similar to section 125 of the Born bay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Vidarbha Act) did not occur in the earlier tenancy legislation. On the other hand, a provision similar to section 124 occurred in the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1948 in favour of section on 85. This led to a number of difficulties. Before the Legislature stepped in by enacting section 85-A, this Court in a decision in (Dhondi Tukaram v. Dadoo Piraji and others)3A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 100, indicated as to what must be done and how the civil Court should proceed and also expressed the hope that the Legislature would enact the necessary Legislature. This view was duly taken note of and section 85-A came to be enacted. 17. 100, indicated as to what must be done and how the civil Court should proceed and also expressed the hope that the Legislature would enact the necessary Legislature. This view was duly taken note of and section 85-A came to be enacted. 17. It will be seen, therefore, either from section 125 of the Vidarbha Act, which is directly applicable and pressed into service in this case, section 85-A of the Bombay Act had provided that where the issues required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a competent authority appointed under the Bombay Act was involved in the suit, then only the civil Court would make a reference to that competent authority. The question which is to be answered in the present case is whether in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, on the allegations specified in sub-section 1 of that section any question as to title or status of a defendant as a tenant is involved or not. We think that the question must be positively answered in the negative. 18. Mr. Choudhary appearing for the defendant-applicant referred us to the Full Bench decision reported in (Kashiram Shriram Doble v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal at Nagpur and another}4 1970Mh.L.J. 462=A.I.R. 1970 Bom. 366, and in particular the observations at the Full Bench in para 18. Those abservations are to the following effect and while dealing with the conflict of jurisdictions under section 120 of the Vidarbha Act. “The mere raising of the plea would not, as in the case at a civil matter must the jurisdiction. The Collector will have to load to the substance of the matter and decide whether the dispute is regarding anaesthetised occupative or wrongful possession,” 19. Mr. Chaudhary contended that in view of the Fun Bench observations quoted above that mere raising of the plea would must the jurisdiction at the civil Court, and a plea which is required to be dealt with, decided or settled under the provisions at the Tenancy Act if raised in a Civil Suit, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is ousted by the mere raising of the plea. He therefore, urged that since the defendant has raised the plea, his mere raising at the plea would aust the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide, deal with or settle that question. He therefore, urged that since the defendant has raised the plea, his mere raising at the plea would aust the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide, deal with or settle that question. As we have pointed out, it is implicit in any such view that the issue must have been involved. And as we have painted out, in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act; no such issue is involved. The Full Bench was also not directly concerned with the question which has been raised in the present case. There, the question which was raised before the Full Bench was as to the limited scape of the jurisdiction of the tenancy authorities under section 100 and an under section 120 of the Vidarbha Act. The question was in regard to the conflict of the jurisdictions conferred under section 120 of the Vidarbha Act, upon the Collector, and that conferred under section 100 upon the tenancy authorities like the Tahsildar. In a case under section 120, the question was whether the Sub-Divisional Officer or the Collector before wham a plea is raised that the defendant was a tenant, was competent to decide that question, in view of the provisions of section 100 of the said Act, or if he was not so competent, the procedure which he must fallow. The Full Bench dealt with that question and answered that the Collector or the Sub-Divisional Officer will have to see the substance at the dispute, he felt that the person is in unauthorised occupation or wrongful possession, then he could decide the matter. On the other hand, if in his opinion, the substance at the matter related to a dispute regarding the tenancy he will have to refer the matter to the Tahsildar. But the Full Bench was also clear in pointing aut that a mere raising at the contention that he was a tenant will not be sufficient to aust the jurisdiction of the Collector. We do not think that the above observation can be read divorced from its can text. It was apparently made to emphasise the distinction and difference in the impact of the provisions upon the jurisdiction of the Collector. Mr.Chaudhary we think is attempting to enlarge the scape of the observation beyond its setting which we think is not permissive. . 20. Mr. It was apparently made to emphasise the distinction and difference in the impact of the provisions upon the jurisdiction of the Collector. Mr.Chaudhary we think is attempting to enlarge the scape of the observation beyond its setting which we think is not permissive. . 