JUDGMENT : A.N. Verma, J. These two second appeals can be disposed off by a common judgment as they involved an identical question. The courts below have alto disposed off the suits giving rise to the aforesaid appeals by a common judgment. These appeals are by one Harnam Singh, who was Defendant in Original Suit No. 196 of 1969 filed by the Respondent Amarnath Ahuja aganinst him for ejectment from a plot No. B-15 situate in the Town Area of Rudrapurand Plaintiff in a suit being Suit No. 317 of 1968 which he had filed against the Respondent Amarnath Ahuja for permanent injunction restraining the latter from interfering with the possession of Harnam Singh over the same plot The trial court decreed the suit No. 317 of 1968 and dismissed suit No. 196 of 1969. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court in the two suits, the Respondent Amarnath Ahaja filed two appeals. Both these appeals have been allowed. The suit of Harnam Singh has been dismissed and that of Amarnath Ahuja decreed. Hence these two second appeals by Harnam Singh. 2. Suit No. 317 of 1968 was filed with the assertion that Harnam Singh was in possession over the plot in dispute having purchased it from one Topan Ram. In the alternative, it was asserted that Harnam Singh had prescribed title by adverse possession. The defence of Amarnath Ahuja in the suit was that the plot in question had been leased out by the State Government to one Sri Sheo Narain Garg who had sold the same to Defendant Amarnath Ahuja and that Amarnath Ahuja had been coming down in possession over the land in dispute. In suit No. 196 of 1969 filed by Amarnath Ahuja against Harnam Singh for possession over the land in dispute, it was asserted that the land in dispute had been acquired by Amarnath Ahuja from Sheo Narain Garg aforesaid, who was a lessee of the land in dispute from the Government. This suit was contested by Harnam Singh on the ground on which his own suit was founded. 3. The two suits were consolidated and tried together. They have also been disposed off by common judgments by both the courts below. The learned Munsif came to the conclusion that Harnam Singh bad not proved his title over the land in dispute. He had perfected his rights by adverse possession. 3. The two suits were consolidated and tried together. They have also been disposed off by common judgments by both the courts below. The learned Munsif came to the conclusion that Harnam Singh bad not proved his title over the land in dispute. He had perfected his rights by adverse possession. In view of these findings, the suit of Harnam Singh was decreed and that of Amarnath Ahuja dismissed. In the two appeals filed by Amarnath Ahuja, the lower appellate court has held that Harnam Singh has failed to establish that he bad acquired right by adverse possession. It has further held that there is valid transfer by sale in favour of Amarnath Ahuja from Sheo Narain, who was a lessee of the land in dispute from the government. On these findings, the lower appellate court reversed the decree of the trial court, decreed the suit of Amarnath Ahuja and dismissed that of Harnam Singh. Learned Counsel appearing for Harnam Singh in the two appeals has contended that the lower appellate court has erred in law in taking the view that the transfer in favour of Amarnath Ahuja was not void. He urged that, inasmuch as, under Clause 8 of the lease deed executed in favour of Sheo Narain, there was a prohibition against the transfer of the lease (property without the permission of the Deputy Administrator, the transfer of the land in favour of Amarnath Ahuja was void abinitio, there being admittedly no permission from the Deputy Administrator. Learned Counsel further submitted that under the Government Grants (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1960, the terms of a lease executed on behalf of the government have the force of a statute and any breach of the terms must be construed as breach of a statutory provision. That being so, learned Counsel contended the transfer in favour of Amarnath Ahuja must be treated as void and not merely voidable at the instance of the government. 4. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that the lower appellate court is right in its judgment that the transfer in favour of Amarnath Ahuja was not void. 5. 4. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that the lower appellate court is right in its judgment that the transfer in favour of Amarnath Ahuja was not void. 5. In order to appreciate the controversy it is necessary to reproduce here the terms of clauses 8 & 9 of the lease deed which have been the subject of interpretation by the lower appellate court and which has a direct bearing on the issue involved. Clause B of the lease in question runs as follows: That the lessee will not, except with the provious permission of the Deputy Administrator assign to any person to said premises hereby demised or any part thereof, but no such permission shall be granted unless the arrears of rent and other dues accruing under these presents have been paid up by the lessee. The proviso to Clause 9 runs as under: Provided always ... if there shall be any breach or non-observance by the lessee of any of the covenants herein contained or ... it shall be lawful for him to enter upon the demised premises and resume possession thereof. 6. Construing the aforesaid terms, the lower appellate court concluded that the mere fact that the permission of the Deputy Administrator had not been obtained does not have the legal effect of rendering the transfer void ab-initio. The proviso to Clause 9 lays down the consequence of the breach of a term of the lease. It says that in the event of any breach or non observance of any terms by the lessee it shall be lawful for the government to enter into the demised premises and to resume possession thereof. The breach of term of the lease, in my judgment only gives an option to the government to resume the demised premises. This is the only consequence of the permission of the Deputy Administrator not having been obtained before the transfer of the leased property. In my view, the lower appellate court is right in construing the terms of the lease in arriving at the conclusion that the transfer in favour of Amar Nath Ahuja was not void. 7. Learned Counsel placed reliance on a decision of this Court reported in 1969 ALJ 612. In my view, the lower appellate court is right in construing the terms of the lease in arriving at the conclusion that the transfer in favour of Amar Nath Ahuja was not void. 7. Learned Counsel placed reliance on a decision of this Court reported in 1969 ALJ 612. In this case, a Bench of this Court was considering the effect and legal implications of agreement between management committees of colleges and teachers at the time of their appointment executed in pursuance of the Agra University Act and the statutes framed thereunder. The Division Bench came to the conclusion that where an agreement is entered into between the committee of management and a teacher under the compulsive force of a statute incorporating the terms prescribed by the statutes themselves, the agreement ceases to be a simple agreement reached between the parties by their free will. Such an agreement and the terms thereof had the force of law and they have statutory flavour. This case is clearly distinguishable. The lease which I am called upon to interpret in the present case is not a lease which has been executed under the force of any enactment or any other provision having the force of law. The terms of such a lease therefore cannot in my opinion be equavated with the provisions of a statute. 8. Learned Counsel for the Appellant also placed reliance on Sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Government Grants (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1960, which reads as follows: (3) Certain lease made by or on behalf of the Government to take effect according to their tenor-All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any such creation, conferment or grant referred to in Section 2, shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor any decree or direction of a court of law or any rule of law, statute or enactment of the legislature, to the contrary notwithstanding; Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent, or be deemed ever to have prevented, the effect of any enactment relating to the acquisition of property, land reforms or the imposition of ceiling on agricultural land. 9. In my view these provisions do not lead to the conclusion that a lease of land executed by the government have the force of law. 9. In my view these provisions do not lead to the conclusion that a lease of land executed by the government have the force of law. These provisions only lay down that leases made by or on behalf of the government shall take effect according to their tenor. These provisions are, therefore, of no assistance to the learned Counsel for the Appellant. 10. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the transfers made in favour of Respondent Amarnath Ahuja was not void. The Appellant Harnam Singh has certainly no right to question the validity of that transfer. 11. As regards the finding of the lower appellate court that the Appellant has not succeeded in establishing that he had acquired title by adverse possession, the learned Counsel for the Appellant was unable to point out any error, whether of fact or of law in it. 12. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that both these appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.