20. Mr. Chaudhary then referred to the decision reported in Dhondi Tukaram v. Dadoo Piraji and others, in which the question was first settled before the enactment of section 85-A. In that case the suit was filed far passession against defendants Nos. 1 to 3 claiming that defendants 1 and 2 were trespassers, while defendant No. 3 was a tenant. Defendants 1 and 2 claimed that they were Mirasdars ar permanent tenants. Their plea was rejected and the Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, which decree was challenged. It was then contended that the question which was raised by the defendants that they were tenants was a question which was exclusively triable by the Special Court and a forum contemplated under the Tenancy Act and the civil Courts jurisdiction was barred. It was held that the civil Court will have no jurisdiction to deal with the plea. It is clear that no relief in that suit could be granted to the plaintiffs without dealing with the plea of the defendants that they were tenants. It follows, therefore, that if determination of a plea is necessary for the disposal of the suit and the plea raised it only cognizable by a special forum, then it is that special forum which alone can decide and deal with that plea. In the present case, as we have pointed out under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, in a suit under that section the question as to the status and title of the defendants is irrelevant and is not required to be dealt with by the Civil Court while dealing with the suit. We think that the matters which could be considered by a civil Court in a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act are limited by the section itself. That section also at the same time excludes from the consideration of the civil Court any question in regard to title, which may be raised. Therefore, if a plea is raised on the basis of title, the Court is entitled and bound to ignore that plea for the purposes of such a suit. That section also at the same time excludes from the consideration of the civil Court any question in regard to title, which may be raised. Therefore, if a plea is raised on the basis of title, the Court is entitled and bound to ignore that plea for the purposes of such a suit. If that is so, then it is clear that the question does not arise or is required to be dealt with, decided or settled by the civil Court. It is only such questions which are required to be decided, dealt with or settled, if they arise and the jurisdiction to do so is barred and conferred upon other authorities that the civil Courts jurisdiction is taken a way. Where such a question does not fall for settlement, decision or being dealt with, before a civil Court, the question really does not arise. 21. Mr. Choudhary, learned counsel for the applicant relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his contention that whenever such a question is raised or pleaded by a party to the suit, then that question can only be decided by the Courts which have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with and decide those questions. The first of these decisions is reported in (Bhimaji Shankar Kulkarni v. Dundappa Vithappa Udapudi and another)5 A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 166. and the other in (Gundaji Smwaji Shinde v. Ramchandra Bhikaji Joshi)6 1979 Mh.L.J. 283. We do not think that the propositions which are relied upon in those cases are, in any way attracted to the controversy which is present before us. In both the cases upon which Mr. Choudhari relied, an issue which was required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a competent authority under the Tenancy Act arose. The jurisdiction of the civil Court to settle, decide or deal with the same was not only ousted but the civil Court was under a statutory obligation to refer the issue to the competent authority. In Bhimaji Shankar Kulkarni v. Dundappa Vithappa Udapudi, the decision in dhondi Tukaram v. Dadoo Piraji and others, referred to above(supra) was referred and followed. We would, however, refer to some of the observations of the Supreme Court in Bhimajis case (cited supra). In Bhimaji Shankar Kulkarni v. Dundappa Vithappa Udapudi, the decision in dhondi Tukaram v. Dadoo Piraji and others, referred to above(supra) was referred and followed. We would, however, refer to some of the observations of the Supreme Court in Bhimajis case (cited supra). It says:- “Section 85.A proceeds upon the assumption that though the Civil Court has otherwise jurisdiction to try a suit, it will have no jurisdiction to try an issue arising in the suit, if the issue is required to be settled decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar or other competent authority under the Tenancy Act.” Section 125 of the Vidarbha Act is modelled on section 85-A of the Bombay Act on the basis of which the present application was preferred. As we have pointed out the issues which were sought to be referred to the Tenancy authorities are not involved in the suit and, therefore, there is no question at attracting the principles to the case before us. 22. We think, we are fortified in the view which we have taken by a full bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in (Yar Muhammad and another v. Lakshmi Das and others)7 A.I.R. 1959, All. There, the question arose under section 242 of the U. P. Tenancy Act which barred certain kinds of suits from being taken cognizance of by a Civil Court. Though the section is not pari materia with section 85 or 124 of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, the purport of the section and its object was clearly “to keep the revenue Court as the only forum, in which all disputes relating to agricultural land should be triable.” In that case the suit was also filed under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act by the plaintiff claiming that he was in actual possession and was wrongfully dispossessed. The defendant claimed to be tenant like what is claimed in the present case. Plaintiffs were land-holders and in terms of the 4th Schedule of the Act their suit could be properly filed for a relief under the Tenancy Act in a Revenue Court. It was contended that the suit filed by the plaintiff was one which could also be filed under section 180 or 183 of the U. P. Tenancy Act and therefore, by reason of the 4th Schedule cognizable only by the Special Court. It was contended that the suit filed by the plaintiff was one which could also be filed under section 180 or 183 of the U. P. Tenancy Act and therefore, by reason of the 4th Schedule cognizable only by the Special Court. The Full Bench, therefore, considered the question as to whether the suit of the plaintiff in respect of which the material allegations were those under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act was of the nature contemplated under section 180 or 183 of the U. P. Tenancy Act or otherwise. The Full Bench observed:- “In an ordinary suit of that kind if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing his title as well as possession, he is bound to succeed. Even if he is unable to prove his title he can succeed on the basis of prior possession alone. But the suit can easily be defeated if the defendant succeeds in proving a good title in himself or another. In that case the presumption in favour of the plaintiff is displaced .....................................In such a suit, therefore, the title of both the parties can be brought in issue and can be considered by the Court. A suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act is, however, an entirely a different kind of action.” The Court then proceeded to consider what were the essentials and the basis of a relief in a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, and pointed out that the restoration of possession in such a suit is, however, always subject to a regular title suit, and the person who has the real title or even the better title cannot, therefore, be prejudiced in any way by a decree in such a suit. The contention that a decree in such a suit will be easily defeated by a regular suit filed by the defendant, was also considered. We may mention that in the order referring this revision application to the Division Bench, the learned Single Judge also observed “Similarly such a defendant can move the tenancy authorities and obtain declaration which would render the decree made without reference, nugatory.” The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court nevertheless held that “the only course that will be open to the wrong door was, therefore, to hand back possession and then if he can take it back by establishing his own title. A Court cannot, therefore, refuse to entertain a suit under section 9 simply on the pretext of discouraging multiplicity of litigation.” This decision of the Allahabad High Court was specifically approved and confirmed by the Supreme Court in its later decision reported in (Lallu Yashwant Singh(dead) by his legal representative v. Rao Jagdish Singh and others)8 A.I.R. 1968, S.C. 620. In that case also, a similar question had arisen under section 326 of Qanoon Mai read with section 163 of Qanoon Ryotwari as was applicable in the former Gwalior State. This section also provided that if a plaintiff was dispossessed from his prior juridical possession, within six months of the suit, then he is entitled to recover possession and in such a suit questions of title are irrelevant. The Supreme Court observed under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, it is well settled that question of title is irrelevant in a suit under that section. As the structure of section 326 of Qanoon Mal, is similar to section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, there is no reason why section 326 should be interpreted differently. “Interpreting, therefore, the relevant provisions like section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, the Supreme Court pointed out”. The Indian Legislature has, however, provided for the summary removal of anyone who dispossess another, whether peaceably or otherwise than by due course of law. Their Lordships also affirmed the statement of law in this connection by the Full Bench of the Allababad High. Court reported in Yar Muhammad and another v. Lakshmi Das and others (cited supra) as also the observations of Hun. Mr. Chagla, C. J. In (Brigadier K. K. Verma and Another v. Union of India and another)9 A.I.R. 1954, Born. 358, that:- “Under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant may sue for possession against his landlord if the landlord deprives him of possession otherwise than in due course of law, but a trespasser who has been thrown out of possession cannot go to Court under section 9 and claim possession against the true owner”. We are, therefore, satisfied on consideration of all aspects of the matter raised before us that the decision of Hon. Nain, J., reported in Atmaram v. Prabhawalibai, needs no reconsideration and was correctly decided. The revision application fails and is dismissed with costs. Revision application dismissed. -----